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At the height of the so-called “refugee crisis” during the summer of 
2015, the Austrian Student Organization Österreichische Hochschülerschaft 
organized a demonstration outside the main Austrian government’s refugee 
camp, Traiskirchen, in Lower Austria. The students, supported by the NGO 
Neue Linkswende, protested under the heading, “United We Stand for 
Refugee Rights in Traiskirchen.” Traiskirchen Refugee Camp, located 20 
kilometers south of Vienna, was formerly used for military barracks and an 
officer training center that had been re-opened in the 1950s to accommo-
date refugees coming to Austria during Cold War crises in the Communist 
Bloc (Hungary in 1956/57, Czechoslovakia in 1968/69, Poland in 1981/82, 
GDR and Romania in 1989/90). In the summer of 2015, Traiskirchen was 
overcrowded with refugees who had made it through the Balkans and even-
tually arrived in Austria. The iconic refugee camp was in the Austrian news 
all summer. The demands of the protesters gathering outside that camp 
on July 26, 2015 are clearly outlined in the banners they carried in the 
picture on the cover of this volume. Refugees were asking for their basic 
human needs being met: passports and the right to transfer through Austria 
to places beyond (Germany, Sweden), and decent food and living condi-
tions. One poster also said, “Muslims and Refugees are Welcome Here!,” 
referencing what became known that summer as the “culture of welcome” 
(“Willkommenskultur”). This, interestingly, was the Austrian “word of the 
year” in 2015; the “ugly phrase of the year,” on the opposite side, was “I am 
not a racist, but …”. In Germany, it was “Flüchtlinge” (“refugees”), while 
the “sentence of the year” was Angela Merkel’s phrase “Wir haben so vieles 
geschafft—wir schaffen das!” (“We have managed again and again—we can 
do it!”). 
Austria, of course, did not become a “migration society” overnight 
in 2015. Austrians have long ignored the fact that the country has been 
changing enormously after World War II as a result of a continuous influx 
of migrants. The turning point in postwar Austrian history came in the 
1960s, with the beginning of organized recruitment of foreign laborers 
from Turkey and Yugoslavia. But a longer history needs to be kept in mind 
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to understand and contextualize these postwar Austrian developments. 
There is the complex history of the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire and 
its internal migration: millions of people moved from Bohemia, Moravia, 
Silesia, and Galicia to the expanding capital city of Vienna. This internal 
migration segued into overseas emigration, mostly to the United States. 
In the four decades before World War I, as many as four to five million 
people left the Habsburg Empire. As in today’s Vienna, as early as 1840, the 
population was composed of 40% “foreigners.” The discussion after the end 
of World War I and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire revolved around 
who to admit as citizens to the newly formed Republic of Austria and who 
to exclude. 
An Austrian history of migration also needs to consider the grim 
chapter of forced labor (“Zwangsarbeit”) during the Nazi period. The Nazis 
put to work 15 million slave laborers in Germany and all over occupied 
Europe during World War II; around three million of them perished. In 
the fall of 1944, around one million slave laborers worked on the territory 
that is Austria today. The history of millions of Displaced Persons (DPs), 
refugees, and German ethnic expellees (“Vertriebene”) has been also part and 
parcel of Austrian migration history after the end of World War II. And 
there are also hundreds of thousands of Cold War refugees from Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland that mostly used Austria as a transfer point 
(only a few thousand stayed) who need to be considered. 
In 2015 Austria had an all-time high in-migration of ca. 110,000 peo-
ple—more than in the early 1990s when Austria accepted tens of thou-
sands of refugees from “the Yugoslav Wars.” 88,340 applications for asylum 
(“international protection”) were filed in 2015. Austria was the third largest 
recipient of asylum seekers in the European Union and allowed more than 
800,000 refugees to transit the country. It was civil society and its “welcom-
ing culture” that managed the so-called “refugee crisis,” much more so than 
an apathetic political class. Pressured by a xenophobic and nativist popular 
press, Austrian politicians reacted by pondering a cap for asylum applica-
tions, including the proclamation of a state of emergency for the whole 
country. Some Austrian politicians, following the example of Australia, 
where refugees are put into camps on offshore islands, have been suggesting 
“concentration camps” on Greek islands, North Africa, or the Caucasus for 
people on the move to Europe.
Similar to other countries in the European Union (and the United 
States), the ongoing “refugee crisis” has produced a populist political back-
lash. Ever since the 1990s, the nativist Austrian “Freedom Party” (FPÖ) has 
been dictating the domestic agenda on limiting the number of immigrants/
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asylum seekers with its xenophobic, anti-immigrant discourse. During the 
recent Austrian Presidential election, FPÖ candidate Norbert Hofer ran a 
strong second with 47 percent of the vote. In the past few years, the FPÖ 
has consistently been the strongest party in public opinion polls all over 
Austria. A national federal election is scheduled for the fall of 2017. The 
governing Socialist-Conservative SPÖ-ÖVP “grand coalition” has tried to 
coopt the anti-immigrant public mood to stay competitive in this shrill 
nativist national public discourse. It remains to be seen how these migration 
and societal diversity issues will be addressed in the next national election. 
It would be a surprise if they did not dominate the political landscape, given 
the staunch anti-Muslim racism that has been proffered and introduced 
into the public discourse by the populist right-wing FPÖ. 
Austria is not alone in the Western world in facing such a growing 
anti-immigrant consensus. This comes at a time when, according to the 
United Nations Refugee Agency, an astounding 65.3 million refugees are 
on the move worldwide, leaving their troubled home countries behind. 
1.3 million applied for asylum in the European Union in 2015. In the 
United States, some eleven million undocumented immigrants defined the 
2016 presidential election campaign. The new populist administration of 
President Donald Trump is trying to remove these undocumented immi-
grants from the U.S. and is stirring up fears about “radical Islamic terror-
ism,” suggesting to the American people a strong linkage between what 
some people call “illegal migrants,” terrorism, and national security, while 
also proffering openly anti-Muslim sentiments. 
Given this populist, xenophobic, and highly emotionalized anti-immi-
gration political environment in the West, it is hard to make the rational 
voices of scholars heard when it comes to migration and diversity issues. 
Scholars do not pretend to have easy answers and quick fixes at hand. They 
insist on measured and differentiated approaches to migration, including 
the complex and deep historical contexts of the continuous movement of 
people due to political (conflicts and wars), economic (globalization), and 
increasingly environmental changes. Dealing with and accepting immi-
gration as a continuous historical force means embracing diversity in our 
societies. Making migrants visible in our historical master narratives is a 
prerequisite for recognizing social diversity in society and giving newcom-
ers opportunities to participate. Migration research and scholarship must 
therefore guard itself against accepting the prevailing public discourses that 
are deeply mired in highly problematic presumptions about “integration” of 
migrants and imagined images of refugees always “drowning” in metaphors 
of water, natural disasters, and threats (“flood,” “tsunami,” etc.). 
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This interdisciplinary volume offers methodologically innovative 
approaches to Austria’s coping with issues of migration past and present. 
These essays show Austria’s long history as a migration country. Austrians 
themselves had been on the move for the past 150 years to find new homes 
and build better lives. After World War II, the economy improved and 
prosperity set in, so Austrians tended to stay at home. Austria’s growing 
prosperity made the country attractive to potential immigrants. After 
the war, tens of thousands of “ethnic Germans” expelled from Eastern 
Europe settled in Austria. Starting in the 1950s “victims of the Cold War” 
(Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks) began looking for political asylum in 
Austria. Since the 1960s, Austria has been recruiting a growing number 
of “guest workers” from Turkey and Yugoslavia to make up for the labor 
missing in the industrial and service economies. Recently, refugees from 
the arc of crisis from Afghanistan to Syria to Somalia have braved perilous 
journeys to build new lives in a more peaceful and prosperous Europe. 
With Heinz Tesarek’s photo essay, Contemporary Austrian Studies enters 
uncharted territory. We have always tried to illustrate our volumes, but we 
have never before invited a photo artist to contribute a photographic essay 
to illuminate the emotional depth of the ongoing migration issues capti-
vating Europeans and Austrians. Tesarek has followed the Bakkar family of 
Aleppo, Syria, over three days from Hungary, via Austria to Germany, on 
September 5 to 7 in the summer of 2015. Like thousands of Austrian fami-
lies seeking refuge from political turmoil and a better life during the World 
War II era all over the world, Syrian, Iraqi, Afghani, Somali, Sudanese, and 
Nigerian families have been seeking to escape the (civil) war-torn regions 
of their homelands and build better lives in Europe (and America).
Historian and co-editor Dirk Rupnow’s introductory essay shows 
how the history of migration during the Second Austrian Republic has 
been orphaned by historians and is non-present in the grand narratives of 
twentieth-century Austrian history. Discussing recent trends and delving 
more deeply in the history of the1960s and 1970s labor migrations, he also 
analyzes some of the current challenges for historical research, grappling 
with the issues of migration and diversity in contemporary Austrian history. 
He also presents projects that deal with the documentation and archiving 
of migration.
Annemarie Steidl’s essay provides a deeper historical contextualization 
of migratory patterns in the late Habsburg Monarchy, wherein people from 
the Monarchy’s impoverished peripheries moved to the capital Vienna to 
contribute to the expansion of the city. These migratory movements contin-
ued into neighboring European areas, where migrants went to look for work 
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and eventually across the Atlantic to the United States and the Americas. 
While desperate poverty often pushed them out of their native regions, 
work, as well as political and religious freedom, attracted them to America.
Maximilian Graf and Sarah Knoll question the post-World War II 
Austrian myth that refugees from neighboring Communist Bloc coun-
tries were always warmly welcomed in Austria. Austria built an admirable 
record in serving as a transfer point for tens of thousands of Cold War 
refugees leaving “communist paradise” in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia 
(1968), Poland (1981), and GDR and Romania (1989). Yet Graf and Knoll 
demonstrate how during each of these Cold War crises, the influx of ref-
ugees produced nativist backlashes. Austrians felt they could not afford to 
accommodate so many, nor did they want refugees to stay and integrate into 
Austrian society.
Historian Vida Bakondy and sociologist Anne Unterwurzacher explore 
Austrian labor recruitment from Turkey and Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 
1970s. While Bakondy deals with the overall structure and legal framework 
of the recruitment of foreign workers in Austria, Unterwurzacher focuses 
on one specific company in Lower Austria and its “guest workers.” 
In her contribution, Verena Lorber presents a case study of female 
Yugoslav migrant workers’ difficulties in making a living in Styria and inte-
grating into local societies. Based on oral history interviews, the gender 
perspective illuminates how difficult it was for female migrant workers to 
find decent jobs to raise children in Austria and take care of loved ones back 
in Yugoslavia with remittances.
Eva Asboth and Silvia Nadjivan follow the social media discourses of 
both the grandchildren of the “guest workers” from Yugoslavia and young 
refugee children from the 1990s Balkans Wars growing up in Austria. 
Their research has grown out of a larger project on social media discours-
es of what they call “Generation In-Between,” headed by Erhard Busek 
(Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe) and Rainer Gries 
(Franz Vranitzky Chair for European Studies, University of Vienna). Such 
a discursive sociological approach opens up new windows into integration 
studies.
Legal scholar Andreas Müller and philosopher Andreas Oberprantacher 
offer new approaches and old concerns to migration studies. Looking at 
the borders and “border regimes” from a broad theoretical perspective, they 
then apply that perspective to the current migration issues in the European 
Union. They narrow in on the dis-functioning “Dublin regime,” assigning 
the responsibility of conducting asylum proceedings to the EU member 
state (most often Greece, Italy, and Malta) whose borders the asylum seekers 
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“irregularly crossed” from a third country, as well as the lack of solidarity 
within the EU; Germany, Sweden, and Austria have been most affected 
by refugees. As for meaningful redistribution among the 28 EU member 
states, the “Visegrad group” (i.e. Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia) have resisted such redistribution mechanisms within the EU and 
have shown a lack of solidarity.
The geographer Christiane Hintermann follows the memory of 
the Nigerian refugee Markus Omofuma, who was denied asylum and 
deported in 1998. Accompanied by three policemen on his flight home, 
he resisted, his mouth was taped, and he choked to death. With her case 
study, Hintermann shows how Austrians tried to silence the memory of 
Omofuma’s death (and their own racism). Were it not for civil society and 
a brave artist constructing a commemorative sculpture, eventually placed in 
a busy Viennese location, the silencing of Omofuma’s memory would have 
succeeded. 
The political scientist Manfred Kohler analyzes recent Austrian opin-
ion polls and what they tell us about the public’s view of the ongoing 
migration situation. While people noted that local authorities (mayors and 
state governments) have handled the “refugee crisis” well, they found the 
federal government and the EU authorities to have mismanaged it; the 
further away a government institution is situated, the less Austrians value 
its performance. Only 25 percent of respondents were angry about the pres-
ence of refugees, and about a third felt positively about assisting and inte-
grating them. Two thirds of Austrians were even shocked about the hatred 
expressed by some of their co-nationals about refugees. Surprisingly, in a 
survey of mayors of communities affected by refugees, 23 percent felt there 
were opportunities in hosting refugees, while 22 percent saw more risks; 55 
percent were neutral and wanted to see the situation develop. Civil society 
trusted faith-based organizations like the Catholic CARITAS to take care 
of refugees better than the federal government. It was civil society that 
overwhelmingly welcomed refugees. Public opinion surveys thus seem to 
be more embracing of refugees on the local governmental and civil societal 
level than the populist mass daily Kronen Zeitung makes us believe. How 
this will translate in future national elections remains to be seen. All these 
different approaches show how migration and diversity are the defining 
issues in our time of globalization and mass flights.
 
* * *
A number of people have been instrumental in making the completion 
of this volume possible. We have conceptualized this volume while Günter 
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Bischof was a visiting professor at the Institute of Contemporary History at 
the University of Innsbruck in the spring of 2016. We are sincerely thankful 
to all the contributing authors for submitting their essays in a timely fashion, 
responding favorably to all editing suggestions from our production team. 
Tobias Auböck, the 2016/17 Austrian Ministry of Economics, Science, 
and Research Dissertation Fellow at UNO and PhD student in American 
Studies at the University of Innsbruck, has done a superb job in tracking 
every manuscript through both the copyediting and proofreading processes 
and toward final publication. He also has been relentless in correcting and 
aligning footnotes with our style sheet and humoring authors toward com-
pletion of their manuscripts. At the final stages of the project, Hans Petschar 
from the Picture Archives of the Austrian National Library contacted the 
Vienna photojournalist Hans Tesarek about contributing a photo essay to 
this volume. Tesarek had been documenting refugees in Central Europe 
over the past three years. We are grateful to him for submitting the photo 
essay and providing the picture for the cover of this volume. 
An important framework for this edited volume has also been the 
research project “Deprovincializing Contemporary Austrian History: 
Migration and the Transnational Challenges to National Historiographies 
(ca. 1960-today),” at the Institute for Contemporary History at the 
University of Innsbruck, headed by Dirk Rupnow. It has been generously 
funded by the Austrian Science Fund FWF (P 24468-G18). We would also 
like to thank our anonymous outside peer reviewers for their thorough and 
timely assessments.
Katie Pfalzgraff at UNO Press put her customary enthusiasm into the 
final round of copyediting the individual manuscripts; Alex Dimeff skillful-
ly typeset the final text of the volume and designed the cover. G.K. Darby 
and Abram Himelstein, the leadership team at UNO Press, have been 
hugely supportive to spirit this volume through to final publication. At 
Center Austria: The Austrian Marshall Plan Center for European Studies, 
Gertraud Griessner conducted the Center’s daily business with superb 
efficiency to allow the coeditor to work on managing the completion of 
this volume. Without the dedicated teams at Center Austria and the UNO 
Press there would be no CAS series. At innsbruck university press, Birgit 
Holzner was helpful with the production of the cover, the final round of 
proofreading, and then producing the volume for the European market. 
Cooperating with her has become a big bonus in the production of these 
volumes.
As always, we are happy in acknowledging our sponsors and support-
ers for making the publication of the Contemporary Austrian Studies series 
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possible at all, not a small matter in the age of diminishing budgets for 
higher education in general and the social sciences and humanities in par-
ticular. At the Universities of Innsbruck and New Orleans, our thanks go 
to Vice Rektor for Research Sabine Schindler for a grant towards the print-
ing of this volume, Matthias Schennach, Barbara Tasser, Gerhard Rampl, 
Christina Antenhofer, Marion Wieser, and Eva-Maria Fink in the New 
Orleans Office. At UNO, Kim Long, the Dean of the College of Liberal 
Arts, Education and Human Development, and Robert Dupont, the chair 
of the History Department, have given us green lights and much sup-
port whenever needed. We are also grateful to Rektor Tilmann Märk and 
President John Niklow for their support of the entire UNO-University of 
Innsbruck partnership agenda, including its publication series. Ambassador 
Wolfgang Waldner, the Austrian Ambassador to the United States, has 
been supportive as has his staff member Hannes Richter. In the Federal 
Ministry of Economics, Science, and Research and its student exchange 
office Österreichischer Auslandsdienst (ÖAD), we are grateful to Barbara 
Weitgruber, Christoph Ramoser, Felix Wilcek, Josef Leidenfrost, and 
Florian Gerhardus. Markus Schweiger, the executive secretary, Ambassador 
Wolfgang Petritsch, the chairman of the board, as well as the board mem-
bers of the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation have been our strongest 
supporters for more than a decade now. It is a great pleasure and privilege 
to work with them all and acknowledge their unwavering support of Center 
Austria: The Austrian Marshall Plan Center of European Studies at UNO 
and its activities and publications.





The Bakkar Family from Aleppo, Syria: Frontpage 
Refugees
A Photo Essay by Heinz Tesarek1
I took the pictures in this photo essay in Hungary, Austria, and 
Germany at the height of the refugee crisis during the summer of 2015, 
between September 5 and 7. On September 5, 2015, Austria’s Federal 
Chancellor Werner Faymann agreed with German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel: “Refugees coming from Hungary are allowed to enter Austria and 
Germany.” The Austrian Press Agency (APA) published these vital news 
stories the same day (pic 1).
At the time, tens of thousands of refugees from the Syrian war zones 
were stuck in Hungary, waiting to get to Germany. Among them were the 
Bakkar Family: Mohamed, his wife Samia, and their eight-month-old son 
Husam (pics 3 & 4).
The picture of a Reuters News Agency photographer, showing the 
Syrian family huddled on railroad tracks and surrounded by Hungarian 
policemen, was seen around the world (pic 2).
The German mass daily Bild Zeitung featured the story on their front 
page: “Hungarian Police are Beating Up Refugees.” Newspapers and mag-
azines around the world had similar cover stories. Soon thereafter, a video 
made the rounds showing Mohamed Bakkar tossing his family and himself 
onto the railroad tracks. Mohamed explained in an interview to have acted 
out of desperation: “The Hungarian police threatened to send us back to 
Syria. For us it became clear: either we live or die together.”
Only a few days later, the news of open Austrian and German borders 
spread like wildfire. In the vast trek of people moving toward the West were 
1   Heinz Tesarek is a prize-winning Vienna photojournalist and documentary 
photographer. He has worked as a photographer with the Austrian magazine News since 
1999. He has been documenting upheavals in crisis regions around the world for the past 
20 years, including the implosion of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Russia and Eastern Europe 
(2001-2005), and “the war against terror” in Afghanistan, the Caucasus and Europe. In 
the past three years, he has been documenting the “refugee crisis.” His photos have been 
exhibited in shows, and he published the book Zwischenzeit (Interim) in 2013. This photo 
essay originated in a cooperative project with Saskia Wolfesberger, a journalist for the 
Austrian magazine News. 
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the Bakkar family. Their destination was Germany. Like hundreds of other 
refugees, they managed to secure a spot in one of the trains moving toward 
Austria (pics 5 & 6). The same day, they reached Vienna’s Western Railroad 
Station and found provisional shelter in emergency sleeping quarters (pics 
7 & 8 & 9).
The next morning, they continued on their journey toward Germany 
(pics 10 & 11). The refugees were registered for the first time in Munich. 
They also had their first health check-up. Samira discovered that she was 
four months pregnant.
The Bakkar family was transferred from Munich to the small town 
of Wiesau in the Upper Palatinate. Here their flight came to an end in a 
gymnasium converted into a temporary refugee camp (pics 12 & 13).
A year later, the family lives in Mayen in the Rhineland-Palatinate 
region. The family receives the quasi-asylum status of being “beneficiaries 
of subsidiary protection” from the German government, initially made 
out for a year. A number of local people and institutions are working on 
integrating the Bakkars into their community, among them the Richters, a 
retired couple (pic 14). Walter Richter concludes from the experience: “The 
refugees take care of themselves, not only in the good sense. It is hopeless 
to expect these people ever to become Germans. But everybody is hoping 
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The History and Memory of Migration in Post-War 
Austria: Current Trends and Future Challenges1 
Dirk Rupnow 
Without a doubt, migration counts among the most important issues 
of the present and the future. With the all-encompassing demand for 
integration levied against migrants, which is generally understood as their 
complete assimilation into an ostensibly clearly delineated “indigenous” 
culture, conceived of as static and homogeneous, migration is however 
fatally understood as a purely contemporary phenomenon, something 
ahistorical, as though migration had no history and as though migrants 
had no history, as though migration has not been altering society and 
culture since ever before. This has only been exacerbated with the recent 
rise in the number of migrants on their way to Europe, which is perceived 
as a crisis.
The term Flüchtlingskrise (refugee crisis) to describe the events of the 
summer of 2015 alone demonstrates how perceptions in Austria, as in many 
other European countries, are distorted in a European frame and limited 
to the present. This is not to say that there is no problem or challenge that 
must be addressed, but to emphasize that people in Europe only began to 
perceive a “crisis” when a greater number of refugees successfully arrived 
in the European Union and when they began to die right in the middle of 
Europe, for example in late August 2015, when 71 refugees, among them 
four children, were found suffocated in the back of a truck on a highway 
in Austria near the Hungarian border. People in Europe did not perceive a 
“crisis” when the majority of refugees died somewhere in the Mediterranean 
Sea, or when Turkey was confronted with more than three million Syrian 
refugees.
In the summer of 2016, the Austrian government even pondered 
possibilities to declare a state of emergency in order to suspend the right 
1  This paper emerged as part of the FWF Austrian Science Fund Project P 24468-G18, 
“Deprovincializing Contemporary Austrian History: Migration and the transnational 
challenges to national historiographies (ca. 1960-today),” which is based at the Institute for 
Contemporary History at the University of Innsbruck (11/2012-10/2017) and headed by 
Dirk Rupnow.
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of asylum. Public order and internal security were seen to be in danger 
and threatened if more than 37,500 refugees entered the country.2 Also 
here, the self-centeredness of the European discussion becomes visible: 
The state of emergency is given when refugees try to find a safe haven 
but not when people are in danger and flee from their homes. A state of 
emergency is, of course, a performative act, a self-fulfilling prophecy: it 
exists when it is formally declared – or even only contemplated. But it is 
completely incalculable what the ramifications are for a society to live in 
a permanent (perceived) state of emergency, except that it caters to right-
wing populist and racist politicians.
I
Alfred Schütz (1899-1959), the Austrian emigrant and sociologist, 
in 1944 defined “the stranger” (immigrant, newcomer) as a “man without 
history,” to whom exoticism is attributed but nothing more: “Seen from the 
point of view of the approached group, he [the stranger] is a man without 
history.”3 And as long as “he” – “she” obviously remains completely out of 
consideration here – is not afforded his own history by mainstream society 
(the “approached group”), so one could deduce from Schütz’s line of think-
ing, “the stranger” will remain foreign.
At present, migrants are often expected not only to learn the lan-
guage of the majority, along with an ostensibly generally recognized 
value system, but also to learn the history of the respective mainstream 
society as a symbol of their willingness to integrate.4 The citizenship 
tests in Austria and Germany reflect this very clearly: aside from the 
democratic constitutional order, these are concerned above all with 
2   “Österreich bereitet sich auf Notstand vor,” n-tv.de, June 2, 2016, accessed April 3, 2017, 
http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Osterreich-bereitet-sich-auf-Notstand-vor-article17840401.
html; “Österreich bereitet Notstand wegen Flüchtlingen vor,” Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten, 
Aug. 21, 2016, accessed April 3, 2017 https://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.de/ 
2016/08/21/oesterreich-bereitet-notstand-wegen-fluechtlingen-vor/; “Warum Flüchtlinge 
angeblich die innere Ordnung gefährden,” Welt.de, Sept. 1, 2016, accessed April 3, 2017, 
https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article157918938/Warum-Fluechtlinge-angeblich-
die-innere-Ordnung-gefaehrden.html.
3   Alfred Schütz, “The Stranger,” in Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory, ed. Arvid 
Brodersen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 91-105, 97. 
4   On the nexus of language and identity as well as the underlying exclusionary agenda, 
and the demand for monolingualism in current debates but also historical perspectives, 
see Heinrich C. Seeba, “The Rhetoric of Origin: Language and Exclusion in Historical 
Perspective,” in Transit 1, no. 1 (2004), accessed June 22, 2012, http://escholarship.org/uc/
item/0357t86n. 
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historical dates and facts.5 Meanwhile, an engagement by the main-
stream society with the migrants’ past, their historical experiences and 
memories, is completely lacking. Obviously, this paternalistic stance 
towards migrants, which demands of them an engagement with “our” 
history while their own history, including the history of their migration, 
remains almost entirely invisible and shielded, is deeply problematic. The 
history of migration and migrants is a blank space in hegemonic memory, 
and this holds true to varying degrees for all European countries of 
immigration.
In the second half of the twentieth century, Austria became a country 
of immigration. Up until then, emigration was statistically predominant, 
despite the immigration that did take place, as was internal migration. This 
reality remained unacknowledged for a long time, and it is still contested in 
the Austrian political arena. Structured worker migration was introduced 
in Austria later than in Germany, at the end of December 1961, with the 
Raab-Olah Agreement, which constituted one of the foundation stones 
for the institutionalization of Social Partnership, as well as the resulting 
recruitment agreements with Spain (1962), Turkey (1964), and Yugoslavia 
(1966). The European refugee movements after World War II also played 
an important role in this context (such as the expulsion of ethnic Germans 
in 1945 and refugee movements from Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia 
in 1968, Poland in the 1980s, and ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s). The Second 
Austrian Republic has seen 4.5 million people migrate through its borders. 
Of those, 1.3 million stayed.6 At present, more than 20% of the residential 
population have a so-called “migration background” (1.8 million of 8.4 mil-
lion Austrian citizens); in Vienna, the proportion is over 40%.7 The largest 
groups of (non-EU) migrants are people from ex-Yugoslavia (almost half 
a million) and Turks (more than a quarter million). On January 1, 2016, 
5   For the Austrian test, see “Mein Österreich,” Bundesministerium für Inneres, accessed 
Oct. 24, 2016, http://www.staatsbuergerschaft.gv.at; or “Österreichischer Einbürgerungstest,” 
Einbürgerungstest.at, accessed Oct. 24, 2016, http://www.einbuergerungstest.at; for the 
German test, see “Einbürgerungstest in Deutschland,” Bundesausländerbeauftragte.de, accessed 
Oct. 24, 2016, http://www.bundesauslaenderbeauftragte.de/einbuergerungstest.html; or 
“Alle 300 Fragen und Antworten zum Einbürgerungtest der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” 
Einbürgerungstest-online.eu, accessed Oct. 24, 2016, http://www.einbuergerungstest-online.
eu/fragen/.
6   Andreas Weigl, Migration und Integration: Eine widersprüchliche Geschichte, Österreich – 
Zweite Republik 20 (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2009), especially 14-15.
7   “Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund nach Bundesländern ( Jahresdurchschnitt 
2015)” [population with a migration background by federal state (annual average 2015)], 
Statistik Austria, accessed Oct. 25, 2016, http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/
menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_
migrationshintergrund/index.html.
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almost 15% of the resident population of the country held non-Austrian 
citizenship, in Vienna accounting for almost 30% of the resident popula-
tion.8 The largest group of these by origin were people from ex-Yugoslavia, 
followed by Germans, and then Turks. In this respect, Austria has arrived 
at the top of the European list, with the Austrian news magazine profil 
stating: “Austria has become what it never wanted to be: one of the leading 
countries of immigration in the world.”9 (The largest ethnic group amongst 
the foreigners, the Germans, naturally enjoy a special status in Austria and 
are accordingly usually left out of discussions about migration and integra-
tion, although conflicts of memory and other issues between Austrians and 
Germans are notorious.)
Especially in the case of migration and diversity, statistics – with their 
supposedly clear categorizations – are more confusing than enlightening. 
Not only do they necessarily reduce the complexity and diversity of reali-
ty, but the objects that they count and the definitions behind the numbers 
constantly change.10 Nevertheless, they still seem to be necessary in order 
to demonstrate what should already be beyond discussion but what has still 
not been fully accepted in the political arena: that Austria has long been a 
“migration society” and is not only just becoming such due to the impact 
of the current “refugee crisis.” Although the refugee movements to Austria 
during the Cold War (especially Hungary in 1956) command a fixed place in 
the collective memory of the country and count as evidence for the openness 
and solidarity of the Austrian population, they were less demographically 
incisive. In these cases, Austria acted far more as a transit country than as 
8   “Bevölkerung am 1.1.2016 nach detaillierter Staatsbürgerschaft und Bundesland” 
[population on January 1, 2016, according to citizenship and country of birth], 
Statistik Austria, accessed Oct. 25, 2016, http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/
menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_
staatsangehoerigkeit_geburtsland/index.html.
9   Clemens Neuhold, “Lebenslüge der Nation,” Profil, 31 Oct. 2016, 14-21.
10   See for example the various definitions of what constitutes a “migration background” by 
Statistik Austria (both parents born abroad, further subdivided in migrants of the first generation 
who were born abroad and migrants of the second generation, or children of migrants who, 
however, were born locally); by Statistik Wien (people who either do not hold Austrian 
citizenship or were born outside of Austria); and by the German Federal Statistical Office (not 
personally born with German citizenship or having at least one parent who was born without 
German citizenship). See: “Bevölkerung in Privathaushalten nach Migrationshintergrund,” 
Statistik Austria, accessed Oct. 25, 2016, http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/
menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_
migrationshintergrund/index.html; “Definitionen zur Bevölkerungsstatistik,” Wien.at, 
accessed Oct. 25, 2016, https://www.wien.gv.at/statistik/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstand/
definitionen.html; “Migrationshintergrund,” Statistisches Bundesamt, accessed Oct. 
25, 2016, https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/
MigrationIntegration/Glossar/Migrationshintergrund.html.
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a country of immigration.11 The initial willingness to welcome and help 
refugees in these situations, moreover, exhausted itself very quickly, a fact 
that is happily forgotten in the dominant narratives.
While in 1961 the proportion of persons with foreign citizenship 
in Austria stood at 1.4%, the acquisition of so-called “guest workers” from 
Yugoslavia and Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s led to a preliminary peak at 4.1% 
in 1974 (over 310,000 persons among a total population of about 7.6 million). 
Not until the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s did another significant increase occur, 
resulting in over 8% by 1993, and another after the turn of the millennium, 
with the 10% barrier surpassed for the first time in 2008 (some 845,000 persons 
among a total population of about 8.3 million).12 In 2015, over 88,000 asylum 
applications were filed, predominantly by people from Afghanistan, Syria, and 
Iraq (the total across the EU was over 1.3 million).13 Austria thereby attained 
the second-highest rate of asylum applications per capita in Europe (10 asy-
lum seekers per 1,000 residents), following Sweden (17 per 1,000).
To date, the history of migration and the experiences of migrants 
have not been integrated into the hegemonic version of Austrian history. 
With few exceptions, they are not visible in school textbooks or in the 
mainstream representations of the history of the Second Republic, nei-
ther in museums nor in public spaces such as memorials or street names. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that the current heated debates on migration, 
refugees, and integration still deny the obvious: that Austria has long 
been a country of immigration, and is not just becoming so now; that 
it is already diverse and pluralistic, as it has always been; and that it has 
already been changed by migration and migrants. In the public arena, it 
seems to be easily forgotten that the presence of so-called “people with a 
migration background” has a fifty-year history, with specific actors, each 
with their own particular interests, taking place in an equally specific 
regulatory, societal, and political framework. Despite the relatively inten-
sive research activity on the very different migrations that took place in 
the late Habsburg era, and on the refugee movements to Austria during 
the Cold War, the misleading impression is often created that there has 
never been any state-sponsored and structured immigration in post-war 
11   Oliver Rathkolb, Die paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 bis 2005 (Vienna: Zsolnay, 
2005), 49–52. See also Gernot Heiß, and Oliver Rathkolb, eds., Asylland wider Willen: 
Flüchtlinge in Österreich im europäischen Kontext seit 1914, Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig 
Boltzmann-Instituts für Geschichte und Gesellschaft 25 (Vienna: J & V Edition, 1995). 
12   “Fact Sheet 24: Staatsbürgerschaft und Einbürgerung,” Österreichischer 
Integrationsfond, Oct. 2016, accessed October 25, 2016, http://www.integrationsfonds.at/
themen/publikationen/oeif-fact-sheets/.
13   “Integrationsbericht 2016,” Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres, 
accessed October 25, 2016, https://www.bmeia.gv.at/integration/integrationsbericht/.
Rupnow:  The History and Memory of Migration in Post-War Austria42
Austria, as though it came out of nowhere and did not develop out of the 
needs of the Austrian economy and society. Yet it should be obvious that 
the economic rise of the Second Republic would have been impossible 
without immigration. By contrast to the original “guest worker” concept 
of the 1950s and 1960s, which was based on the assumption of a purely 
temporary, demand-based migration and a continuous rotation of work-
ers, people ended up settling, thus permanently changing the immigration 
societies, not least of all because of the enduring transnational links with 
the countries from which they emigrated.
Audibility and visibility have hitherto not been granted to everyone 
equally in our society. This is by no means a purely academic problem, and 
it speaks rather to a fundamental condition for belonging, recognition, and 
equality in society.14 The burgeoning nation states of the nineteenth century 
legitimized and secured themselves through homogeneous conceptions of 
peoplehood, territory, and history. The writing of history was an important 
instrument in this process, while archives and museums were its decisive 
institutions. Historiography served to invent a national past and a com-
munal culture, which was then visualized in museums. Not only were clear 
borders thereby drawn towards the outside, homogeneity was also produced 
on the inside: population, culture, and territory were tied together as some-
thing quasi-naturally belonging together. Whatever counted as “other” 
was pushed to the margins, written out of history, made invisible. This was 
also true in society: the mass violence of the twentieth century was not the 
least of all the consequences of this drive toward homogenization. Often 
no difference was made between nation and peoplehood, and conceptions 
of nation have time and again been contaminated with ethnicity. This has 
hampered the acceptance of ethnic and cultural diversity as well as of dif-
ferent historical entanglements within nations to this day.
The classical national memories, which have always been more riven 
and heterogeneous than omnipresent notions such as that of “collective 
memory” would have one believe, are currently undergoing massive changes 
as a result of migration, which is, so to speak, bringing globalization into the 
front yard and transforming it into an everyday occurrence.15 For the most part, 
migrants do not relate well to either the history of the majority population, nor 
to the established practices of engagement with this history. They have a differ-
ent perspective on a thoroughly shared past, which represents an unusual 
14   See among others Paul Mecheril, Prekäre Verhältnisse: Über natio-ethno-kulturelle 
(Mehrfach-)Zugehörigkeit (Münster: Waxmann, 2003), especially 28.
15   Georg Simmel, Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung (Munich: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1923), 509-512; Erol Yildiz, Die weltoffene Stadt: Wie Migration 
Globalisierung zum urbanen Alltag macht, Kultur und soziale Praxis (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011).
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one for mainstream society, or they have no relationship to the history of 
mainstream society at all. Simultaneously, they bring other historical expe-
riences and memories in their wake, which were hitherto alien to main-
stream society.16 The memory of the mass atrocities of National Socialism 
in the primary perpetrator countries of Germany and Austria, for example, 
have a divisive, rather than an integrating, effect. Originating from a marginal-
ized position, it has by now become a state memory, a governmentally asserted 
and instrumentalized hegemonic memory that is in turn accused of covering 
up and suppressing other memories.17 Memory, however, can and should not 
be a zero-sum game, as it is often repeatedly and fatally presented in historical 
political debates. Michael Rothberg, the American literary scholar, attempted to 
make this point in his 2009 book “Multidirectional Memory: Remembering 
the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization,” in which he traced historical 
connections between anti-colonial and anti-Nazi positions.18
16   Viola B. Georgi, Entliehene Erinnerung: Geschichtsbilder junger Migranten in Deutschland 
(Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003); Viola B. Georgi, and Rainer Ohliger, eds., 
Crossover Geschichte: Historisches Bewusstsein Jugendlicher in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft 
(Hamburg: Ed. Körber Stiftung, 2009); Astrid Messerschmidt, Weltbilder und Selbstbilder: 
Bildungsprozesse im Umgang mit Globalisierung, Migration und Zeitgeschichte, Wissen und 
Praxis 151 (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2009). See also the project conducted by 
myself and trafo.K., a Viennese office for research and education, from 2009-2011: “‘Und 
was hat das mit mir zu tun?’ Transnationale Geschichtsbilder zur NS-Vergangenheit,” 
in the framework of the BMWF/“Sparkling Science” program, “Transnationale 
Geschichtsbilder,” Sparkling Science, accessed Oct. 19, 2016, http://www.sparklingscience.
at/de/projekte/312-transnationale-geschichtsbilder; as well as Nora Sternfeld, Kontaktzonen 
der Geschichtsvermittlung: Transnationales Lernen über den Holocaust in der postnazistischen 
Migrationsgesellschaft (PhD thesis, Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, 2012). 
17   Dirk Moses, “Der nichtdeutsche Deutsche und der deutsche Deutsche: Stigma und Opfer-
Erlösung in der Berliner Republik,” in Demokratie im Schatten der Gewalt: Geschichten des Privaten 
im deutschen Nachkrieg, ed. Daniel Fulda, Dagmar Herzog, Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, and Till 
van Rahden (Göttingen: Wallstein 2010), 353–378; Jan Löfström, “Historical Apologies as Acts 
of Symbolic Inclusion – and Exclusion? Reflections on Institutional Apologies as Politics of 
Cultural Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 15, no. 1 (2011), 93–108.
18   Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory. Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of 
Decolonization, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009). In this context, 
see also Michael Rothberg’s new project (together with Yasemin Yildiz and Andrés Nader) 
on Holocaust memory and migration in Germany, Michael Rothberg and Yasemin Yildiz, 
“Memory Citizenship: Migrant Archives of Holocaust Remembrance in Contemporary 
Germany,” Parallax 17, no. 4 (2011), 32-48. On the discussion surrounding colonialism and the 
Holocaust, see for example A. Dirk Moses, “Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas 
in the ‘Racial Century’: Genocides of Indigenous People and the Holocaust,” Patterns of Prejudice 
36, no. 4 (2002), 7-36; Jürgen Zimmerer, “Annihilation in Africa: The ‘Race War’ in German 
Southwest Africa (1904-1908) and its Significance for a Global History of Genocide,” GHI 
Bulletin 37 (Fall 2005), 51-57; Birth Kundrus, “From the Herero to the Holocaust? Some 
Remarks on the Current Debate,” Africa spectrum 40, no. 2 (2005), 299-308; Robert Gerwarth 
and Stephan Malinowksi, “Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts: Reflections on the Disputable Path from 
Windhoek to Auschwitz,” Central European History 42 (2009), 279-300. 
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The reality of migratory societies has by now become an everyday occu-
rance and visible in many countries and can no longer be denied. A plural-
istic society, however, requires a polyphonic history from multiple perspec-
tives in order to come to terms with itself, with its development through 
the past, but also with its future. The hegemonic format of history, which 
is still primarily framed in national terms, is fundamentally and lastingly 
challenged by migration as a genuine transnational phenomenon, which 
traverses, transgresses, or perforates borders. Migration irritates concep-
tions of unambiguous belongings and homogeneous identity constructions 
based on clear delineations, of fixed, intraversable borders as well as equally 
unchanging, clearly delineated cultures. Writing migration and migrants 
into national history therefore constitutes a great challenge.
The urgency of addressing this challenge is underlined by various stud-
ies: Turkish and ex-Yugoslav migrants feel far less belonging in Austria 
than they do, for example, in Germany; “hyphenated identities” as have 
by now become commonplace in Germany are practically never formulat-
ed in Austria because domestic discourse is still strongly exclusionary and 
racist. Even when they are in possession of Austrian citizenship, migrants 
of the second generation are time and again told that they are not “real 
Austrians.”19
II
The last few years have seen some changes. A new survey reveals that 
three quarters of Austrians today see their country as a country of immi-
gration: 33% say this is “very surely” true, 43% say it is “rather” true, while 
14% say it is “rather not” true and 8% believe Austria is “very surely not” a 
country of immigration.20  
19  Delna Antia, Eins, zwei, keins oder beides: Warum Migranten der zweiten 
Generation eine hybride Identität wählen – wenn sie dürften: Ein empirischer Vergleich 
nationaler Selbstpositionierung in Deutschland und Österreich (M.E.S. thesis, Vienna 
University, 2016); Delna Antia, “Dann bin ich eben nicht Österreicher!,” Biber, 
November 2016, 19-25; Maurice Crul, Jens Schneider, and Frans Lelie, “The European 
Second Generation Compared: Does the Integration Context Matter?,” TIES-project, 
Amsterdam 2012. 
20   “Umfrage: 76% sehen Österreich als Einwanderungsland,” Profil, 31 Oct. 
2016, accessed Oct. 31, 2016, http://www.profil.at/oesterreich/umfrage-oesterreich-
einwanderungsland-7663079. The 2011 party program of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), 
entitled “Österreich zuerst” [Austria First], nevertheless continues to insist that “Austria is not 
a country of immigration.” (“Parteiprogramm der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs (FPÖ),” 
FPOE.at, accessed Nov. 2, 2016, https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.
at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_web.pdf ). The Austrian People’s Party 
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The fixation of the media and the public on historic anniversaries 
and celebrations is a blessing and a curse at once: It runs counter to logic 
and scholarly research, and yet it offers the opportunity to snatch cer-
tain topics from oblivion and to discuss them broadly. This opportunity, 
however, is not always seized upon. So for example, in 2012 the fiftieth 
anniversary of the signing of the first Austrian recruiting agreement with 
Spain in 1962 passed, like that of the Raab-Olah Agreement before it, 
without either having received any significant public or media attentions 
in Austria.21 To be fair, only few Spanish “guest workers” came to Austria 
as the country was less attractive to them than France or Germany, 
but nevertheless the (secret) agreement between the Austrian Federal 
Economic Chamber and Austrian Trade Union Federation in December 
1961 and the consequent balance of interests between employers and 
employees created the very conditions for the acquisition of foreign labor 
(and moreover laid the foundations for the institutionalization of Social 
Partnership).
The anniversary of the signing of the 1964 recruiting agreement 
between Austria and Turkey in 2014 was nevertheless commemorated, 
this commemoration moreover effected by numerous parties: The Austrian 
Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (BMEIA) 
organized a scholarly symposium in May entitled 50 Jahre türkische 
Migration nach Österreich – Gestern, heute und in der Zukunft (50 years of 
Turkish Migration to Austria – Yesterday, Today, and in the Future) which 
took place at the Austrian embassy in Ankara, with a follow-up held in 
June at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. The date of the signing in May 
was also accompanied by dense media coverage.22 In September, the City 
of Vienna invited 1,000 former Turkish and Yugoslav “guest workers” for a 
(ÖVP) meanwhile declared itself in its 2015 program in favor of qualified immigration and 
the maintenance of a “Leitkultur” (dominant culture) (“Die Partei,” OEVP.at, accessed Nov. 
2, 2016, https://www.oevp.at/die-partei/Die-OeVP.psp). The 1998 program of the Austrian 
Social-Democratic Party takes a position against xenophobia, racism, and antisemitism, and 
argues for a coexistence based on solidarity (“Das Grundsatzprogramm,” SPOE.at, accessed 
Nov. 2, 2016, https://spoe.at/sites/default/files/das_spoe_parteiprogramm.pdf ). The party 
program of the Green Party from 2001 alone made the statement: “Despite the acquisition 
of foreign labor since the beginning of the sixties, it has to date not been recognized that 
Austria is a country of immigration. Quite on the contrary, Austria has to this day simply 
ignored the fact that immigrants have become a part of this society and are here for the long 
haul, and treated those affected as ‘guest workers’.” (“Parteiprogramm,” Gruene.at, accessed 
Nov. 2, 2016, https://www.gruene.at/partei/programm/parteiprogramm).
21   See “50 Jahre Gastarbeiter in Österreich: Von Anwerbeabkommen und Integration,” 
ORF.at, Dec. 27, 2011, accessed Sept. 2, 2014, http://www.orf.at/stories/2090725/2090744.
22   See for example the numerous contributions in: Die Presse, May 11, 2014, and in: Der 
Standard, May 15, 2014. 
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celebration at the city hall under the motto Gerufen und gekommen ([We] 
Called and [They] Came), where Federal President Heinz Fischer, Mayor 
Michael Häupl, and City Councilor for Integration Sandra Frauenberger 
expressed their recognition and gratitude. However, a statewide symbolic 
act remained conspicuously absent.23 Nevertheless, a range of local projects 
occurred, principally exhibitions (for example in St. Pölten, Salzburg, Hall 
in Tyrol, and Telfs, as well as traveling exhibitions), but also performanc-
es and other events that emerged from various contexts (ranging from 
universities and research institutions to NGOs and associations to local 
museums). Ultimately, however, these were not connected to major cultural 
institutions.24
The anniversary of the agreement with Yugoslavia in 2016 was not 
publicly marked by official polity with any events, commemorations, or 
projects. A conference of the Institute for Contemporary History at the 
University of Innsbruck, which took place in Vienna in cooperation with 
the Austrian NGO Initiative Minderheiten (Initiative for Minorities), the 
working group Archiv der Migration (Migration Archive), and the Austrian 
Federal Railways (ÖBB), dealt with the coming into effect of the agreement, 
accompanied by an exhibition on Yugoslav associations in Austria in the 
23   On research in the framework of the Vienna conference of the BMEIA, see Sylvia 
Hahn and Georg Stöger, 50 Jahre österreichisch-türkisches Anwerbeabkommen (Salzburg 
2014), https://www.uni-salzburg.at/fileadmin/multimedia/Geschichte/documents/Studie_
Anwerbeabkommen_-_Uni_Salzburg.pdf.
24   City Museum of St. Pölten, Center for Migration Research at the Institute of Rural 
History and the Lower Austrian State Archive, Bernhard Gamsjäger, Austrian-Turkish 
Friendship Association (Österreichisch-Türkischer Freundschaftsverein), and Pastoral 
Care for Working People in Traisental (Betriebsseelsorge Traisental), “Angeworben! 
Hiergeblieben! 50 Jahre ‘Gastarbeit’ in der Region St. Pölten” [Recruited! Remained! 50 
Years of ‘Guest Work’ in the Region of St. Pölten]; City Archive of Salzburg and University 
of Salzburg, “Kommen – Gehen – Bleiben: Migrationsstadt Salzburg 1960-1990” [Coming 
– Going – Staying: Salzburg, City of Migration 1960-1990]; Institute for Contemporary 
History at the University of Innsbruck and City Museum and Archive of Hall in Tyrol, 
“Hall in Bewegung: Spuren der Migration in Tirol” [Hall in Motion: Traces of Migration 
in Tyrol]; Commissioner for Integration in the market town of Telfs and Migration Archive 
in Telfs, “Alte Neue TelferInnen” [Old New Telfers]; Association Jukus for the Promotion 
of Youth, Culture, and Sport (Verein Jukus zur Förderung von Jugend, Kultur und Sport), 
“Avusturya! Österreich – 50 Jahre türkische Gastarbeit in Österreich” [Avusturya [Turkish, 
Austria]! Austria – 50 Years of Turkish Guest Work in Austria]; Migrare, Volkshilfe, and 
University of Linz, “Gekommen und geblieben: 50 Jahre Arbeitsmigration” [They Came 
and Stayed: 50 Years of Labor Migration]; Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and 
Cooperation and Wienwoche, “Gaygusuz gegen Österreich oder von der Nützlichkeit der 
‘Gast’-arbeiter_innen” [Gaygusuz versus Austria, or the Usefulness of ‘Guest’ Workers]. 
A further scholarly conference was organized by Christiane Hintermann and the author, 
together with the Karl Renner Institute, the Educational Workshop of the Green Party, 
and the NGO Initiative Minderheiten: “Orte, Räume und das Gedächtnis der Migration” 
[Places, Spaces, and the Memory of Migration]. 
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1980s and by video interventions at the Hauptbahnhof and Westbahnhof 
train stations in Vienna. In the meantime, the BMEIA and the Austrian 
Integration Fund supported an art exhibition on the theme of Gastarbeit in 
Österreich (guest work in Austria) in the Museumsquartier in Vienna enti-
tled Ajnhajtclub (Unity Club, the German word Einheit being humorously 
rendered in pseudo-Yugoslav phonetic spelling), conceptualized by the 
Belgrade-born, Amsterdam-based artist and curator Bogomir Doringer. 
The Graz-based association Jukus once again stepped forward with an exhi-
bition, which was at first presented in the Austrian Museum of Folk Life 
and Folk Art (Österreichisches Museum für Volkskunde) in Vienna, entitled 
Unter fremdem Himmel: Aus dem Leben jugoslawischer GastarbeiterInnen 
(Under Foreign Skies: From the Lives of Yugoslav Guest Workers). The 
fragmentation of the community since the disintegration of Yugoslavia and 
the wars of the 1990s seem in any case to have influenced the treatment of 
the anniversary.
It would be totally false to credit the recruitment agreements with too 
much significance and to posit them as the starting point of (labor) migra-
tion to Austria. They were only intended to regulate what had already long 
since begun and many people migrated to Austria by other means than the 
recruitment agreements. They are nevertheless reminders of the fact that 
Austria became a country of immigration in the second half of the twenti-
eth century, and that it was in Austria’s interest to bring foreign labor into 
the country that contributed significantly to the creation and maintenance 
of prosperity.25 State regulation and the involved institutions certainly 
failed repeatedly to completely control and regulate migration.26 The rapid 
succession of anniversaries of the recruitment agreements, however, does 
not only bring the history of so-called “labor migration” to the fore, but also 
25   This was already referred to early on in the introduction to an important edited 
collection by the historians Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb: Gernot Heiss and Oliver 
Rathkolb, Vorwort der Herausgeber, in: Asylland wider Willen: Flüchtlinge in Österreich im 
europäischen Kontext seit 1914, ed. Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb, Veröffentlichungen 
des Ludwig-Boltzmann-Institutes für Geschichte und Gesellschaft 25 (Vienna: J & 
V Edition, 1995), 7-17, here: 13. In this context, see also Weigl, Migration, especially: 
14-15; Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, Einwanderungsland Österreich? Historische 
Migrationsmuster, aktuelle Trends und politische Maßnahmen (Vienna: Jugend & Volk, 1995). 
On the recruitment agreements generally, see Christoph Rass, Institutionalisierungsprozesse 
auf einem internationalen Arbeitsmarkt: Bilaterale Wanderungsverträge in Europa zwischen 
1919 und 1974, Studien zur historischen Migrationsforschung 19 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
2010), 121-128, 380-383 (on Austria).
26   In this context, consider the concept of the “Autonomy of Migration” [Autonomie der 
Migration] which has established itself in so-called Critical Migration Studies: Manuela 
Bojadžijev and Serhat Karakayalı, “Autonomie der Migration: 10 Thesen zu einer Methode,” 
in Turbulente Ränder: Neue Perspektiven auf Migration an den Grenzen Europas, ed. Transit 
Migration Forschungsgruppe (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2007), 203-209.
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the present-day plurality of Austrian society which is an undeniable part 
of everyday reality. In the political arena, this is notoriously not universally 
recognized or uncontested, with a homogeneous nation – which of course 
never previously existed – being frequently imagined or even promoted 
with force.
It has been repeatedly pointed out that the history of labor migration 
has not yet arrived in Austrian collective memory.27 This blank space is 
self-evident. The long-established term of the “guest worker” – derived, 
incidentally and against common assumptions, from the National 
Socialist era and not from the post-war era, in opposition to Nazi ter-
minology – who was supposed to leave the country as soon as his/her 
labor was no longer needed, is an expression of this fact as well one of the 
causes of this present circumstance.28 Aside from a few (in themselves 
remarkable) exceptions, the history of labor migration has also not been 
written yet.
Institutionalized Austrian contemporary history has hardly picked 
up this topic.29 Oliver Rathkolb is the only one among contemporary 
historians who has granted it ample attention, for example in his history 
of the “paradoxical” Second Republic.30 Subsequently, in 2005 Rathkolb 
established a working area in migration and memory, supervised by the 
geographer and migration researcher Christiane Hintermann, at the 
Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for European History and Public Spheres, 
which Rathkolb had founded and developed, but which unfortunately 
shut down in 2013.31
The neglect of Austria’s history as a society of migration can proba-
bly be explained in large part by the general reservedness of Austrian 
27   Christiane Hintermann, “Gedächtnislücke Migration? Betrachtungen über eine 
nationale Amnesie,” Zeitgeschichte 40, no. 3 (2013), 149-165; Dirk Rupnow, “Deprovincializing 
Contemporary Austrian History: Plädoyer für eine transnationale Geschichte Österreichs 
als Migrationsgesellschaft,” Zeitgeschichte 40, no. 1 (2013), 5-21. 
28   Thomas Schiller, NS-Propaganda für den Arbeitseinsatz (Hamburg: Lit, 1997), 6.
29   See for example the brief references in Karl Vocelka, Geschichte Österreichs: Kultur 
– Gesellschaft – Politik (Munich: Heyne, 32004), 345-347, as well as Peter Berger, Kurze 
Geschichte Österreichs im 20. Jahrhundert (Vienna: Facultas.wuv, 22008), 294, 347. Ernst 
Hanisch, Der lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert 
(Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1994), 448, discusses exclusively the refugee migration from Hungary.
30   Oliver Rathkolb, Die paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 und 2005 (Vienna: Zsolnay, 
2005), 40-41, 44, 49-52, 207, 415-416. 
31   See the edited collections which emerged from this: Stefanie Mayer, and Mikael 
Spang, eds., Debating Migration: Political Discourses on Labor Immigration in Historical 
Perspective, Studies in European History and Public Spheres 1 (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 
2009); Christiane Hintermann and Christina Johansson, eds., Migration and Memory: 
Representations of Migration in Europe since 1960, Studies in European History and Public 
Spheres 3 (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2010). 
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contemporary history, especially of the Viennese variety, toward the 
history of the Second Republic since the 1960s.32 Thomas Angerer 
at the History Department of the University of Vienna referred to 
this “historiographic vacuum” as early as in the mid-1990s in his crit-
icism of the temporal and topical confinedness of Austrian contem-
porary history research and the absence of a “recent history of Austrian 
immigration – from the call for foreign man power in the 1960s to the 
actual quasi-closing of the borders,” with a view to contemporary debates 
about immigration, especially the so-called “anti-foreigner referendum” 
officially known as Österreich zuerst (Austria First) initiated by Jörg 
Haider’s Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in 1992/93, which demanded 
that the constitution incorporates the dictum that Austria is not a 
country of immigration.33
In the context of this “historiographical vacuum,” public discourse 
continues to be dominated by—aside from polemics and racism—social 
science analyses, and much less by historical knowledge and (hi)stories, 
not least of all because the basis for the latter are broadly lacking. The 
research landscape in Austria may be witnessing an increasingly rapid 
and nuanced expansion in the field of migration, yet the topic continues 
to be left primarily to geographers and demographers, sociologists and 
political scientists.34 Therefore, normative and quantitative approaches 
32   Ernst Hanisch, “Die Dominanz des Staates: Österreichische Zeitgeschichte im 
Drehkreuz von Politik und Wissenschaft,” in Zeitgeschichte als Problem: Nationale Traditionen 
und Perspektiven der Forschung in Europa, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Sonderheft 20, ed. 
Alexander Nützenadel and Wolfgang Schieder (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2004), 54-77, here: 70. Simultaneously, contemporary history is witnessing an opening 
up going backwards, into the long nineteenth century, in order to analyze the conflicts of 
the short twentieth century against this background. See Oliver Rathkolb, “Zeitgeschichte 
im Krebsgang ins 19. Jahrhundert zurückschreiben: Am Beispiel der Demokratie-
Diktatur-Debatte,” Die Universitaet-online, January 28, 2009; as well as Oliver Rathkolb, 
“Zeitgeschichte im Krebsgang ins 19. Jahrhundert zurückschreiben: Am Beispiel der 
Demokratie-Diktatur-Debatte” (lecture at the University of Vienna) accessed Sept. 3, 2014, 
http://stream.univie.ac.at/media/geschichte/2008WS/vranitzky/070113_090113?res=320. 
33   Thomas Angerer, “An Imcomplete Discipline: Austrian Zeitgeschichte and Recent 
History,” in Austria in the Nineteen Fifties, Contemporary Austrian Studies 3, ed. Günter 
Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Rolf Steininger (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1995), 207-251, 
here: 227. See also Thomas Angerer, “’Gegenwartsgeschichte’? Für eine Zeitgeschichte ohne 
Ausflüchte,” in Zeitgeschichte im Wandel: 3. österreichische Zeitgeschichtetage 1997, ed. Gertraud 
Diendorfer, Gerhard Jagschitz, and Oliver Rathkolb (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 1998), 46-53.
34   See for example in newer literature: Mayer and Spång, Debating Migration; Ferdinand 
Karlhofer and Günther Pallaver, eds., Jahrbuch 2011: Zuwanderung – Herausforderung für 
Gesellschaft und Politik, Politik in Tirol (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2011); Julia Dahlvik, 
Heinz Fassmann, and Wiebke Sievers, eds., Migration und Integration – wissenschaftliche 
Perspektiven aus Österreich: Jahrbuch 1/2011; Migrations- und Integrationsforschung 2 
(Vienna: V&R, 2012).
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are foregrounded, with the emphasis lying on migration movements and 
their legalistic parameters. The intention of the bulk of this research is 
to prepare knowledge that can be employed in political consulting and 
social organization. Economic aspects and the migrant as a source of labor 
are frequently foregrounded. Migration is here, as in media discourses, 
often—if only implicitly—brought up in relationship to “problems” or as a 
“problem” (“guest worker problem” or “foreigner problem”), complete with 
problematic categorizations and characterizations as well as reductions 
of the reality of migration.35 Individual experiences are mostly concealed 
while questions and approaches of everyday history are only slowly estab-
lishing themselves.36 By contrast, minority histories, including from an 
activist perspective, form an important basis and point of comparison.37 
These, however, are often highly compartmentalized, posing a challenge 
to their contextualization and integration into general political, social, and 
cultural history.38
There have nevertheless been hints in recent years, propelled by the 
anniversaries discussed above, of an increasing trend toward the histori-
cization of “guest worker migration.” The media reports of May 2014 
alone suggest this tendency. Most of the above-named exhibitions and 
35   See for example Peter Zuser, Die Konstruktion der Ausländerfrage in Österreich: Eine 
Analyse des öffentlichen Diskurses 1990, Politikwissenschaft 35 (Vienna: Institut für Höhere 
Studien, 1996).
36   See for example Peter Payer, “’Gehen Sie an die Arbeit’: Zur Geschichte der ‘Gastarbeiter’ 
in Wien 1964-1989,” Wiener Geschichtsblätter 59, no. 1 (2004), 1-19.
37   See for example the important works of Ljubomir Bratić, “Soziopolitische 
Organisationen der MigrantInnen in Österreich,” Kurswechsel, no. 1 (2000), 6-20; Ljubomir 
Bratić, “Soziopolitische Netzwerke der MigrantInnen aus der ehemaligen Sozialistischen 
Föderativen Republik Jugoslawien (SFRJ) in Österreich,” in Österreichischer Migrations- und 
Integrationsbericht: Demographische Entwicklungen – sozioökonomische Strukturen – rechtliche 
Rahmenbedingungen, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Irene Stacher (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2003), 
395-409.
38   On the state of the field in Austrian migration studies, see Bernhard Perchinig, 
“Migration Studies in Austria – Research at the Margins?” Kommission für Migrations- 
und Integrationsforschung (KMI) Working Paper 4 (Vienna n.d. [2002]); Heinz Fassmann, 
“Migrations- und Integrationsforschung in Österreich: Institutionelle Verankerung, 
Fragestellungen und Finanzierungen,” KMI Working Paper 15 (Vienna n.d. [2009]); 
Sabine Strasser, “Migrationsforschung in Österreich, ein [KriMi]? Kommentar zur 
Kritischen Migrationsforschung,” Stimme: Zeitschrift der Initiative Minderheiten  75 
(Summer 2010), 22-23. The Viennese social historian Josef Ehmer recently claimed once 
again that established contemporary history focuses on the National Socialist era and its 
consequences while neglecting other more recent topics and aspects, which are then left 
to the social sciences: Josef Ehmer, “Sozialwissenschaftler/innen oder Zeithistoriker/innen: 
Wer schreibt die Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts?,” in Politische Gewalt und Machtausübung 
im 20. Jahrhundert: Zeitgeschichte, Zeitgeschehen und Kontroversen; Festschrift für Gerhard Botz, 
ed. Heinrich Berger, Melanie Dejnega, Regina Fritz, and Alexander Prenninger (Vienna: 
Böhlau, 2011), 59-71, especially: 64. 
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events have also, in the face of these anniversaries, centered on a historical 
approach. The trend can be seen above all in the increased archiving of 
migration.
III
To date, the histories of migration and migrants are insufficiently rep-
resented in established archives. There has been practically no systematic 
collection of materials on this topic, and important materials remain scat-
tered and widely unknown or—whether intentionally or not—have already 
been destroyed. Experienced historical knowledge and privately transmit-
ted knowledge are in danger of getting lost in generational shifts. It is an 
important and fundamental prerequisite for a new historical approach that 
the histories and experiences of migration are first collected in an archive, 
the most basic infrastructure of “collective memory.” Finally, it cannot be 
overlooked that state archives simply reproduce the hegemonic structures 
in society, or even produce and safeguard them: They do not merely collect 
but also constitute power machines of the state which produce knowledge 
and erase traces. This insight, which was formulated by the American 
anthropologist and historian Laura Ann Stoler in her work on colonial 
archives, is also relevant here.39  
As early as September 2012, in reference to the signing of the 
recruitment agreement with Spain, Arif Akkılıç und Ljubomir Bratić 
conducted a poster campaign in the framework of the Wienwoche, 
which brought three central demands into the public sphere: 50 Jahre 
Arbeitsmigration – Geschichtsschreibung jetzt / Gleichheit jetzt / Archiv jetzt 
(50 Years of Labor Migration – Historiography Now / Equality Now / 
Archive Now).40 The working group “Archiv der Migration,” which was 
founded in its wake, drew up a blueprint for an archive of migration 
39   Laura Ann Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” Archival Science 2 
(2002), 87–109.
40   See “Wienwoche 2012,” Verein zur Förderung der Stadtbenutzung, accessed Apr. 10, 
2013, www.wienwoche.org; as well as “Arbeitskreis Archiv der Migration,” accessed Sept. 
8, 2016, www.archivdermigration.at. The posters were designed by Toledo i Dertschei (Eva 
Dertschei, Carlos Toledo), Vienna. See also Arif Akkılıç and Ljubomir Bratić, “Aufruf für 
ein Archiv der Migration,” Stimme: Zeitschrift der Initiative Minderheiten 84 (Fall 2012), 27; 
as well as Wladimir Fischer, “Warum Österreich endlich ein Archiv der Migration braucht,” 
Die Presse, Oct. 3, 2012; Monika Mokre, “Was nicht in den Akten ist, ist nicht in der Welt: 
zum Projekt eines Archivs der Migration,” Kulturrisse: Zeitschrift für radikaldemokratische 
Kulturpolitik 3 (2012); Dirk Rupnow, “Migration braucht ein Archiv – aber was für eines?,” 
Wiener Zeitung, October 3, 2012; “Die verdrängte Migration: Experten wollen Archiv der 
Migration,” ORF.at, accessed Sept. 23, 2012, www.orf.at./stories/2140709. 
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in Austria.41 A renewed poster campaign with the demand for histori-
cization and an archive of migration, entitled 50 Jahre Anwerbeabkommen 
Österreich-Türkei, 15. Mai 1964-15. Mai 2014 (50 Years of the Recruitment 
Agreement Austria-Turkey, May 15, 1964 – May 15, 2014), was conduct-
ed in May 2014 in cooperation with Initiative Minderheiten: Some of the 
central aspects of the recruitment of so-called “guest workers” were the-
matized with historical quotations (for example the initially diminished 
attractiveness of Austria for foreign laborers by contrast to other countries 
of recruitment such as Germany and Switzerland, especially due to bad 
wage conditions, the living conditions of migrants of the first generation, 
or the interests of Austrian businesses). The logical conclusion was set by a 
poster with a quote from an interview from 2012 with a migrant who came 
to Austria as a “guest worker” in 1967: “Whether Turks or Yugoslavs, the 
guest workers built this country. This should be celebrated! After all, this is 
the history of Austria.”42 
In 2012, a Zentrum für Migrationsforschung (Center for Migration 
Studies) was established at the Institute of Rural History of the 
Lower Austrian State Archive in St. Pölten, which has acted as an 
independent association since 2015.43 It began its activities with 
an exhibition on the German-speaking displaced persons from 
Czechoslovakia in Lower Austria, but by now is dedicated to a broad 
and general migration history. In July, 2013, a complementary region-
al initiative was founded in Vorarlberg, namely the Vielfaltenarchiv 
– Dokumentationsstelle zur Migrationsgeschichte Vorarlbergs (Diversity 
Archive – Documentation Site for Migration History in Vorarlberg) 
in Dornbirn, a development of the previous collection and exhibition 
projects of the Bodensee Amateur Fotografen (Amateur Photographers 
41   The working group consists of Arif Akkılıç, Vida Bakondy, Ljubomir Bratić, Wladimir 
Fischer, Li Gerhalter, and Dirk Rupnow. For a while, it also included Belinda Kazeem. See 
www.archivdermigration.at. See also the contributions by Natalie Bayer, Ljubomir Bratić, Li 
Gerhalter, Zara Pfeiffer, and Hannes Sulzenbacher, as well as the interview by Gerd Valchars 
with Arif Akkılıç, Vida Bakondy, Ljubomir Bratić, and Dirk Rupnow, in Kulturrisse: 
Zeitschrift für radikaldemokratische Kulturpolitik 4 (2013): “¡Archiv der Migration, jetzt!,” as 
well as Dirk Rupnow, “Beschäftigung mit Geschichte ist kein Luxus: Wieso Österreich 
ein ’Archiv der Migration’ braucht,” Stimme: Zeitschrift der Initiative Minderheiten 89 
(Winter 2013), 8-9 (as well as the further contributions in ibid. by Vida Bakondy, Wladimir 
Fischer, Vladimir Ivanović, Dirk Rupnow, Verena Sauermann/Veronika Settele, and Theresa 
Weitzhofer-Yurtişik) and “‘… Prozesse und Logiken, die vor allem die privilegierte Mehrheit 
verlernen muss’: Gespräch mit Marissa Lôbo und Dirk Rupnow,” Bildpunkt: Zeitschrift der 
IG Bildende Kunst (Spring 2014), 10-12.
42   The posters are also available under www.archivdermigration.at. They were designed by 
Beatrix Bakondy, Vienna. They were printed in Der Standard, May 15, 2014.
43   See www.migrationsforschung.at (accessed September 8, 2014).
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of the Bodensee, BAF).44 Initiated and run by a group of post-mi-
gratory Vorarlberg citizens from Turkish families, its aim is “the docu-
mentation, research, and dissemination of migration history in Austria, 
especially in Vorarlberg, with a particular focus on labor migration since 
industrialization.” Through cooperation with communal archives and edu-
cational or cultural institutes it intends to “document and disseminate a 
significant part of Austrian and especially Vorarlberg history.” It places 
special importance on its cooperation with the Vorarlberg state museum.
The City of Salzburg also announced its intentions in the anniversary 
year of 2014 to collect photos and documents of migrants and to begin an 
interview collection in the city archive, in cooperation with the University 
of Salzburg.45 Aside from labor migration to Salzburg, this will also address 
internal migration within Salzburg, Austria, and Europe, as well as emi-
gration from Salzburg. Finally, the Municipal Department for Integration 
and Diversity (MA17) of the City of Vienna put out a call in September 
2014 together with the Wien Museum (Vienna City Museum) for a project 
entitled Migration Sammeln (Collecting Migration). This secured objects 
relevant to the history of the so-called “guest worker migration,” albeit only 
temporarily until the summer of 2016, which are now housed in the collec-
tions of the Wien Museum.46
Whether a federal institution or further regional institutions is/are 
required is still an open question. What remains decisive and should not 
be forgotten is that this task concerns not only the federal capital Vienna, 
but also the provinces. Moreover, it requires a general transition in con-
sciousness and a rethinking of existing institutions (archives, museums, and 
so forth) —as in society as a whole—and a critical evaluation as well as, if 
necessary, an expansion or change in existing practices of collecting.
The new Vorarlberg state museum has already taken an important step 
in this direction: In the exhibitions organized for its re-opening in 2013, 
entitled buchstäblich vorarlberg (literally Vorarlberg), vorarlberg. ein mak-
ing-of (Vorarlberg: a making-of ), and Sein & Mein. Ein Land als akustische 
44   See www.vielfaltenarchiv.at and www.bafart.com (accessed September 8, 2014) as well 
as the exhibition “Arbeyter: Bodensee Amateur Fotografen, Fotografien,” Emsiana 2013, 
Hohenems. See also Fatih Özcelik and Dirk Rupnow, “Migration – Geschichte – Archiv: 
Aktuelle Herausforderungen und Projekte aus Anlass von 50 Jahren Anwerbeabkommen 
Österreich – Türkei 1964, in museums verein jahrbuch: Jahrbuch des Vorarlberger 
Landesmuseumsvereins 2014, ed. Brigitte Truschnegg (Bregenz: Bertolini, 2014), 148-169.
45   Aussendung der Stadt Salzburg: Kommen – Gehen – Bleiben: Migrationsstadt Salzburg 
1960-1990, Pressegespräch Stadt & Uni zur Ausstellung am Makartsteg vom 23. Mai bis 6. 
Juli (May 22, 2014).
46   Arif Akkılıç, Vida Bakondy, Ljubomir Bratić, and Regina Wonisch, eds., Schere Topf 
Papier: Objekte zur Migrationsgeschichte (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2016).
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Passage (His & Mine: A State as an Acoustic Passage), which approach 
regional history in a variety of ways while thereby focusing strongly on 
its most recent history, the experiences and histories of migration become 
an integral part of the narrative. This has set a new standard, which other 
institutions in the country will have to take into account in the future. A 
problem here, however, is that contemporary history is generally profound-
ly under-represented in Austria’s state museums.
A still exemplary and benchmark-setting exhibition, conceptualized 
by Initiative Minderheiten and shown in 2004 in the Wien Museum, is 
Gastarbajteri: 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration (Gastarbajteri [Yugoslav, derived 
from the German Gastarbeiter—guest worker]: 40 Years of Labor 
Migration). It aimed, in the face of the fortieth anniversary of the signing of 
the recruitment agreement with Turkey, “to view the lives of the immigrants, 
who have since the sixties and seventies become an increasingly relevant 
part of the population of this country, as an equally important part of the 
social history of this country.”47 Gastarbajteri represented a first impetus for 
the collection and presentation of the history of labor migration in Austria. 
It was trailblazing not least of all as a bottom-up initiative of Initiative 
Minderheiten, which also involved migrant actors, but it unfortunately did 
not have a lasting effect since it did not succeed in securing the collected 
materials and making them accessible at a suitable location.
The new trend toward the historicization of migration is, in any case, 
obvious, even if not in all projects historians and/or academic institutions 
are involved, but often NGOs, associations, and activists.48 The 2013 
petition by the National Council representative of the Green party Alev 
Korun for the establishment of a museum of migration also points in this 
direction. Korun argued, among other things, that “a museum of migration 
with permanent and changing exhibitions” could contribute “much […] 
to social enlightenment about national and European histories of migra-
tion, mobility in the age of globalization, as well as to the emergence and 
change of identities and inclusion and exclusion.” She pointed out that the 
establishment of a “critical museum of migration” would also enable “an 
engagement with the blank spaces in the memory of societies and in the 
official writing of history.”49 Reactions to this petition have, however, so far 
been minimal. To what extent the Haus der Geschichte Österreich (House of 
47   See Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia Mattl, eds., Gastarbajteri: 40 Jahre 
Arbeitsmigration (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2004), exhibition catalog, 23. See also the online 
version, http://www.gastarbajteri.at (accessed June 22, 2012).
48   Ljubomir Bratić, Politischer Antirassismus: Selbstorganisation, Historisierung als Strategie 
und diskursive Interventionen (Vienna: Löcker, 2010), especially: 137-139. 
49   2244/A(E) XXIV. GP – Entschließungsantrag, March 21, 2013.
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History Austria), which was greenlit by the National Council in April 2016 
after a long and extremely complex prehistory and is currently being estab-
lished, will take on this function remains to be seen. In the proposals of the 
international academic advisory board, migration was named explicitly as 
an issue that cuts across all areas of content.50
This opens a new working field for contemporary history, which more-
over corresponds to the current need for transnational European and global 
histories, in which the regional and the local nevertheless remains visible.51 
This can also connect to a whole range of traditions and discussions, such 
as about a social history from the margins, emanating from minorities and 
the marginalized.52 The acquisition of new source materials—which has 
ever been a central task of contemporary history53—is in any case of central 
importance to the examination of this topic. Relevant materials will not 
only have to be discovered in existing archives, it will be important above 
all to search for and to secure potential inventories (for example in con-
sulting centers, migrant associations, and so forth).54 Beyond this, it will be 
necessary to generate interviews with contemporary witnesses in order to 
preserve their experiences and memories. Without them, a new, multi-per-
spective view of Austrian history will be impossible.
Archiving will certainly not be the end result, but collecting and pre-
serving is nevertheless a first and decisive foundational step, a precondition 
50   Oliver Rathkolb, ed., Umsetzungsstrategie für das Haus der Geschichte Österreich: Ideen 
und Entwürfe des Internationalen Wissenschaftlichen Beirates, Sept. 4, 2015, accessed May 25, 
2016, http://www.hdgoe.at/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/HGOE_Strategie_Download.
pdf. In the framework of the international academic advisory board of the Haus der 
Geschichte, a working group on migration was created consisting of Dirk Rupnow, Maria 
Stassinopoulou (Institute for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies/University of Vienna), 
and Werner Hanak-Lettner ( Jewish Museum Vienna). On the origins of the Haus der 
Geschichte, see Dirk Rupnow, “Nation ohne Museum? Diskussionen, Konzepte und 
Projekte,” in Zeitgeschichte ausstellen in Österreich: Museen – Gedenkstätten – Ausstellungen, ed. 
Dirk Rupnow and Heidemarie Uhl  (Vienna: Böhlau,  2011), 417-463.
51   See Michael Gehler, Zeitgeschichte im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem: Zwischen 
Regionalisierung, Nationalstaat, Europäisierung, internationaler Arena und Globalisierung, 
Herausforderungen 12 (Bochum: Winkler, 2001), as well as Hanisch, “Dominanz des 
Staates,” 76.
52   Ingrid Bauer, “Von den Autobahnen der Erkenntnis – und versäumten Ausfahrten,” 
L’Homme 7 (1996), 206-211.
53   On the significance of the acquisition of source materials, see Hans Rothfels, 
“Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 1, no. 1 (1953), 1-8, here: 
3-4, as well as the earlier contribution by Justus Hashagen, Das Studium der Zeitgeschichte 
(Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1915), 25-32. 
54   In this context, it is problematic that the central actors in the “guest worker employment” in 
Austria—the Federal Economic Chamber and the Trade Union Federation—as associations 
are not obliged to preserve documentation. This has already led to the destruction of many 
important materials, while others are accessible only with great difficulty.
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for all else; without an archive there is no writing of history. Finally, this is 
not only about writing the history of migration, but also, writing migration 
and migrants into history; this is about changing general perceptions: to 
see migration and migrants as a self-evident, visible, and audible part of the 
present and the past.
IV
This opens up a range of questions which are fundamental to every 
engagement with history, but are often not explicitly addressed: Whose 
(hi)stories are being told? Who is telling (hi)stories? Who is allowed to 
tell (hi)stories? Whose (hi)stories are being heard? Migration must be 
told as a lived reality, not only as an exception and a problem; the margin-
alized must be centered. Migrants must themselves tell this history and 
(co-)author it. Finally, this is not about a segregated (ghetto-)history of 
migration and migrants, but about an inclusive history that does justice 
to the everyday plurality and the shifts in contemporary Austria. A his-
tory of migration and migrants is here an indispensable prerequisite. The 
concept of a migration history can simultaneously only be an aiding term, 
because this is about significantly more than just the process of migration 
in the narrower sense; rather, it is about the representation of plurality and 
social change. This goes hand-in-hand with the discussion surrounding the 
Entmigrantisierung (demigrantization) of migration studies and simulta-
neously the Migrantisierung (migrantization) of social studies currently 
taking place in the field of migration studies.55 As ever, the terms we use 
to describe the objects of our research are of central importance and by no 
means only peripherally relevant. It will be decisive not to create further 
invisibilities while simultaneously not encouraging the construction of an 
“other” in the course of the development of a “migrantology.”56
The traditional, implicit, ethnically-formulated national history of the 
Second Republic, with its established narratives of prosperity and the wel-
fare state or neutrality and the path into the EU, but also of the “first victim” 
or of (co-)perpetrators of the crimes of the Third Reich and the resulting 
55   Manuela Bojadžijev and Regina Römhild, “Was kommt nach dem ‘transnational 
turn’? Perspektiven für eine kritische Migrationsforschung,” in Vom Rand ins Zentrum: 
Perspektiven einer kritischen Migrationsforschung, ed. Labor Migration, Berliner Blätter 65 
(Berlin: Panama, 2014), 10-24.
56   In this context, see also Stephan Lanz, Berlin aufgemischt: Abendländisch – multikulturell 
– kosmopolitisch? Die politische Konstruktion einer Einwanderungsstadt (Bielefeld: Transcript, 
2007), 86-96, and his description and criticism of “Ausländerforschung” (the study of 
foreigners). 
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memory cultures and/or history-political distortions cannot contribute 
anything here.57 This, of course, does not mean that these core narratives 
have lost their meaning. However, they are not merely augmented, but 
moreover transformed, through the focus on migration and the perspectives 
of migrants.
Beyond this, the broader historical context naturally has to be taken 
into account. Migration is by no means a phenomenon new to the Second 
Republic. Above all, it is not possible to speak of foreignness and construc-
tions of foreignness in the second half of the twentieth century in Austria 
as in Germany without thereby taking into account that these countries 
have a catastrophic history of racism, persecution, expulsion, and geno-
cide. This includes also colonial experiences of racism and violence. This is 
evident for example in the development of terms such as Ausländer- and 
Fremdenfeindlichkeit (both meaning xenophobia) in the 1970s as terms of 
substitution, since (structural) racism in our society has since the Holocaust 
not been perceived as such or been systematically blanked out.58 Equally, 
habitual references to “prejudices” reduce racism and antisemitism to indi-
vidual errors while thereby masking the fact that these are not exceptional 
phenomena but rather a dominant conception of the members of a society 
about their society, a complex of “racist knowledge.”59 
Furthermore, one cannot speak about “guest workers” without a view 
toward the history of forced labor and foreign laborers in World War II. 
Aside from this history, which is shared by Austria and Germany, it is of 
course necessary not to forget the Austrian prehistory of Habsburg interior 
migration, especially from Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Galicia to the 
57   See Verena Sauermann, “‘doing difference:’ Zur Repräsentation von Migration und 
Migrant_innen in historischen Gesamtdarstellungen, Museen und Ausstellungen,” (diploma 
thesis, Universität Innsbruck, 2011). 
58   See Mark Terkessidis, Psychologie des Rassismus (Opladen: Westdt. Verlag, 1998); Mark 
Terkessidis, Die Banalität des Rassismus: Migranten zweiter Generation entwickeln eine neue 
Perspektive, Kultur und soziale Praxis (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2004). In this context, see also 
David Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning (Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell, 1993); David Theo Goldberg, The Racial State (Oxford: Wiley, 2002). The 
inability of post-Nazi German society of perceiving its own racism as such is also evident 
in the treatment of the murders of migrants by a neo-Nazi terror cell: These were for a 
long time presented as crimes taking place within a “criminal milieu of foreigners,” while 
a racist motive was—intentionally or not—completely dismissed. See for example Michael 
Rothberg, “Neo-Nazi Terror and Germany’s Racism Problem,” openDemocracy, December 
16, 2011, accessed June 22, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/michael-rothberg/neo-
nazi-terror-and-germany%E2%80%99s-racism-problem. 
59   See Mark Terkessidis, “Woven into the texture of things: Rassismus als praktische 
Einheit von Wissen und Institution,” in Evidenzen im Fluß: Demokratieverlust in Deutschland, 
ed. Andreas Disselnkötter, Siegfried Jäger, Helmut Kellershohn, and Susanne Slobodzian 
(Duisburg: DISS, 1997), 172-187. 
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metropolis Vienna, which in 1840 was composed of up to 40% of “for-
eigners” who lived and worked in the city, where “colonial attitudes” toward 
the immigrants from the provinces were omnipresent, as Moritz Csáky 
recently explicated.60    
Migration is an originally transnational phenomenon. The traditional 
frame of the nation state is here preserved, not least of all due to the sig-
nificance of various national legal systems, but it is thereby simultaneously 
and continually also breached and subverted. Other levels—the local and 
regional—are enhanced since it is here that the new society is practiced 
every day. Migration systems and migrant biographies and networks 
simultaneously connect spaces to Austrian history which do not classically 
belong; above all, migrants’ places, regions, and countries of origin with 
their respective histories which led to their migration, as well as the plac-
es to which they – themselves transformed – migrate onward or return.61 
Migration not only opens complex spaces but also complex temporal con-
nections through their manifold associations in memory. Transnationality 
should therefore be understood as an analytical perspective in which the 
nation remains an important frame of reference but where the established 
logic of the national is repeatedly and fundamentally challenged and put to 
the test. Transnational and national developments take place in a complicat-
ed interrelationship with each other, just as various transnational processes, 
which are referred to, for example, as Europeanization or globalization, 
influence each other, overlap with each other, and compete with each other. 
The national frame is here not simply dissolved, but very much influenced 
and crisscrossed by transnational streams. The global and local/regional are 
thereby mixed, a process of hybridization known as “glocalization.”62
Migration radically and pervasively challenges the format of national 
history and its established grand narratives. Therefore to name it and to 
60   Moritz Csáky, Das Gedächtnis der Städte: Kulturelle Verflechtungen – Wien und die urbanen 
Milieus in Zentraleuropa (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 222-230, 345-356. Csáky also speaks in 
this context of an “inner colonization.”
61   See Regina Römhild, “Global Heimat Germany: Migration and the Transnationalization 
of the Nation-State,” Transit 1, no. 1 (2004) accessed June 22, 2012, http://escholarship.
org/uc/item/57z2470p. On the paradigm of transnationalism, see Sabine Strasser, “Über 
Grenzen verbinden: Rezente Debatten zur Migrationsforschung in der Sozial- und 
Kulturanthropologie,” in Rezente Debatten zur Migrationsforschung, ed. Heinz Fassmann 
and Julia Dahlvik (Göttingen: V&R, 2011), 33-56 (here 41-51); María do Mar Castro 
Varela and Paul Mecheril, “Migration,” in Integration, Rassismen und Weltwirtschaftskrise, ed. 
Gerhard Hetfleisch and Manfred Oberlechner (Wien: Braumüller, 2010), 385-411 (here 
394-396).
62   Roland Robertson, “Glokalisierung: Homogenität und Heterogenität in Raum und 
Zeit,” in Perspektiven der Weltgesellschaft, ed. Ulrich Beck (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
1998), 192–220.
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focus on it clearly as such has a strategic function. This is a transnational 
history par excellence: globalization takes place daily in situ, the trans-
gression and subversion of boundaries is constantly practiced.63 This is in 
the best sense a “divided history,” in the sense of “divided” and “shared” at 
once, an “entangled history” and histoire croisée (crossed history), as in fact 
every history always is, with all the ambivalences which bring exchange and 
interaction in their wake, including the ever-repeatedly produced inclu-
sions and exclusion.64 History can therefore only henceforth be understood 
as transnational in the true sense of the word, undermining and perforating 
borders, without entirely abrogating them.65 However, the nationalism of 
the humanities, which is not only methodological, largely prevents this 
from being appropriately taken on board.
As with any history, this (new) history will also never be told in full, but 
at best in extracts and fragments. Most historical representations of course 
like to conceal this fact and attempt to awaken the impression of a rounded 
and closed “history.” Here, the “nation” above all else offered the frame and 
scope of reference, but also the legitimacy. Whatever did not fit neatly and 
without problems was and is happily erased and “written out.” In reality, 
beyond historiography, this closedness and purity was often attempted to 
be realized by force, including through the participation of historians and 
often employing history as an argument.
With a view toward migration, there was to finally be a departure from 
the fallacious imagining of a complete and closed history. A fragmented 
history would also be a more honest history, which unravels not only at the 
63   Yildiz, Stadt; Römhild, “Heimat.”
64   Shalani Randeria, “Geteilte Geschichte und verwobene Moderne,” in Zukunftsentwürfe: 
Ideen für eine Kultur der Veränderung, ed. Jörn Rüsen, Hanna Leitgeb, and Norbert Jegelka 
(Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1999), 87-96; Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria, 
“Einleitung: Geteilte Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt,” in Jenseits des 
Eurozentrismus: Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichte- und Kulturwissenschaften, ed. 
Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2002), 9-49 (here: 17).
65   From the wealth of literature, see for example—with fundamentally different positions 
and accentuation—Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Christina Szanton Blanc, 
“From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration,” Anthropological 
Quaterly 68, no. 1 (1995), 48-63; Ludger Pries, “Migration und Integration in Zeiten der 
Transnationalisierung; oder, Warum braucht Deutschland eine ‘Kulturrevolution’?,”  iza: 
Zeitschrift für Migration und soziale Arbeit 23, no. 1 (2001), 14-19; Andreas Wimmer and 
Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of 
Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology,” International Migration Review 37, no. 
3 (2003), 576-610; Michael Bommes, “Der Mythos des transnationalen Raumes; oder, 
Worin besteht die Herausforderung des Transnationalismus für die Migrationsforschung,” 
in Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat, ed. Dietrich Thränhardt 
and Uwe Hunger, Leviathan Sonderhefte 22 (Wiesbaden: Westdt. Verlag, 2003), 90-116; 
Michael Bommes, “Transnationalism or Assimilation,” Journal of Social Science Education 4, 
no. 1 (2005), 14-30. 
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edges but on every level. It would also be immune to becoming legitimizing 
history for new and always exclusionary projects, whether on a national 
or—ever more frequently—on the international level. An understanding of 
history, however, remains equally strategically important. With a perspec-
tive on the past, conceptions of possibility and change can develop. Critical 
remembrance is a necessary instrument to displace ossified perspectives and 
to “unlearn” them.66 The demand is, of course, for a history that realized its 
potential for inclusion and does not always buy this with a simultaneous 
and new exclusion.
The field of contemporary history is today – as it always has been, 
but now perhaps to a greater degree – confronted with a range of chal-
lenges: the temporal delineation of its jurisdiction is becoming ever less 
clear; a multitude of narrators and actors, not least of all contemporary 
witnesses, stand in public competition with the professional historian; 
simultaneously, an increasing range of media and genres are competing 
over the presentation of the most recent past, including even fictional-
ized approaches to history; being part of the culture of memory as well 
as its critical counterpart at the same time, produces a complex entan-
glement which demands constant reflection.67 To this is added the fact 
that the reality of the society of migration cannot just be an object of 
contemporary history, but also necessarily its precondition and its frame. 
Contemporary history still needs to come to terms with this fact and all 
of its consequences. Thereby the normative-homogeneous concept of a 
“collective memory” is once again challenged. More plural and hetero-
geneous “collected memories” should be put in the place of “collective 
memories”; these collected memories should moreover be exchanged, 
shared, and recognized.68
66   María do Mar Castro Varely, “Interkulturelle Kompetenz, Integration und Ausgrenzung,” 
in Interkulturelle Kompetenz im Wandel, ed. Matthias Otten, Alexander Scheitza, and Andrea 
Cnyrim, vol. 1, Grundlegungen, Konzepte und Diskurse, SIETAR Deutschland – Beiträge zur 
interkulturellen Zusammenarbeit 1 (Frankfurt am Main: IKO, 2007), 155-169 (here: 167). 
67   See Martin Sabrow, Zeitgeschichte schreiben: Von der Verständigung über die Vergangenheit 
in der Gegenwart (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2014), especially: 133-146.
68   Michele Barricelli, “Collected Memories statt kollektives Gedächtnis: Zeitgeschichte 
in der Migrationsgesellschaft,” in Handbuch Zeitgeschichte im Geschichtsunterricht, ed. Markus 
Furrer and Kurt Messmer (Schwalbach am Taunus: Wochenschau, 2013), 89-118.
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V
In Germany, the topic of migration has already been adopted by 
contemporary history, even if not to the desirable extent.69 Germany, as 
a country of immigration, is in any case the focus of a whole range of new 
English-language studies. These examine not least of all the continuities 
between racism in the Nazi era and in post-war Germany, as also between 
the treatment of “foreign” or forced laborers in the Nazi era and “foreign” or 
“guest laborers” in the Federal Republic.70 The field is obviously booming 
and becoming ever more nuanced, not least of all through the multilateral 
cultural research questions and approaches. Historians seem to be playing 
something of a secondary role, however, even though historical perspectives 
are increasingly discernible.71 
69   See for example Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland 1880 
bis 1980: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter (Berlin: Dietz, 1986); Ulrich Herbert, 
Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, 
Flüchtlinge (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001); Karin Hunn, “Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück…”: 
Die Geschichte der türkischen “Gastarbeiter” in der Bundesrepublik, Moderne Zeit 11 (Göttingen: 
Wallstein, 2005); Karen Schönwälder, Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität: Politische 
Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er 
bis zu den 1970er Jahren (Essen: Klartext, 2001); Manuela Bojadžijev and Massimo Perinelli, 
“Die Herausforderung der Migration: Migrantische Lebenswelten in der Bundesrepublik in 
den siebziger Jahren,” in Das Alternative Milieu: Antibürgerlicher Lebensstil und linke Politik 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Europa 1968-1983, ed. Sven Reichardt and Detlef 
Siegfried, Hamburger Beiträge zur Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte 47 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 
2010), 131-145; Oliver Janz, and Roberto Sala, eds., Dolce Vita? Das Bild der italienischen 
Migranten in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2011). See also the seminal 
works of the Osnabrück-based historian and migration researcher Klaus Bade: Population, 
Labour and Migration in 19th- and 20th-Century Germany, German Historical Perspectives 
(Leamington Spa: Bloomsbury Academic, 1987); Europa in Bewegung: Migration vom späten 
18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, Europa bauen (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000); Sozialhistorische 
Migrationsforschung, Studien zur Historischen Migrations-forschung 13 (Göttingen: V&R, 
2004); and co-edited with Pieter C. Emmer, Leo Lucassen, and Jochen Oltmer: Enzyklopädie 
Migration in Europa: Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (Paderborn: Schöhningh, 2007).
70   See for example Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2007); Rita Chin et al., After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy 
in Germany and Europe (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2009); Ruth Mandel, Cosmopolitan 
Anxieties, Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany (Durham: Duke UP, 2008); 
as well as the helpful reader: Deniz Göktürk, David Gramling, and Anton Kaes, eds., Germany 
in Transit: Nation and Migration 1955-2005, Weimar and Now: German Cultural Criticism 
(Berkeley: U of California P, 2007). The conference “Good-bye Germany? Migration, Culture, 
and the Nation-State” also took place at the University of California, Berkeley, in 2004. Some 
of the contributions were published in Transit 1, no. 1 (2004), accessed June 22, 2012, http://
www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4pf6t335?display=all. See there for example: Werner Sollors, 
“Good-bye Germany,” accessed June 22, 2012, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7nm7g8vt. 
71   See for example the contributions in Şeyda Ozil, Michael Hofmann, and Yasemin 
Dayıoğlu-Yücel, eds., 50 Jahre türkische Arbeitsmigration in Deutschland, Türkisch-deutsche 
Studien – Jahrbuch 2011 (Göttingen: V&R, 2011).
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In Germany, a public debate has also been on-going for several years 
now on the necessary musealization of the history of migrants.72 As 
early as 1990, the DOMiT, Dokumentationszentrum und Museum über die 
Migration aus der Türkei e.V. (The Documentation Center and Museum of 
Migration from Turkey), was founded as an independent organization of 
Turkish migrants in order to preserve their historical heritage for future 
generations. The initiative went public with a number of exhibitions and 
Internet projects, such as in 1998 with the exhibition Fremde Heimat. Eine 
Geschichte der Einwanderung aus der Türkei (Foreign Homeland: A History 
of Immigration from Turkey), which took place at the Ruhrlandmuseum 
in Essen. This was followed in 2005/06 by a large social history and art 
exhibition in several locations in Cologne entitled Projekt Migration, which 
was realized in cooperation with the Cologne Kunstverein, the Institute 
for Cultural Anthropology and European Ethnology at the University of 
Frankfurt am Main, and the Institute for Theory of Design and Art at the 
School of Design and Art in Zurich, and was supported by the German 
Federal Foundation for Culture. The social and cultural historical collec-
tion of the association was here augmented with materials on migration 
from Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia, Ex-Yugoslavia, 
South Korea, Vietnam, Mozambique, and Angola, which led in 2005 
to the changing of its name to DOMiD, Dokumentationszentrum und 
Museum über die Migration in Deutschland e.V. (Documentation Center and 
Museum of Migration in Germany).73 In 2007, it fused with the associa-
tion Migrationsmuseum in Deutschland e.V., thus bringing together migrants 
of various backgrounds with Germans without a migration background.
The demand for an independent museum has, however, by no means 
fallen silent in Germany: Aytaç Eryılmaz, until 2012 the managing director 
of DOMiD in Cologne, is continually calling for a “museum of migration 
as a center for the history, art, and culture of migration” and as “a key to a 
more encompassing social history,” “a place at which Germany can learn 
72   See Jan Motte, and Rainer Ohliger, eds., Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der 
Einwanderungsgesellschaft (Essen: Klartext, 2004). See also Christiane Hintermann and 
Christina Johansson, eds., Migration and Memory: Representations of Migration in Europe 
since 1960, Studies in European History and Public Spheres 3 (Innsbruck: Transaction, 
2010). 
73   See Dokumentationszentrum und Museum über die Migration in Deutschland e.V., 
http://www.domid.org, as well as Aytaç Eryılmaz, and Mathilde Jamin, eds., Fremde Heimat: 
Eine Geschichte der Einwanderung aus der Türkei / Yaban, Sılan olur: Türkiye’den Almanya’ya 
Göçün Tarihi (Essen: Klartext, 1999); Cologne Kunstverein, DOMiT, Institute for Cultural 
Anthropology and European Ethnology at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of 
Frankfurt am Main, and Institute for Theory of Design and Art at the School of Design and 
Art in Zurich, eds., Projekt Migration, (Cologne: DuMont, 2005). 
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to discover and understand itself as a country of immigration.”74 In 2015, 
Rita Süßmuth, as patron of the project DOMiD, which by then was under 
new direction with the former president of the Bundestag, had begun a new 
attempt at realizing a central museum of migration in Germany.
The national German integration plan, Neue Wege – Neue Chancen 
(New Paths – New Opportunities), of 2007 dedicated a chapter to the 
topic Kultur und Integration (Culture and Integration). This claimed, for 
example, that “immigration and integration […] are a part of our history.” 
The cultural achievements of migrants was to be given more space and the 
history of migration to be made more visible, but above all the focus was 
to lie on “successful historical integration processes as a part of our own 
cultural heritage”: not migration, but “integration should be the cross-cut-
ting theme for cultural institutions.”75 The issue here is, very pragmatically, 
winning over migrants as a target group for cultural institutions. Traditional 
conceptions of integration, however, remain dominant, above all the notion 
of achievement(s) that migrants are supposed to produce, “us” and “them,” 
culture and values, and so forth.
In response, the German Museums Association published a 
Handreichung für die Museumsarbeit (Handout for Museum Work) in 2015 
on the topic “Museums, Migration, and Cultural Diversity.”76 This made 
suggestions for all levels of museum work: collections (to survey existing 
collections anew, to develop new strategies for collecting, to identify pre-
viously overlooked materials), exhibitions (migration is to be regarded in 
an appropriate form as a cross-cutting theme in permanent exhibitions, 
while changing exhibitions should increasingly implement intercultural 
perspectives), and dissemination (with the goal of overcoming the distinc-
tion between persons “with and without a migration background”), all the 
way to the demand for increasing the proportion of those persons “with 
migration background” working in all sectors of the museums in the long 
term. Participation here becomes the key to preserving and making visible 
the history of migration: “In the documentation and presentation of the 
history of migration, museums are dependent on individuals, associations, 
and organizations as advisors and participants. Without these people and 
74   Aytaç Eryılmaz, “Migrationsgeschichte und die nationalstaatliche Perspektive in 
Archiven und Museen, in Museum und Migration: Konzepte – Kontexte – Kontroversen,” 
ed. Regina Wonisch and Thomas Hübel (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2012), 33-48, 47-48.
75   Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, and Die Beauftragte der 
Bundesregierung für Migration, eds., Der nationale Integrationsplan: Neue Wege – Neue 
Chance (2007), 127–136. 
76   Deutscher Museumsbund, ed., Museen, Migration und kulturelle Vielfalt: Handreichungen 
für die Museumsarbeit (Berlin: BGZ, 2015).
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their experiences, there can neither be new potential questions asked of 
existing collections nor new perspectives developed.”77
Internationally, the discussion surrounding migration and museums 
has advanced greatly. The classic countries of immigration have already long 
dedicated themselves to the issue in a range of special institutions: So for 
example the Ellis Island National Museum of Immigration in New York 
City (since 1990), the Immigration Museum in Melbourne (since 1998), 
or the Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21 in Halifax (since 
1999). Since 2007, France also has an immigration museum, the Cité natio-
nale de l ’histoire de l ’immigration (The National Center for the History of 
Immigration) in Paris, surprisingly housed in the building that was created 
for the Paris Colonial Exposition of 1931.78
International examples of migration archives are by contrast not too 
numerous, but they do exist. A leading role in this regard is played, for 
example, by the Immigration History Research Center Archives at the 
University of Minnesota, and by the French NGO Génériques, which has 
since 1992 worked on the collection, documentation, and preservation of 
materials relevant to the history of migration in the framework of a part-
nership with the French National Archives.79 The collections of DoMiD in 
Cologne, finally, comprise over 100,000 books, gray literature, newspapers, 
journals, original documents, photographs, films, audio documents, flyers, 
posters, and material artifacts.80
VI
Turning migration and migrants into an integral part of Austrian 
history in order to understand it as pluralistic and transnational and to 
narrate anew is by no means an easy task when on the outside—in reality 
—racism is on the rise, clean-cut oppositions between different cultures are 
seen as beyond dispute, and borders are becoming fortified again, thereby 
establishing and presenting them as controllable and impermeable, even 
77   Museumsbund, Museen, 29.
78   On their (controversial) origins, collection practices, and presentation principles and 
forms, there exists a range of analyses and studies and a relatively expansive literature: 
Joachim Baur, Die Musealisierung der Migration: Einwanderungsmuseen und die Inszenierung 
der multikulturellen Nation (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009); Laurence Gouriévidis, ed., Museums 
and Migration: History, Memory and Politics (London: Routledge, 2014); Wonisch and 
Hübel,  Museum und Migration.
79   Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, accessed Nov. 1, 2016, 
http://cla.umn.edu/ihrc; Génériques, accessed Nov. 1, 2016, www.generiques.org.
80   DOMiD, accessed Nov. 1, 2016, www.domid.org.
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if ultimately total control and total impermeability are impossible, unless 
fundamental human rights are ignored and states resort to violence.         
The current situation in Austria is extremely complex: in the emerging 
engagement with Austria’s recent history of migration within the last three 
or four years, there has been an obvious focus on the so-called guest worker 
migration of the 1960s and 1970s. Simultaneously, the so-called “refugee 
crisis” has since last year absorbed so much attention it almost delegitimizes 
any engagement with history when it comes to migration by contrast to the 
immediate needs of the present and concrete plans for the future. It also 
seems to delegitimize a focus on structured labor migration by contrast to 
the specifics of refugee movements.  
First, the recent focus on labor migration is more than understandable 
due to the anniversaries, and the attention they attract, which we as historians 
can and should use, and the fact that the first generation of labor migrants 
from Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia in Austria is dying off. There is a pressing 
need for a systematic examination and preservation of information, materials, 
and documents to counteract the continuing danger of their disappearance.
Second, it definitely makes sense to start with labor migration, even if 
we want to draw conclusions relevant to the present day. The differences 
between labor migration and refugee movements seem obvious, but both 
phenomena have always been interconnected and are not easily separable. 
The historic cases of refugee movements to post-war Austria – refugees 
from Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1981, or 
Jews from the Soviet Union through many years – are part of the established 
hegemonic narrative of the Second Republic but pose no lasting challenge 
to Austria as a nation: most of these refugees left the country after a short 
time, using Austria only to “pass through” but not to stay. They had a very 
small effect on Austria’s demographics, yet they nevertheless occupy a sig-
nificant place in the collective memory of the country as examples of its 
readiness to help and its solidarity. 
If we want to understand diversity and plurality in Austria today, the 
history of labor migration in the 1960s and 1970s seems a good place to 
start. All those who share this new interest in a historical approach to 
migration know that this can only be a starting point for rethinking and 
reconfiguring the history of post-war Austria as an inclusive history. Since 
we have not processed those stories and histories yet, we have been totally 
unprepared for what has been happening since last year. This is the failure of 
the historians, and it is still the biggest challenge of our profession to realize 
history’s great potential for inclusion without producing new marginaliza-
tions and exclusions.

From the Late Habsburg Empire to 
World War II

Migration Patterns in the Late Habsburg Empire
Annemarie Steidl
Regional mobility took many different forms. People moved 
shorter and longer distances, passed over administrative, geographi-
cal, or cultural borders, went back and forth between rural and urban 
areas, migrated to a neighboring country, or even crossed oceans. 
While some migrations consisted of a one-time move from one 
place of residence to another, other movements, even across national 
borders, were temporary, circular, or repeated. Even if a move may 
have been permanent from the perspective of the migrant, she or 
he may have left only the home country permanently, but remained, 
for some stretches of time, in more than one host region. Migrations 
are omnipresent characteristics of all human societies, yet they could 
differ considerably in terms of purpose, distance, intended duration, 
or types of migrants involved. Various migration patterns emerged, 
were transformed, and also disappeared according to changing social, 
demographic, economic, and political circumstances. Regional mobil-
ity within the vast empires of nineteenth-century Europe proved 
particularly difficult to classify as internal or international. Significant 
movements could take place within the territories of single empires, 
yet other migrations, which seemed strictly local or regional, crossed 
imperial borders.1
Transatlantic moves were important phenomena during the second half 
of the nineteenth century; however, four times as many people migrated 
from Eastern and Southern to Central and Western Europe. Most countries 
that have been sources of large-scale out-migration have also experienced 
significant levels of migration within their borders. The massive overseas 
movement of nearly 60 million Europeans before World War I was itself 
part of a still much larger migration within Europe during the same period. 
In the decades preceding the war, multidirectional labor migration swept 
1   See Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Connecting Seas 
and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations 
from the 1830s to the 1930s, ed. Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 
1-11.
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through Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of accelerated urban-
ization and industrialization.2 Research on migration patterns in Imperial 
Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary has come to similar conclusions, 
with internal migration rates about three times as large as international 
ones in 1910 (either within Europe or overseas); a minority of the highly 
mobile people left for the United States.3 As a contemporary Hungarian 
statistician, Imre Ferenczi, emphasized in a paper given in the 1930s:
Die verschiedenen, aus dem freien Willen der Einzelnen, 
entstandenen inneren und äußeren Wanderungsströme gingen 
bis zum Weltkriege kaum behindert ineinander über, ergänzten 
und ersetzten einander nach dem Gesetz des geringsten Druckes. 
Die hunderttausend Slowaken, die jährlich aus ihren Bergen 
in die reiche ungarische Tiefebene zum Schnitt herabstiegen, 
wurden oft von den noch ärmeren Ruthenen ersetzt, während die 
Ungarn, von den höheren Löhnen angezogen, vielfach zur Saison 
nach Deutschland und nach Niederösterreich zogen. Hier haben 
sie oft die Tschechen verdrängt, die sich dann nach Amerika 
wandten. So mündeten oft die von einem kleinen festländischen 
Wanderungsbächlein ausgehenden Wellen irgendwo in den 
großen Ozean der interkontinentalen Wanderung.4 
Until 1918, Austria-Hungary was one of the vast European 
empires. As a multinational state, it displayed high levels of social 
and cultural diversity, especially with the steady growth of national 
consciousness since the 1870s. In addition, the empire’s institutional 
diversity should not be underestimated. Its two major units, Imperial 
2   Julianna Puskás, Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide: One Hundred Years of Hungarian 
Experience in the United States (New York: Holmes & Meir, 2000), 303.
3   Heinz Fassmann, “Emigration, Immigration and Internal Migration in the Austro–
Hungarian Monarchy, 1910,” in Roots of the Transplanted: Volume One; Late 19th Century East 
Central and Southeastern Europe, ed. Dirk Hoerder and Inge Blank (New York: Columbia 
Univ. Press, 1994), 253–308 (here 276-277).
4   Imre Ferenczi, Kontinentale Wanderungen und die Annäherung der Völker: Ein geschichtlicher 
Überblick ( Jena: Fischer, 1930), 18; “Before the World War, different voluntary internal and 
international migration patterns did not interfere but instead complemented and replaced 
each other, according to the law of lowest pressure. Even poorer Ruthenians (Ukrainians) 
replaced hundred thousand Slovaks, who moved annually from their mountains to the rich 
Hungarian central plains for the harvest, while Hungarians, attracted by higher wages, 
migrated seasonally to the German Reich and to Lower Austria. There they often displaced 
Czechs, who then turned to America. This way, migration waves, which mostly started as 
small continental streamlets, often flowed into the big ocean of intercontinental moves.” 
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Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, were quasi-states with con-
siderable autonomy, and within each, especially in Imperial Austria, 
local and regional political institutions exercised greater flexibility in 
contrast to the central government.5 The vast territories of Austria-
Hungary, populated by more than 51 million people in 1910, were 
no nation states. Inhabitants spoke at least ten official languages, fol-
lowed various religious denominations, of which Roman-Catholic, 
Protestant, Serbian-Orthodox, or Jewish were only the most domi-
nant, and were characterized by a broad socio-economic and cultural 
diversity. Multifaceted migration patterns of people living in the 
Habsburg territories provide, therefore, an excellent research field.6
The Habsburg provinces and lands constituted a highly heterogeneous 
European empire circa 1900 and revealed a broad range of economic devel-
opment. Regional processes strongly determined its economic growth, both 
in industrial and agricultural sectors. A large gap distinguished the most 
advanced, western regions from the less developed areas to the east and 
southeast. Levels of income and industrialization in the Alpine provinc-
es and Bohemian lands were one and a half times those of the southern 
lands, and twice those of the Hungarian territories.7 While some Habsburg 
territories ranked among the most highly industrialized regions of con-
tinental Europe, others, such as Galicia and Bukovina, were still rather 
agricultural and hardly touched by industry or manufacturing. The partial 
nature of industrialization and its late introduction resulted in a dispari-
ty between supply and demand of male and female laborers and created 
even more movement within the country, but also resulted in the arrival of 
other European labor migrants. In the 1900s, no less than one third of the 
adult agrarian population of vast Central European territories that includ-
ed Hungary proper, the Slovak territories, Transylvania, Croatia-Slavonia, 
as well as Galicia, Bukovina, and the Mediterranean provinces (Carniola, 
Littoral, and Dalmatia) had lived or worked in places different from those 
of their birth.8
5   David F. Good, “The Economic Lag of Central and Eastern Europe: Income Estimates 
for the Habsburg Successor States, 1870–1910,” The Journal of Economic History 54, no. 4 
(1994): 869–91 (here 880); Puskás, Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide, 3-17.
6   For a more detailed study on migration patterns in Austria-Hungary, see Annemarie 
Steidl, “On Many Roads: Internal, European, and Transatlantic Migration in the Habsburg 
Monarchy, 1850 – 1914” (Habilitation manuscript, Vienna University, 2014).
7   See David F. Good, “Modern Economic Growth in the Habsburg Monarchy,” East 
Central Europe 7 (1980): 248-68.
8   Ewa Morawska, For Bread with Butter: Life–Worlds of East Central Europeans in 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania, 1890 – 1940 (Cambridge: Lerner Publications Company, 1985), 
28.
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Internal Migration within Austria-Hungary
Most people moved over relatively short distances in nineteenth-cen-
tury Central Europe. They often went to and from long established urban 
areas and newly developing industrial centers, but people migrated among 
agrarian regions and rural communities as well. Migrants were not long-
ing, necessarily, for alien urban environments. Many moved within the 
same community, walked to a nearby place or to a settlement with similar 
features farther afield. They left villages for other villages or for a nearby 
small town, thus often moving back and forth between rural and urban 
areas. And, not uncommonly, any one of these movements could take 
migrants across district, provincial, or state borders. Contrary to popu-
lar assumptions that the road overseas was the dominant pattern before 
World War I,9 Gustav Thirring, a leading contemporary Hungarian 
statistician and demographer, showed that just the opposite was the case 
for the Hungarian Kingdom. Based on census records, he calculated that 
exactly 1,034,203 Hungarian inhabitants had left their place of birth 
between 1881 and 1900, of which nearly two thirds, or 654,228 people, 
had migrated internally.10
Josef Ehmer and Hermann Zeitlhofer’s study on rural migration in the 
Bohemian lands presents a new approach in migration research.11 In com-
parison to other Habsburg territories, internal migration rates were excep-
tionally high in late nineteenth century Bohemia and Moravia. The authors 
identified several internal and international migration patterns: over shorter 
and longer distances, seasonal or permanent, from the countryside to towns 
and back, and among various urban regions. Bohemians would not move 
either to Prague or to heavily industrialized Plzeň/Pilsen;12 instead, internal 
migration patterns were rather more complex. Along with movements to 
industrialized cities, destinations in neighboring agricultural districts were 
usually the most important. Nearly a third of all 104 Bohemian districts 
had migration rates to rural areas of at least 20 percent; in ten districts, over 
9   “The number of external emigrants is two and one-half times greater than the number 
of migrants to internal industry”; Puskás, Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide, 21.
10   Gustav Thirring, “Die Auswanderung aus Ungarn: Beiträge zur Statistik und 
topographischen Verteilung der Auswanderung,” Bulletin de la Société Hongroise de Géographie 
XXX (1902): 1-29 (here 4).
11   Josef Ehmer and Hermann Zeitlhofer, “Ländliche Migration in Böhmen vor dem 1. 
Weltkrieg,” Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie 53, no.1 (2005): 40-58.
12   Between 1843 and 1910 Plzeňs’ population grew 10-fold. For more information on 
that, see Ronald Smelser, “German-Czech Relations in Bohemian Frontier Towns: the 
Industrialization/Urbanization Process,” in Studies in East European Social History, ed. Keith 
Hitchins (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 2:62-87.
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40 percent of the mobile population made its way to an agricultural region 
within Imperial Austria.13
Migrations within Central Europe over short as well as long distances 
were common phenomena in the mid-nineteenth century, and all regions 
of Austria-Hungary show a long tradition of various migration patterns. 
Large numbers of people were involved in regular and less visible every-
day migrations. Since the early modern period, men and women moved as 
agricultural laborers, either as male or female servants on larger farmsteads 
or as seasonal workers to sow and harvest crops or to take care of livestock. 
Smallholders and cottagers from Switzerland, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg walked 
as mowers, harvesters or as fruit pickers to Bavarian and Swabian grain 
fields;14 day laborers from Carniola moved seasonally to harvest wine in 
Vipavska dolina/Wippachtal/Valle del Vipacco, to cut the wheat in the 
region around Postojna/Postumia/Adelsberg, to pick hops in Styria in the 
summer months, and to make lumber in the Tolmin/Tolmino/Tolmein 
district during the winter.15 With an increasing intensity of cultivation and 
a growing demand for seasonal labor, the harvest migrations from the hills 
to the plains added to the mobility.16 
Since the early modern period, Austrians and Hungarians developed 
migration strategies that linked them to specific labor markets in other 
regions and countries. Quite a few people from Alpine areas made their liv-
ing as migrant laborers in different professions or as peddlers by travelling 
through vast parts of Central Europe. Mobile traders were part of local and 
village economies and responded to growing demands for merchandise and 
special services. Up to 80 percent of the male population of Ticino villages 
were temporarily absent as travelling vendors or mobile laborers in the early 
nineteenth century.17 Another characteristic feature of Alpine peddling was 
its specialization in certain products or services by local valleys, such as 
mobile oil and herbs dealers from the Zillertal.18 A more profitable example 
13   Ehmer/Zeitlhofer, “Ländliche Migration,” 40-58.
14   Manfred Scheuch, Geschichte der Arbeiterschaft Vorarlbergs bis 1918, 2nd ed. (Feldkirch: 
Verl. d. Österr. Gewerkschaftsbundes, 1978), 19.
15   Marina Cattaruzza, “Die Migration nach Triest von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis 
zum Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Gesellschaft, Politik und Verwaltung in der Habsburgermonarchie 1830 
– 1918, ed. Ferenc Glatz and Ralph Melville (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1987), 273-304 (here 284).
16   Dirk Hoerder, People on the Move: Migration, Acculturation, and Ethnic Interaction in 
Europe and North America (Providence: Berg, 1993), 11.
17   Raffaello Ceschi, Geschichte des Kanton Tessin (Frauenfeld: Huber, 2003), 110-116.
18   An excellent overview of various labor migrants in Central Europe can be found in Hanns 
Haas, “Wandergewerbe und Wanderhandel aus und in den Alpen: Ein wirtschaftlicher 
Funktionstypus im sozialen Umfeld,” in Vor- und frühindustrielle Arbeitsmigration: 
Massenmigrationen in Zentraleuropa im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Josef Ehmer (Gütersloh: 
Verlag für Regionalgeschichte, forthcoming).
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for mobile merchants were Bohemian glass dealers, who founded branches 
of their trade in all-important European cities.19 Tramping artisans were a 
common feature up to the nineteenth century; around three quarters of the 
journeymen and most of the masters and apprentices in Central European 
towns were migrants.20 Mobile journeymen even increased in volume and 
retained many of its traditional structures and functions during the nine-
teenth century.21 The labor force of certain trades developed special connec-
tions to their geographical origin, such as silk weavers from Lombardy or 
chimney sweeps from the Swiss cantons of Grisons and Ticino.22
The expansion of a bourgeois lifestyle in European towns and cities 
since the eighteenth century brought about a growing demand for female 
and male servants. At the end of the nineteenth century, domestic ser-
vice was overall a domain for women only: between 80 and 98 percent of 
the domestic servants were female in almost all European urban areas.23 
Domestic service in urban households was the most important occupa-
tion for young women from the Habsburg Monarchy. In Carniola and the 
Littoral, many young Slovenian women moved to Trieste and Gorizia/
Gorica for employment as maids, housekeepers, or nurses. Other women 
from Slovenian villages delivered bread to Trieste or worked as seamstress-
es for urban dwellers. In Transylvania, meanwhile, young unmarried girls 
and widows moved to nearby towns and to București/Bucharest in the 
Kingdom of Romania to make a living as domestic servants.24 After the 
end of the Napoleonic wars, enormous building sites for expansion and 
19   Klaus Weber, “Böhmische Glashändler in Europa vom 17. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert,” in 
Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa: Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Klaus J. Bade, 
et al. (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2007), 413-5.
20   Reinhold Reith, “Arbeitsmigration und Technologietransfer in der Habsburgermonarchie 
in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts: Die Gesellenwanderung aus der Sicht der 
Kommerzienkonsesse,” Blätter für Technikgeschichte 56 (1994), 9-33; Annemarie Steidl, Auf 
nach Wien! Die Mobilität des mitteleuropäischen Handwerks im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert am 
Beispiel der Haupt- und Residenzstadt (Wien: Verlag f. Geschichte u. Politik, 2003). 
21   Josef Ehmer, “Tramping Artisans in Nineteenth Century Vienna,” in Migration, 
Mobility, and Modernisation, ed. David Siddle (Liverpool: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2000), 164-
85 (here 183).
22   Annemarie Steidl, “Rege Kommunikation zwischen den Alpen und Wien: Die regionale 
Mobilität Wiener Rauchfangkehrer,” Histoire des Alpes – Storia delle Alpi – Geschichte der 
Alpen 14 (2009): 25-40.
23   Raffaella Sarti, “Who are Servants? Defining Domestic Service in Western Europe 
(16th –21st Centuries),” in Proceedings of the Servant Project, ed. Suzy Pasleau and Isabelle 
Schopp (with Raffaella Sarti) (Liège: Éditions de l’Univérsité de Liège, 2006), 2:3-59; Sylvia 
Hahn, Historische Migrationsforschung (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2012), 113-114.
24   Marta Verginella, Ekonomija odresenja in prezivetja: Odnos do življenja in smrti na 
Tržanskem podezelju [Economy of Salvation and Survival: The Relationship to Life and 
Death in the Region of Tržanska] (Koper: Zgodovinsko drustvo za juzno Primorsko, 1996); 
Johann Hintz, Das wandernde Siebenbürgen: Eine statistische Studie (Kronstadt, 1876), 9. 
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industrialization of urban agglomerations created demand for hundreds of 
thousands of labor migrants all over Europe. Up to 13 percent of Northern 
Italy’s population, which included parts of Imperial Austria, moved sea-
sonally, mainly as construction workers. According to René Del Fabbro, 
about 454,000 labor migrants from Friuli found temporary employment 
in the German Reich, and the number of seasonal laborers from that area 
was nearly twice as high in Imperial Austria (about 895,000 from 1872 to 
1915).25 Industrialization created new jobs for female labor migrants as 
well; many women found employment in textile factories.26
According to the 1910 census of Imperial Austria, 37.6 percent of 
all inhabitants had at least left their home municipalities, and nearly 25 
percent had crossed the borders of a political district, but only 8.6 per-
cent moved over provincial borders and an even smaller ratio, 2.2 percent, 
had left the country.27 On average, spatial mobility of Imperial Austria’s 
inhabitants was high, but the rates varied across different regions. Nearly 
80 percent of the Galician people lived within municipal boundaries of 
their birthplaces, while the ratio of sedentariness was much lower in more 
industrialized parts, such as Lower Austria (47 percent) or Bohemia (55 
percent).28 According to the official numbers, Hungarian inhabitants were 
less mobile than Imperial Austrians; the proportion of people with a dif-
ferent place of residence than place of birth was only 30 percent in the 
Kingdom of Hungary.29
Seasonal laborers and permanent migrants also moved regularly 
back and forth between Imperial Austria and the Hungarian Kingdom. 
According to census records, the number of Hungarian citizens crossing 
over to Imperial Austria was always higher than the other way around. In 
the second half of the nineteenth century, Hungarian-born people were 
leading the list of “international foreigners” in Austrian provinces. Already 
in 1869, the Austrian census listed about 91,000 Hungarian migrants, 
while the Hungarian census of 1870 recorded about 68,000 people who 
had moved east and south from Imperial Austria. An even higher number 
25   René Del Fabbro, Transalpini: Italienische Arbeitswanderung nach Süddeutschland im 
Kaiserreich 1870–1918 (Osnabrück: Rasch, 1996), 40.
26   Sylvia Hahn, “Nowhere at Home? Female Migrants in the Nineteenth-Century 
Habsburg Monarchy,” in Women, Gender and Labour Migration: Historical and Global 
Perspectives, ed. Pamela Sharpe (London: Routledge, 2002), 108-26.
27   K. K. statistische Central-Commission, ed., 1912–15, Österreichische Statistik N.F. 1, 
2, 3, Vienna.
28   Ibid.
29   A magyar szent korona országaiban 1910: Évi népszámlálása; Ötödik rész, Részletes 
Demografia [Volkszählung in den Ländern der Ungarischen Heiligen Krone im Jahre 1910: 
Fünfter Teil; Detaillierte Beschreibung der Bevölkerung] (Budapest, 1913).
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of people from the Hungarian territories moved west and north before 
World War I, since Imperial Austria provided better-paying jobs in more 
advanced industries. In 1910, about half of all “international” migrants liv-
ing in Imperial Austria were born in the Kingdom of Hungary.30
Crossing Borders inside Europe
Before World War I, Central and Eastern Europe formed the 
greatest reservoir of cheap laborers for the growing industrial sectors of 
western and northern Europe as well as for commercialized agriculture. 
The territories of Austria-Hungary, especially, were the most important 
regions of origin for seasonal workers who found employment all over 
Europe. Even if it were mainly the neighboring countries, namely the 
German Reich, Switzerland, the Kingdom of Italy, the Russian Empire, 
and the Kingdom of Romania, that attracted most Austro-Hungarians, 
some of them moved as far as Sweden, France, Denmark, and various 
other European countries in search of work. In 1910, approximately 1.5 
million people from Imperial Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary 
made their living in other European countries, while at the same time 
about 860,000 foreigners lived and worked in Austro-Hungary (approx-
imately 583,000 of them in Imperial Austria).31 
Temporary labor migrations from Northern Bohemia, predominant-
ly, to Saxony and Prussia (Sachsengängerei) have a long-standing tradition 
throughout the early modern period, whereas seasonal movements from 
Austrian Galicia to Prussia and other German territories only culminat-
ed at the beginning of the twentieth century.32 In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, Imperial Austria was the most important origin for 
labor migration, providing more than 42 percent of all foreigners in the 
German Reich in 1885. Mining, industry and building trades were pri-
mary employments for Austrians, with more than half of them in these 
30   The Hungarian census of 1910 counted 235,475 Austrian migrants, which was nearly 
100,000 fewer than the 324,495 Hungarian-born people that Austrian statistics recorded in 
their territory in the same year. Ibid.
31   Imre Ferenczi and Walter F. Willcox, International Migrations, vol. 2 (New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929); see also Donna R. Gabaccia and Elizabeth 
Zanoni, “Transitions in Gender Ratios among International Migrants, 1820–1930,” Social 
Science History 36, no. 2 (2012): 197-221.
32   Manuela Obermeier, Die Sachsengänger: Wanderarbeiter im Rübenbau 1850–1915 
(Berlin: Bartens 1999); Hermann Zeitlhofer, “Zwei Zentren temporärer kontinentaler 
Arbeitsmigration im Vergleich: der Böhmerwald und das Friaul um 1900,” in Übergänge 
und Schnittmengen: Arbeit, Migration, Bevölkerung und Wissenschaftsgeschichte in 
Diskussion, ed. Annemarie Steidl et al. (Wien: Böhlau, 2008), 45-75.
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professions. Not surprisingly, the majority of domestic servants working in 
the German Reich were women, originating mainly from the Czech lands. 
Female migrants worked on German fields as well, while only 15 percent 
of them found employment in industry.33 About half of Polish agricultur-
al workers were women, who cultivated and harvested root crops, mainly 
sugar beets and potatoes. Usually, these women worked in gangs under the 
supervision of male foremen who most often spoke Polish and German. 
Similar systems of organizing seasonal work could be found in southern 
Sweden and Denmark as well.34
Since the 1890s, the German Reich was facing a rapid increase in 
laborers arriving from Eastern Europe.35 Broad changes in agricultural pro-
duction had resulted in rising demand for seasonal day laborers in western, 
northern, and central Europe. Changes from mere growing of cereals to 
growing sugar beets promised considerably higher profits. Modernizations, 
the mass cultivation of sugar beets, as well as intensified use of machines, 
raised the need for short-term laborers during sowing and harvest periods. 
By 1910, six times more people had crossed the borders than in 1871, their 
numbers growing from 75,702 to 667,159. German labor markets mostly 
attracted people from Western Galicia, while the number of labor migrants 
from the Hungarian Kingdom was rather small.36 On the eve of World 
War I, the German Reich had a foreign population of 1.5 million, Prussia 
alone accommodating 900,000 of them. In 1914, a lot more people from 
the Russian Empire and Imperial Austria moved as seasonal labor migrants 
to German industry and fields than went overseas.37 Migrants from the 
33   Heinrich Rauchberg, “Die österreichischen Staatsangehörigen im Deutschen Reich 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Österreicher im Preussischen Staate,” Statistische 
Monatsschrift 15 (1889): 301-31 (here 321).
34   Klaus J. Bade and Jochen Oltmer, “Polnische landwirtschaftliche Arbeitskräfte 
in Preußen-Deutschland vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in 
Enzyklopädie, ed. Bade et al., 879-885 (here 881-882). 
35   Anton Knoke, Ausländische Wanderarbeiter in Deutschland (Leipzig: Universität Leipzig, 
1911), 3; Ferenczi, Kontinentale Wanderungen; Ludwig, Die polnischen Sachsengänger; 
see also Klaus J. Bade, “‘Preussengänger’ und ‘Abwehrpolitik’: Ausländerbeschäftigung, 
Ausländerpolitik und Ausländerkontrolle auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in Preussen vor dem Ersten 
Weltkrieg,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 24 (1984): 91-162; Josef Ehmer, Bevölkerungsgeschichte 
und Historische Demographie 1800–2000 (München: Oldenbourg, 2004), 19-33.
36   According to the census of the German Reich, 32,107 Hungarian-born people were 
counted in 1910, see “Auswanderung und Rückwanderung der Länder der Ungarischen 
Heiligen Krone in den Jahren 1899-1913,” Ungarische Statistische Mitteilungen, 67, n.s. 
(Budapest, 1918), 110-111.
37   Klaus J. Bade, Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland? Deutschland 1880–1980 
(Berlin: Colloquium-Verlag, 1983), 29-51; Ewa Kępińska and Oded Stark, “The Evolution 
and Sustainability of Seasonal Migration from Poland to Germany: From the Dusk of the 
19th Century to the Dawn of the 21st Century,” International Review of Economics and 
Finance 28 (2013): 3-18.
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Hungarian Kingdom moved to various European countries, but only in 
the case of the German Reich, the Kingdoms of Romania and Serbia, and 
the other Balkan states were instances of regional mobility significantly 
numerous.38
After the turn of the century, in response to intensified xenophobia 
against Polish-speaking migrants and to meet simultaneously growing 
demands for cheap laborers, the German government started to stimulate 
movements of other Europeans. They invited, in particular, Ukrainians from 
Galicia to take up jobs in German industry and agriculture.39 The number 
of Ukrainian-speaking labor migrants rose from nearly zero in the 1890s 
to about 7,000 at the turn of the century and more than 100,000 people 
before World War I. By 1914, Ukrainians from Galicia were the second 
largest group of foreign Slavic-speaking workers in German industry and 
agriculture after Austrian and Russian Poles.40 
During the same period that the German Reich was hiring Galician 
seasonal migrants, large numbers of foreign population entered many other 
countries of western and northern Europe. France, Denmark, Switzerland, 
the Scandinavian countries, and even Romania competed for agricultur-
al workers from central and eastern Europe.41 Already in the 1880s, 1.2 
million of 38 million French inhabitants were international migrants who 
spoke Italian, Polish, Flemish, Spanish, Russian, Czech, and several other 
languages.42 By the 1890s, Danish beet growers and sugar producers had 
begun hiring people from Russian Poland and Galicia; their numbers rose 
to 18,000 Polish labor migrants in 1913.43 In 1900, Swedish and Swiss 
sugar producers as well as French beet growers began to compete for sea-
sonal workers. Imre Ferenczi estimated that the number of Galician sea-
sonal workers in France was 40,000, while in the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Norway another 80,000 Polish and Ukrainian laborers from 
38   Gustav Thirring, Hungarian Migration of Modern Times (New York, 1931), 430.
39   See Jochen Oltmer, “Grenzüberschreitende Arbeitsmigration von und nach Deutschland 
im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” in Perspektiven in der Fremde? Arbeitsmarkt und Migration von 
der Frühen Neuzeit bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Dittmar Dahlmann and Margit Schule Beerbühl 
(Oldenbourg: Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, 2011), 25-48 (here 31-32).
40   Armin Mitter, “Die ukrainische Erwerbsmigration nach Preußen (1900–1914),” 
Jahrbuch für Geschichte 34 (1987), 147-78.
41   Lars Olsson, “Labor Migration as a Prelude to World War I,” International Migration 
Review 33 (1996), 875–900; Ulrich Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880–
1980: Seasonal Workers – Forced Laborers – Guest Workers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1991).
42   Hoerder, People on the Move, 22.
43  Andrzej Brożek, “Polish Immigrant Workers in Europe and the Labor Movement,” 
Polish American Studies 46, no. 1 (1989): 61-73 (here 63); Morawska, For Bread with 
Butter, 67.
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Austria-Hungary found employment.44 Within Europe, internation-
al competition for migrant workers grew notably, and recruitment was 
increasingly directed to areas on the outskirts of agrarian capitalist centers. 
By 1910, even the Hungarian Kingdom competed with the German Reich 
for Galician seasonal laborers, and smaller numbers settled permanently in 
Bukovina and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
From Austria-Hungary to the United States
From 1890 to 1914, more than fifteen million people left Europe for 
the United States, the vast majority of whom had been born in eastern 
and southern Europe. Records of United States immigration authorities 
show people from Habsburg territories to be the largest group from one 
single country among new arrivals during the period from 1902 to 1911, at 
27.9 percent of all migrants.45 The great transatlantic movements of central, 
southern, and southeastern Europeans declined sharply with the beginning 
of World War I and, due to new United States immigration laws, never 
regained the same strength after the war. Nineteenth-century industrial-
ization, new developments in traffic (railways and steamships), and polit-
ical and economic liberalization made massive and voluntary transatlantic 
movements possible. Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, more and 
more jobs in mines, factories, construction, and urban services attracted 
Europeans as the American economy was more labor-intensive, and even 
urban service jobs and factories relied heavily on mostly temporary employ-
ments.46 These were perfect conditions for the growing mobile labor force 
from southern and eastern Europe: “For most Europeans around 1900, the 
economic advantages of working in America were, on average, quite high 
compared to staying at home, the costs of moving were proportionately 
quite low, and yet the overwhelming majority did not leave Europe.”47
44   Ferenczi, Kontinentale Wanderungen, 79; Olsson, “Labor Migration as a Prelude,” 892-
893.
45   Karl Englisch, “Die österreichische Auswanderungsstatistik,” Statistische Monatsschrift 
39 (1913): 65-167; Johann Chmelar, “The Austrian Emigration, 1900–1914,” Perspectives in 
American History 7 (1973): 289; Michael John, “Push and Pull Factors for Overseas Migrants 
from Austria-Hungary in the 19th and 20th Centuries,” in Austrian Immigration to Canada: 
Selected Essays, ed. Franz A. J. Szabo (Carleton: McGill-Queen‘s Press, 1996), 55-81 (here 59).
46   See Michael J. Piore, Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979).
47   Drew Keeling, The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United 
States, 1900–1914: Mass Migration as a Transnational Business in Long Distance Travel 
(Zürich: Chronos, 2013), 33 and 22.
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In comparison with other European regions, such as western German 
lands or Scandinavian countries, Habsburg inhabitants were latecomers to 
transatlantic migration. Although various migration patterns within, from, 
and to Austria-Hungary had a long-standing history, transatlantic move-
ments were not a characteristic feature of mass mobility prior to the 1880s. 
By the end of the century, transatlantic migrations itself had become easier, 
due to the circulation of knowledge about the wider world. Although some 
people from Austrian territories had moved overseas as early as the eighteenth 
century,48 a new type of international movement did not emerge before the 
end of the nineteenth century. According to official surveys, only 14,255 peo-
ple left Austrian provinces for destinations overseas between 1821 and 1830; 
from 1831 to 1840, the total was a mere 7,536 people.49 Numbers for over-
seas migrants were even smaller from the Hungarian Kingdom and Croatia-
Slavonia, at only a few hundred persons per year. American statistics listed 
138,125 arrivals from the Hungarian Kingdom until the 1890s.50 Overseas 
movements were still low in the 1870s, but grew apace in the following 
decade. A first peak was reached at the beginning of the 1890s, with people 
from Imperial Austria in the lead, and declined sharply from 1893 to 1895, 
when the next economic recession created unemployment and labor unrest 
in the United States.51 The end of the 1890s saw a more modest increase 
and then a quadrupling in the years leading up to World War I, when a new 
type of long distance migration emerged. Even if necessary preconditions for 
significant overseas traffic had developed relatively late, these migrations had 
now become a generally accepted practice to improve an individual’s, as well 
as a family’s, living situation. It was a positively marked instrument for social 
advancement, and the rise in the number of people who moved over longer 
distances increased the information available concerning potential destina-
tions. Overall, up to 3.5 million people from Austria-Hungary arrived in the 
United States during the nineteenth century.52
Even if the United States had become the preferred destination for a 
fast increasing number of migrants from Austria-Hungary, their regions 
of origin changed dramatically. While in the second half of the nineteenth 
48   See for example William O’Reilly, “Emigration from the Habsburg Monarchy and 
Salzburg to the New World, 1700 – 1848,” in “Österreich und die Amerikas,” ed. Thomas 
Fröschl and Ursula Prutsch, special issue, Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit 1 
(2005): 7-20.
49   John, “Push and Pull Factors,” 55.
50   Chmelar, “The Austrian Emigration,” 310; Julianna Puskás, From Hungary to the US 
(1880–1914) (Budapest: Akad. Kiadó, 1982), 18.
51   Keeling, The Business of Transatlantic Migration, 62.
52   Ernö Deak, Die Auswanderung aus Österreich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Ein Überblick 
(Wien: Institut für Österreichkunde, 1974), 34. 
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century, German-, Czech-, and Yiddish-speaking people from the 
Bohemian lands and from Vorarlberg accounted for more than 80 percent 
of all international migrants, at the end of the century, new arrivals were 
primarily Poles, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Hungarians, Ukrainians, 
Romanians, and Rusyns: groups counted as parts of the so-called “New 
Immigration.”53 Therefore, Austro-Hungarian transatlantic migrations 
should not be reduced to only one type of mass movement. Divergent over-
seas mobility patterns emerged along various regional, ethnic, and cultural 
lines and during different stages of economic development. Migrants’ social 
status, gender, and religious and ethnic affiliations linked them closely to 
certain mobility patterns. While in some parts of Imperial Austria people 
started to move overseas quite early, the knowledge of a United States labor 
market in search of foreigners did not spread to other areas until the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Many moved as family groups, such as 
Czechs in search of free land in the 1870s and 1880s, while others left 
their families in Europe with intentions of returning. Most transatlantic 
travelers were young men and women in their prime employment age, 
many of them single and hoping for a profitable job or a suitable marriage 
partner.54 Especially since the end of the nineteenth century, most Austro-
Hungarians moved within well-developed transatlantic communication 
and migration networks of family and friends, but one should not forget 
about the adventurous pioneers who made their way to still scarcely-popu-
lated areas in the western and southern United States.55 
Once Europeans started to settle in the Americas, some of them 
returned to their country of origin.56 An increase in globalizing processes of 
53   Heinz Fassmann, “Auswanderung aus der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie,” in 
Auswanderung aus Österreich: Von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Traude 
Horvath and Gerda Neyer (Wien: Böhlau, 1996), 33-55 (here 39-40).
54   Annemarie Steidl, “Young, Unwed, Mobile, and Female: Women on their Way from 
the Habsburg Monarchy to the United States of America,” Przeglad Polonijny 4 (2005): 
55-76; Annemarie Steidl, “Transatlantic Migration from the Late Austrian Empire and its 
Relation to Rural-Urban Stage Migration,” in European Mobility: Internal, International, 
and Transatlantic Moves in the 19th and early 20th Centuries, ed. Annemarie Steidl et al. 
(Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2009), 207-228; Annemarie Steidl and Wladimir Fischer-
Nebmaier, “Transatlantischer Heiratsmarkt und Heiratspolitik von MigrantInnen aus 
Österreich-Ungarn in den USA, 1870–1930,” in “Heiraten nach Übersee,” ed. Margareth 
Lanzinger and Annemarie Steidl, special issue, L’Homme: Zeitschrift für feministische 
Geschichtswissenschaft 1 (2014): 51-68.
55   That not all European transatlantic migrants moved within migration chains is 
convincingly demonstrated by Jochen Krebber for people from Wurttemberg at the end 
of the nineteenth century; see Jochen Krebber, “Creed, Class, and Skills: Three Structural 
Limitations of Chain Migration,” in European Mobility, ed. Steidl et al., 69-77.
56   Mark Wyman, Round-Trip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880–1930 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 9.
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labor markets modified transcontinental migration patterns from exclusive-
ly lifelong commitments to temporary employment.57 Before World War 
I, most people did not leave Austria-Hungary with intentions of settling 
in the United States for good. Wages were considerably higher in heavy 
industry, mining, and construction, and the main goal was to save as much 
money as possible and to return after two to five years.58 Thus the mainly 
work-related moves all over the globe had high return rates both because 
there was little intention of permanent settlement and because new travel 
possibilities made return much easier. Based on official data from the U.S. 
government and shipping company statistics, nearly half of all Europeans 
crossed the Atlantic more than once during the first decades of the twen-
tieth century. The official return rate to Imperial Austria was 39.5 percent; 
the percentage of those going back to the Hungarian Kingdom was slightly 
lower (37.9 percent).59
A Regional Approach – Migration Patterns in Vorarlberg
From the 1840s to the 1860s, at least thirty-six Vorarlbergers 
had left the small village of Schoppernau in the Bregenzer Wald (in 
1869, the village had less than 500 inhabitants): seventeen of them 
moved northwest to France, five mobile laborers crossed the border to 
Switzerland, four migrated to the German Rhineland, and two of them 
went on the long transatlantic trip to the United States; another six tried 
their luck in the capital and found employment in Vienna, and one each 
took the path to Bavaria and the Kingdom of Hungary. Meinrad Pichler 
completed this list by including another four transatlantic migrants and 
concluded that the Montafon region in Vorarlberg shows similar migra-
tion patterns as well.60
57   See Dirk Hoerder, “Immigration and the Working Class: The Remigration Factor,” 
International Labor and Work Class History 21 (1982): 28-41; Walter Kamphoefner, “Volume 
and Composition of German-American Return Migration,” in A Century of European 
Migrations, 1830-1930, ed. Rudolph J. Vecoli and Suzanne M. Sinke (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1991), 293-312.
58   See Christian Dustmann and Yorma Weiss, “Return Migration: Theory and Empirical 
Evidence from the UK,” British Journal of Industrial Relations 42, no. 2 (2007): 236-56.
59   Gerda Neyer, “Auswanderungen aus Österreich: Von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts 
bis zur Gegenwart,” Demographische Informationen (1995/96): 60–70; Ferenczi and Willcox, 
International Migrations, 91; Keeling, The Business of Transatlantic Migration, 43.
60   Maria Katharina Strolz, “Umwelt und Persönlichkeit Franz Michael Felders (1839–
1869): Ein Beitrag zur Sozialgeschichte des Hinterbregenzerwaldes,” (phil. diss., Vienna 
University, 1976), 343-347; Meinrad Pichler, Auswanderer: Von Vorarlberg in die USA 1800 
– 1938 (Bregenz: Vorarlberger Autoren Ges., 1993), 20.
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In Imperial Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, various migration 
patterns—traditional routes and new ones, within a country and beyond 
administrative borders, to other continents, in one direction or circular—
were highly entangled and related to each other. To understand the con-
nectedness and complexity of these patterns, a regional approach is nec-
essary. As Leslie Page Moch emphasized, such an approach is best suited 
to migration studies because the majority of human movements occurred 
within regions, and regions varied enormously from one another.61 As peo-
ple moved among villages and towns and to neighboring countries, they 
established links within these areas and a system of shared knowledge. 
The province of Vorarlberg, which was part of a much larger migration 
region—stretching across state borders from the Swiss textile area sur-
rounding St. Gallen, to the Grand Duchy of Baden and the later Kingdom 
of Wurttemberg, to Italian-speaking regions in Switzerland, the Veneto in 
the Kingdom of Italy, and the Habsburg region of Trentino—is well-suited 
for such a regional approach. 
Seasonal movements of laborers from Vorarlberg to other European 
regions have a long tradition. Since the late sixteenth century, mostly men 
moved as masons and construction workers to Switzerland, France (for exam-
ple, Alsace), and smaller German territories nearby (for example, Swabia). 
Until the nineteenth century, construction workers from Vorarlberg and the 
district of Trento/Trient (today a self-governing Italian province) were among 
the best-known labor migrants in all of Europe. More than 1,000 construc-
tion workers, master builders, and artists from the narrow area of Bregenzer 
Wald moved to all parts of Europe, especially to the southwestern parts of 
Germany and to France, to build churches, monasteries, and palaces.62 Even 
children found seasonal employment as shepherds and agricultural servants 
in southwestern German regions. From the seventeenth up to the nineteenth 
century, many families in the Austrian western provinces sent their children 
as farm laborers for a few months over the border to the German territories 
of Wurttemberg, Ravensburg, Baden, Bavaria, or Swabia.63
In the nineteenth century, Vorarlberg was, besides Lower Austria, the 
most industrialized region of the Alpine provinces and it was leading—in 
61   Leslie Page Moch, Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650, 2nd ed. 
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2003), 9.
62   Pichler, Auswanderer, 45; Hannelore Berchtold, “‘... in Frankreich ihr Fortkommen zu 
gründen ...’: Die Arbeitsmigration von Vorarlberg nach Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert,” 
(phil. diss., Innsbruck University 2001); Michael C. Maurer and Anton Schindling, 
“Italienische, Graubündner, Tessiner und Vorarlberger Baumeister und bildende Künstler 
im barocken Europa,” in Enzyklopädie, ed. Bade et al., 683-689 (here 687).
63   Josef Märk, Schwabenkinder aus Rankweil (Feldkirch: Rheticus-Ges., 1981); Roman 
Spiss, Saisonwanderer, Schwabenkinder und Landfahrer (Innsbruck: Wagner), 1993.
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1910, at least—in regard to the share of international migrants. Less than 
half of Vorarlberg’s population was making a living in agriculture in 1890 
and, until 1910, this already low level fell under 30 percent.64 Especially in 
the Rhine valley, a thriving textile industry progressed, which offered many 
jobs for men and women. Vorarlbergers and Tyrolians who dealt with tex-
tiles produced in those new enterprises went as far as Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. In some cases, the next generation continued these European 
movements over the Atlantic to America, and it is no surprise that early 
intercontinental migrants took the route overseas via French harbors.65 
When information of new opportunities in the United States spread inside 
existing networks, Vorarlbergers were interested, and some started to move 
overseas before the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Since regional mobility had a long tradition in families of Vorarlberger 
artisans and industrial laborers, the new continent seems to have been a lot 
closer for them than for people from the east of Austria-Hungary. In his 
study, Markus Hämmerle describes migration to the United States as part 
of continuous regional mobility, which existed already at the start of the 
nineteenth century. Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority of trans-
atlantic migrants were skilled workers, mostly from the building trades; in 
the 1850s, most of them gave their occupation as quarrymen, masons, or 
carpenters.66 From 1851 to 1860, 565 Vorarlbergers left in the direction of 
the United States. According to shipping records, between 1848 and 1880, 
about 2,000 adults, accompanied by up to 300 children, made their way to 
North America. This was about 2 percent of Vorarlberg’s population, which 
had grown from 103,036 people in 1869 to 107,373 in 1880.67 Contrary 
to traditional paradigms that transatlantic migrations were caused by crisis 
scenarios such as crop failure or the recession in rural textile industries, 
early transatlantic voyagers who left Imperial Austria were overwhelmingly 
skilled people who originated in more industrialized regions, where the 
economy was in full swing, as in Vorarlberg.68
64   Rupert Pichler, Italiener in Österreich – Österreicher in Italien: Einführung in Gesellschaft, 
Wirtschaft und Verfassung 1800-1914 (Wien: Eichbauer, 2000), 158-60.
65   Othmar Aschauer, “Tirolerische Wander-Bauhandwerker aus dem Außerfern im 17. 
– 19. Jahrhundert,” in Künstler, Händler, Handwerker: Tiroler Schwaben in Europa, ed. Tiroler 
Landesmuseum (Innsbruck: Tiroler Landesmus. Ferdinandeum 1989), 190-203 (here 204); 
according to Meinrad Pichler, all known U.S. migrants who left Vorarlberg before the middle of 
the nineteenth century chose a French harbor for their move; see Pichler, Auswanderer, 45-63.
66   Markus Hämmerle, Glück in der Fremde: Vorarlberger Auswanderer im 19. Jahrhundert 
(Feldkirch: Rheticus-Gesellschaft, 1990), 216. 
67   Ibid., 51; Österreichische Statistik, vol. 1, ed. K. K. Statistische Central-Commission 
(Wien, 1882).
68   For an approach of agricultural crises and industrial reorganizations, see Fassmann, 
“Auswanderung aus der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie,” 47-48.
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Later in the century, people from the most developed industrial textile 
centers in the Rhine Valley tried overseas opportunities in the neighbor-
hood of New York and in New Jersey. The most industrialized communities, 
Dornbirn, Hohenems, Wolfurt, Bregenz, Bludenz, and Frastanz, were cen-
ters of transatlantic migration in the second half of the century. From 1890 
to 1914, textile workers, many of them embroiderers, were the next most 
important overseas migrants besides artisans in the building sector. About 
600 people, many from the communities of Lustenau and Höchst in the 
political district of Feldkirch, crossed the Atlantic and settled overwhelm-
ingly in New Jersey to go on with their work as embroiderers. This pattern 
continued after World War I and about 10,000 people left Vorarlberg in the 
direction of the Americas from 1800 to 1938.69 
Given the long tradition of various migration patterns, it would 
be easy to describe Vorarlberg as a province of emigration. While these 
people tried their luck abroad, Italian-speaking migrants from Trentino, 
Grisons in Switzerland, and Veneto in the Kingdom of Italy arrived 
as laborers throughout the nineteenth century. Before 1850, seasonal 
migrants, who mostly spoke Rhaeto-Romance, arrived with their families 
from Grisons. From 1870 to 1914, due to a labor shortage in the textile 
industries, Vorarlberg’s entrepreneurs started to recruit foreigners, many of 
them women from Trento.70 The fact that Vorarlberg is, up to today, an 
active migration region demonstrates the long lifespan of these patterns. 
According to data from the Statistik Austria for 2015, with more than 17 
percent foreign-born inhabitants, the province is second only to Vienna 
(34.5 percent) in this regard, and Vorarlbergers are also second on the list 
of people leaving the Republic of Austria (1.4 percent of the average popu-
lation in 2015, only topped by Vienna with 2.4 percent).71
As this study on the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
Imperial Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary shows, various migra-
tion patterns—traditional and new roads, within a country and beyond 
administrative borders, in one direction or circular—were highly entangled 
and related to each other. Internal movements of Habsburg inhabitants 
69   Meinrad Pichler, Aus dem Montafon an den Mississippi: Amerika-AuswandererInnen aus 
dem Montafon (Schruns: Heimatschutzverein Montafon, 2013).
70   Reinhard Johler, Mir parlen Italiano und spreggen Dütsch piano: Italienische Arbeiter 
in Vorarlberg, 1870 – 1914 (Feldkirch: Rheticus-Ges., 1987), 12; Robert Rollinger, “Die 
trentinisch-italienische Einwanderung nach Vorarlberg: Ein Überblick,” in Auswanderung 
aus dem Trentino – Einwanderung nach Vorarlberg: Die Geschichte einer Migrationsbewegung 
mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von 1870/80 bis 1919, ed. Karl Heinz Burmeister und Robert 
Rollinger (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1995), 27-100 (here 27).
71   See “Bevölkerung,” Statistik Austria, accessed Jan. 28, 2017, https://www.statistik.at/
web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/index.html.
Steidl: Migration Patterns in the Late Habsburg Empire86
might sometimes lead to international migration, while in other cases 
the sequences may be reversed or other complex combinations may arise. 
Central Europeans had a matrix of opportunities to migrate, and the selec-
tion of internal instead of international or vice versa can be seen as either 
competing or complementary strategies. As Dirk Hoerder wrote, there was 
always a “range of destinations from which potential migrants selected 
the one that best suited their aspirations.”72 Only considering one type of 
migration and ignoring other paths, as has often been done in past studies, 
is to focus on only one part of the whole story, and mostly has resulted in a 
partial and unbalanced interpretation.73
72   Dirk Hoerder, “Introduction,” in People in Transit: German Migrations in Comparative 
Perspective, 1820–1930, ed. Dirk Hoerder and Jörg Nagler (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 1-16 (here 5). 
73   Russell King, Ronald Skeldon, and Julie Vullnetari, “Internal and International 
Migration: Bridging the Theoretical Divide,” Working Paper No. 52, Sussex Centre for 






In Transit or Asylum Seekers?
Austria and the Cold War Refugees from the 
Communist Bloc
Maximilian Graf and Sarah Knoll1
Introduction: Myths and Exposition2
Austrian politicians and media have explicitly referenced a positive 
memory of the Austrian response to the various “waves of refugees” from 
neighboring communist countries on the occasion of the recent “refugee cri-
sis.” The master narrative of these historical episodes, however, is weighed 
down by myth making and is waiting to be investigated critically.3 In addition, 
the historiographies on the various “waves of refugees” differ greatly in quality 
and depth and are waiting to be analyzed in a broad synthesis.4 This essay 
will present a general introduction to the topic of Cold War refugees and 
then look at the vast movement of refugees into Austria in 1956 (Hungary), 
1968/69 (Czechoslovakia), 1981/82 (Poland), 1989/90 (Eastern Europe in 
the course of the collapse of Communism). In each of these case studies, 
rebellions in the Soviet bloc led to the mass flight of refugees. Within a few 
weeks on each of these occasions, thousands of refugees came to Austria and/
or transited to the West through Austria. State-sponsored movements of ref-
ugees, such as Jews from the Soviet Union, will not be covered in this essay.5
1   Günter Bischof translated this essay from German into English.
2   This contribution is a revised and expanded version of Maximilian Graf and Sarah Knoll, “Das 
Ende eines Mythos? Österreich und die Kommunismusflüchtlinge,” in Flüchtlingskrisen: Nichts Neues 
in Österreich, ed. Börries Kuzmany and Rita Garstenauer (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2017).
3   For a recent introduction to Cold War scholarship in Austria, see Maximilian Graf 
and Agnes Meisinger, “Österreich im Kalten Krieg: Forschungsstand und Desiderata,” in 
Österreich im Kalten Krieg: Neue Forschungen im internationalen Kontext, ed. Maximilian Graf 
and Agnes Meisinger (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2016), 9–48.
4   For a good introduction, short of providing a synthesis, see Gernot Heiss and Oliver 
Rathkolb, eds., Asylland wider Willen: Flüchtlinge in Österreich im europäischen Kontext seit 
1914 (Vienna: Dachs, 1995).
5   For a summary of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, see Wolfgang Mueller, 
Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence? The Soviet Union, Austria, and Neutrality, 1955–1991 
(Vienna: ÖAW, 2011), 225-230; see also Ruth Orli Moshkovitz, “Wien als Transitstadt 
sowjetisch-jüdischer Migration,” GEDENKDIENST 76, no. 1 (2016): 3-4.
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Flight from communist regimes was a frequent Cold War phenome-
non. Lowering the Iron Curtain at the end of the 1940s, however, cut off 
this flight.6 This barrier was designed to stop further attempts at flight by 
increasing the risk of a deadly outcome to refugees from the communist 
world. Still, in the 1950s, thousands of people escaped to Austria from 
the neighboring communist countries Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and 
Yugoslavia. The exact number of refugees from the communist world has 
never been established and, if it were, could never be verified. Compared 
to the 1.5 million Germans and Austrians expelled from Eastern Europe, 
and the Displaced Persons (DPs) stranded in Austria after World War II, 
their numbers are relatively small.7 There was also much overlap between 
these groups. People tried to escape communist regimes for political, eco-
nomic, and personal motives. In the first years after World War II, people 
felt that the new political order in east-central Europe infringed both upon 
their personal rights and economic wellbeing. On top of that, the newly 
established communist regimes launched repressive policies particularly 
targeting those people who did not want to adjust to the new order and 
opposed their governments. As soon as legal means to emigrate were cut 
off, an escape across the sealed borders came at a high personal risk. We do 
not know the exact numbers of escapees. 
Many people were expelled from Hungary in 1945, and more fled across the 
border into Austria after the Communist takeover in 1947. Next to “German 
ethnics” (Volksdeutsche) and Hungarian Jews, Hungarian nationals (among them 
deserters from the Army) left the country. Lowering the Iron Curtain along 
the Austro-Hungarian border, starting in 1948, cut off their escape routes. 
Border guards shot the refugees, who tried to cross the border anyway. From 
the Soviet-occupied zone in Austria bordering onto Hungary, the Soviets 
often transported refugees back across the border, if the Hungarians insisted.8 
6   Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944–1956 (New York: 
Anchor, 2012).
7   On the DPs, see Peter Wassertheuer, “‘Volksdeutsche,’ Fremdarbeiter und Displaced 
Persons (DPs),” in “Österreich ist frei!” Der Österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955, ed. Stefan Karner 
(Vienna: Berger, 2005), 47-50; Thomas Albrich, “Asylland wider Willen: Die Problematik 
der Displaced Persons in Österreich 1945–1948,” in Die bevormundete Nation: Österreich und 
die Alliierten 1945–1949, ed. Günter Bischof and Josef Leidenfrost (Innsbruck: Haymon, 
1988), 217-244; Gabriela Stieber, “Volksdeutsche und Displaced Persons,“ in Asylland 
wider Willen, ed. Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb (Vienna: Dachs, 1995), 140-153; on 
the Jewish DPs, see Thomas Albrich, “Jüdische Displaced Persons und Flüchtlinge nach 
dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Asylland wider Willen, ed. Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb 
(Vienna: Dachs, 1995), 122-139; see also Thomas Albrich, eds., Flucht nach Eretz Israel: Die 
Bricha und der jüdische Exodus durch Österreich nach 1945 (Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag, 1998).
8   Andreas Gémes, “Wie zwei geschiedene Eheleute”: Österreichisch-ungarische Beziehungen 
in den 1950er Jahren (Graz: Uni-Press, 2010), 19 and 23-24.
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In the case of Czechoslovakia, as well, the first refugees leaving after 1945 
cannot be separated easily from the much larger group of ethnic Germans 
expelled after the war. After the communist seizure of power in February 
1948, the stream of refugees out of Czechoslovakia grew again. Only the 
advent of the Iron Curtain along the Austro-Czechoslovak border after 1948 
stopped potential refugees from exiting and kept the people confined in 
their own country.9 In spite of the tight sealing of the Austrian borders with 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia—apart from some more liberal phases in the 
border regimes—people fled these countries continuously until 1989.
Austria’s border with Yugoslavia happened to be the bloodiest one in the 
early Cold War. Here too, we do not have firm figures on refugees and victims 
from the 1940s. Thousands of refugees crossed the border between Slovenia 
and Styria in the 1950s.10 After Tito’s break with Stalin and the beginning of 
better relations with the West, Austria’s relations with Yugoslavia also improved 
dramatically. Bilateral conflicts over borders and reparations had dominated 
relations after the war and became less prominent after 1948. Since the 1950s, 
Austro-Yugoslav relations were normalized and tensions along the border sub-
sided.11 With the easing of the border regime, more Yugoslav citizens were per-
mitted to cross the border with greater ease. Many Yugoslavs came to Austria 
to work. There was no longer any need to become a refugee, since the option to 
legally leave the country provided another escape route.12
9   Concentrating more on the Slovak part of the country, see David Schriffl, Tote Grenze 
oder lebendige Nachbarschaft? Österreichisch-slowakische Beziehungen 1945-1968 (Vienna: 
ÖAW, 2012), 353-379. Schriffl shows how the various groups of refugees after 1945 cannot 
be separated from each other. Their flight since 1947/48 became continuous. Even before 
the Czechoslovak Communists seized power in 1948, almost 2,000 refugees crossed the 
border into Austria. Schriffl also takes note of Jewish refugees from the Slovak part of the 
country in the 1940s and 1950s.
10   Edda Engelke, “Jeder Flüchtling ist eine Schwächung der Volksdemokratie”: Die illegalen 
Überschreitungen am jugoslawisch-steirischen Grenzabschnitt in den Fünfzigerjahren (Vienna: 
LIT, 2008).
11   Arnold Suppan, “Jugoslawien und der österreichische Staatsvertrag,” in Der österreichische 
Staatsvertrag/The Austrian State Treaty 1955: Internationale Strategie, rechtliche Relevanz, 
nationale Identität/International Strategy, Legal Relevance, National Identity, ed. Arnold 
Suppan, Gerald Stourzh, and Wolfgang Mueller (Vienna: ÖAW, 2005), 431-447; Petar 
Dragišić, “Österreichisch-jugoslawische Beziehungen 1945–1955” (PhD diss., University of 
Vienna, 2007); Petar Dragišić, Odnosi Jugoslavije i Austrije 1945–1955 (Belgrade: Institut za 
noviju istoriju Srbije, 2013).
12   Otmar Höll, ed., Österreich – Jugoslawien: Determinanten und Perspektiven ihrer 
Beziehungen (Vienna: Braumüller, 1988); on “guest workers,” see Vladimir Ivanović “Die 
Beschäftigung jugoslawischer Arbeitskräfte in Österreich in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren,” 
Zeitgeschichte 40, no. 1 (2013): 35-48; Verena Lorber, “‘Arbeitskräfte wurden gebraucht …’: 
Steirische Arbeitsmigration von 1961 bis 1975 – ein mikrogeschichtlicher Blick auf ein 
transnationales Migrationssystem,” in Tagungsbericht des 26. Österreichischen Historikertages 
(Krems/Stein, 24. bis 28. September 2012) (St. Pölten: NÖ Institut für Landeskunde, 2015), 
699-708; see also Lorber’s chapter in this volume.
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On the one hand, there are the sensationalized stories of refugees suc-
cessfully crossing the borders into Austria or being stopped—at times vio-
lently—by border guards. On the other hand, there are successive migration 
movements unfolding over longer periods of time. During the Cold War, 
Austria tended to practice a liberal policy of granting asylum to refugees 
from the communist bloc, granting political asylum to each and every ref-
ugee whatever their motives may have been for leaving their country.13 The 
first major group of Hungarian refugees entered Austria in 1956, at the very 
moment when the Hungarian government had eased travel restrictions for 
their citizens.
Austria and the Hungarian Refugees 1956: “Freedom Fighters” in 
Transit?
Even though the cohorts of ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) and 
DPs coming through Austria in the first postwar decade were more 
significant, the master narrative is focused on Austrian humanitar-
ian aid for refugees from Hungary in 1956. This success story is 
questionable.
After Stalin’s death in 1953, the Hungarian government only uneven-
ly, and with considerable delay, began a process of “de-Stalinization” and 
reforms. Progress was insufficient, however, to calm the growing discon-
tent in vast swaths of the population in the communist one-party state. 
Khrushchev’s famous “secret speech” attacking the cult of personality 
around Stalin accelerated the reform process in the communist bloc. 
Changing the leadership in the Communist Party and reforms did not 
satisfy the population. Beginning the rehabilitation of the victims of 
Stalinist purges only revealed abusive affairs of state in the previous years. 
This onset of reforms produced a climate that allowed open opposition 
against the communist regime. These developments during the summer 
of 1956 culminated in late October in mass protests demanding an end of 
the one-party state and democratization. The growing protest movement 
ended in open insurrection. Refusing to tolerate the Hungarian party and 
state giving in to the demands of the protesters, the Soviet Union decided 
on November 4 to send the Red Army into Hungary to suppress the 
13   Between 1956 and 1968 Austria granted asylum collectively to refugee cohorts, see 
Patrik-Paul Volf, “Der politische Flüchtling als Symbol der Zweiten Republik: Zur Asyl- 
und Flüchtlingspolitik seit 1945,” Zeitgeschichte 22, no. 11/12 (1995): 415-436 (here 430-
432).
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rebellion, no matter what the cost in blood. The result was the massive 
flight of Hungarians across the border into Austria.14
Ironically, the Hungarian regime made this mass flight possible, since 
it had started to dismantle the Iron Curtain on the Austrian border in the 
spring of 1956 as part of its post-Stalinist reforms. The border fences and 
minefields had been removed. On top of that, during the days of rebellion, 
regular border controls broke down.15 Soon after the Soviet occupation 
forces withdrew from Austria in the course of the summer and fall of 1955, 
the number of refugees fleeing Hungary increased. During the spring and 
summer 1956, the post-Stalinist “thaw” led to the new border regime and 
a further increase in refugees. Starting in May 1956, 200 refugees crossed 
the border into Austria every month; they were considered to be “economic 
migrants” (migrants leaving for economic reasons to improve their lives) 
and were not welcomed by Austrians.16 During the fall of 1956, this per-
ception changed, though only for a short time.
Austrians sympathized with Hungarians during their insurrection, 
for Austrians themselves only a year before had managed to get rid of the 
Soviet occupiers. The protagonists of the rebellion and the initial masses 
of refugees were warmly welcomed by the Austrian population as hero-
ic “freedom fighters.” They were offered quick help, first by Austrian civil 
society and then by the Red Cross and the Austrian Army. As new cohorts 
of Hungarian refugees crossed the border, they began to risk their lives. 
In early November, the Hungarian government tightened border security 
and began to brutally stop the exodus. Still, within the short period of two 
months, 180,000 refugees came to Austria.17 
Austria was caught unprepared for such numbers of refugees and 
quickly ran out of space to house them. They were crammed into temporary 
14   Andreas Gémes, Austria and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution: Between Solidarity 
and Neutrality (Pisa: Univ. Press, 2008); Ibolya Murber and Zoltán Fónagy, eds., Die 
ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956 (Vienna: Czernin, 2006); Erwin A Schmidl, ed., 
Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Österreich (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003); Manfried Rauchensteiner, 
Spätherbst 1956: Die Neutralität auf dem Prüfstand (Vienna: ÖBV, 1981).
15   The Hungarian Politburo had decided on March 9 to remove the “technical obstacles” 
along the border against the opposition of the socialist states. Hungary began to remove 
these border installations on May 11. In the future border troops and new technical signal 
installations were supposed to guard the border. However, installing this new signal system 
was not completed yet by October/November 1956; see Bettina Hofmann, “Grenze zu 
Ungarn 1956: Der Stacheldraht fällt,” in Das Burgenland als internationale Grenzregion im 
20. und 21. Jahrhundert, ed. Maximilian Graf, Alexander Lass, and Karlo Ruzicic-Kessler 
(Vienna: Neue Welt, 2012), 86-97 (here 92-97).
16   Gémes, “Wie zwei geschiedene Eheleute,” 19 and 43-51.
17   For the number of refugees, see Ibolya Murber, “Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich 1956,” 
in Die ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956, ed. Murber and Fónagy (Vienna: Czernin, 
2006), 335-386 (here 336, 343, and 351).
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camps. The Hungarian refugee crisis also marked the beginning of the old 
artillery barracks in Traiskirchen being utilized as a temporary refugee camp. 
Traiskirchen since has become synonymous with Austrian refugee poli-
tics.18 Both the buildings used for temporary refugee accommodations and 
the barracks in Traiskirchen were in desolate condition. Most of these tem-
porary accommodations had been left in shambles by wartime destruction 
and the recent evacuation of the Soviet occupation element. The bathroom 
facilities were hardly functioning, and the onset of winter temperatures left 
inmates freezing. After a few days of initial chaos, aid organizations and 
the Austrian Red Cross assisted the Austrian government in improving 
the accommodation and support of this mass of refugees. In spite of these 
improvements, camp life hardly met the refugees’ expectations about life 
in the “Golden West.” During the initial phase of the crisis, the Austrian 
population was very supportive of refugees with donations,19 and refugees 
were distributed without any problem throughout Austria.20
International refugee aid took time to be organized. So the initial 
welcoming of refugees fueled by Austrian anti-communism quickly wore 
out by the end of November 1956 and turned into the opposite. For the 
Austrian government and population, the transit of these refugees could 
not happen quickly enough. Media reports and public opinion turned hos-
tile by the end of the year.21 Hungarian refugees were soon denounced as 
“ungrateful” and “parasitical.” From the beginning of 1957, the Austrian 
government began to argue that the refugees also had “responsibilities.” 
Now “the latent prejudices vis-à-vis Hungarian refugees […] were voiced 
openly.” Brigitta Zierer has noted: “As the Hungarian refugees stayed in 
the country beyond their initial welcome, the demand that they return to 
their homeland became louder. Austrians’ initial willingness to be helpful 
quickly subsided as these ‘victims of communism’ began to compete for jobs 
and accommodations.” She added: “Only those should receive help who 
18   Leopoldine Götz, Volksaufstand in Ungarn 1956: Ein Jahr der Bewährung für die Stadt 
Traiskirchen (Schwarzach: Heimat-Verlag, 2006), 38.
19   Peter Eppel, “Wo viele helfen, ist viel geholfen: Ungarn-Hilfe 1956/57 in Österreich,” 
in Murber and Fónagy, Die ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956, 431-464 (here 433-
435).
20   Studies of the regional accommodation of refugees in various Austrian states are available 
now, see Alexandra Haas, Ungarn in Tirol: Flüchtlingsschicksale 1945-1956 (Innsbruck: 
Studien-Verlag, 2008); Edda Engelke, “Einem besseren Leben entgegen?”: Ungarische 
Flüchtlinge 1956 in der Steiermark (Innsbruck: Studien-Verlag, 2006); Ibolya Murber, 
Flucht in den Westen 1956: Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich (Vorarlberg) und Liechtenstein: 
Magyar menekültek Ausztriában (Vorarlberg) és Liechtensteinben 1956 (Feldkirch: Rheticus 
Gesellschaft, 2002).
21   For a recent discussion of Austrian treatment of the Hungarian refugees, see Gémes, 
Austria and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 65-83.
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contributed to the rebuilding of the country as Austrians had done in the 
postwar era.”22
The international community was very receptive of Hungarian refu-
gees. Between November 1956 and January 1957, some 153,000 refugees 
left Austria;23 only 25,000 to 30,000 stayed. This number probably reflects 
the refugees of 1956 and those Hungarians who came before them. Most 
of the refugees found new homes in the United States and Canada. In 
Europe, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Switzerland 
also offered them new homes.24 Given their high levels of education, the 
integration of these refugees into Austrian society was smooth. Among 
them were later luminaries of postwar Austrian life, such as the journalist 
Paul Lendvai. Still, Austrian and Hungarian bureaucrats negotiated the 
“hot potato” of repatriating refugees, especially minors. Austrian officials 
hoped that those refugees left in the country at the beginning of 1958 
might return to Hungary.25 Among the Hungarian refugees who fled to 
Austria in 1956/57, a total of 11,800 returned to their homeland.26
During this time, the Austrian government began to view refugee orga-
nizations disapprovingly. As Austrian–Hungarian relations were improving 
during the 1960s, NGOs were seen as burdening bilateral relations and 
their range of activities were reduced. Paradoxically, Austrian – Hungarian 
Cold War relations became the “paragon of European détente.” The Iron 
Curtain along their border became increasingly porous. In 1989, this bor-
der once again became the site of mass flight.27 In 1956, Austria gained 
a considerable international reputation for both their firm stance on the 
border during the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian insurrection and 
its welcome of, and aid for, the refugees. Austrian neutrality, still untested, 
passed its first test in this crisis. Even though the crisis of 1956 demonstrat-
ed very clearly that Austria did not consider itself a permanent haven for 
refugees, the country successfully cultivated its public image of acting in an 
exceptional humanitarian fashion regarding refugees.
22   Brigitta Zierer, “Willkommen Ungarnflüchtlinge 1956?,” in Heiss and Rathkolb, 
Asylland wider Willen, 157-171 (here 169-170).
23   Friedrich Kern, Österreich: Offene Grenze der Menschlichkeit; Die Bewältigung des 
ungarischen Flüchtlingsproblems im Geiste internationaler Solidarität (Vienna: BMI, 
1959), 54.
24   Murber, “Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich 1956,” 351 and 362; on the U.S., see Irwin F. 
Gellman, The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2015), 348-359.
25   Gémes, “Wie zwei geschiedene Eheleute,” 144-161.
26   Murber, “Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich 1956,” 366.
27   Tamás Baranyi, Maximilian Graf, Melinda Krajczar, and Isabella Lehner, “A Masterpiece 
of European Détente? Austrian–Hungarian Relations from 1964 until the Peaceful End of 
the Cold War,” Zeitgeschichte 41, no. 5 (2014): 311-338 (here 313-323).
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The End of the “Prague Spring” and Czechoslovak “Tourist 
Refugees” in 1968/69
On August 21/22, 1968, the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia to 
stop the reforms of the “Prague Spring,” unleashing a second wave of Cold 
War refugees from the communist East. The reforms of the “Prague Spring” 
aimed at democratizing life in Czechoslovakia; the monopoly of power of 
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was not questioned during the 
initial phase of the reform era.28 With regard to refugees, one of the reforms 
envisioned liberalizing foreign travel, even permitting travelling to the 
West. The leadership in the Kremlin had agreed before the intervention to 
not use violence in stopping people from leaving the country. The Austrian 
government responded to the invasion of Czechoslovakia with great 
restraint. Yet it announced publically that it would accept refugees as part 
of its humanitarian responsibility.29 In spite of this public gesture, prodded 
by the Minister of the Interior, the Foreign Ministry in Vienna directed the 
Austrian Legation in Prague not to issue any more visas for Czechoslovak 
citizens. However, Rudolf Kirchschläger, the Austrian Minister in Prague, 
ignored these orders from Vienna and continued to issue visas, thus allow-
ing Czechoslovak citizens to legally enter Austria during and after the 
crisis. In the course of the fall of 1968, the Austrian Legation issued more 
than 100,000 visas, about twice as many as it had issued before routinely.30 
Whoever did not have a visa might also cross the border and apply for 
asylum in Austria.
Austria again became the first country in the non-communist West to 
accept tens of thousands of Czech and Slovak refugees. The country was 
ill prepared for such a massive influx of refugees. Add to those refugees, 
who directly crossed the border from Czechoslovakia into Austria, thou-
sands of Czechs and Slovaks who were vacationing in Yugoslavia during 
28   Stefan Karner et al., eds., Prager Frühling: Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968, 2 vols. 
(Vienna: Böhlau, 2008); Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler, eds., The 
Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Lanham: Lexington, 
2010); see also Florentine Kastner et al. eds., “Prager Frühling” und “Ära Kreisky”: Zwischen 
Reformwillen und Reformverwirklichung; Untersuchungen zu den europäischen Nachbarn 
Tschechoslowakei und Österreich (Prague: Institut Mezinárodních Studií, 2009).
29   Silke Stern, “Die tschechoslowakische Emigration: Österreich als Erstaufnahme- und 
Asylland,” in Karner et al., eds., Prager Frühling, 1025-1043 (here 1026-1028).
30   Klaus Eisterer, “The Austrian Legation in Prague and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 
1968,“in Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak, eds., Neutrality in Austria, 
Contemporary Austrian Studies 9 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001), 214-235; Karl 
Peterlik, “Tausende Visa Pro Tag ausgestellt,” in Karner et al., eds, Prager Frühling, 1163-
1166.
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the Warsaw Pact invasion. Due to the closing of the Warsaw Pact borders, 
these vacationers no longer could return home via Hungary. Some 50,000 
Czechoslovak “tourists” were stuck and came to Austria to observe the 
unfolding of the situation in their native Czechoslovakia. Many returned 
home later that fall. Both the exact numbers of refugees coming to Austria 
and those returning home is not known. We know that between August 
and late October 1968, some 162,000 persons, refugees, and “tourists” 
came to Austria. A second major influx of refugees from Czechoslovakia 
into Austria followed in the spring and summer of 1969. As a result of 
the Stalinist regime “normalizing” life in the country, the “Prague Spring” 
reforms were rolled back and the “reform communists” lost their power in 
the party and government. Thousands left the country for fear of political 
persecution or to improve their lives economically. Only when the borders 
were finally closed down on October 9, 1969 did this renewed exodus of 
refugees stop.31
Again, housing and feeding this vast number of refugees became a 
problem, especially in Vienna, as most of the refugees came to the capital. 
The Austrian government soon ran out of funds to take care of the refugees 
and called upon the international community for support.32 The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided consid-
erable financial support, relieving the Austrian budget woes in the short 
term. The UNHCR, however, was only in a position to help those people 
recognized as refugees under the Geneva Convention. Only a small number 
of refugees qualified for this status. As a consequence, 4,176 Czechs and 
Slovaks applied for political asylum in Austria in 1968, and another 6,529 
in 1969.33 In the end, it is estimated that only 2,000 to 3,000 refugees 
stayed in Austria. For most refugees, Austria only served as a temporary 
haven. The Austrian government wanted them to leave anyway, since it faced 
severe bottlenecks in taking care of them and housing them. At the time, 
a number of western European countries experienced a time of economic 
boom. Many businesses were looking for well-trained laborers and found 
them among the refugees. Switzerland accepted many of them in Europe, 
and the United States, Canada, and Australia accepted them overseas.34 
31   Stern, “Die tschechoslowakische Emigration,” 1030-1037 and 1040-1041.
32   The Austrian Cabinet decided as early as Sept. 10, 1968 to ask the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to support to take care of the refugees and evacuate 
them out of Austria, see Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), Archiv der Republik (AdR), 
Bundeskanzleramt, Ministerratsprotokolle, 2. Republik Klaus II Nr. 92, Sept, 10, 1968, Box 
275.
33   Vlasta Valeš, “Die tschechoslowakischen Flüchtlinge 1968–1989,” in Heiss and 
Rathkolb, eds., Asylland wider Willen, 172–182 (here 178).
34   Stern, “Die tschechoslowakische Emigration,” 1038-1042.
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Again, those refugees who stayed were quickly integrated into Austrian 
society. They formed exile organizations, which played an important role 
in supporting the emigration of dissidents after the 1977 proclamation of 
Charta 77.35
Most of Czech and Slovak refugees in 1968, then, transited through 
Austria and most of the “tourists” returned to their native land. The 
Austrian media covered them as “transients,” and therefore the Austrian 
population responded positively and less critically than vis-à-vis the 
Hungarian refugees in 1956/57. Austrians continued to show solidarity 
throughout the crisis of 1968. The Austrians’ perception of the “Prague 
Spring” was governed by their anti-communist stance. The population 
was highly critical of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by their Warsaw 
Pact allies. The image of “vacationing” refugees waiting to return to their 
homeland continued until April 1969, when Alexander Dubček, one of 
the leading protagonists of the “Prague Spring,” was finally stripped of his 
position in government and additional Czechoslovak refugees crossed the 
border into Austria.36 When, more than ten years later, Austria encoun-
tered a new massive influx of refugees from Communist Poland, many 
Austrians reacted with hostility. 
Solidarność, Martial Law in Poland, and Polish “Economic 
Refugees,” 1981/82
In Poland, the independent labor union Solidarność led by Lech Wałęsa 
had pushed the communist government close to collapse by 1981. In the 
end, the communist regime only survived as a result of the imposition of 
martial law in the country on December 13, 1981. The new communist 
government led by General Jaruzelski jailed the leadership of Solidarność 
and prohibited the existence of labor unions.37 During the initial phase of 
the Polish protest movement, Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and most Austrian 
officials were supportive of the labor movement Solidarność; however, 
35   Přemysl Janýř, “Tschechoslowakei 1968 – Charta 77,” in Heiss and Rathkolb, eds., 
Asylland wider Willen, 182–188; see also Benjamin Gilde, Österreich im KSZE-Prozess 1969–
1983: Neutraler Vermittler in humanitärer Mission (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013), 297–304; 
for a recent synthesis, see Ondřej Haváč, “Czech Refugees in Austria 1968–1985,” in Prague 
Papers on the History of the International Relations 1 (2016), 82-97.
36   Arbeiter-Zeitung, Apr.19, 1969, 3.
37   Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., From Solidarity to Martial Law: The 
Polish Crisis of 1980–1981; A Documentary History (Budapest: Central European Univ. Press, 
2007).
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caution was in place. As the “crisis in Poland” was escalating over the course 
of 1981, Kreisky’s stance became more restrained and the debate in Austria 
became more contentious. When Polish coal deliveries to Austria ceased, 
Kreisky became upset and called upon the Polish miners to return and do 
their jobs. The labor strikes turned a bad economic situation in the country 
worse.38
Berthold Molden has correctly noted that, “the beginning Polish 
labor migration to Austria in 1980 turned into a refugee movement in 
the course of the deteriorating political situation in Poland.” The des-
perate state of the Polish economy pushed many Polish citizens in 1981 
“to flee to Austria or transit through the country,” even though they were 
not politically persecuted.39 In the context of Cold War refugee discours-
es after 1945, these Polish citizens represent a special case. Here was the 
first substantial cohort of Cold War refugees coming to Austria whose 
homeland did not have a common border with Austria. Their coming 
to Austria was made possible by a 1972 agreement allowing for trav-
el without visas. People with a passport could travel between the two 
countries without restrictions.40 Polish refugees therefore might travel 
to Austria legally without a visa as tourists and then apply for political 
asylum once they arrived. In the course of the spring 1981, the number of 
asylum applicants of previous years had increased substantially. In June 
1981, 2,000 additional asylum-seekers were recorded. By September, 
the number had risen to 4,000 every month. By October 1981, “almost 
22,000 Poles had applied for asylum in Austria.” In addition, another 
approximately 5,000 “unrecorded tourists” from Poland lived in Austria. 
Only 10 percent of those refugees applying for asylum were given the 
status according to the Geneva Convention. The rest only received 
permission to stay. When the refugee camps were filled, the govern-
ment housed people in inns and bed & breakfast accommodations. The 
38   On the Austrian labor unions’ and political parties’ “ambivalent” position vis-à-vis 
Solidarność, see Oliver Rathkolb, “Austria: An Ambivalent Attitude of Trade Unions and 
Political Parties,” in Solidarity with Solidarity: Western European Trade Unions and the Polish 
Crisis, 1980–1982, ed. Idesbald Goddeeris (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 269-
288.
39   Berthold Molden, “Die Ost-West-Drehscheibe: Österreichs Medien im Kalten Krieg,” 
in Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich, ed. Manfred Rauchensteiner 
(Vienna: Böhlau 2010), 687–774 (here 762).
40   Maximilian Graf, “Kreisky und Polen: Schlaglichter auf einen vernachlässigten Aspekt 
der österreichischen ‘Ostpolitik,’” in Bananen, Cola, Zeitgeschichte: Oliver Rathkolb und das 
lange 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Lucile Dreidemy et al. (Vienna: Böhlau, 2015), 692-706 (here 703–
706); Maximilian Graf and Peter Ruggenthaler, “Polnisch-Österreichische Beziehungen 
im Kalten Krieg,” in Österreich im polnischen öffentlichen Diskurs nach 1945, ed. Agnieszka 
Kisztelińska-Węgrzyńska (Krakow: Universitas, 2016), 31-66.
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Interior Ministry forked out 90 million Austrian Schillings monthly to 
pay for these refugees.41
The extent of these financial burdens led the Austrian government 
to apply for aid from the international community to master the “refugee 
crisis.” The international response was minimal. The Poles who had come 
to Austria were perceived as “migrants seeking work” (“Arbeitsmigranten”) 
by both the international community and domestic politics. The majority 
of the Austrian population rejected these Polish asylum-seekers, who had 
entered the country as tourists, but in effect were regarded as “economic 
migrants.” The Austrian yellow press fueled this perception. The Kreisky 
government experienced growing domestic pressure. Chancellor Kreisky’s 
concerns are reflected in the Cabinet meeting of December 1, 1981: “Kreisky 
noted that there was a growing aversion in the Austrian population about 
the Polish refugees and that the government had to consider demanding 
visas again.”42 The idea of suspending the agreement on visa-free travel had 
been first raised in the Foreign Ministry in the summer of 1981.43 Starting 
December 7, 1981, Polish citizens needed a visa again to enter Austria. The 
reasons given publically were overcrowded refugee camps and the massive 
cost of housing and taking care of refugees. In reality, it was a concession 
to public opinion, namely the “general aversion towards refugees” in the 
population. It also became harder for bona fide Polish dissidents to receive 
Austrian visas.44 While in previous months thousands of refugees had 
entered Austria, only 59 visas were issued in the week between December 
9 and 14.45 On December 13, martial law was imposed in Poland after the 
dialogue with the Solidarity Labor Union hit a dead end. By fall 1981, 
Solidarność had registered more than 10 million members and had become 
5 times as strong as the Polish Communist Party.
In the morning of December 13, Kreisky announced on Austrian 
National Radio: “We always have accepted political refugees […] and have 
viewed refugees generously. We are against economic refugees because we 
41   Amtsvermerk, Gegenstand: Offizieller Besuch des polnischen Aussenministers, 
Jozef Czyrek, in Österreich vom 9. bis 11. November 1981; Medienecho, Programm und 
Informationsmappe, genehmigt von Ullmann, Wien, Nov. 20, 1981, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, 
II-Pol 1981, Polen 166, GZ. 166.18.14/34-II.3/81, Box 33/81.
42   Recorded by the Minister of Trade in his diary, see Staribacher-Tagebücher, Dec. 1, 
1981, Kreisky-Archiv.
43   Einsichtsbemerkung von Hietsch, Vienna, July 29, 1981; allfällige Kündigung des 
Sichtvermerksabkommens, gez. Daublebsky, Wien, Aug. 17, 1981, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, 
II-Pol 1981, Polen 166, GZ. 166.02.40/8-II.3/81, Box 31/81.
44   Molden, “Die Ost-West-Drehscheibe,” 763-765.
45   Tagesmeldung der Botschaft Warschau, Dec. 14, 1981, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 
1981, Polen 166, GZ. 166.02.40.
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simply cannot support them.”46 In case the asylum seekers were in “imme-
diate danger,” however, visas had to be issued “without delay.”47 However, 
during the days after the imposition of martial law, the Austrian Embassy 
in Warsaw only issued 1 to 4 visas per day.48 On December 17, the Council 
for Foreign Affairs (Rat für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten) issued an urgent 
appeal “to all states concerned to aid Austria in mastering the problem of 
Polish refugees.”49 The situation had improved for Polish refugees after 
the imposition of martial law. There were first agreements to take refugees 
from third party states. Moreover, the UNHCR at last became active since 
“there was no doubt any longer that this group qualified for political ref-
ugee status.” Austria had stopped the influx of refugees coming into the 
country and was determined to see them transit quickly to third coun-
tries.50 The Austrian government therefore pressed third countries to accept 
Polish refugees and also continued to ask the international community for 
financial support to take care of them.51 However, international community 
support and acceptance of refugees only arrived slowly, from the Austrian 
perspective, and a large number of refugees stayed in the country. During 
Christmas 1981 – after the imposition of martial law – a wave of solidarity 
swept the country and private donations increased by leaps and bounds. 
Austrian public opinion and the national and local media continued to 
voice their discontent during 1982. Many Austrians brought their personal 
dislike for these refugees to Kreisky’s attention in no uncertain terms. Some 
letters to the Chancellor stated, “Austrians do not care for Poles in our land” 
(“Wir Österreicher wollen die Polen nicht in unserem Land”), and “Send the 
Poles home!!!” (“Schickt die Polen nach Hause!!!”). Some letters characterized 
the Polish refugees as “a dirty pack of lazies” (“Dreckiges/Faules Gesindel”).52
The worst tensions in the refugee situation in Austria had subsided by June 
of 1982 as a result of both the reinstatement of visa requirements and a rise 
46   ORF-transcript: Hörfunk-Sonderjournal (9 Uhr) vom 13. 12. 81: BK Kreisky zur 
Entwicklung in Polen, in: Polen; Verhängung des Ausnahmezustandes. Information für den 
Herrn Bundesminister, Vienna, Nov. 14, 1981, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1981, Polen 166, 
GZ. 166.03.00/355-II.3/81, Box 32/81.
47   Amtsvermerk, Gegenstand: Polen; Visum-Anträge freigelassener Internierter, Wien, 
Mar. 1,1982, Kreisky-Archiv, country box Polen 1.
48   See the daily bulletins until the end of December in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1981, 
Polen 166, Zl. 166.02.40.
49   Erklärung des Rates für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Vienna, Dec. 17, 1981, ÖStA, 
AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1981, GZ. 166.03.00/408-II.3/81.
50   Amtsvermerk über das Gespräch des Generalsekretärs des BMAA mit Direktor 
Homann-Herimberg, Vienna, [n.d., probably Dec. 23, 1981], ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 
1981, Polen 166, GZ. 166.02.40/53-II.3/81, Box 31/81.
51   For the correspondence with the UNHCR, see Kreisky-Archiv, country box Polen 2.
52   See the extensive file in Kreisy-Archiv, country box Polen 1.
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in international aid. In the beginning of 1982, the number of asylum-seekers 
had dropped from 29,000 to 18,000. Hundreds of Polish tourists were still 
applying for political asylum. Austrian appeals to the international communi-
ty were beginning to show results. The United States, Canada, and Australia 
all agreed to accept sizable contingents of Polish refugees. Switzerland 
accepted 1,000 refugees, and other countries smaller contingents. The num-
ber of Poles returning to their country is not known. Austria continued to 
plead for emigration of refugees, “since Austria would not be able to take 
tens of thousands of refugees, due to its size and economic strength,” argued 
the Foreign Ministry officials, and added: “Our country can only continue 
its humanitarian role, if the international community will help us master this 
difficult task.”53 Like in 1956 and 1968, Austria only agreed to serve as a port 
of transit for the refugees of 1981/82. What was different in the Polish crisis 
was the negativity of the refugee discourse from the beginning. The public at 
large only became more accepting of refugees after martial law was imposed. 
However, the public only showed solidarity with the refugees as long as they 
did not outstay their welcome in the country. The sooner they left, and the 
sooner the international situation eased, the better. 
The situation in Poland began to improve in 1982/83. Yet the seeming 
return of political stability was only short-lived. Even though the Jaruzelski-
government outlawed Solidarność, the popular labor union continued to 
survive underground. The country lived on the brink throughout the 1980s. 
When labor strikes were unleashed in 1988, their demands turned political. 
One of their principal goals was to permit the existence of Solidarność again. 
Austro-Polish bilateral relations, too, began to improve in the course 
of the 1980s. Regular mutual visits took place between political delega-
tions and relations were as solid as in the early 1980s. Beginning of 1988, 
an agreement was reached once more to allow visa-free travel. When the 
domestic political situation in Poland deteriorated again in the late 1980s, 
and the outcome of the renewed political turmoil was uncertain, once again 
a high number of Polish refugees entered Austria. Between January and 
October 1988, “5,833 poles applied for political asylum in Austria.” Only 
7 percent of them were granted asylum status. By mid-November 1988, 
the Austrian government once again took care of 4,000 Polish citizens.54 
53   Dienstzettel an die Sektion II, gez. Hietsch (Abt. IV.2) Vienna, June 30, 1982, Zl. 
0.07.01/180-IV.2/82, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol 1982, Polen 166, GZ. 166.02.40/79-
II.3/82.
54   Flüchtlingssituation, Ges. Dr. Hack, Abteilung IV.2, 16. November 1988, in Mappe 
“Besuch Premierminister Rakowski; Nov. 24-26, 1988,” Kreisky-Archiv, Depositum Franz 
Vranitzky, AP, Box “MP Grosz Ungarn Nov. 88; MP Rakowski (Polen) Nov. 88; AM 
Johannes CSSR.”
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This new wave of refugees, however, relied on Polish exile networks and did 
not receive much public attention or cause resentment. Yet given the dra-
matic changes occurring in Eastern Europe, the Austrian Foreign Ministry 
began to fear and prepare for more drastic scenarios at the end of 1988. 
In case of a deteriorating domestic situation in Eastern Europe, “suddenly 
growing streams of refugees” seemed likely, and Austria needed to be pre-
pared this time.55
“Welcomed Refugees” and “Security Risks”: East German and 
Romanian Refugees 1989/90
Unrest in the population in Poland was clearly palpable in the late 
1980s, and not only in Communist Poland, but in the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) as well. The causes of this discontent rested in these 
communist regimes not being able to take care of the basic needs of their 
populations. Moreover, East Germans demanded freedom to travel and 
resented the repressiveness of the regime of the Socialist Unity Party, SED. 
By the summer of 1989, 125,000 East Germans had applied for exit visas.56 
On top of it, “communal elections” had taken place in May 1989, and the 
election results had been manipulated. When evidence was revealed for the 
purloined results, people began to protest. Peaceful demonstrations were 
violently dispersed. East Germans also openly protested against these mas-
sacres at Tiananmen Square in Beijing by the Chinese Communist regime 
on June 4, 1989. The SED party leadership found excuses for the crack-
down by the Chinese Communists. Consequently, East Germans were 
afraid that a “Chinese solution” might be possible in the GDR too.57 These 
factors, next to the models of peaceful transformation and democratization 
unfolding in Poland and Hungary, contributed to the decision of many East 
Germans to leave the GDR in the summer of 1989.
The initial motivation, however, came from the apparent opening of the 
Iron Curtain along the Austro-Hungarian border. It has been noted above 
55   Information “Osteuropa im Wandel? Zur innenpolitischen Bewegung in den WP-
Staaten und Jugoslawien,” Gesandter Ernst Sucharipa, Vienna, Nov. 11, 1988, ÖStA, AdR, 
BMAA, II-Pol 1988, GZ. 701.03/19-II-3/88.
56   Anja Hanisch, Die DDR im KSZE-Prozess 1972-1985: Zwischen Ostabhängigkeit, 
Westabgrenzung und Ausreisebewegung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 373-374.
57   Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Endspiel: Die Revolution von 1989 in der DDR (Munich: 
C.H.Beck, 2009), 318-343; see also Bernd Schäfer, “Die DDR und die ‘chinesische Lösung.’ 
Gewalt in der Volksrepublik China im Sommer 1989,” in 1989 und die Rolle der Gewalt, ed. 
Martin Sabrow (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012), 153-172.
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that relations between Austria and Hungary had been improving dramat-
ically ever since the 1960s. Due to both Austrian pressure and domestic 
changes in Hungary, the border between the two countries had become 
porous. The Hungarian government had begun to remove deadly mine 
fields along the border with Austria in 1971. This led to increased contacts 
across the border zone and regional cooperation. In 1979, visa free travel 
had been introduced, which greatly increased border crossings.58 In 1988, 
Hungary introduced a passport valid throughout the world (“Weltpass”), and 
Hungarians took advantage of the new opportunities to travel in the West. 
In the spring of 1989, the rest of the border installations between Austria 
and Hungary were removed. In the summer of 1989 dramatic pictures from 
the opening of the Austro-Hungarian border were seen around the world. 
The last remnants of the Iron Curtain were removed in May. In an iconic 
“photo op” the Austrian and Hungarian Foreign Ministers Alois Mock 
and Gyula Horn were cutting the barbed wire of the Iron Curtain. And 
in August, the “Pan European Picnic” was organized on the border. These 
instances all served as invitations for East Germans to flee their country.59 
Most citizens of the GDR exited their country and the communist bloc 
either through the opened Austro-Hungarian border, or by occupying West 
German embassies in Eastern Europe, as in Prague and Warsaw.60
The number of attempts to leave the GDR dramatically increased by 
mid-June 1989. The GDR regime expressed growing concern about fellow 
communist regimes, such as the one in Hungary, and their handling of 
border crossings. They no longer handed over such refugees to the East 
German Security Service “STASI” as they had done in the past. The 
Austro-Hungarian border no longer was an area where access was pro-
hibited (“Sperrzone”). Starting in August, upon the request of the Bonn 
government, the Austrian government no longer made public the num-
bers of East German refugees that were transiting to the Federal Republic 
through Austria.61 In the course of the “Pan-European Picnic” on August 
19, some 600 GDR citizens crossed the Austrian border in one day. In 
terms of numbers, this represented the largest group of refugees escaping 
58   Maximilian Graf, “Eine neue Geschichte des ‘Falls’ des Eisernen Vorhangs: Die Öffnung 
der österreichisch-ungarischen Grenze 1989 in Langzeitperspektive und ihre unmittelbaren 
Folgen für die DDR,” in Jahrbuch für Mitteleuropäische Studien 2014/2015 (Vienna: new 
academic press, 2016), 349-373.
59   The best account of the border opening Andreas Oplatka, Der erste Riss in der Mauer: 
September 1989 – Ungarn öffnet die Grenze (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2009).
60   Katarzyna Stokłosa, “Die letzte Fluchtwelle aus der DDR im Jahr 1989: Aus den 
Berichten der westdeutschen Botschaften in Budapest, Prag und Warschau,” Zeitschrift für 
Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung 64, no. 1 (2015): 40-80.
61   Oplatka, Der erste Riss in der Mauer, 115-120 and 129.
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the GDR since the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. East Germans 
vacationing in Hungary had been receiving detailed information about the 
picnic and the opportunity to cross the border with flyers. Vast publicity on 
this one-day exodus encouraged East Germans waiting in Hungary to try it 
themselves. The day after the picnic, 40-50 GDR citizens managed to cross 
the border at Szengotthárd (St. Gotthard) in spite of border guards trying 
to stop them. More than 600 escapees registered as refugees on August 20 
at the West German Embassy in Vienna.62
The weeks between the picnic and the opening of the border on 
September 11 were the “hour of the Burgenländers.” Local civil society 
on the Austrian side of the border took care of the initial groups of East 
German refugees. Then the Burgenland Red Cross organized holding 
camps and cared for refugees before they were directed towards the West 
German Embassy in Vienna. Red Cross support service centers sprung up 
in a number of small Burgenland border communities. The work of the 
Red Cross was also supported by armies of volunteers. For many locals, 
memories of 1956 sprang up vividly. Some even got involved in organizing 
the flight of the refugees. Gawkers on the border unsettled the refugees. The 
international community was impressed with the spontaneous Austrian aid 
efforts. The Austrian media once again beat the drum of Austria as the 
model nation for refugees: shades of the past.63
When two incidents of deaths occurred – clearly due to accidents – a 
solution needed to be found to this “refugee crisis.” The decision to allow 
citizens of the GDR to exit the communist bloc through Hungary was 
made in Budapest, in agreement with the governments in Vienna and 
Bonn. Austria agreed to accept these refugees for humanitarian reasons. 
Austria actually would have been bound by treaties with the GDR to not 
allow entry into the country to GDR-citizens without a visa and did not 
want to risk breaking international treaties as a neutral country. So “a typi-
cally Austrian solution” was found: the names of refugees were noted down 
and loose pieces of paper with a visa stamp were inserted in their passports 
to allow them entry into the country. This piece of paper was removed from 
passports when refugees crossed the border to the Federal Republic, and 
so the treaty with the GDR that its citizens needed visas to enter Austria 
62   Maximilian Graf, “Das Paneuropäische Picknick im Kontext: Wie Österreich zum 
Tor in die Freiheit werden konnte und welche Folgen dies hatte,” in Der erste Stein aus 
der Berliner Mauer: Das paneuropäische Picknick 1989, ed. Stefan Karner and Philipp Lesiak 
(Graz, 2016).
63   Maximilian Graf, “Die Welt blickt auf das Burgenland. 1989 – Die Grenze wird 
zum Abbild der Veränderung,” in Graf, Lass and Ruzicic-Kessler, eds., Das Burgenland als 
internationale Grenzregion, 135-179 (here 162-179).
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was satisfied.64 Opening the Austro-Hungarian border on September 11 
produced further waves of refugees. This time, however, the authorities were 
ready when mass migration occurred.
The government tasked the Austrian Red Cross to take care of the ref-
ugee movements, which brought considerable experience to the job. Since 
it was a humanitarian mission, Austrian neutrality law was respected too. 
On September 10, the Red Cross had already set up welcome centers on 
the border. When thousands of refugees began crossing the border the next 
day, they received food and medical care, if needed. Those refugees arriving 
in a car received road maps that directed them through Austria to the West 
German border and, on top of it, 700 Austrian Schillings for fuel costs. A 
considerable number of East German refugees were picked up in busses 
in Hungary and shipped through Austria directly to the border of West 
Germany. During the first few days after the border opening, more than 
10,000 GDR citizens transited from Hungary through Austria into the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Sources differ: as few as 20,000 or as many as 
50,000 East Germans may have crossed Austria from Hungary to the FRG 
in the fall of 1989. The Embassy of the FRG in Austria reimbursed the 
Austrian Red Cross 1.5 million German Marks for its refugee expenses.65 
The refugees crossing Austria from Hungary to the FRG received a warm 
welcome in Austria as “transiting refugees.” 
In the course of the fall 1989, concerns grew again in Austria with 
regard to growing numbers of refugees coming to the country as a result of 
turmoil and the political transitions in the rest of Eastern Europe. When 
the removals of the Iron Curtain began, the issue of how to secure the 
Eastern borders became more urgent. Austrians feared an “invasion” of 
Romanian and GDR citizens; this anxiety waxed in the course of the fall. 
As the Hungarian “refugee crisis” became more serious, Peter Martos, the 
Budapest correspondent of the Austrian daily Die Presse, stressed “the com-
mitment by the FRG to treat all Germans as citizens,” sparking the quick 
transit of East German refugees through Austria. But he also asked the 
question what would happen if “Czechs, Slovaks, and Romanians” would 
seek freedom in Austria by exiting through Hungary. This surely would 
create a “difficult situation” in Austria. If Austria were “abandoned by those 
64   Michael Gehler, “Bonn – Budapest – Wien: Das deutsch-österreichisch-ungarische 
Zusammenspiel als Katalysator für die Erosion des SED-Regimes 1989/90,” in Grenzöffnung 
1989: Innen- und Außenperspektiven und die Folgen für Österreich, ed. Andrea Brait and 
Michael Gehler (Vienna: Böhlau 2014), 135-162.
65   Tobias Mindler and Johannes Steiner, Grenzenlose Menschlichkeit: Wie das Rote 
Kreuz Burgenland 1989 den DDR-Flüchtlingen half (Eisenstadt: Österr. Rotes Kreuz, 
Landesverband Burgenland, 2014), 28-29.
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countries that traditionally have accepted refugees,” Austria quickly would 
be overwhelmed by large numbers of refugees.66
As a result of the spillover of political upheaval in Eastern Europe to 
Romania at the end of 1989, refugees began arriving in Austria from there. 
Austrian media intensified their critical discussion of “refugee crises.” Now 
the traditional Austrian Cold War discourses about refugees intensified, 
rejecting additional refugees. The bloody revolution in Romania shocked 
Austrians and produced an abundance of donations for the stricken coun-
try. Austrians, however, showed little empathy for those refugees who came 
to Austria when the upheaval was over and applied for political asylum. The 
political and economic situation dramatically changed at the end of the 
Cold War and so did the old “enemy image” about the communist threat. 
The demonstrations of solidarity for refugees in Austria and elsewhere in 
the West quickly subsided. Transiting to Western countries from Austria 
for Romanian refugees became more difficult, and so they stayed in the 
country and expected support. In 1990, 12,199 Romanian refugees applied 
for political asylum in Austria in accordance with the Geneva Convention.67 
Media and popular discourses narrowed in on “economic refugees” who 
were overstaying their welcome in Austria.68 In addition, Romanian ref-
ugees were suspected of being “agents” of the Romanian Security Agency 
Securitate, criminals, or worse “potential sexual predators,” constituting 
“security risks” for the country. These debates spilled out into the streets 
in February/March 1990. In the small village of Kaisersteinbruch in 
Burgenland, public protesters gathered in the streets opposing the housing 
of 800 male Rumanian refugees in their local Austrian Army barracks.69 
As a consequence, Austria began to demand visas from Romanian citizens 
wanting to enter the country on March 15, 1990. This quickly stopped the 
numbers of refugees entering the country.70 No historical research has been 
done about the fate of these Romanian refugees in Austria, whether they 
transited to other countries, returned to Romanian, or stayed and were inte-
grated in Austria.
66   Martos quoted in Graf, “Die Welt blickt auf das Burgenland,” 157 and 170-171.
67   Brigitta Zierer, Politische Flüchtlinge in österreichischen Printmedien (Vienna: Braumüller, 
1998), 65.
68   Bernd Matouschek and Ruth Wodak, “‘Rumänen, Roma… und andere Fremde’: 
Historisch-kritische Diskursanalyse zur Rede von den ‘Anderen,’” in Heiss and Rathkolb, 
eds., Asylland wider Willen, 210-238 (here 215).
69   Hubert Speckner, Von drüben …: Die Flüchtlingshilfe des Österreichischen Bundesheeres in 
den Jahren 1956 bis 1999 (Vienna: BLV, 2006), 43-50.
70   Brigitta Zierer, “Politische Flüchtlinge in österreichischen Printmedien: Dargestellt 
am Vergleich des Ungarischen Volksaufstand 1956 und der Revolution in Rumänien 1989” 
(PhD diss., University of Vienna 1995), 503-505 and 514-517.
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Conclusion
During the Cold War, Austria tended to grant asylum to those “waves 
of refugees” who were perceived as political refugees. Austrian officialdom 
and civil society did their best to take care of refugees during crisis sit-
uations. This is true for the large numbers of refugees from Communist 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968. Based on the welcoming 
of these refugees, Austria claimed to pursue a long-standing humanitarian 
tradition. Yet in both these cases, it became quickly apparent that Austria 
only wanted to offer transit to refugees, not a new home. This response 
became clearly visible in the case of Hungarian refugees in 1956, even 
though the international community offered to help and accept refugees 
from Austria. This response repeated itself in 1968/69 when few Czechs 
and Slovaks applied for political asylum in Austria. Surely, the Austrian 
government had considerable expenses taking care of “tourist-refugees” in 
1968. The situation with refugees from Poland in 1981/82 was different 
again. It became clear very quickly that the Poles who entered Austria 
were perceived as “economic refugees” who wanted to stay in Austria per-
manently. The international community initially showed little interest in 
helping Austria, or agreeing to accept Polish refugees. This changed briefly 
with the imposition of martial law in Poland and the persecution of Polish 
dissidents. Now the international community demonstrated solidarity and 
agreed to accept Polish refugees coming through Austria. 
The GDR citizens coming through Austria in 1989 were welcomed. 
They were only transiting through Austria from Hungary into the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Bonn government generously paid for the 
expenses incurred in taking care of them. Refugees coming from Romania 
in 1989/90 were seen as the Polish refugees had been perceived in 1981/82. 
These political “refugees from communism” were quickly seen as “work-
ing migrants” looking to improve their lives economically. These Poles 
and Romanians arrived at a time of deteriorating economic conditions in 
Austria and the West and the end of the full employment era. Open borders 
and the people transiting them in 1989 and thereafter – like the Romanians 
– were increasingly seen as security risks. 
Austrian discourses about Poles in 1981/82 and Romanians in 1989/90 
were quite similar. Public discourses were negative and critical and politi-
cians chose the path of least resistance by stopping the influx of refugees 
entering the country by cutting legal immigration with visas. This was 
made easier by the fact that Austria did not have common borders with 
Poland and Romania. In 1956 and 1968, the masses of refugees entering 
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Austria could not be interrupted so easily due to the common borders 
with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In each case it was the Austrian yellow 
press (especially the Kronen Zeitung) inciting public opinion. In most of 
these case studies, Austrians started out welcoming refugees, only to turn 
against them in the course of these “refugee crises” unfolding. Austrians saw 
themselves not as a country of immigrants but as a place granting asylum 
to people transiting. Public and media discourses quickly turned negative 
during these Cold War refugee crises. People were worried about the large 
numbers of refugees entering the country and regularly changed the polit-
ical responses to refugees. 
In spite of the critiques voiced in the analysis of this paper, Austria 
tended to respond with great alacrity to these Cold War refugee crises. 
Austrians were welcoming to refugees and the government supported 
them by offering food and shelter. Yet the traditional image of Austria’s 
great humanitarian record on behalf of Cold War refugees also needs to be 
demythologized. Austrians can learn how to deal with refugee “waves” and 
“crises” by taking a closer look at their ambivalent responses in the past. 

“Austria Attractive for Guest Workers?” Recruitment 
of Immigrant Labor in Austria in the 1960s and 1970s
          
Vida Bakondy1
In 1947, Austria faced an acute shortage of male labor that was sup-
posed to help in the “reconstruction” after the end of World War II and 
the Nazi regime. In this context, a draft for an agreement between Italy 
and Austria for the “Recruitment and Employment of Italian Seasonal 
Laborers in 1947” was drawn up.2 According to the tasks described in the 
draft, 8,400 male seasonal laborers were desired. They were to be employed 
in logging and construction, as well as in brick making and in mining. The 
brick-making industry above all complained at the time of the shortage 
in labor and pointed to historical continuity in the employment of Italian 
brick-makers.3 It was feared, however, that “the enticement of the really 
qualified Italian seasonal laborers to other countries” had already begun.4 No 
other sources indicate that the agreement was signed in 1947. Nevertheless, 
this is testimony of historical relevance, as it documents the early demand 
for immigrant labor in the immediate post-war period and the simultane-
ous awareness of historical continuity with regard to their employment. In 
public debates and political discussions surrounding labor migration in the 
following decades, however, there was an evident tendency toward a lack 
of historical perspective. The immigrant labor of earlier decades, as well as 
Nazi forced labor (which in the first half of the 1940s had led to a massive 
1  This paper emerged as part of the FWF Austrian Science Fund Project P 24468-G18, 
“Deprovincializing Contemporary Austrian History: Migration and the transnational 
challenges to national historiographies (ca. 1960-today),” which is based at the Institute for 
Contemporary History at the University of Innsbruck (11/2012-10/2017) and headed by 
Dirk Rupnow. This essay and all quotations from German sources have been translated by 
Tim Corbett, unless otherwise noted.
2   Übereinkommen zwischen Österreich und Italien zur Anwerbung und Beschäftigung 
italienischer Ziegelarbeiter im Jahr 1947, Geschäftszahl Sp 2595/1947, MF 680, RZ 6621, 
Archiv der Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (Archive of the Austrian Federal Economic 
Chamber, hereafter Archiv WKÖ).
3   A letter from the Association of the Stone-working and Ceramics Industry to the 
Federal Ministry for Social Administration of May 14, 1947 for example states that above 
all the federal provinces of Carinthia, Upper Austria, Styria, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg “have 
always been dependent on the employment of Italian bricklayers.” Ibid.
4   Ibid.
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forced deployment of foreign labor in Austria),5 were often disregarded. 
Rather, immigration was much discussed as a contemporary phenomenon 
while a veil was drawn over its history as well as its causes and reasons.
Austria’s desire for time limits on recruitment agreements and the 
related belief in a temporal restriction of immigrant labor was to endure 
over the years, as did the competition with other Western European coun-
tries over the recruitment of foreign labor and the related concern about 
not being able to recruit enough qualified laborers. This is also testified to 
in the headlines of contemporary media reports in the early 1960s, when 
negotiations over the conclusion of recruitment agreements were taken up 
once more: “40,000 foreign workers are allowed to come to Austria. But 
there will hardly be that many available,” ran a title in the Arbeiterzeitung 
on January 9, 1962; “Austria attractive for guest workers? Economy fears 
the magnetic effect of Germany and Switzerland,” ran the headline in the 
Presse on February 6, 1962. The newspaper reports cited here also refer-
enced the two dominant terms – “Fremdarbeiter” (foreign worker) and 
“Gastarbeiter” (guest worker) – which were used for labor migrants above 
all from Yugoslavia and Turkey right into the 1980s.6
 Societal Contexts
Austria entered the European competition over migrant workers relatively 
late.7 The first recruitment agreement was signed with Spain on May 2, 1962; 
5   At the height of World War II, there were “about 80,000 civilian foreigners, prisoners 
of war, concentration camp inmates, and Hungarian Jews [employed] in the economy of 
the ‘Ostmark,’” according to the historians Bertrand Perz and Florian Freund. Florian 
Freund and Bertrand Perz, “Zwangsarbeit von zivilen AusländerInnen, Kriegsgefangenen, 
KZ-Häftlingen und ungarischen Juden in Österreich,” in NS-Herrschaft in Österreich: Ein 
Handbuch, ed. Emmerich Tálos, Ernst Hanisch, Wolfgang Neugebauer, and Reinhard Sieder, 
2nd ed. (Vienna: öbv & hpt, 2000), 644-695 (here 684).
6   The term “guest worker” was here connoted positively and was also seen as a dissociation 
from the term “foreign worker” associated with the Nazi era and forced labor. The fact that 
the term “guest worker” is by no means an empty and ahistorical term is evident from the 
efforts of the Nazi regime to introduce it in the 1940s as a descriptor for those workers who 
came to Germany in the context of official recruitment agreements. Christoph Rass, “Die 
Internationalisierung des Faktors Arbeit in Europa vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis 
zum Ölpreisschock 1973,” in Projekt Migration, ed. Kölnischer Kunstverein et al. (Cologne: 
Dumont, 2005), 354-365 (here 362).
7   Switzerland had already begun recruiting Italian workers in 1948, and the Federal 
Republic of Germany signed an agreement with Italy in 1955. Eveline Wollner, “Maßnahmen 
Jugoslawiens und der Türkei zur Regulierung der Arbeitsmigration während der 1960 
Jahre,” in Good Luck! Migration Today – Vienna, Belgrade, Zagreb, Istanbul, ed. Vida Bakondy 
et al. (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2010), 80-87 (here 80).
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an agreement with Turkey followed in 1964 and with the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1965. Ultimately, immigrant labor from Turkey 
and Yugoslavia was to become historically significant. From 1962 to 1973, the 
year that marked the provisional heyday of the “employment of foreigners” in 
Austria, the proportion of migrant employees had risen from about 17,700 
to about 250,000, with Yugoslav citizens making up the largest proportion at 
78.5 percent, followed by Turkish citizens at 11.8 percent.8 The proportion of 
women among the migrant workers, meanwhile, also increased notably in the 
same time period, from 19 percent to 31 percent.9 Negotiations over recruit-
ment agreements with Italy, Greece, and Tunisia, which were conducted in 
the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, ended up failing. Nevertheless, 
migrants from these countries were also employed in Austria, albeit in much 
smaller numbers.10 In the case of Tunisia, a provisional protocol between 
Austria and Tunisia was signed in 1970, which regulated to bring in a “test 
group” of Tunisian workers; in 1971 the number was raised from 100 to 400.11
The attractiveness of Austria as a destination for immigrant labor from 
the countries mentioned was not present in the professions in which for-
eigners were to be employed, which for the most part promised neither good 
pay nor prospects for advancement.12 Immigrants were above all in demand 
for less prestigious jobs, for which ever fewer Austrian workers could be 
found. These jobs were characterized by low pay, unpleasant and unhealthy 
working conditions (for example noise, dirt, damp), shift and contract work, 
as well as a notably higher risk of seasonal and cyclical unemployment.13 
This included work in the leather, textile, and construction industries, as 
well as in the service sector (such as tourism).14 
In comparison to other industrialized Western European countries, 
such as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) or Switzerland, a phase 
8   Helga Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985: Der Kampf um und 
gegen die ausländischen Arbeitskräfte,” Journal für Sozialforschung 25, no. 2 (1985): 159-194 
(here 173).
9   Ibid., 174.
10   Ibid., 173.
11   Copy of a memorandum of the Working Group for the Recruitment of Foreign Labor 
(AGA) from April 14, 1970, concerning the employment of Tunisian labor forces in Austria, 
Sektionszahl 1082/70, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv der Wirtschaftskammer 
Wien (Archive of the Vienna Economic Chamber, hereafter WKW).
12   Bernhard Perchinig, “Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration? Migrations- und 
Integrationspolitik in Österreich nach 1945,” in Good Luck! Migration Today, ed. Vida 
Bakondy et al. (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2010), 142-158 (here 144).
13   Georg Fischer, Hans Steiner, and Georg Wallner, Ausländische Arbeitskräfte in Österreich, 
Forschungsberichte aus Sozial- und Arbeitsmarktpolitik 9 (Vienna: Bundesministerium für 
soziale Verwaltung, 1985), 72-75; Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 
174.
14   Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 174.
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of increased economic growth only began in Austria from the middle of 
the 1950s. Until then, Austria had mainly been a country of emigration.15 
Moreover, internal migrants from economically underdeveloped regions 
and the integration of refugees (in 1952, for example, the basic opening of 
the labor market to the group of so-called Volksdeutsche, refugees perceived 
as co-ethnics, took place), constituted a large reservoir of labor.16 Following 
the growth of the economy, the unemployment rate in Austria sank from 
5.5 percent in 1955 to 2.9 percent in 1961.17 This development was encour-
aged by the “expansion of the welfare state, state investment in construction 
and other infrastructure programs, the extension of the average time in 
education, and the reduction of the working life and working hours.”18 As 
early as the late 1950s, the Austrian economy had therefore been suffering 
an increasing shortage in labor in certain regions and industries. Various 
attempts to limit the labor migration of Austrians into neighboring coun-
tries, especially into Switzerland or the FRG, remained unsuccessful.19
Employers therefore demanded liberalization of labor market pol-
icies and, related to this, easier access for immigrants to the Austrian 
labor market.20 The legal framework exacerbated the ability of business-
es to respond flexibly to the demand for labor. Until the passing of the 
Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz (Foreign Nationals Employment Law) in 
1975, the Deutsche Reichsverordnung über ausländische Arbeitnehmer (German 
Reich’s Decree on Foreign Labor) of 1933, which had been in force in 
Austria since 1941 and replaced the Inlandarbeiterschutzgesetz (National 
Workers Protection Act) of 1925, had formed the juridical foundation for 
the employment of migrants.21 This was based on a “complicated admittance 
procedure” and was not only dependent on the economic situation and that 
of the domestic labor market, but also on companies’ ability to prove that 
no Austrian labor was available.22 However, the demands of the economy 
15   August Gächter, “Ausländerpolitik seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zwischen Assimilation 
und Ausgrenzung,” in Österreich: Kultur und Identität – heute und vor 100 Jahren, ed. 
Flemming Talbo Stubkjaer (Odense: Odense Univ. Press, 2000), 107-127 (here 109).
16   Perchinig, “Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration?,” 144.
17   Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 159.
18   Kenneth Horvath, Die Logik der Entrechtung: Sicherheits- und Nutzendiskurse im 
österreichischen Migrationsregime (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2014), 148.
19   Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 161. 
20   Ibid., 159-160.
21   Eveline Wollner, “Auf dem Weg zur sozialpartnerschaftlich regulierten 
Ausländerbeschäftigung in Österreich: Die Reform der Ausländerbeschäftigung und der 
Anwerbung bis Ende der 1960er Jahre” (diploma thesis, University of Vienna, 1996), 23. 
However, three decrees issued after 1945 led to the law not being applied in Austria “in this 
form.” Ibid.
22   Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 161.
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for a liberal management of the employment of foreigners initially met 
with vehement opposition from the workers’ representative organizations. 
They by contrast demanded an “active labor-market policy,” in the sense of 
a redeployment and better qualification of Austrian workers.23 In 1955, the 
union of construction workers and loggers threatened a strike if foreign 
labor was brought in for the construction industry.24
The basic agreement on the increased admission of foreign labor into 
the Austrian labor market was achieved in the context of the Raab-Olah 
Agreement,25 following the failure of negotiations over a new law on the 
employment of foreigners in the early 1960s.26 The Raab-Olah Agreement 
was concluded in 1961 between the Austrian Trade Union Federation 
(ÖGB) and the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (BWK),27 the prin-
cipal interest groups of employees and employers in Austria. As an inter-
im solution, the expanded employment of immigrants in the framework 
of agreements on contingents (Kontingentvereinbarungen) was arranged, 
which were concluded between the ÖGB and BWK anew each year. A 
maximum number of foreign laborers for which the complicated individual 
admissions procedure could be waived was fixed for each federal province/
region and industry.28 The agreements on contingents were passed on as 
“recommendations” to the Federal Ministry for Social Affairs, which was 
responsible for the employment of foreigners in Austria, and which in turn 
implemented these in the framework of decrees which were supposed to 
regulate the practice of the employment of foreigners.29 Until the Foreign 
Nationals Employment Law of 1975, Austrian immigration policies thus 
opted for an “extra-parliamentary path” without a legal foundation.30 The 
23   Ibid., 162.
24   Gewerkschaftlicher Nachrichtendienst Nr. 590, 5.5.1955, Geschäftszahl SP 2224/1955, 
MF 680, RZ 6621, Archiv WKÖ.
25   Named after the President of the Federal Economic Chamber at the time, Julius Raab, 
and the President of the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, Franz Olah.
26   The passing of a new Law on the Employment of Foreigners not only aimed to take 
account of the need for an “expansion and simultaneously a continuation of state control of 
the employment of foreigners” (Wollner, “Auf dem Weg,” 23), it had also become necessary 
because the constitutional court had annulled three decrees as unlawful that had been 
issued after 1945 and which had simplified the process of admission for the employment 
of immigrants; Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 163. For details on 
the negotiations, see Wollner, “Auf dem Weg.”
27   Today: Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (WKÖ)
28   Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 166.
29   Stefanie Mayer, “Migration & Labor Markets: Political Discourse in Austria,” in 
Debating Migration: Political Discourses on Labor Immigration in Historical Perspective, ed. 
Stefanie Mayer and Mikael Spang (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2009), 25-73 (here 32).
30   For more detail, see Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985”; Wollner, 
“Auf dem Weg”; Horvath, “Die Logik der Entrechtung,” 156. 
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social scientist Helga Matuschek explained the initial reservation of state 
institutions in this area as follows: “Since the protection and the supremacy 
of domestic workers had been secured, the government and/or other state 
institutions have been able to leave this field to the social partners without 
endangering the basis of legitimation toward the citizens.”31 Beyond this – 
according to the migration researcher Bernhard Perchinig – the domestic 
political significance of the Raab-Olah Agreement lay in the establishment 
of the institution of social partnership “as a specifically Austrian form of 
corporatist cooperation between the government and the interest groups 
and their domination of labor and social policy.”32
The ÖGB linked its agreement to a number of conditions. These 
included, for example, compulsory medical examination before arrival in 
Austria, the limitation of employment of foreigners to a maximum of one 
year, the “Inländerprimat” (domestic primacy, according to which immi-
grants were to be laid off before Austrians), the prohibition of employment 
of immigrants in place of striking Austrian workers, immigrant workers 
being subject to the same collective agreements as Austrian workers, but also 
the fixation of maximum numbers of immigrant laborers according to the 
branch of the economy and the federal province.33 Significant features of the 
agreements on contingents already contained these conditions, which were 
to be incorporated into the Foreign Nationals Employment Law in 1975.34 
The immigration policies of the Second Republic thus relied on historical 
continuities. The basis was offered by the National Workers Protection Act 
of 1925, which, as social scientist Kenneth Horvath demonstrated, not only 
distinguished “explicitly between domestic and foreign labor” and legal-
ly anchored the “Inländerprimat,” but also fundamentally subjugated labor 
migration to reorganization, as it was made into the “direct object of nego-
tiation processes between business associations and labor representatives.”35 
The fundamental premise of Austrian migration policies was rotation and the 
eventual return of immigrants to their country of origin.36 For this reason, 
Austria’s first recruitment agreement with Spain was at first limited to one 
year.37 Simultaneously, however, the countries of origin and the immigrants 
themselves initially believed in the temporary character of labor migration.
31   Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 180.
32   Perchinig, “Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration?,” 145. 
33   Mayer, “Migration & Labor Market,” 31-32.
34   Ibid.
35   Horvath, “Die Logik der Entrechtung,” 165-166 (emphasis in the original).
36   Perchinig, “Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration?,” 145.
37   Spanien-Anwerbeabkommen und Sozialversicherungsabkommen, Information für 
den Herrn Sektionsleiter, Grundzahl 201 042, Geschäftszeichen 31, BMHGI, AdR, ÖStA 
[Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Austrian State Archive].
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The Formalization of Immigrant Labor in the Recruitment 
Contracts
While the Raab-Olah Agreement and the quota solution marked the 
domestic political cornerstone for immigrant labor from Spain, Turkey, and 
Yugoslavia to Austria, the conclusion of intergovernmental recruitment con-
tracts and social security agreements provided the necessary foreign policy 
cornerstone.38 The signing of the agreements was sometimes preceded by years 
of protracted domestic as well as foreign negotiations. The recruitment agree-
ments – which were mostly modeled on existing contracts of the countries of 
origin with other states39 – regulated the procedure of recruitment through to 
the organization of travel and the respective responsibilities of the contractual 
partners. The formalization of immigrant labor through the recruitment con-
tracts and the labor and salary equalization of immigrants with the resident 
workers stipulated in them was intended to serve as protection for both groups. 
The granting of equal rights, however, was consistently subverted; for example, 
through the limitation of work permits for immigrants to one year, which was 
moreover bound to a specific business, as well as the “domestic primacy” that 
had been structurally anchored in the Austrian labor market since 1925.
The countries of origin in many cases opposed direct recruitment by 
foreign businesses and therefore demanded the establishment of an official 
recruitment center, which was to cooperate with the respective national 
authorities on site; moreover, employment services were a state monopoly 
at this point in time.40 The countries of origin thereby tried to control the 
labor migration of their citizens.41 The degree of attempted control and 
38   Spain initially declined to conclude a social security agreement with Austria. Due to the 
time limit on the validity of the recruitment agreement until December 31, 1962, renewed 
negotiations were already necessary in 1963, and a new agreement was finally signed in 1964. 
As a result, a social security agreement was concluded—on the express wish of Spain—which 
entered into force in 1966. (Grundzahl 137/63, Sektion II, BMSV, AdR, ÖStA) Austria 
concluded a social security agreement with Turkey in 1969. In the case of Yugoslavia, the 
agreement was concluded at the same time as the recruitment agreement. See Abkommen 
zwischen der Republik Österreich und dem Spanischen Staat über Soziale Sicherheit samt 
Zusatzprotokoll, Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Law Gazette, hereafter BGBl.] 8/66; Abkommen 
zwischen der Republik Österreich und der Türkischen Republik über Soziale Sicherheit samt 
Zusatzprotokoll, BGBl. 337/69; Abkommen zwischen der Republik Österreich und der 
Sozialistischen Föderativen Republik Jugoslawiens über Soziale Sicherheit, BGBl. 289/66.
39   Negotiations over the recruitment agreement with Spain were based on the Swiss-
Spanish agreement; in the case of Turkey it was the German-Turkish agreement.
40   Eveline Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei,” 80-87 (here 82).
41   Monika Mattes, “Gastarbeiterinnen” in der Bundesrepublik: Anwerbepolitik, Migration 
und Geschlecht in den 50er bis 70er Jahren (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005), 64; see also 
Wollner, “Auf dem Weg” and Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei.”
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influence varied from country to country and was subject to the interests of 
the economy and labor-market policies. The possibility of control on the part 
of the countries of origin extended, for example, to the limitation of selection 
to certain regions or groups, the restriction of the recruitment of specific indi-
viduals, up to the curtailing of the recruitment of qualified workers and the 
prohibition of individual recruitment by companies.42 This “pre-selection” of 
workers and the concurrent limitation of recruitment opportunities, however, 
led to conflicts with the recruiting states and to the exploitation of “alternative 
channels of migration.”43 According to the social scientist Eveline Wollner, 
Austria’s recruitment institutions may have lost their importance over the 
course of the 1960s, “but they were of great significance for the willingness of 
the sending countries to permit recruitment.”44
The first recruitment agreement between Austria and Spain, which was 
signed in May 1962, did not result in any noteworthy or lasting labor migra-
tion to Austria. Austria was not an attractive destination for Spanish work-
ers. Kurt Büchlmann, the head of the Austrian recruitment office in Madrid 
at the time, recalled that the salaries offered by Austrian businesses were 
25% less than those offered by German, French, and Swiss businesses, and 
the success of recruitment altogether remained very modest.45 Moreover, 
Austrian companies hardly made use of the recruitment opportunities in 
Spain. A statement by the Federal Economic Chamber in 1966 stated that 
“the employment of Spanish labor in Austria is only of secondary impor-
tance.”46 Within the next year, the Austrian recruitment office in Madrid 
was closed, with any subsequent recruitment being handled by the Austrian 
external trading office of the Economic Chamber in Madrid.47 
42   For details, see Wollner “Auf dem Weg” and Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und 
der Türkei,” which analyze this question with regard to the cases of Turkish and Yugoslav 
migration policies.
43   Christoph Rass, Institutionalisierungsprozesse auf einem internationalen Arbeitsmarkt: 
Bilaterale Wanderungsverträge in Europa zwischen 1919 und 1974 (Paderborn: Ferdinand 
Schöningh, 2010), 301.
44   Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei,” 83.
45   Kurt Büchelmann, in discussion with Christina Hollomey and the author, Innsbruck, 
May 7, 2014. Various strategies, such as the targeted use of Austrian tourist advertising or the 
search for Austrian businesses that were prepared to pay higher salaries, were nevertheless 
employed to win over Spanish labor for work in Austria.
46   Schreiben der BWK an das Bundesministerium für Handel und Wiederaufbau vom 
4. Mai 1966 betreffend Arbeitsvertrag für spanische Arbeitskräfte, Grundzahl 201 042/67, 
Geschäftszeichen 31, BMHGI, AdR, ÖStA.
47   Abkommen zwischen Österreich u. Spanien über die Anwerbung span. Arbeitskräfte 
und deren Beschäftigung in Österreich, BGBl. Nr. 26/1969; Frage der Wiedererrichtung 
der 1967 aufgelösten österr. Anwerbekommission in Madrid, Grundzahl 204 903-Sekt.
IV/71, Geschäftszeichen Spanien V/5P, Abteilung 12, Bundesministerium für auswärtige 
Angelegenheiten (Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs) [hereafter BmaA].
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By contrast, the conclusion of the recruitment agreement with Turkey 
in 1964 constituted the intergovernmental formalization of a “de facto 
status.”48 As early as 1962, representatives of the Turkish labor-market 
administration, the BWK, and the Austrian trade delegate in Turkey had 
concluded a provisional agreement, which was to regulate the recruitment 
of Turkish workers until the conclusion of a final agreement. Until the 
establishment of a commission in Istanbul in 1964, recruitment was han-
dled by the Austrian foreign trade office in Istanbul in cooperation with 
the Turkish labor market authorities.49 However the planned recruitment 
agreement with Turkey, which was welcomed by the BWK due to the as-yet 
unexhausted labor reservoir in the country,50 was at first met with domestic 
political opposition by the labor unions and individual ministries, above 
all by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. The 
latter, for example, feared a considerable cost arising from the deportation 
or repatriation of unwanted migrants to Turkey.51 The Ministry of Social 
Affairs, by contrast, argued with cultural and racist reservations: “There is 
no particular interest in the employment of Turkish labor in Austria due 
to the unusual working and living customs and due to linguistic reasons,” 
as expressed in a statement in May 1961.52 While the trope of the osten-
sible “otherness” of Turkish workers was to maintain itself stubbornly in 
the following years and decades, the initial domestic political opposition 
to a recruitment agreement with Turkey was quickly dropped, especially 
since negotiations over recruitment agreements with Italy, Greece, and 
48   Information für den Herrn Sektionsleiter betreffend Unterzeichnung des österr.-
türkischen Fremdarbeiterabkommens vom 10.2.1964, Grundzahl 200 360-12/64, 
Geschäftszeichen Türkei V/5P, Abteilung 12, BmaA.
49   Bericht des österreichischen Handelsdelegierten in der Türkei an die Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
zur Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte vom 16.7.1962, Grundzahl 205 930-12/62, 
Geschäftszeichen AK-Öst-Türkei, BmaA.
50   See Abschrift eines Berichtes des österreichischen Handelsdelegierten in der Türkei 
an die Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte (AGA) vom 
9.1.1963, Grundzahl 300 965-12/63, Geschäftszeihen AK-Öst (Türkei), BmaA. It is noted 
right at the beginning here that “[e]ven in the case of an increased recruitment of labor by 
several developed countries, the supply will not be depleted and there will be no shortage 
of healthy labor forces, from whom one should however not expect any particular technical 
expertise.”
51   Schreiben des Bundesministeriums für Inneres, Generaldirektion für die öffentliche 
Sicherheit an das Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten betreffend 
Anwerbung von türkischen Arbeitskräften nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und nach 
Österreich vom 6.6. 1961, Grundzahl 117 552-12/61, Geschäftszeichen AK-Türkei II, 
BmaA.
52   Schreiben des Bundesministeriums für soziale Verwaltung an das Bundesministerium 
für auswärtige Angelegenheiten betreffend Anwerbung von türkischen Arbeitskräften nach 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und nach Österreich vom 9.5.1961, Grundzahl 117 552-
12/61, Geschäftszeichen AK-Türkei II, BmaA.
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Yugoslavia in 1962 had not led to positive results. The Austrian-Turkish 
recruitment agreement was signed on May 15, 1964.53
The negotiations over an agreement with Yugoslavia turned out to 
be more protracted and difficult. Negotiations had begun in 1962,54 were 
resumed in 1964, and resulted in the signing in 1965 of the “Agreement 
between the Republic of Austria and the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia Concerning the Regulation of Employment of Yugoslav 
Employees in Austria.”55 For ideological and political reasons, Yugoslavia 
had rejected the promotion of transnational labor migration to Western 
European countries well into the 1960s. A restrictive passport law and 
the punishment of “illegal emigration” aimed at preventing the efforts of 
its citizens to emigrate – albeit unsuccessfully.56 The Yugoslav economic 
reforms of 1965, however, resulted in an immediate rise in unemployment 
and thus sealed the final reversal of Yugoslav migration politics toward the 
promotion of temporary labor migration.57 This reversal had in part already 
taken place at the beginning of the 1960s with the easing of the restrictive 
emigration regulations and a liberalization of the passport regime.58
The demand in the Austrian economy for Yugoslav labor, however, had 
already been partially slaked before the conclusion of the Austrian-Yugoslav 
recruitment agreement. This was possible due to, among other things, 
employment contracts with smaller groups,59 to regional agreements with 
53   BGBl. 164/1964.
54   While the ÖGB generally left the intergovernmental negotiations over recruitment 
to the BWK and the responsible ministries, in the case of Yugoslavia (the ÖGB favored 
recruitment from Austria’s neighboring countries), it became active of its own accord. So, 
for example, in 1962 a meeting took place between the president of the ÖGB, Franz Olah, 
and the president of the Yugoslav Association of Trade Unions, Svetozar Vukmanovic-
Tempo, during which the Austrian trade union president proclaimed the interest of 
“wanting to employ at least 10,000 Yugoslav workers in Austria.” Fernschreiben der 
Österreichischen Botschaft in Belgrad an das BmaA vom 19.4.1962, Grundzahl 205930-
12/62, Geschäftszeichen AK-Öst ( Jugosl.), BmaA.
55   BGBl. 42/1965.
56   Rass, Institutionalisierungsprozesse, 192-193. The first agreement was signed with France 
in January 1965.
57   Ibid; Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei,” 85. The belief in the 
temporary nature of labor migration was also underlined in the Yugoslav term for immigrant 
labor as “privremeno u inostranstvu zaposleni” (those employed abroad temporarily).
58   Rass, Institutionalisierungsprozesse, 193. Not only was the Amnesty Law passed in 1962, 
which was intended to categorically exempt Yugoslav citizens who had previously been 
working abroad illegally, but a first “Decree Concerning the Treatment of the Employment 
of Labor Abroad” was issued, which came into force in 1963. Vladimir Ivanović, “Die 
Beschäftigung jugoslawischer Arbeitskräfte in Österreich in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren,” 
zeitgeschichte 40, no. 1 (2013): 35-48 (here 37).
59   Fernschreiben der Österreichischen Botschaft in Belgrad an das Bundesministerium für 
auswärtige Angelegenheiten vom 19.4.1962, Grundzahl 205930-12/62, Geschäftszeichen 
AK-Öst ( Jugosl.), BmaA.
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employment agencies of individual republics (Zagreb and Sarajevo),60 as 
well as to the liberal dispensation of work visas by the Austrian diplomatic 
representation authorities in Yugoslavia.61 It should be noted, however, that 
not all Yugoslav citizens were equally desirable as workers for the Austrian 
authorities. Historical sources indicate that, owing to their supposed lack of 
a work ethic, Yugoslav Roma were not to be given work visas.62
The great significance of Yugoslav workers for the Austrian economy 
was also underlined by a statement by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 
1964: “From the perspective of Austria, the conclusion of a recruitment 
agreement with Yugoslavia is nevertheless […] very important since […] 
the domestic economy relies heavily on Yugoslav labor, which is pouring 
into Austria more or less unregulated, resulting in not inconsiderable 
difficulties.”63 With the conclusion of a recruitment agreement, both the 
Austrian and Yugoslav parties sought a formalization, and thereby a stricter 
regulation, of labor migration of Yugoslav citizens to Austria. Yugoslavia, 
moreover, also hoped for increased protection for its citizens working 
abroad and attempted to assert this in the recruitment negotiations. To cite 
two examples: the text of the agreement granted Yugoslav employees the 
right to “agree on a new contract with their Austrian employer” during the 
course of their stay in Austria. Additionally, the contract also included the 
demand brought forward by Yugoslavia during negotiations in 1964, “that 
the Yugoslav employee, should he lose his employment, must be secured 
accommodation and provisions by an Austrian body until he finds new 
employment.”64 Beyond this, Yugoslavia assumed direct influence over 
the process of recruitment, since a mixed Austrian-Yugoslav commission 
decided “whether the selected labor forces suit the requirements of health 
and other requirements of the available workplaces.”65 In contrast, the final 
60   Jahresbericht der Bundeswirtschaftskammer, 1966; Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in 
Österreich 1962-1985,” 170; Ivanović, “Die Beschäftigung jugoslawischer Arbeitskräfte,” 
38.
61   In an inter-ministerial meeting on May 7, 1962, including representatives of the Foreign, 
Interior, Social, Trade, and Reconstruction Ministries as well as representatives of the ÖGB 
and BWK, a “benevolent visa-granting practice” was agreed upon for the “promotion of 
the immigration of Yugoslav labor.” Grundzahl 250 019/62, Geschäftszeichen 35, BMHW, 
AdR, ÖStA.
62   Grundzahl 326 613-12/65, Geschäftszeichen Jugoslawien IX/2P, Abteilung 12, BmaA; 
Grundzahl 230 184-12/66, Geschäftszeichen Jugoslawien IX/2P, Abteilung 12, BmaA. On 
the discrimination of Yugoslav Roma, see Vida Bakondy, “Keine Arbeitsvisa an jugoslawische 
Roma,” Stimme: Zeitschrift der Initiative Minderheiten Nr. 93 (2014): 15-17.
63   Schreiben des BMSV an die Sektion II im Hause vom 17.2.1964, Grundzahl 176/64, 
Geschäftszeichen Jugoslawien-Abk, Sektion II, BMSV, AdR, ÖStA.
64   BGBl. 42/1966, Article 12. For details on Yugoslavia’s strong negotiating position, see 
Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei” and Rass, Institutionalisierungsprozesse.
65   BGBl. 42/1966.
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selection of applicants in Spain and Turkey lay with the Austrian com-
mission on site. As a result, the Yugoslav authorities repeatedly rejected 
the recruitment orders from Austrian businesses, for example because the 
wages offered were deemed too low.
 
 The Austrian Recruitment Apparatus
In the course of the conclusion of intergovernmental recruitment agree-
ments, a new administrative apparatus was also created in the 1960s that 
was intended to organize the recruitment of foreign labor. The Ministry of 
Social Affairs entrusted the Federal Economic Chamber with this task.66 
On the part of the employers, this was perceived not least as an opportu-
nity not to leave the fields of employment services and immigration policy 
entirely to the “political opposition.”67 The costs of the recruitment appa-
ratus were covered by the Federal Economic Chamber and its respective 
provincial chambers.68 In February 1962, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die 
Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte (Working Group for the Recruitment 
of Foreign Labor, AGA) took up operations as the center of the Austrian 
recruitment apparatus, with its offices in Vienna.69 After the conclusion 
of intergovernmental recruitment agreements, commissions or recruitment 
offices were established in Madrid (1962), Istanbul (1964), and Belgrade 
(1966). Before the conclusion of the contracts, the AGA worked with the 
Austrian external trading offices of the BWK in the various countries or 
directly with the local labor market authorities.
A central task of the AGA concerned the organization of the recruit-
ment of foreign labor. It constituted the intersection between Austrian 
66   A little later, the presidential conference of the Chamber of Agriculture was also 
tasked with the recruitment of labor for agriculture. This also established a recruitment 
organization. According to Edith Tschank, a former employee, all the documentation of the 
Working Group of the Central Union of Agriculture and Forestry was shredded in recent 
years; Edith Tschank, in discussion with the author, Vienna, Aug. 1, 2013.
67   This argument was still being made in the 1980s to justify the existence of the 
recruitment organizations: “It must also be mentioned that the Federal Chamber through 
the creation of the committee in 1962 succeeded in achieving an exception to the monopoly 
in employment services, which to this day the Chamber of Labor and the ÖGB describe 
as a grave mistake by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The workers’ representatives are of the 
opinion that the placement of foreigners should be handed back to the Ministry of Social 
Affairs.” See Dienstreisen des Leiters. Dreiseitiges Papier, undatiert, V2, SPA-Kommission 
Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. 
68   Schreiben der BWK bezüglich Errichtung einer Anwerbeorganisation vom 14.11.1961, 
Sektionszahl 1362/60, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, WKW.
69   Wollner, “Auf dem Weg,” 85.
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businesses and the commissions in the countries of origin. Interested 
companies could turn to the AGA with a recruitment order, who in 
turn forwarded this together with the necessary documentation to the 
commission, who in turn cooperated with the responsible labor market 
authorities on site. All steps, from the assignment of contracts through 
to the settlement of the fixed recruitment fees, ran through the AGA. 
Apart from the handling of the necessary recruitment steps in Austria, 
a further task of the AGA involved the ongoing provision of informa-
tion to Austrian companies and the various chamber organizations.70 The 
Austrian commissions in the countries of origin were responsible for the 
complete handling of recruitment on site; they corresponded and nego-
tiated with local authorities and workers, organized the examinations of 
workers and their travel to Austria, and also supported Austrian compa-
nies that selected workers themselves on site. The staff of the Austrian 
commissions was composed of Austrian and local employees. The run-
ning of the commission was entrusted to young men, mostly graduates of 
(international) trade and law.71 
Statistics on the number of employees in the commission in Istanbul 
in the 1960s and 1970s show that the number of year-round employees 
changed over the years and that additional local staff were sometimes hired 
provisionally or dismissed, depending the order situation.72 For medical 
examinations and examination of labor skills, either local professionals 
were employed on a freelance basis or in cooperation with local insti-
tutions, such as national health authorities or recruitment offices of the 
FRG. In comparison to the recruitment organizations of other Western 
European states, such as the FRG or France, the Austrian recruitment 
apparatus remained relatively small. If we believe a statistic from the early 
70   Since its founding, the AGA regularly issued circulars on legal and practical questions 
concerning the recruitment and employment of migrants, and published memoranda and 
ads on this issue in various economic papers. In 1973, for example, more than fifty circulars 
were issued. The AGA was moreover a member of various councils and committees that 
dealt with issues of migrant policy; it also participated in meetings between the social 
partners and ministries regarding the employment of foreigners.
71   The first head of the Austrian commission in Madrid, for example, Kurt Büchlmann, 
was 24 years old when he took on the position in 1962. He had recently completed his 
studies at the Vienna University of Economics and Business: Kurt Büchlmann, in discussion 
with Christina Hollomey and the author, Innsbruck, May 7, 2014. Siegfried Pflegerl, born 
1939, the long-term head of the commission in Istanbul, studied law and was also in his 
mid-20s when he took over the commission in 1965. Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an 
das Bundesministerium für Umwelt und Familie, Sektion II, Abteilung 2/3, vom 23.6.1988, 
A3-A12, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.
72   Anlage Kontrollamtsbericht vom 1.9.1981, Selektion Vermittlungszahlen – 
Personalstand Kommission Istanbul 1965-1981, V3-5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv 
WKÖ.
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1970s, the West German commission in Istanbul employed more than 
133 staff, and the French more than 17 staff, while the Austrian commis-
sion only employed five staff members. A comparison with the Yugoslav 
commissions paints a similar picture: 116 West German employees, 24 
French, and six Austrian.73
All the documentation produced and received over the decades by 
the center of the Austrian recruitment apparatus in Vienna was destroyed 
after its official closure in 1993.74 The same is true of the documentation 
of the recruitment commissions in Madrid and Belgrade.75 The archive of 
the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber merely contains an incomplete 
collection from the commission in Istanbul. This comprises the period from 
the late 1960s to the closure of the commission in Istanbul in 1993.76 Apart 
from this, the archive of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber contains 
recruitment orders from Austrian companies for Yugoslav and Turkish 
workers from the 1960s; those for Spanish workers are missing. The posi-
tion and voices of those who came to Austria as workers are only rarely 
documented in the existing correspondence, as in cases where the workers 




The placement of labor through the recruitment organizations of 
the Federal Economic Chamber took the form of a bureaucratic pro-
cess and was based on a multistage selection procedure. The recruit-
ment process was based on the principle of recruiting the most effective 
labor for the Austrian economy. This followed the tendency of reifying 
migrants in the recruitment process as objects of labor, who were treat-
ed as commodities, examined for whether or not they ultimately suit-
ed the given professional and medical qualities. The tendency toward 
commodification and/or objectification was, in my estimation, also 
expressed in the correspondence: “Lieferscheine” (delivery notes) and 
73   Anhang Unterlagen für Gespräche mit dem Kontrollamt, undatiert, vermutlich 1972 
oder 1973, V4, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.
74   Rita Tezzele, head of the Archiv WKÖ, in discussion with the author, Dec. 7, 2012.
75   Ibid. 
76  With regard to this collection, it should be noted that not only is the entire 
documentation from the first four years of its existence (1964 to 1968) missing, but 
further material not deemed worthy of archiving was destroyed after being delivered to 
the archive; Rita Tezzele, in discussion with the author, Dec. 7, 2012. See also the index of 
the archive.
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“Transportbescheinigungen” (transport confirmations) documented the 
journeys of the workers; “Rest” (the rest) or “Restbestände” (remainders) 
denoted the workers who had not yet arrived, while the term “Stück” 
(item) served as a unit of measurement for people. Simultaneously, there 
are numerous indications in historical sources that migrants resisted this 
objectification.77
As a rule, the duration of recruitment, from the submission of the 
recruitment order to the arrival of the desired workers, took several weeks, 
if not months. In the mid-1960s, for example, the average recruitment 
period for unqualified workers in Yugoslavia was stipulated as four to six 
weeks and for qualified workers as up to eight weeks.78 Generally speaking, 
a distinction was made between anonymous and person-specific recruit-
ment, the recruitment of so-called “Rückholer” (workers who had already 
previously been employed by the company), and direct recruitment by com-
panies. Person-specific recruitment and direct recruitment by companies in 
particular were subject to various regulations from the countries of origin, 
who – aiming to control emigration – continually changed these over the 
course of the years.79 
The recruitment procedure began with the submission of a company 
order to the AGA in Vienna. Apart from the order form, the company 
submitted completed employment contracts, valid for a maximum of one 
year, as well as the Einzelzusicherung (individual assurance) to the AGA. 
For each worker requested the company needed to receive a permit from 
the responsible labor market authority allowing it to employ an immi-
grant worker (Einzelzusicherung). Above and beyond this, the employer 
had to supply the immigrants with “accommodation customary for the 
location” (“ortsübliche Unterkunft”),80 although the criterion “customary 
for the location” was a flexible concept, and complaints were repeated-
ly lodged – also from the countries of origin – about wretched housing 
conditions.81
77   See Vida Bakondy, “Bitte um 4 bis 5 türkische Maurer: Eine Analyse von Anwerbeakten 
der österreichischen Wirtschaftskammer,” in Good Luck, 68-79.
78   Merkblatt für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte aus dem Jahr 1965, 
Sektionszahl 1226/64, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW.
79   For more detail, see Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei.” Thus 
Yugoslavia fundamentally forbade individual recruitment by companies. Wollner, “Auf dem 
Weg,” 102.
80   Merkblatt für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte aus dem Jahr 1965, 
Sektionszahl 1226/64, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW.
81   See for example the complaint of the regional employment agency in Sarajevo to the 
AGA of May 12, 1966, which was made after an inspection of the accommodation for forty 
Yugoslav workers employed by a Carinthian construction company. Jug 54/1966, MF 904, 
Archiv WKÖ.
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After the companies had submitted all necessary documentation and 
paid the recruitment fees for each worker requested,82 the AGA forwarded 
the recruitment orders to the Austrian commissions.83 The data given in the 
recruitment orders offered the basis for potential exclusionary criteria for 
recruitment in the countries of origin. Apart from information about sala-
ries and working conditions, the duration of employment, and accommo-
dation, they generally included details on the number of workers requested, 
the country of origin, sex, age, and technical qualifications – insofar as these 
were stipulated. Sometimes the companies specified workers by name, 
either because they had already worked at the company in the previous year, 
or because of suggestions by relatives or acquaintances who had worked at 
the company previously. In principle, workers between the ages of 18 to a 
maximum of 50 were sought after, with younger labor generally favored. 
With regard to the recruitment of women, the marital status “single” was 
preferred, since it promised more flexibility and adaptation. The immigra-
tion, or later bringing in of family members, was only promoted in the 
rarest of cases.84 While some companies only submitted general specifica-
tions on the desired number, national origin, gender, and occupation, others 
offered a precise profile, by indicating regional wishes, or specifications 
regarding bodily constitution and character or personal qualities, among 
other requests: when asked for “specific wishes of the employer in selection 
of labor,” a concrete factory answered, “strong, willing workers”;85 in the 
recruitment order for seven female spoolers from 1964, “single, nimble, 
82   The fixed recruitment fee was intended to cover the costs for the issuance of visas, 
medical examination, travel to Austria, provisions for the journey, as well as “deportation 
costs following expulsion in the case of uncollectibility.” Merkblatt für die Anwerbung 
ausländischer Arbeitskräfte aus dem Jahr 1965, Sektionszahl 1226/64, Sektionsakten der 
Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW. In the case of recruitment in Turkey, however, applicants had 
to cover part of the technical and medical examinations themselves, leading to criticisms 
by the Turkish labor market authorities since this practice contradicted the regulations of 
the recruitment agreement. Bericht über eine Dienstreise des Kommissionsleiters Siegfried 
Pflegerl nach Ankara vom 3.3.1972, V1-V2, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, V1-V2, Archiv 
WKÖ.
83   In practice, the AGA had to repeatedly demand payment of the fixed recruitment fees 
from the companies in the early years.
84   Only the recruitment agreement with Spain contained a clause concerning the 
subsequent immigration of next of kin. BGBl. 193/1962. Simultaneously, some companies 
expressed interest from an early stage in the long-term employment of immigrant workers 
and supported the subsequent immigration of next of kin, for example in the case of a 
Turkish tailor in a clothing company in Tyrol in 1963. In order to avoid losing the worker, 
the company attempted to recruit his wife who was to follow him to Austria together with 
their child. The files note: “We request that she at least be brought in, pending permission by 
the Turkish employment agency, as a relative (with the child) so that we can keep this good 
worker.” T66/1963, MF 886, Archiv WKÖ.
85   Jug 23/1966, MF 904, Archiv WKÖ.
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suitability for piecework” workers were requested;86 in a 1967 profile of a 
recruitment order, a fish processing company sought workers who were, 
“female, 20-35 years old, if possible Slovenian (no Serbs).”87 
It is clear from the sources that businesses and employees of the recruit-
ment organizations occasionally drew generalizing conclusions on personal 
characteristics and job performance on the basis of regional, national, and 
social origin. This is evident, for example, in the report of a company doc-
tor in a Lower Austrian textile business from 1969 who had participated 
in the recruitment examinations in Banja Luka in Yugoslavia. His report, 
compiled for the management of the company, states that “illiterates” and 
“partial illiterates” were “downright predestined by fate for manual labor”; 
one would have to “accept a prolonged training period” with “labor deriving 
from agriculture” but could “afterwards reckon with all the more industri-
ousness and greater loyalty to the company.” “One has to take into account 
that the labor forces in agriculture at home and abroad have been used to 
work from childhood onward and that precisely for such workers employ-
ment in a large factory signifies an unheard of improvement in their envi-
ronment, which they will under no circumstances wish to jeopardize.”88 In 
this understanding, economic disparities, structural disadvantages, and the 
resulting lack of options promised more willing workers. While illiteracy 
sometimes counted as grounds for exclusion,89 a low level of education 
combined with a rural background in part augured a particular industrious-
ness.90 In some cases, German language skills were also demanded.91 For 
this reason, some businesses preferred immigrant workers from Yugoslavia, 
since these sometimes already had some command of German or were 
attributed a faster ability to learn German and quicker adaptation to living 
conditions in Austria.92
The ethnic and cultural stereotypes – such as those about “the Turks”93 – 
that were repeatedly expressed in the recruitment discourses were sometimes 
also interlaced with gendered stereotypes. So for example, in reference to 
the “sociological standing of the woman in Turkish society,” a statement by 
86   Jug 7/1964, MF 899, Archiv WKÖ.
87   Jug 167/1967, MF 980, Archiv WKÖ. Emphasis in the original.
88   Jug 1968/1969, MF 979, Archiv WKÖ.
89   T 50/1969, MF 898, Archiv WKÖ.
90   Jug 167/1967, MF 980, Archiv WKÖ.
91   T 9/403, MF 898, Archiv WKÖ.
92   T 16/1963, MF 885, Archiv WKÖ.
93   See for example the letter from the head of the commission in Istanbul, Siegfried Pfegerl, 
to the AGA in Vienna of October 22, 1971 in response to the requested “comparison” of 
the “differences between Austrians and Turks.” Unterlagen für die AGA-Ausschusssitzung 
1971, V2, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.
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the Austrian commission in Istanbul on the “efficient placement of women” 
in 1975 claimed that it constitutes “a significantly complicated and difficult 
step for a Turkish woman to take up employment abroad.”94 If Turkish 
workers were generally attributed a greater difficulty integrating into the 
“host country,” this was all the more true for women, since “the Turkish 
woman, through her entanglement in authoritarian social structures” would 
be “even less able, when suddenly left to herself, to deal with the great 
psychological difficulties which arise from the integration problem.”95 The 
examples cited demonstrate clearly how hegemonic conceptions of ethnici-
ty, in this case about “the Turks,” were connected to gendered images in the 
recruitment discourses. In this context the “host society,” or the recruiting 
country, functioned as a normative yardstick. Recruitment difficulties were 
culturalized and not – as formulated elsewhere – regarded as the result of 
competition between the various European recruiting countries as well as 
the workers’ rational consideration of well-paying job offers. 
 
In Situ: Recruitment Examinations in the Case of the Austrian 
Commission in Istanbul
After the submission of the company order, the Austrian commission 
forwarded the request to the responsible national or local labor market 
authorities. These in turn conducted a preliminary selection from a list of 
the people who had registered as seeking employment, and informed those 
selected of the offer. If the workers decided on a workplace in Austria, they 
appeared in person at the commission. Recruitment orders of Austrian 
companies were repeatedly rejected: either because the tendered salary and 
working conditions did not meet expectations and the applicants decided 
for a better offer, or because the selection criteria proved in reality to be 
unfulfillable. This is evident in the example of a Lower Austrian textile 
business, which submitted an order in Turkey for the recruitment of 40-70 
textile workers “aged 18 to 24, over 1.50 meters tall, and no illiterates”; of 
these, “at least 20” were to be “trained textile workers.”96 As is evident in 
the sources, the order could not be completed due to “the delimiting factors 
stipulated by the company (qualification, minimum education, and mini-
mum height),” but also due to the wages offered and competition from the 
94   Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an die AGA vom 15.7.1975 betreffend effiziente 
Frauenvermittlung, B19, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.
95   Ibid.
96   T50/1969, MF 898, Archiv WKÖ.
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FRG.97 In such cases, the commission recommended altering the selection 
criteria (higher wages, more flexibility regarding age, height, education etc.) 
in order to make a placement possible after all.
A central component of the on-site recruitment examinations was the 
examination of the physical and work suitability of the applicants for the 
workplace. These decided whether or not a worker would ultimately be 
selected for a workplace in Austria. In addition, immigrants had to submit 
a criminal record certificate from the police confirming their good conduct. 
In the case of recruitment of workers with specific qualifications, the AGA 
recommended that the companies be present on site during the selection. 
Presumably, companies planning to recruit a large number of workers would 
be the most likely to follow this suggestion.98 Still, company representatives 
“rarely” went to Turkey.99 The work skill tests were then administered either 
by staff from the commission or by local professionals.100 In the design of the 
work skill tests for “construction technicians, textile and metal technicians, 
carpenters etc., the commission relied on the expertise of the German liai-
son office,” since the “Turkish labor market administration was not capable 
of conducting such technical preliminary examinations,” according to the 
former head of the Austrian commission in Istanbul, Siegfried Pflegerl.101
The physical and mental health of the applicants ultimately constituted 
a crucial criterion in the selection process. This was not only to keep the cost 
to the Austrian welfare state as low as possible, but also to ensure the pro-
tection of the domestic population. The so-called “Infektionsfreiheitsschein” 
(Certificate of Freedom from Infection), which was issued by the commis-
sion in Istanbul after the final examination, was supposed to guarantee that 
upon entry immigrants were free from infections that were legally required 
to be disclosed. Immigrants were therefore construed from the outset as 
potential carriers of infectious diseases and thus a danger to public security 
and order in Austria.
97   Ibid.
98   See T50/1969 and T35/1969, MF 898, Archiv WKÖ. Sometimes the company doctor 
also traveled to check medical suitability.
99   Die Verwaltungsagenden der Kommission, undatiert, 23, V5, SPA-Kommission 
Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. 
100  Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an den Leiter der Österreichischen Kommission 
in der SFRJ, Franz Koppensteiner, vom 3.8.1973 betreffend “Selektionsunterlagen,” V 6-8, 
SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. Regarding the examination of construction 
workers, the commission in Istanbul stated: “The examination of technical workers is 
conducted by a civil engineer, who is no longer integrated in the office, who conducts 
examinations as required. For small numbers, the necessary examination materials 
(construction materials and tools) are available to the commission, for larger company 
selections and larger orders the examination is conducted at construction sites.” Ibid.
101  Siegfried Pflegerl, e-mail correspondence with the author, April 29, 2013.
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While the regulation of the medical examination was formulated rath-
er generally in the intergovernmental recruitment agreements, in practice 
candidates had to undergo a comprehensive medical examination. During 
the recruitment process, not only was the medical or physical suitability for 
the requesting workplace generally tested, but “a general clinical examina-
tion including locomotor system, ears, eyes, and a neuro-psychiatric exam-
ination, pulse and blood pressure measurements, a urine analysis, [and] 
a full blood test” were also conducted.102 With women, the discovery of 
pregnancy also constituted a definite criterion for exclusion.103 According 
to an internal memorandum of the Austrian commission in Istanbul from 
the late 1960s, the applicants for a workplace in Austria underwent the 
following mandatory examination steps: “1) full blood examination, 2) seri-
al examination (height, weight, eyes, ears, venereal diseases etc.), 3) X-ray 
examination, 4) examination of stool, and 5) examination of suitability.”104 
As a rule, the first three examination steps had to be completed at a Turkish 
medical authority even before appearing in person at the commission, the 
costs of which had to be borne by the applicants themselves. The fourth and 
fifth examination steps, by contrast, were conducted by the commission’s 
medical officer. The issuance of the “Certificate of Freedom from Infection,” 
which followed a positive final examination, was also the responsibility of 
the medical officer. A lack of faith in the Turkish medical authorities may 
have played a role in this deviation from the directives stipulated in the 
recruitment agreement.105 The final examination of suitability comprised “the 
concluding medical evaluation of the X-ray and lab results and an individual 
general medical examination of the worker.”106 This examination focused once 
more on the general medical condition of the candidate and their physical and 
medical “suitability” for the requesting workplace in Austria.107 Even “minor 
102  Schreiben der Österreichischen Kommission in der Türkei vom 13.8.1990, C, 
SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.
103  According to Siegfried Pflegerl, pregnancy tests with women were generally 
conducted. Siegfried Pflegerl, e-mail correspondence with the author, April 2, 2014. At least 
in the early years of the Austrian recruitment practice, this presumably only happened in 
cases where pregnancy was suspected, or in the case of the expressed wish of the company. 
See T2/1963, MF 885 und Jug 12/1964, MF 899, Archiv WKÖ.
104  Die Verwaltungsagenden der Kommission, undatiert, 6, V5, SPA-Kommission 
Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.
105  Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an die AGA vom 23.8.1990 betreffend 
Infektionsfreiheitsschein, C 4, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. The “Certificate 
of Freedom from Infection” was issued by national medical authorities in the cases of 
recruitment in Spain and Yugoslavia (here: “medical report”). These were valid for a period 
of fourteen days, but could be extended.
106  Siegfried Pflegerl, e-mail correspondence with the author, April 2, 2014.
107  On the criteria for exclusion, see Richtlinien für die Schlussuntersuchung vom 
2.1.1973, C 5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. 
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physical deficiencies” – including, for example, lower than average sight in one 
eye108 – could constitute a criterion for exclusion. In such cases, the commis-
sion recommended inquiring with the AGA “whether the company wishes to 
recruit.”109 In the placement of so-called “Rückholer” (workers who had already 
previously been employed by the company) and workers specified by name, 
the criteria were in part less strict, since the selection was based on a “given, 
specific interest of an Austrian company in the placement.”110 In some cases, 
decisions were made on an individual basis, for example dependent on the type 
of employment in Austria.111 
There are occasional references to the number of rejections for med-
ical reasons: a memorandum from 1975, for example, states that 25-30% 
of applicants for a job in Austria had to undergo a follow-up appearance 
at the commission,112 with the rate of rejection for medical reasons being 
“significantly higher” with women.113 However, there is no indication of 
the reasons for this gender difference. The fact that a verdict of “provision-
ally unsuitable” existed and a “follow-up appearance” at the commission 
following treatment was possible indicates that there was a certain leeway 
and that, depending on the diagnosis, workers were given the possibility of 
a second chance. The sources indicate that the medical examinations at the 
Austrian commission in Turkey followed stricter criteria than was com-
monplace in official medical examinations in Austria.114
A systematic analysis of the subjective experiences of migrants in the 
recruitment process has not been conducted to date. The few recorded 
memories indicate, however, that the medical examinations were above 
all experienced as unpleasant and demeaning.115 Simultaneously, there 
are indications that immigrants sought and found strategies to circumvent 
108  Die Verwaltungsagenden der Kommission, undatiert, 25, V5, SPA-Kommission 
Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.
109  Ibid.
110  Richtlinien für die Schlussuntersuchung vom 2.1.1973, C5, SPA-Kommission 
Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. 
111  These included anomalies of the skin, missing fingers, or limited flexibility of 
joints and extremities. Ibid.
112  Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an die AGA vom 7.2.1975 betreffend 
Laboruntersuchungen, C2, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.
113  Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an die AGA vom 15.7.1975 betreffend effiziente 
Frauenvermittlung, B19, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.
114  Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an die AGA vom 8.9.1986 betreffend 
Grundsätze der ärztlichen Untersuchungen, C5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. 
This also fundamentally concerned all examinations conducted abroad, which according to 
this letter was a result of the express wishes of the Austrian Social and Labor Ministries.
115  See for example the descriptions of Emin Erdoğan and Aslan Doğan, who came 
to Austria in the early 1970s, in 50 Jahre türkische Gast?Arbeit in Österreich, ed. Ali Özbaș, 
Handan Özbaș, and Joachim Hainzl (Graz: Leykam, 2014), 287-288 and 307-308.
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the strict recruitment criteria. This is also testified to in reports of the 
commission in Istanbul concerning bribery allegations against Turkish 
staff members and Turkish authorities in order to achieve positive test 
results.116 In 1974, there was talk of an “organization of fraudsters” who 
promised support, against payment, to “gullible workers,” especially from 
rural regions, with the completion of the formalities and the attainment 
of a “favorable result.”117 As demonstrated by Gamze Ongan and Dilman 
Muradoğlu, “a kind of ‘niche economy’” emerged around the recruitment 
offices in Istanbul and the Turkish employment agency, which “consisted of 
street photographers, consultation and translation offices, restaurants, cafés, 
hotels, and so-called mediators who would take care of the formalities on 
behalf of the applicants, or at least claimed to.”118
The final selection by the commission did not always meet the expec-
tations of the companies, as documented in complaints about so-called 
“Fehlanwerbungen” (literally, “mis-recruitments”). These occurred when, for 
example, local labor-market authorities intervened for reasons of migra-
tion policy and placed other workers than those that had been specifically 
requested.119 Austrian companies moreover complained about missing 
workers, workers who changed their workplace (here we also find the figure 
of the “Abwerber,” the poacher, in contrast to the “Anwerber,” or recruiter), 
and cases where workers were categorized as “insufficient” due to illness, 
pregnancy, unsatisfactory work, or “refusal to work.” In reaction, sanctions 
and compensation were demanded: the deportation of the person con-
cerned, the reimbursement of the costs of recruitment, and the prohibition 
of further employment with a different company in Austria.120 While in 
cases of “poaching” of labor by other companies, only complaints or rec-
ommendations for improvement could be submitted, the correspondence 
116  Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an die AGA vom 16.12.1974 betreffend 
Röntgenuntersuchungen der Kommission, Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an die AGA 
vom 9.1.1975 betreffend Neue Laborregelung, C, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ.
117  Schreiben von Siegfried Pflegerl an die AGA vom 25.11.1974 betreffend 
Betrügerorganisationen, C2, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. Pflegerl was here 
referring to examinations conducted by the West German commission in 1973. 
118  Dilman Muradoğlu and Gamze Ongan, “1964 Anwerbestelle,” in Gastarbajteri: 
40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration, ed. Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia Mattl (Vienna: 
Mandelbaum, 2004), 122-124 (here 124).
119  Jug 23/1966, MF 904, Archiv WKÖ.
120  See Vida Bakondy, “(K)Ein Paradies versprochen...: Die Anfänge der 
Arbeitsmigration nach Österreich seit den 1960er Jahren,” in Der Onkel aus Amerika: 
Aufbruch in eine neue Welt, ed. Verein Industriekultur und Alltagsgeschichte and Werner 
Koroschitz (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2006), 67-74; Vida Bakondy, “Bitte um 4 bis 5 türkische 
Maurer,” 68-79; and Vida Bakondy, “Die zwei Türken wollen nach Deutschland: Mobilität 
als Strategie des Aufbegehrens gegen die Arbeitsverhältnisse in den 1960er Jahren,” Stimme: 
Zeitschrift der Initiative Minderheiten 89 (2013): 15-17.
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regarding “insufficient” recruitments also included threats to refuse the 
mediation by the AGA in future. The costs arising for the respective busi-
ness were repeatedly cited here.
The complaints point above all to the fact that immigrants to Austria 
occasionally did not find the working and living conditions that had been 
promised them. There is documentation of demands for improvement,121 
strikes,122 or the changing of workplaces. To prevent the latter, a decree of 
the ÖGB and BWK in 1966 resulted in the introduction of the Ausländer-
Arbeitskarte (Foreigner’s Work Card).123 This noted the workplace and also 
the “medically certified harmlessness” of the worker. The card served as an 
ID, which migrants were required to carry with them at all times until 
the passing of the Foreign Nationals Employment Law in 1975. As a pre-
cautionary measure to prevent immigrants’ mobility, some companies held 
on to their personal documents: “The two Turks, for example, who wanted 
to leave my company for Germany, waited for two days from morning to 
evening at the office to effect the release of their papers, although they had 
been informed through the interpreter that this was pointless,” reported a 
Lower Austrian construction company in a memorandum to the AGA in 
1963.124
The desire for total control over the immigrants, as repeatedly demand-
ed or imagined by Austrian companies and authorities, was ultimately not 
realizable. The economy’s demand for immigrants was too great, as was the 
competition between Austrian companies, and with companies in other 
Western European states. Mobility thus constituted a pivotal strategy of 
resistance for immigrants to defend themselves against working conditions, 
whether through changing their job, returning to their country of origin, 
or traveling on to another country that offered more attractive working 
conditions.
121  For example, the federal police in Innsbruck reported that on June 14, 1966, 
36 Yugoslav workers at an Innsbruck construction company “in the period from 7am to 
10am refused to work and demanded more pay, better food, and better accommodation.” 
Grundzahl 221 721-11/66, Geschäftszeichen Jugoslawien V/5P, Abteilung 12, BmaA.
122  These led in many cases to deportations back to the country of origin. To 
name one example: according to a report of the District Commission of Feldkirch, three 
Greek workers received an unlimited exclusion order in the summer of 1962 and were 
deported to Greece as a result, because they had “incited the other workers [...] employed 
at the factory to discontent, so that they had to be dismissed by the company.” Bericht der 
Bezirkshauptmannschaft Feldkirch vom 13.7.1962, Grundzahl 86 003-24/69, AdR, ÖStA.
123   Erlass des Bundesministeriums für soziale Verwaltung betreffend Vereinbarung 
über die Beschäftigung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte im Jahr 1966 (Kontingent-Vereinbarung 
1966), Sektionszahl 1226/64, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW; Weisung an die 
Landesarbeitsämter. Renée Winter, “Migration kontrollieren?,” in Gastarbajteri, 53-59 (here 54).
124  T 17/1963, MF 885, Archiv WKÖ.
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The difficulties in recruitment outlined here—the associated costs, 
the relatively long waiting periods, as well as the criticism of “mis-recruit-
ments”—led to the recruitment institutions increasingly losing significance 
for labor migration to Austria in the latter half of the 1960s. Increasing 
numbers of Austrian employers relied on private mediation of workers from 
among the circles of acquaintances and relatives of workers already employed 
in Austria.125 The company would often reward this mediation with pay-
ment of a “bounty” per worker.126 In the following years, the informal forms 
of migration and recruitment also included the employment of immigrant 
workers who had entered Austria as tourists (without work visas), known 
as “tourist employment.” The foundation for this was Austria’s conclusion 
of visa agreements with Turkey in 1955 and Yugoslavia in 1965.127 These 
enabled Yugoslav and Turkish citizens to enter Austria as tourists with the 
right of stay (visa-free) for three months. To stay for the purposes of work 
and for employment in Austria, a permit was applied for after entering 
the country. “Most employment relationships at the time thus began with 
a legalization,” according to the migration researcher August Gächter.128 
How important the so-called tourist employment was to Austrian business-
es is also testified to by the fact that in 1968 the employment of “immigrant 
foreign labor [...] without work visas” was listed as a third form of recruit-
ment in a memorandum of the Economic Chamber (alongside recruitment 
through the AGA and individual recruitment by companies).129
The beginning of the economic crisis in Austria in 1974 resulted in 
an end to the more or less unhindered immigration of labor migrants who 
had come “to and fro across the border seasonally and according to the 
125  Perchinig, “Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration?,” 146.
126  Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 173. See also the 
descriptions of Ružica Gavrić, who was also offered money by her company Elin for the 
private procurement of labor in Yugoslavia. Ružica Gavrić, in discussion with the author, 
Vienna, Sept. 9, 2015.
127  August Gächter, “Migrationspolitik in Österreich seit 1945,” Arbeitspapiere 
Migration und soziale Realität 12, no. 5 (2008), accessed Nov. 13, 2015, https://www.zsi.at/
attach/p1208vukovic.pdf.
128 Ibid.
129 Merkblatt über die Anwerbung und Beschäftigung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte 
1968, Sektionszahl 1082/68, Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW. That 
same year, the abrogation of the Austrian recruitment organizations was discussed since 
the Austrian recruitment apparatus had come under fire within the chambers due to its 
lack of efficiency and the notable costs. This also resulted in the temporary dissolution of 
the commissions in Belgrade and Istanbul. Schreiben von S. Pflegerl an den Leiter der 
AGA, P. Binder, vom 18.12.1982 betreffend Liquidierungsvorschlag Anwerbeorganisation, 
V3-5, SPA-Kommission Istanbul, Archiv WKÖ. Schreiben der Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
für die Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte vom 25.7.1968, Sektionszahl 1082/68, 
Sektionsakten der Sparte Handel, Archiv WKW. 
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availability of workplaces.”130 The Austrian state reacted with limitations on 
access by forbidding “tourist employment” and introducing a new Foreign 
Nationals Employment Law in 1975.131 According to the migration 
researcher Bernhard Perchinig, this was a reaction “with clear restrictions 
to the economic crisis,” involving the intensification of “domestic primacy” 
in the Austrian labor market.132 During the economic crisis from 1974 to 
1976, “some 55,000 foreign employees were deprived of their work permits 
and therefore also their residency permits, and another 33,000 between 
1982 and 1984.”133 These restrictive measures, however, did not lead to a 
reduction in immigration to Austria. Rather, they forced the subsequent 
immigration of family members, since labor migrants now had to choose 
between returning and settling.134 
130 Gächter, “Ausländerpolitik seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” 107.
131 August Gächter and research group, “Vom Inlandarbeiterschutzgesetz bis Eurodac 
Abkommen,” in Gastarbajteri, 31-45 (here 37). As early as the beginning of the 1970s, 
“tourist employment” had already come under fire from both the ÖGB and the Yugoslav 
state, who saw this as a fundamental breach of the recruitment agreements. This form of 
recruitment and employment therefore also became a central topic of discussion for the 
mixed Austrian-Yugoslav commission, which began to meet regularly from 1970 onward.
132  Perchinig, “Von der Fremdarbeit zur Integration?,” 146.
133  Ibid.
134  Ibid., as well as Gächter, “Ausländerpolitik seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” 107.

“The Other Colleagues”:  
Labor Migration at the Glanzstoff-Fabrik in St. Pölten 
from 1962 to 1975
Anne Unterwurzacher1
In July, 1962, the Erste Österreichische Glanzstoff Fabrik AG (First 
Austrian Synthetic Fiber Factory Inc.) submitted a recruitment order for 
thirty foreign workers to the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Anwerbung auslän-
discher Arbeitskräfte (Committee for the Recruitment of Foreign Labor) in 
Vienna.2 This first attempt at recruitment failed, however, due to a lack 
of suitable accommodation. It took another two years until the compa-
ny management was able to employ the urgently required workers from 
Turkey. Aside from these Turkish “guest workers,” the company addition-
ally brought workers from Tunisia to St. Pölten from 1971 onward. In 
2008, some four decades later, the company finally closed its doors after a 
thoroughly checkered business history. In total, 327 people lost their jobs 
due to the closure. Many of those affected had roots in Turkey or Tunisia, 
having either immigrated themselves or having grown up in St. Pölten as 
the progeny of those people recruited from the mid-1960s onward.
The 1961 Raab-Olah Agreement laid the foundation for this recent 
history of labor migration. The social partners at the time agreed to the 
determination of sector quotas to be negotiated annually, through which 
foreign labor could be employed without the legally prescribed screening 
of individual cases. Austria thus entered the Western European system of 
recruitment politics relatively late. Austria modeled itself on the Federal 
Republic of Germany in order to get the intended labor migration toward 
the country going. Intergovernmental recruitment and social security 
agreements were concluded with the countries of origin, where appropriate 
recruitment institutions were then established.3
1   This essay has been translated by Tim Corbett.
2   Microfilm T 232/1963, BUKA – Anwerbeakten der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die 
Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte (BUKA – AGA), Archiv der Wirtschaftskammer 
Österreich (hereafter WKÖ). 
3   Eveline Wollner, “Auf dem Weg zur sozialpartnerschaftlich regulierten 
Ausländerbeschäftigung in Österreich: die Reform der Ausländerbeschäftigung und der 
Anwerbung bis Ende der 1969er Jahre” (diploma thesis, University of Vienna, 1996). 
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Against their original intentions, some of the men—and also some of 
the women—who were brought to Austria from the mid-1960s onward 
ended up settling in the country. Others returned to their countries of ori-
gin or tried their luck in other Western European countries. Those who 
stayed, like the migrants of prior phases of immigration, contributed to 
the pluralization of Austria. Labor migration to Austria also meant new 
experiences for the people from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, and Tunisia; the 
history of their settling in Austria is characterized by “hope, deprivation, 
longing, animosities.”4
This essay focuses on the early phase of this history of immigration, 
which is now more than half a century old. On the basis of the concrete 
example of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik in St. Pölten, it demonstrates how the 
factory management practically implemented state-regulated recruitment, 
and how this business strategy of employment affected the lived realities of 
the people. An arc is traced here from the beginning of recruitment in the 
mid-1960s, to its peak in the early 1970s, and the first major crises in the 
post-war history of the company beginning in 1975.
This essay proceeds from the premise that the factory constituted a 
central place in the experience of the recruited workers formative of the 
lived realities of the immigrants, especially in the beginning. Work permits 
were originally tied to a specific business, which had to provide customary 
accommodations, later allotting company-owned apartments. Often, sev-
eral family members worked in the same business. In the early phase, in 
any case, working life, private life, and living space were closely connected 
to each other. The specific challenges that arose from the employment of 
foreign labor had to be met locally. Businesses thus developed practical 
solutions that sometimes deviated substantially from political and admin-
istrative stipulations. The aim here is to fathom the spheres of action of the 
various migration actors as far as possible: of the businesses in relation to 
the political and administrative attempts at regulation on the one hand, and 
of the immigrants in relation to the given parameters on the other.
This essay mainly draws on the recruitment records of the Federal 
Economic Chamber and the business records from the archive of the 
Glanzstoff-Fabrik in St. Pölten. As much as possible, the source-based 
analysis is complemented by the testimony of contemporary witnesses. 
The subjective experiences of the immigrants have, to date, only been doc-
umented through individual narrative interviews, which were conducted 
4   Hakan Gürses, “Eine Geschichte zwischen Stille und Getöse,” in Gastarbajteri: 40 
Jahre Arbeitsmigration, ed. Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia Mattl (Vienna: 
Mandelbaum, 2004), 24-27 (here 24). 
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for an exhibition on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signing 
of the recruitment agreement with Turkey.5 The findings presented here 
are preliminary results of an on-going research project. Therefore, some of 
the following observations are formulated hypothetically and occasionally 
require further investigation. As part of a comprehensive research focus 
on labor migration at the Glanzstoff-Fabrik, however, they offer important 
indicators for a micro-historical reconstruction of individual patterns and 
processes of migration of employees recruited in Turkey or Tunisia. In the 
framework of a research project funded by the state of Lower Austria,6 the 
results presented here are, as of the autumn of 2016, being systematically 
augmented by a biographical/narrative component of investigation as well 
as through further archival research.
The first part of this essay presents the historical context of the 
state-regulated “recruitment of guest workers.” The second section sketches 
the checkered 104-year history of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik in St. Pölten. The 
third section comprehensively examines the managerial recruitment prac-
tice of the factory and discusses this conclusively.
Historical Context: The State-Regulated “Guest Worker System”
Unlike in other Western European countries, labor migration only 
became a prominent political topic in Austria in the early 1960s. Belated 
industrialization, continuous economic growth, and the shrinking domestic 
labor pool7 led to an increased call for a liberalization of foreign recruit-
ment. Regulations for the employment of foreigners were extremely 
restrictive at the time, being based on the German Verordnung über aus-
ländische Arbeitskräfte (Act Concerning Foreign Employees) from 1933, 
5   The exhibition “Angeworben! Hiergeblieben! 50 Jahre ‘Gastarbeit’ in der Region St. 
Pölten” was displayed from June 13 to September 14, 2014, in the St. Pölten Stadtmuseum. 
For more detail, see Anne Unterwurzacher and Gertraud Pantucek, “Angeworben! 
Hiergeblieben! 50 Jahre ‘Gastarbeit’ in der Region St. Pölten – Reflexion eines lokalen 
Erinnerungsprojektes,” soziales_kapital: wissenschaftliches journal österreichischer fachhochschul-
studiengänge soziale arbeit 15 (2016): 249-259, accessed Oct. 29, 2016, http://soziales-kapital.
at/index.php/sozialeskapital/article/view/432.
6   The state of Lower Austria funds two research networks in the field of Humanities, 
Social and Cultural Sciences: one on the topic of migration, the other on the insecurity 
of nourishment. Both research networks are connected to the Forschungsnetzwerk 
Interdisziplinäre Regionalstudien (Research Network for Interdisciplinary Regional Studies, 
FIRST), based at the Danube University Krems. FIRST, accessed Dec. 21, 2016, http://
first-research.ac.at/.
7   See Christoph Reinprecht, Nach der Gastarbeit: Prekäres Alter in der 
Einwanderungsgesellschaft (Vienna: Braumüller, 2006), 9. 
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which passed into the body of laws of the Second Republic due to the 
Rechtsüberleitungsgesetz (Law for the Transition of Legislation). The com-
plicated process for individual approval legally stipulated a dual respon-
sibility for obtaining a permit. The employer required an employment 
permit, while the employee required a work permit issued according to the 
demands of the immigration authorities. The approval of an employment 
permit was in any case subject to the specific inspection of economic needs 
and the situation in the labor market. Both permits were limited to one 
year and tied to a specific workplace. After a ten-year unlimited residence, 
it was possible to receive a so-called “Befreiungsschein,” which was valid for 
two years and allowed for free access to the labor market during this period 
without being limited to a specific workplace.8 The German Act precluded 
the codetermination of trade unions, leaving the power of decision to the 
various state labor authorities.9
The German Act was, however, not implemented in the Second Republic 
as had been intended. Equality of codetermination in the process of approval 
was restored per decree in 1946, with a further decree in 1948 scrapping 
the work permits and Befreiungsscheine.10 Finally, in 1951, the activities and 
competences of workers’ committees were defined and secured per decree.11 
All three decrees were repealed at the end of 1959 by the Constitutional 
Court, thus re-enacting the German Act Concerning Foreign Employees. 
This decision of the Constitutional Court raised the pressure to revise the 
legislation concerning the employment of foreigners in Austria.
What followed was a protracted political tug-of-war. Despite various 
suggestions, conflicts of interest at first prevented an agreement. A break-
through only occurred with the 1961 Raab-Olah Agreement; the Chamber 
of Labor and the Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) agreed to the simplified 
employment of foreigners, and in turn they were able to institutionalize 
social partnership.12 Sector quotas for the individual federal states were 
8   Helga Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962 – 1985: Kampf um und gegen 
die ausländische Arbeitskraft,” Journal für Sozialforschung 25, no. 2 (1985): 159-198 (here 161).
9   Equally represented committees for foreigners were merely able to lodge complaints 
against decisions of the state labor authorities. See Wollner, “Auf dem Weg,” 28. 
10   With the concentration of the process of approval falling on the employer, the foreign 
workers lost their position as a legal subject, since no legal means were possible against the 
disallowance of a work permit. The strategy of disempowerment pursued by the Chamber 
of Labor and the trade unions through the discontinuation of the work permits was legally 
upheld in the Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz (Law for the Employment of Foreigners) of 
March 20, 1975 (AuslBG 218/1975). See Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik,” 185.    
11   For more detail, see Wollner, “Auf dem Weg,” 27-34.
12   The agreement on quotas was regarded at the time as temporary. However, fifteen years 
were to pass before the actual revision of the law on the employment of foreigners (AuslBG 
as per January 1, 1976). See Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik.”
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determined annually by the social partners, wherein the inspection of the 
labor market situation was omitted. This agreement provided for a tempo-
rary model of employment; the permits were limited to one year and tied 
to a specific business, with labor intended to rotate according to the Swiss 
model. Labor representatives were moreover able to ensure that foreign 
workers had to be employed under equal salary and working conditions. 
The recruited workers were not allowed to be employed as strikebreakers 
and, in the event of downsizing, they were to be made redundant before 
domestic workers (the principle of domestic primacy).13 The Raab-Olah 
Agreement thus created the parameters for the employment of foreigners. 
The specific institutional implementation of recruitment is examined more 
thoroughly below in the case study of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik. In significant 
respects, namely in equal codetermination, time-limited permits, and the 
principle of domestic primacy, the restrictive migration policy introduced 
by the Inlandarbeiterschutzgesetz (Law for the Protection of Domestic 
Workers) in 1925 was continued in the Second Republic.14
History of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik in St. Pölten
By the time it finally closed in 2008, the factory in St. Pölten could 
look back on a very colorful 104-year history. The Erste Österreichische 
Glanzstoff Fabrik (EÖG) was founded in 1904 as a subsidiary of the 
Vereinigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken (United Synthetic Fiber Factories, VGF) in 
Wuppertal-Elberfeld in Germany in order to bypass the customs restric-
tions introduced in 1903 in Austria-Hungary.15 Johann Urban was the 
director of the factory, who together with Max Fremery patented a process 
for the production of synthetic fibers. The conversion in the production of 
artificial silk through a new process based on viscose led to a significant 
expansion of the German parent company, above all through takeovers and 
mergers.
From 1917, during World War I, production in the EÖG was con-
trolled by the army and geared toward the production of cartridge cases for 
grenade explosives.16 Following the economic slump after World War I and 
13   See ibid., 166.
14   For more details, see Kenneth Horvath, Die Logik der Entrechtung: Sicherheits- und 
Nutzendiskurse im österreichischen Migrationsregime (Vienna: V & R unipress, 2014).
15   Rudolf Büttner, St. Pölten als Standort industrieller und großgewerblicher Produktion seit 
1850 (Veröffentlichung des Kulturamtes der Stadt St. Pölten, 1972), 40. 
16   “Glanzstoff Austria,” Austria-Forum, accessed Oct. 30, 2016, http://austria-forum.org/
af/AustriaWiki/Glanzstoff_Austria.
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the concurrent coal crisis, the factory in St. Pölten had to be decommis-
sioned for half a year, with full production rates only being reached again 
in 1922. The years 1924 to 1928 witnessed an enormous upsurge in the 
artificial silk industry, with over 3,000 people being employed in St. Pölten 
in 1928.17 In 1929, the German corporation merged with the Algemene 
Kunstzijde Unie (General Artificial Silk Union, AKU) in Arnhem in the 
Netherlands due to financial difficulties. The majority of the shares thus 
passed over to Dutch control, and yet the EÖG continued to be adminis-
tered by the German company. The Great Depression hit the EÖG with 
full force: production ceased completely starting in July 1930 and lasting for 
eighteen months. Following reorganization, production resumed in 1932 
with 800 employees.18
During World War II, the factory once more became used for the arma-
ments industry. In 1941, the site in St. Pölten passed once more into German 
hands due to an increase in capital and through the involuntary cession of the 
AKU shares to the German company.19 Hundreds of prisoners of war and 
forced laborers had to perform heavy work in the factory. The Glanzstoff-
Fabrik ran two camps, one located directly on the factory grounds, the other 
outside in a nearby meadow. According to surviving construction plans, the 
camp located on the factory grounds was designed for 800 people.20 Due 
to the change in ownership in 1941, the factory was confiscated in 1945 as 
“German property” by the Soviet occupying forces and run as a business of 
the USIA (Administration for Soviet Property in Austria).
After the withdrawal of occupying forces, the Austrian government 
temporarily took over the business before returning it to the Dutch AKU 
in 1956. Aside from fabrics, the factory began additionally producing tech-
nical yarns for the production of car tires in 1957.21 Then, in 1969, the AKU 
was thoroughly reorganized. Unlike the merger in 1929, in which the VGF 
and AKU remained relatively autonomous, the two companies were now 
economically and organizationally completely merged.22 The European 
17   Büttner, St. Pölten, 58-9.
18   Ibid.
19   USACA - German External Assets Branch of the US Allied Commission for 
Austria› ... General Records › Erste Oesterr Glanzstoff Fabrik-St. Poelten A.G., St. 
Poelter [sic], Dokumentenportal fold3, accessed May 2, 2016, https://www.fold3.com/
image/271456078/?terms=Glanzstoff.
20   Magistrat der Stadt St. Pölten, St. Pölten 1945: Broschüre zur gleichnamigen Ausstellung 
(St. Pölten, 2016), 72.  
21   Büttner, St. Pölten, 103.
22   Christian Marx, “Die Manager und McKinsey: Der Aufstieg externer Beratung und die 
Vermarktlichung des Unternehmens am Beispiel Glanzstoff,” in Die Anfänge der Gegenwart: 
Umbrüche in Westeuropa nach dem Boom, ed. Morten Reitmayer, Thomas Schlemmer (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2014), 66-77.
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companies of the corporation were administered under the name Enka-
Glanzstoff N.V. (Enka Synthetic Fiber Inc.). The new AKU N.V. moreover 
merged with the Dutch pharmaceutical corporation KZO, and the name 
was changed to AKZO.N.V. Following the economic crisis, reduced work-
ing hours and layoffs were implemented in 1975. The factory was thus able 
to stabilize itself in the short term; in the mid-term, however, the corpora-
tion planned to decommission the factory. After several turbulent years, the 
factory truly faced the end in late 1982. 
A state bailout ensued, with the factory being taken over by the state 
holding Gesellschaft zur Beteiligung von Industrieunternehmen (Company 
for Equity Investment in Industrial Enterprises) in 1983, reorganized, 
and privatized again.23 In 1988, the factory was taken over by the group of 
companies Lenzing AG. Glanzstoff-Austria AG was once again engulfed 
in a crisis at the end of 1993, announcing the layoff of its employees in 
early 1994. This closure was prevented by further state interventions, and 
the Glanzstoff-Fabrik was taken over by the CAG Holding of the indus-
trialist Cornelius Grupp. Of the 950 employees, 450 were re-hired.24 The 
production of textile yarns was resumed and the company even invested in 
a new exhaust system and new spinning machines. In 2008, a serious fire 
occurred in that exhaust system. This was followed by a tug-of-war over the 
factory that lasted for several months, in which above all the environmental 
regulations for a new exhaust system were discussed. In July 2008, the final 
closure of the factory was announced for the end of the year.
A Factory Seeking Workers 
According to the former staff manager, the board of managers expend-
ed every effort in the 1960s to find new workers. The company tried to 
recruit people throughout the entire state of Lower Austria. However, 
despite payment of travel allowances for workers living far afield, the pro-
vision of bus transfers for travel to the factory, and the theoretical possibil-
ity of being awarded one of the approximately 300 company apartments, 
hardly any workers were found. Due to the difficult working conditions, 
the company did not enjoy the best reputation. The board of managers 
of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik therefore decided to recruit foreign laborers for 
the factory work. Research in the surviving documentation shows that the 
23   “Glanzstoff Austria,” Austria-Forum.
24   “Glanzstadt Geschichte,” Die Konerei, accessed Oct. 30, 2016, http://www.diekonerei.
at/de/Geschichte.
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extent of recruitment of labor was considerable: 1,020 personnel records of 
Turkish workers survive for the period from 1964 to 1994 as well as of 140 
Tunisians. The workers were mostly recruited through the official route, 
through the Federal Economic Chamber.
The Official Route to Recruitment through the Federal Economic 
Chamber25
The Federal Economic Chamber (BWK) was tasked by the Federal 
Ministry of Social Administration with the creation of an organization for 
recruitment. To this end, the BWK founded the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die 
Anwerbung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte (Committee for the Recruitment of 
Foreign Labor, AGA) in 1961 with its headquarters in Vienna. Specific 
commissions were established in the countries of recruitment. The first 
recruitment agreement was already signed in 1962 with Spain. Due to 
the low level of pay, however, Austria was not an attractive destination for 
labor migrants from Spain. Instead of Spanish labor, businesses were able, 
from mid-1962 onward, to recruit people from Turkey and Yugoslavia. 
Recruitment in these countries was made possible by interim agreements 
off the record, which were later legitimized through the conclusion of inter-
governmental agreements (with Turkey in 1964, and with Yugoslavia in 
1966).
The official recruitment procedure is sketched in the following, with 
the help of documentation from the BWK,26 as it illustrates clearly the 
logic of economic advantage through which recruitment took place. The 
primary function of the labor migrant as an “object of labor” prompts a 
comparison of the recruitment procedure with a trade in goods.27 The 
official recruitment procedure, which is presented through the case study 
of Turkey, took place as follows: businesses could place recruitment 
25   For a detailed presentation of recruitment politics, see the chapter “‘Austria Attractive 
for Guest Workers?’: Recruitment of Immigrant Labor in Austria in the 1960s and 1970s” 
by Vida Bakondy in this volume. 
26   For more detail, see Vida Bakondy, “Bitte um 4 bis 5 türkische Maurer: Eine Analyse 
von Anwerbeakten der österreichischen Wirtschaftskammer,” in Viel Glück! Migration heute: 
Wien, Belgrad, Zagreb, Istanbul, ed. Vida Bakondy et al. (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2010), 68-
79.
27   Verena Lorber, “‘Wir brauchen Arbeitskräfte’: Das ‘Gastarbeitersystem’ in Österreich 
als spezifische Form transnationaler Arbeitsmigration,” in Migration und Minderheiten in 
der Demokratie: Politische Grundlagen und soziale Grundlagen von Partizipation, ed. Philipp 
Eigenmann, Thomas Geisen, and Tobias Studer (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2016), 221-239 
(here 229). 
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orders with the AGA in Vienna; for every sought worker, a place had to 
be secured in the framework of the sector quotas determined annually 
by the social partners; this was confirmed by the state labor authorities 
through an Einzelsicherungsbescheinigung (individual work permit). These 
individual work permits were submitted to the AGA together with stan-
dardized employment contracts including all relevant information about 
the position, such as the type of work, payment, and information about 
accommodation.28
The AGA forwarded the recruitment orders to the commission in 
Istanbul. The recruitment wishes of Austrian businesses were then relayed 
to the Turkish labor market administration on site, who, in cooperation with 
local employment agencies, earmarked workers for placement. The lists of 
earmarked workers were then referred to the foreign agencies, which aside 
from Austria also included West Germany and France.29 These workers were 
invited to audition at the various commissions, which conducted medical 
examinations as well as, if the businesses so wished, technical examinations. 
In order to receive an immigration visa, the workers had to first present a 
so-called Infektionsfreiheitsschein (Certificate of Freedom from Infection) 
issued after the medical examination, as well as a criminal record certificate 
from the police confirming their good conduct. The commission procured 
these visas and then organized travel to Austria.
The businesses had to pay a recruitment fee for each worker to cover the 
costs of medical examination, travel, provisions, visa fees, as well as a con-
tribution to a fund for deportations. In the 1960s, this recruitment fee con-
sisted in the case of Turkey of 900 Schilling per worker, which was raised to 
1,200 Schilling in the 1970s. If a recruited worker breached their contract 
within the first week, the recruitment was regarded as a Fehlanwerbung 
(literally: mis-recruitment) and the AGA refunded the recruitment fee.
Aside from this official route through the recruitment commission in 
Istanbul, there were two further routes to immigration, one being individual 
recruitment by businesses and the other being “tourist employment,” which 
became increasingly common over time. In individual recruitments, workers 
immigrated legally, mostly through mediation of relatives or acquaintances 
already working in the business, and with the permission of the foreign 
labor market authorities or of Austrian agencies (with valid immigration, 
28   The employment contracts were issued in German as well as the language of the 
respective country.  
29   See Siegfried Pflegerl, “50 Jahre Anwerbeabkommen Türkei – Österreich: Ein 
korrektives Narrativ,” unpublished report, Vienna 2014, accessed Nov. 3, 2016, 36, 
or-om.org/50JAAT.pdf. 
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residence, and work permits).30 In the second case, people came to Austria 
from Turkey, and even more so from Yugoslavia, without a visa as “tour-
ists” and searched for work on location.31 The necessary work permits were 
procured by the employers after the fact. Although tourist employment 
was politically regarded as controversial, it was handled liberally. In this 
context, it is interesting that the state employment agencies of Vienna and 
Lower Austria installed a guest worker support service at the Südbahnhof 
in Vienna in the summer of 1967 to place “tourists” with companies. This 
service was used especially by immigrants from Yugoslavia.32
Turks instead of Spaniards?
Instead of the Spaniards envisaged by the company management in 
1962, Turks were eventually recruited for the factory. It would have also 
been possible for the management at the time to acquire people from 
Yugoslavia. The management decided explicitly in favor of Turkey as a 
country of recruitment in 1964, however, because it did not want to bring 
people from a Communist country into the factory, considering that the 
workers’ committee was already dominated by Communists. Such reserva-
tions toward Yugoslavs, who were socialized under Communism and were 
therefore allegedly more interested in employee organizations, were wide-
spread at the time. In Vorarlberg, for example, some companies decided to 
recruit exclusively Turkish labor.33
At the height of guest worker immigration, Turks were described 
lackadaisically in the milieu of the social partnership as the “more low 
maintenance” immigrants. For example, a study published by the social 
partners in 1973 claimed, “this moreover complements the general obser-
vation that Turks in many respects seem to adapt easier to the Austrian 
way of life. It is to their advantage that they tend more toward subordina-
tion, are more immune to excessive alcohol consumption, and due to their 
custom of ritual washing find it easier to achieve a high level of personal 
hygiene.”34
30   Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik,” 172. 
31   Visa exemption for Turkish nationals had already been introduced in 1955, for Yugoslav 
nationals in 1965. See Pflegerl, “50 Jahre,” 23. 
32   Landesarbeitsamt Niederösterreich, Jahresbericht 1967 (Vienna, 1968), 33. 
33   Erika Thurner, Der “Goldene Westen”? Arbeitszuwanderung nach Vorarlberg seit 1945 
(Bregenz: Vorarlberger Autoren Gesellschaft, 1997), 98.  
34   Arbeitskreis für Ökonomische und Soziologische Studien, ed., Gastarbeiter: 
wirtschaftliche und soziale Herausforderung (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1973), 56.
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Such blatant (from today’s perspective) stereotypes often referred to 
the ostensible obedience to authority of the Turks.35 How far removed 
these generalizations were from reality is proven by my research into the 
Glanzstoff-Fabrik. In the early phase, the recruited Turks protested against 
the conditions on site; for example, a number of Turks who had according to 
their contracts been recruited for work in a department called Druckwäsche 
(literally: pressure washer) refused in August 1964 to work in the spinning 
mill of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik, since working in this department was per-
ceived as more hazardous to one’s health.36 In the beginning, the BWK and 
the Turkish embassy thus had to intervene numerous times.
Generally, however, the potential for protest was extremely limited, 
given the legal situation of the “guest workers”; due to their work permits, 
foreign workers were bound to a specific company. The permits, moreover, 
were only temporary. This became a means for the employer to exert pres-
sure to prevent a change of workplace, even under bad conditions or dis-
crimination.37 Changing the workplace at that time constituted a breach 
of contract. The files of the Economic Chamber include many complaints 
about workers who had breached their contracts. Companies repeatedly 
sought compensation or sanctions in such cases, such as the reimbursement 
of the recruitment fee from the AGA or the new employer, or in other cases 
demanding the prohibition of further placement or even deportation of the 
person who breached their contract.38
Difficulties Recruiting
It can generally be surmised from the files of the BWK that recruitment 
was beset by difficulties in its early stages. With the Glanzstoff-Fabrik, too, 
recruitment did not go off without a hitch. The company always attached 
a list to its official recruitment orders requesting that attention be paid 
during the examinations in Istanbul to certain injuries and illnesses that 
precluded working in a chemical factory. Nevertheless, the very first “Turk 
35   See Elisabeth Röhrlich and Stefanie Mayer, “Konstruktionen des Anderen: Historische 
und kulturelle Bezüge in österreichischen Mediendebatten über den EU-Beitritt der Türkei,” 
Endbericht für den Jubiläumsfonds der Österreichischen Nationalbank (Demokratiezentrum 
Vienna, 2009), 109-110.
36   Microfilm 0887, T232, 1963, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ. 
37   See Sylvia Hahn and Georg Stöger, 50 Jahre österreichisch-türkisches Anwerbeabkommen, 
research report (University of Salzburg, 2014), 26.   
38   For an example of a breach of contract resulting in deportation, see the following 
recruitment order: Microfilm 0889, T361, 1963, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ. Further specific 
example from the recruitment files can be found in Bakondy, “Bitte um,” 71-77. 
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transport” (as it was called in contemporary parlance) brought two Turks 
to the company whose medical condition did not permit them to work 
in the chemical factory. Presumably due to their special health demands, 
the factory management decided to travel to Turkey themselves in order 
to have workers examined by the company doctor on site. The company 
compiled lists of those workers they had preselected whom they then called 
upon as needed. The actual recruitment officially took place through the 
recruitment commission in the framework of the usual procedure, meaning 
that the labor migrants had to undergo another medical examination.
Several such trips are documented in the recruitment files, with recruit-
ment initially taking place in western Turkey. Then, in 1968, eastern Turkey 
became a recruiting site for Glanzstoff. There was a specific plan to recruit in 
Tunceli, as a number of employees working at the company had come from 
this region and, according to statements of former employees, the company 
was very satisfied with the “work ethic” of these people. Glanzstoff was 
warned in advance by the commission that difficulties could arise in this 
region—in contrast to western Turkey—if the local employment agency 
were to invite one hundred workers, of whom only thirty would be chosen 
by the company since, in the opinion of the employment agency in Istanbul, 
“the population of this region is still rather uncultured.”39 As a compromise, 
it was suggested to invite only seventy individuals and to move the selection 
to the employment agency in Elazığ, located some 190 kilometers away and 
reachable from Istanbul by plane.
Glanzstoff agreed to this proposal, but nevertheless sent a list to the 
employment agency in Tunceli with the names of 22 relatives and acquain-
tances of workers already employed by the company. The employment 
agency in Tunceli treated this list of names with suspicion and reported 
this process to the general directorate of the labor market administration in 
Ankara. They insisted in turn that a placement of the named workers would 
only be possible upon request to the general directorate.40 This distrust on 
the part of the Turkish government regarding recruitment in Tunceli had 
a historical background: Tunceli in eastern Anatolia—previously known 
as Dersim—was the site of a massacre by the Turkish army in 1937/38 
against the local Alevi population.41 Thousands of people were murdered 
39   Microfilm 0897, T34, 1968, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ. 
40   Ibid.
41   The local population define themselves predominantly as Kurds; many of them speak 
the Zaza language. Martin van Bruinessen, “The Ethnic Identity of the Kurds in Turkey,” 
in Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, ed. Peter Alford Andrews (Wiesbaden, 2002), 
613-621 (here 613-14), accessed Nov. 5, 2016, http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/
personal/publications/Bruinessen_Ethnic_identity_Kurds.pdf.
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or forcibly resettled. The exact scale of the massacre is unknown to this day. 
The area was a restricted zone until 1948, and is today an occupied territory 
with numerous military checkpoints.42
Returning to the events of 1968: since the commission in Istanbul was 
unable to detach an interpreter for the company visit in Elazığ, the company 
representatives took a worker from Tunceli already employed at Glanzstoff 
along to Elazığ for the selection. Two Turkish colleagues denounced him to 
the Turkish Ministry of Labor because he would allegedly accept a place-
ment percentage from every worker from Tunceli who was accepted. This 
claim, however, quickly proved to be a fabrication and the difficulties could 
be rectified together with the commission. The emigration of the workers 
from Tunceli was thereafter not blocked by the general directorate. Despite 
these difficulties, the company traveled to Elazığ for a second time that year 
to select labor.43 In May 1969, the company delegation visited Erzincan in 
eastern Turkey, and in September of the same year the company selected 
labor in Çankırı and further north in Kastamonu.
If Glanzstoff allowed too much time to elapse before calling up the 
“preselected” workers, they were sometimes placed in other countries. This 
happened in 1969, when the men called up by Glanzstoff in Erzincan 
were placed in West Germany.44 The workers preselected in Kastamonu in 
September 1969 were sent to the Netherlands that December. The local 
employment agency justified this with the five-year waiting period of these 
workers, who had already been recruited by the employment agency in 1964, 
and by the uncertain dismissals by the Glanzstoff-Fabrik.45 The fact that 
there were very long waiting periods for work placement abroad also cast 
a different light on the rivalries that emerged within Glanzstoff as a result 
of the managerial practice of recruiting in specific parts of the country. For 
Turks who did not have personal relations to people already employed in the 
countries of recruitment, the possibility of recruitment by name proved to 
be disadvantageous and led to waiting periods, sometimes lasting years. For 
this reason, the Turkish labor market administration forbade the recruitment 
by name of male workers altogether in 1970; women, however, could still be 
recruited personally to counter the emergence of a “surplus of women.”46 The 
42   Frank Nordhausen, “Das Trauma der Aleviten: eine Reise nach Dersim,” Gruß vom 
Bosporus (blog), Aug. 26, 2013, accessed Nov. 5, 2016, http://gruss-vom-bosporus.berliner-
zeitung.de/2013/08/26/das-trauma-der-aleviten-eine-reise-nach-dersim/. 
43   Microfilm 0897, T80, 1968, BUKA – AGA,WKÖ. 
44   Microfilm 0898, T61, 1969, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ. 
45   Microfilm 0898, T80, 1969, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ.  
46   Eveline Wollner, “Maßnahmen Jugoslawiens und der Türkei zur Regulierung der 
Arbeitsmigration während der 1960er Jahre,” in Viel Glück!, ed. Bakondy, 80-87 (here 84). 
Unterwurzacher: “The Other Colleagues”152
Glanzstoff-Fabrik, however, did not recruit any women in the period before 
1975; women would only be employed in the factory from the mid-1980s 
onward following subsequent immigration of family members.
The company’s recruitment practice led through the subsequent pro-
cess of settling in the area around the factory to a socially and politically 
nuanced self-organization: There are two Sunni mosque associations, an 
Alevi Cem association, as well as secular associations, such as an association 
for Austrian-Turkish friendship.
Not Only Unskilled Labor?
Unfortunately, the recruitment documentation from Turkey only sur-
vives from the period up to 1969, so later recruitment practices of the com-
pany cannot be examined directly. Surviving protocols of the recruitment 
commission, however, suggest that Glanzstoff also traveled to Turkey in 
the 1970s. Additional documentation of the company itself finally reveals 
surprising findings for the period after 1970. For example, internal compa-
ny memoranda demonstrate that Turkish skilled laborers were also being 
employed in the second half of 1970. How many individuals were involved 
has not yet been ascertained; this would require a more precise examination 
of personnel files and further research. The documentation does demon-
strate, however, that Turkish skilled laborers were offered German language 
courses every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday from 4:15pm to 6:15pm.47 
Generally, however, the employment of skilled laborers did not go off with-
out a hitch, with reports of lacking qualifications and language problems. 
One of the company protocols, for example, states: “It is also difficult to 
demand of linguistically inexpert people that they work according to draw-
ings.”48 Skilled laborers who did not meet the qualifications may therefore 
have subsequently been employed in production as unskilled laborers.49 For 
all of these reasons, the recruitment of skilled laborers may only have taken 
place for a limited time.
In any case, the vast majority of Turkish recruits were only employed 
for unskilled work. A part of the “guest workers” were housed in wooden 
47   Protokoll Nr. 20/70 der Personalbesprechung am 07.10.1970, Archiv der Glanzstoff-
Fabrik. 
48   Protokoll Nr. 13/71 der Personalbesprechung am 13.05.1971, Archiv der Glanzstoff-
Fabrik. 
49   At least there are suggestions to this effect in one of the meeting protocols: see Protokoll 
Nr. 15/71 der Personalbesprechung am 17.06.1971, Archiv der Glanzstoff-Fabrik.
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barracks on the factory grounds.50 Others lived beyond the factory grounds 
in communal accommodation, which the factory management had acquired 
from a nearby company after it had moved away. According to the salary 
scale appended to the recruitment orders, the company granted each work-
er at the factory a monthly housing allowance of 30 Schilling. However, 
the “other colleagues,” as the immigrants were once called in the company 
newspaper Reyon-Post,51 had exactly this sum deducted from their salaries in 
exchange for the communal accommodation.52 The wooden barracks on the 
factory grounds had rooms shared by four people each, with one communal 
kitchen for dozens of workers. The crowded and paltry living conditions, 
the unaccustomed work (above all the shift work), the new environment, 
and the separation from home weighed on the men in the beginning. Many 
of them therefore left the factory after short periods, either returning home 
or searching for work in other Western European countries, especially in 
West Germany.
The fluctuation of staff at the factory was generally very high. According 
to an internal company investigation, 177 of 257 Turks employed at the 
factory left again within a year. At 68.9%, the fluctuation rate of the foreign 
workforce was double that of the domestic workforce, at 33.5%.53 The rea-
sons for this fluctuation varied. While more than half of the “guest workers” 
claimed to leave due to better salary and working conditions in Western 
Europe, and around a quarter returned to Turkey for familial or personal 
reasons, the Austrian workforce by and large rejected the working condi-
tions at the factory.54
Generally, it can be assumed that social provisions played an important 
part in the phase of active recruitment in order to achieve a stronger com-
mitment from the recruited workers. For example, in late 1965, the factory 
management requested a cook from Turkey since the Turkish workforce did 
not take to the conventional canteen food.55 However, according to the for-
mer staff cook, the Turks—who were recruited from completely different 
parts of the country—could not agree on a common menu. The company’s 
offer to employ a Turkish cook could therefore not be realized in practice.
50   According to a former personnel manager, these wooden barracks were erected 
specifically for the guest workers. What remains unknown is whether the barracks for forced 
laborers from World War II were also used.
51   Reyon-Post, Weihnachten 1971, Nr. 4, 11-12. 
52   See for example Microfilm 0888, T304, 1963, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ.  
53   Untersuchung über die Fluktuation im Zeitraum vom 1.7.1970 – 30.6.1971. This 
investigation was appended to a letter to the company headquarters in Arnhem from 
October 21, 1971, Archiv der Glanzstoff-Fabrik.
54   Ibid.
55   Microfilm 0891, T579, 1965, BUKA – AGA, WKÖ.
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In early 1970, the company erected a new brick-built communal 
accommodation in place of the old wooden barracks. On the basis of the 
internal investigation mentioned above, the company generally regarded 
the provision of cheap apartments as the best means to reduce fluctuation. 
The labor migrants were not excluded from such considerations, as a memo 
to the company headquarters shows: “The fluctuation of the guest workers 
could also be combated in this manner, since many of them are prepared to 
bring their families to Austria and would then of course stay with the com-
pany that provides them with cheap accommodation.”56 The company was 
thus considering the subsequent immigration of family members at a time 
when official Austrian polity was still clinging to the idea of labor rotation. 
Political regulations and managerial practice began thereafter to diverge 
at times. But from the 1970s onward, family immigration did increasingly 
take place. The difficulties of finding a place to live on the open housing 
market became a central theme in the interviews to date.
The Tunisians Arrive
When the first Turkish Glanzstoff workers began to leave the barracks, 
the company brought a second group of immigrants to the factory; about 70 
people from Tunisia were more or less permanently employed at Glanzstoff. 
What moved the company to this decision is the subject of differing opin-
ions. One contemporary witness from Turkey told me about a visit of the 
former Turkish Labor Minister to the factory in St. Pölten. He had been 
very unsatisfied with the salary and living conditions on site. According 
to the testimony of this contemporary witness, no more Turks were to be 
placed in this factory under those conditions. The files of the BWK docu-
ment both the visit of the Turkish Labor Minister to the Glanzstoff-Fabrik 
in August 1970 as well as his dissatisfaction with the salary conditions, both 
in the chemical industry and in the textile industry.57 According to sur-
viving documentation, the Glanzstoff-Fabrik continued to recruit people 
from Turkey even after the visit of the Labor Minister, with one hundred 
Turks arriving at the factory alone in the period from January to April 
56   Letter to the company headquarters in Arnhem from October 21, 1971, Archiv der 
Glanzstoff-Fabrik. 
57   Report from August 24, 1970, about the visit to Austria of the Turkish Minister of 
Labor: Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul V, Vertraulich (V 2), WKÖ. Aside from the 
Glanzstoff-Fabrik, the Turkish Minister of Labor also visited another textile factory in 
Lower Austria.
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1971.58 The official Turkish visit did not, in any case, result in a moratorium 
on recruitment to the factory. The incident could rather be regarded as a 
passing disgruntlement on the part of the Turkish authorities. It is possible 
that the above-mentioned recruitment of skilled laborers in the second half 
of 1970 was a means to placate the Turkish authorities.
Company records paint a different picture to that of the contemporary 
witness regarding the recruitment of Tunisians. Apparently, problems with 
the Turkish workers were accumulating at the time, including increasing 
threats to strike on the part of the Turkish workforce, which the company 
blamed on the Communist workers’ committee. The later personnel man-
ager assumed that the company management did not want to be solely 
dependent on one country in its recruitment efforts. Moreover, an Egyptian, 
whom the company could use as an interpreter, was working at the factory 
at the time. This may have moved the company to travel to Tunisia for 
recruitment purposes.
This was made possible by a trial quota agreed with Tunisia in 
November 1970. Documentation of the BWK demonstrates that ulti-
mately only a small part of the agreed quota with Tunisia was utilized, 
one reason being the exceedingly long processing time of the orders 
on the part of the Tunisian authorities.59 Although the Tunisian gov-
ernment had strongly backed the conclusion of an official recruitment 
agreement, this never came to pass. Security and special branch con-
siderations from the Federal Ministry of the Interior, as well as reser-
vations about Tunisians (such as weak bodily constitutions, high rates 
of illiteracy, deficient work ethic and concomitantly high demands for 
remuneration, and problems in adaptation and comprehension) on the 
part of the Federal Ministry for Social Administration effectively pre-
vented such an agreement.60
A preliminary, superficial examination of the personnel files shows 
that the familial patterns of the Tunisian workers at Glanzstoff may have 
been thoroughly different from the Turkish immigrants. The bulk of the 
recruited Turks had, after the initial separation, gradually brought women 
and children to the country or started new families on site, although some 
of them left their children, especially the older ones, permanently with rel-
atives in Turkey. The Tunisians, by contrast, often sent their children back 
58   Protokoll Nr. 5/71 der Personalbesprechung am 3.3.1971, Archiv der Glanzstoff-
Fabrik.
59   Tätigkeitsbericht 1973 als Vorlage für die Sitzung des Ausschusses der AGA am 
21.02.1974, 4-5. Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul V, Vertraulich (V 2), WKÖ. 
60   BM für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten,  Sektion IV, 1972,  Grundzahl 31.564, 
Geschäftszeichen Tunesien I/8P, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Wien/Archiv der Republik. 
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to Tunisia for schooling. This was probably due to various reasons about 
which I can only speculate at this point. The school system in Tunisia is 
generally well regarded. As a former colony of France, French continues to 
be an important language in Tunisia.61 The recruited Tunisians possibly did 
not see a possibility for their children to learn sufficient French in Austria. 
The heavy fragmentation of families may also have been connected to the 
time of their arrival: the Tunisians arrived at a time when only a few years 
later—for the first time in 1975—economic crises began to accumulate in 
the company. The possibility of a permanent stay in Austria may therefore 
have seemed slim.
Foreign Labor as an Economic Shock Absorber and the Question 
of Company Interests
What can generally not be overlooked is the fact that the employment 
of foreigners, despite the interests of the company in continuous employ-
ment, also and at all times performed the function of an economic shock 
absorber. The trade unions had ensured from the outset that, in the event of 
a crisis, foreign labor was to be made redundant before domestic labor. The 
Betriebsratsgesetz (Workers’ Committee Law) of 1947 had only granted for-
eign workers passive electoral rights, thus effectively preventing any active 
union work by labor migrants on the company level.62 This also casts some 
light on the difficult chapter of trade unions and labor migration. The posi-
tion of the ÖGB has already been illuminated rudimentarily.63 What has 
hardly been considered in research to date is the question of how specific 
interests were implemented in the companies.
61   See, for example, Claudia Nowotny “Die Bedeutung des Nationenkonzepts im 
kolonialen und postkolonialen Kontext: Eine Analyse an Hand des ehemaligen französischen 
Protektorats Tunesien” (PhD thesis, University of Vienna, 2008), 256-263.  
62   See Eugène Richard Sensenig-Dabbous, Von Metternich bis EU-Beitritt: Reichsfremde, 
Staatsfremde und Drittausländer. Immigration und Einwanderungspolitik in Österreich, 
Ludwig-Boltzmann-Institut für Gesellschafts- und Kulturgeschichte (Salzburg, 1998), 
accessed Nov. 6, 2016, http://www.ndu.edu.lb/lerc/publications/Von_Metternich_bis_EU_
Beitritt.pdf. Foreign workers have only been permitted to run as worker representatives 
since 2006.
63   See Sensenig-Dabbous, “Von Metternich”; August Gächter, “Austria: Protecting 
Indigenous Workers from Immigrants,” in Trade Unions, Immigration, and Immigrants in 
Europe, 1960-1993: A Comparative Study of the Attitudes and Actions of Trade Unions in Seven 
West European Countries, ed. Rinus Penninx and Judith Roosblad (New York: Berghahn, 
2001), 65-89. Jan Kreisky, “Migration und Gewerkschaft: Skizze einer widerspruchsvollen 
und wechselhaften Geschichte,” in Wissenschaft über Gewerkschaft: Analysen und Perspektiven, 
ed. Brigitte Pellar (Vienna: ÖGB Verlag, 2013), 155-187. 
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The workers’ committee of the Glanzstoff-Fabrik was dominated until 
the early 1980s by Communists.64 Unfortunately, the interviews conducted 
to date hardly contain any statements regarding the specific configuration 
of the representation of company interests of the “other colleagues.” What 
is noteworthy, however, or at least deserving of analytical explanation, is 
the absence of the “guest worker” theme in the company newspaper Neue 
Glanzstoffstimme published by the Communist faction of the workers’ com-
mittee. In the period from 1962 to 1974, the topic of “guest workers” was 
only directly addressed four times, in each case negatively. Three of the four 
articles raised the prospect of the corruptibility of the “guest workers,” who 
were accused of accepting money or non-cash benefits like televisions from 
the Socialist faction of the workers’ committee.65
From 1975 onward, economic crises began to beset the Glanzstoff-
Fabrik. In 1975, reduced working hours were implemented for four months 
and retraining measures introduced. Instead of the 35 planned dismissals of 
unskilled female employees, the workers’ committee managed to have 128 
women go on leave on rotation for six weeks, during which they received 
unemployment benefits. The crisis was especially detrimental to the for-
eign workers; more than half of the labor migrants were forced to spend 
several months of unpaid leave in their country of origin, with a part 
of them, forty women according to official documentation, being made 
redundant after this unpaid leave. The Communist workers’ committee 
newspaper discussed these measures in the crisis-ridden year of 1975.66 
In this context, an article from 1977 is revealing. On the occasion of the 
workers’ committee elections, the victories of the Leftist Bloc of the trade 
union in the latest period were enumerated: “Due to your support, we have 
managed to maintain the workplaces of all Austrian workers despite the 
opposing wishes of the company.”67 The dismissal of the labor migrants was 
not mentioned at all in the article. The Communist workers’ committee of 
the Glanzstoff-Fabrik thus did not, at least in its official self-representation, 
question the politically motivated Inländerprimat (principle of domestic 
primacy) of the ÖGB. Whatever (alternative) forms of articulating their 
interests were developed by the immigrants is not immediately clear from 
64   The faction Gewerkschaftliche Einheit (Unionist Unity, GE) in the ÖGB was founded 
by the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) in 1952; due to internal disputes and schisms 
the GE was renamed Gewerkschaftlicher Linksblock (Unionist Leftist Bloc) in 1974. See 
Anton Pelinka, Gewerkschaften im Parteienstaat: Ein Vergleich zwischen dem Deutschen und 
dem Österreichischen Gewerkschaftsbund (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980), 101. 
65   Neue Glanzstoffstimme, no. 2 (1964), 2-3. Neue Glanzstoffstimme, no. 6 (1968), 
unpaginated.  Neue Glanzstoffstimme, no. 3 (1974), 5.  Neue Glanzstoffstimme, no. 3 (1974), 6. 
66   Neue Glanzstoffstimme,  no. 3 (1975), 1-2.
67   Neue Glanzstoffstimme, no. 4 (1974), 1. 
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the archival materials or prior research; this requires deeper research and an 
augmented methodology.
Summary and Outlook
It can be concluded that neither the company employment policies 
toward labor migrants nor their individual methods of dealing with the 
concrete conditions on site can be neatly subordinated into traditional 
models of interpretation of migration history, which are predicated on 
clearly distinguishable and successive phases of migration.68 It is commonly 
postulated that the first phase of “guest work,” which was characterized by 
thoroughly temporary, circular patterns, was followed by a phase of perma-
nent settlement including the subsequent immigration of family members, 
beginning in the mid-1970s.69 These procedural models orient themselves 
predominantly toward migration policy regulations and/or rely on national 
averages in their description of migrant living conditions.
Even a cursory exploration of the Glanzstoff archive reveals a tempo-
ral coexistence of various patterns of migration: some stayed for a shorter 
period than agreed, some stayed longer than originally anticipated; some 
worked repeatedly on and off at the factory, while their colleagues worked 
at the factory permanently from the outset, sometimes even over successive 
generations. Others, by contrast, emigrated after a short stay in St. Pölten, 
above all to West Germany, where they could earn a higher salary and had 
to accept less cumbersome working conditions. Not all labor migrants 
silently quit the factory on the lookout for better conditions; various forms 
of protest have also been documented. The personnel files of the Glanzstoff-
Fabrik reveal, in any case, a wide spectrum of individual forms of action. A 
concentration on one local employer allows for the process of migration to 
be described more densely and precisely than is usually the case. Migration 
thus becomes visible in various facets, between coming, staying, returning, 
or moving on.
The legal regulation of domestic primacy asserted by the trade unions 
and the Chamber of Labor, and the limited potential for participation in 
68   On Germany, see Barbara Sonnenberger, Nationale Migrationspolitik und regionale 
Erfahrung: Die Anfänge der Arbeitsmigration in Südhessen 1955-1967 (Darmstadt: Hessisches 
Wirtschaftsarchiv, 2003).
69   See for example Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, “Österreich – Einwanderungsland 
wider Willen,” in Migration in Europa: Historische Entwicklungen, aktuelle Trends und politische 
Reaktionen, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz (Frankfurt am Main: Campus,1969), 
209-222.
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company management, in any case greatly limited the room for maneuvering 
of the recruited workers. Despite these discriminatory working and living 
conditions, the immigrants who stayed in St. Pölten appropriated their new 
environment over time. This active process of appropriation has hardly been 
investigated in contemporary historical research to date. For future research, 
it therefore seems relevant in this context to adopt an approach which goes 
beyond a merely functionalist understanding, according to which migration 
history is the story of a successful or failed adaptation (keyword “integra-
tion”) in the context of arrival. Despite existing asymmetries of power, the 
immigrants made use “actively of social norms, exploited existing rooms for 
maneuvering or created new ones, and through exchange, appropriation, 
subversion, refusal, or negotiation changed not only their own lives, but 
also the constitution of those societies which— through migration and the 
transfer of knowledge, money, and goods—they connected and interwove 
with each other.”70  
70   Sarah Vanessa Losego, Fern von Afrika: Die Geschichte der nordafrikanischen “Gastarbeiter” 
im französischen Industrierevier von Longwy (1945 – 1990) (Cologne: Böhlau, 2009), 22. 

To Come into Focus
Female “Guest Workers” from Former Yugoslavia in 
Austria (1960-1980)
Verena Lorber
This article is concerned with the labor migration of women to Austria 
in the 1960s and 1970s. First, an overview of the research development in 
the area of gender and migration will be given. Additionally, the picture 
of the male labor migrant, which has long dominated historical migration 
research, will be called into question. There will also be a focus on the 
employment situation of female migrant workers in Austria and Styria, as 
well as the recruitment of women. Finally, the living worlds of those women 
from Yugoslavia, who decided to take up work in Styria from the time 
period of 1967-1976, will become the main point of interest. The intention 
here is to bring their work biographies and experiences to light.
Research on Gender and Migration1
For a long time, gender specific aspects of migration and integration 
have not been taken into account in historical migration research. The male 
migration pioneer was considered to be the object of investigation relevant to 
research. It was assumed that migration movements were primarily economi-
cally motivated, and that for this reason it was almost without exception men 
who migrated for the purpose of work. A reason for the non-observance of 
female mobility can be found in the reproduction of prevailing gender coding 
since the Enlightenment. Traditional gender dichotomies and stereotypes 
and male thought patterns were hardly challenged in migration research, and 
were perpetuated until late into the twentieth century.2
1   Verena Lorber, Angeworben: GastarbeiterInnen in Österreich in den 1960er und 1970er 
Jahren, Transkulturelle Perspektiven 14 (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2016), 39-45.
2   Sylvia Hahn, Migration – Arbeit – Geschlecht: Arbeitsmigration in Mitteleuropa vom 17. bis 
zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, Transkulturelle Perspektiven 5 (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 
2008), 85-94; Sylvia Hahn, “Migration, Geschlecht und Familieneinkommen (18.-20. 
Jahrhundert),” in Migration und Geschlechterverhältnisse: Kann die Migrantin sprechen?, ed. 
Eva Hausbacher et al. (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2012), 83-102 (here 83).
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Between the sexes there was, therefore, a clear division of duty and 
labor. The man was responsible for earnings outside of the home, while 
the woman took care of the household and looked after the children. The 
allocation of the different social areas reflected the evolving bourgeois 
family ideology of the eighteenth century. This required a clear division of 
roles between the sexes, a factor that also mattered in the case of migration. 
According to this worldview, the man was viewed as the family’s breadwin-
ner, and he went abroad to earn money. In the migration process, women 
were commonly viewed as “wives, as dependent persons, who were often 
forced to follow, through the decision of the head of the household.”3 They 
were not perceived as active participants with their own migration biog-
raphies. Research ascribed women a passive role in the migration process 
and they were primarily addressed in the context of going along with their 
husbands for family reasons.4 
The first scholar to take into consideration female migration was the 
British statistician and geographer Ernest Ravenstein in his analysis of 
the population census of Great Britain from the years 1871 and 1881. In 
the resulting study, “Laws of Migration” (1885), he came to the conclusion 
that, while quantitatively women were involved in large numbers in the 
migration processes of the nineteenth century, their mobility was primarily 
limited to short distances. On the other hand, men made up the majority of 
those involved in long distance migration. The fact that women moved in 
with their husbands after marriage, and thus made up the majority of short 
distant migrants, was not taken into consideration.5
Ravenstein was one of the first in a long line of researchers who 
coined the image of the male long distance migrant, and accorded to 
men the function of migration decision-making. This is a perception 
that consequently dominated migration research: “This also made the 
long-distance male migrant most deserving of study; female migrants 
seemed interesting only when they outnumbered males or when they—
like males—sought wage-earning work as unencumbered persons with-
out families.”6
Concerning the Habsburg Monarchy, Gustav Adolf Schimmer in 
1872 came to the conclusion that the “male sex, according to his nature, is 
3   Heberle Rudolf, “Zur Typologie der Wanderungen,” in Bevölkerungsgeschichte, ed. 
Wolfgang Köllmann, Peter Marschalck (Köln: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1972), 69-75 (here 
72).
4   Hahn, Migration – Arbeit – Geschlecht, 85-94; Hahn, “Migration, Geschlecht und 
Familieneinkommen (18.-20. Jahrhundert),” 83.
5   Katharine M. Donato and Donna Gabaccia, Gender and International Migration: From 
the Slavery Era to the Global Age (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2015), 22-24.
6   Ibid., 24.
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far more suited to leaving his home country to look for work elsewhere.”7 
When considering the statistical survey, it becomes clear that the propor-
tional difference between migrating men and women is only very small. 
Numerous studies have shown that women were just as mobile as men.8 In 
her study “Moving Europeans,” Leslie Page Moch made reference to the 
fact that women were always a part of the migration movement and, for 
example, made up nearly half of the Irish and Jewish migrants to the USA 
from 1820 to 1928.9
However, in spite of the social history established in the 1970s and 
1980s and the accompanying exploration of everyday life resulting from 
that, this picture hardly changed at all. The man as the main actor in migra-
tion flows remained unchallenged. In the Anglo-American and European 
area, an androcentric research perspective dominated.10 In this way, the 
image of the multiply oppressed woman often came into being in historical 
migration research. This perception took as its basis the idea that women 
from traditional societies migrated into the modern and had done no work 
outside of the home before their migration. In this context, they were shown 
to be victims who were forced to migrate due to tragic circumstances. Other 
reasons for migration, such as an unhappy marriage, illegitimate children, 
the desire for self-development, the aim of earning money independent-
ly, love, or the consequences of a divorce, were not taken into account. 
Thereby a form of threefold oppression was constantly attributed to female 
migrants: as a woman, a female worker, and a female migrant. In migration 
discourse, therefore, a stereotyped picture of the oppressed woman and the 
image of the female migrant as victim were the springboard for numerous 
investigations.11
In time, it was possible to dismantle this stereotyping and take 
a deeper look in the migration processes with the help of detailed 
regional research and biographical interviews. This led to a wide-rang-
ing understanding of migration flows, and also to the realization that 
this is by no means a mono-causal, linear, entirely economic process. 
It was the aim to include women as active participants in the analysis 
7   Hahn, Migration – Arbeit – Geschlecht, 86.
8   Ibid., 85-87.
9   Leslie Page Moch, Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650, 2nd ed. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
10   Hahn, Migration – Arbeit – Geschlecht, 90-94.
11   Christine Huth-Hildebrandt, Das Bild von der Migrantin: Auf Spurensuche eines 
Konstrukts (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2002), 76-83; Sylvia Hahn, “Wie Frauen 
in der Migrationsforschung verloren gingen,” in Internationale Migration: Die globale 
Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts?, Historische Sozialkunde 17, ed. Karl Husa, Christof 
Parnreiter, and Irene Stacher (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2000), 77-97, 89-90.
Lorber: To Come into Focus164
and to integrate gender as an analytical category in historical migration 
research.12
Women and gender research has, since the 1970s, delivered important 
impulses for the exploration of the female aspect of migration.13 Initially, 
it concerned showing the participation of women in migration flows and 
recording female migration patterns. Subsequently, the specific situation 
of the migration experience and the role of women in a migration context 
moved to the center of research interest. This research approach has been 
the most widespread until today. Since the 1980s, the power and gender 
relations that arise from migration have been increasingly focused on in 
research work. Along with the establishment of gender as a category of 
analysis,14 questions about the construction of masculinity and femininity, 
the influence of migration experience on relations between the sexes, as well 
as the power differences between migrant and non-migrant women have 
been discussed.15
Current research is additionally concerned with looking for new defi-
nitions of the category of ethnicity in terms of social positioning and 
characteristics of social differences. Here, gender is perceived as a con-
stitutive element within migration processes: “This stage of gender and 
migration research has produced numerous and complex understandings 
12   See: Marlou Schrover and Deirdre M. Moloney, “Introduction: Making a Difference,” 
in Gender, Migration and Categorisation: Making Distinctions between Migrants in Western 
Countries 1945-2010, ed. Marlou Schrover and Deirdre M. Moloney (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 7-55.
13   The studies exist primarily in the institutionally embedded immigration history of 
the United States of America. Most of the research concentrates on white middle class 
women, although in the USA further scientifically critical forms of research such as Queer 
Studies, Black Studies, and Critical Whiteness Studies or Postcolonial Studies have been 
established. These studies point out that life circumstances are not only to be captured 
through the category of gender and demand the consideration of further factors such as 
race, class, sexuality, level of education or religion. A new research perspective offers, in this 
case, the intersectional approach, which investigates the interactions and overlaps between 
differentiating categories of gender, class, race and sexuality, through which patterns of 
discrimination and privilege can be revealed.
14  At the current state, gender is conceptualized as a fluid, multi-level set of practices 
embedded in social relations and shaped by race/ethnicity, class, sexuality and 
nationality. Stepahnie J. Nawyn, “Gender and Migration: Integrating Feminist Theory 
into Migration Studies,” Sociology Compass 4, no. 9 (2010): 749-765 (here 749). See 
also Donna Gabaccia and Mary Jo Maynes, “Introduction: Gender History across 
Epistemologies,” Gender & History 24, no. 3 (2012): 521-523; Prodolliet Simone, 
“Spezifisch weiblich: Geschlecht und Migration,” Zeitschrift für Frauenforschung 17, no. 
1+2 (1999): 26-42 (here 28-29).
15   This change from studying women to gender research was clearly expressed in the 
1984 special issue of International Migration Review. “Morokvasic connects the decision to 
migrate and the postmigration experience with gendered system of inequality in households, 
labor markets and cultures.“ Nawyn, “Gender and Migration,” 750.
Migration in Austria 165
of how gendered institutions and gender relations are reconstituted and 
transformed following migration through interactions of micro- and 
macro-level processes.”16 Apart from this, interdisciplinary discussions 
have resulted in migration researchers understanding gender17 “as a 
structure that shapes power relations in families, communities and whole 
societies”18 These different basic directions exist in feminist migration 
research up to the present day.19
The focus on women in the migration process involves an exam-
ination of their life situations and experiences in a multi-dimensional 
and overlapping frame reference of sex, ethnicity, and social origin. In 
this way, the heterogeneity of female migrants and their family envi-
ronments, the diversity of their ways and strategies of living, and their 
capacity to act, which they developed during the migration process, 
become visible. Showing these factors at play is the intention of this 
study.
Research has repeatedly shown that women, with their social and 
family networks, their work and their income, are responsible for the 
survival of their families in both their countries of origin and also in 
their countries of destination.20 The focus in research work is also 
increasingly being placed on integration processes. The fact that female 
migration processes are not mirror images of male ones, and that gender 
relations have a substantial influence on who migrates, which employ-
ment opportunities come up, and how life looks like in the dichotomy 
16   Ibid.
17   An expression of this new perspective is the International Migration Review special 
issue “Gender and Migration Revisited,” which appeared in the year 2006. The International 
Migration Review 40, no. 1 (2006).
18   Nawyn, “Gender and Migration,” 750, 751.
19  Cf. Elisabeth Aufhauser, “Geschlecht und Migration: Zur Konstruktion und 
Rekonstruktion von Weiblichkeit und Männlichkeit in der internationalen Migration,” 
in Internationale Migration: Die globale Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts?, 
Historische Sozialkunde 17, ed. Karl Husa, Christof Parnreiter and Irene Stacher 
(Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2000), 97-122 (here 99); Lutz Helma, 
“Differenz als Rechenaufgabe: Über die Relevanz der Kategorien Race, Class, Gender,” 
in Unterschiedlich Verschieden: Differenz in der Erziehungswissenschaft, ed. Helma Lutz 
and Norbert Wenning (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001), 215-230. See also Ilse Lenz, 
“Geschlecht, Herrschaft und internationale Ungleichheit,” in Das Geschlechterverhältnis 
als Gegenstand der Sozialwissenschaften, ed. Regina Becker-Schmidt and Gudrun 
Knapp-Axeli (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1995), 19-46; Helma Lutz, “Differenz als 
Rechenaufgabe,” 215-230; Sabine Hess and Romana Lenz, Geschlecht und Globalisierung: 
Ein kulturwissenschaftlicher Streifzug durch transnationale Räume (Königstein/Taunus: 
Ulrike Helmer, 2001).
20  Important research about this topic was undertaken by Donna Gabaccia, 
Leslie Page Moch, Jackson James, Christiane Harzig, Marlou Schrover, and Edward 
Higgs. 
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between the countries of destination and origin, are moving into the 
frame of investigations.21 
Research that connects the concept of transnationalism with a gen-
der perspective has established a variety of agreements between the sexes 
in terms of transnational ways and strategies of living. In this context, 
new research questions have arisen regarding translocal ways of living. 
Intercultural encounters, transformed gender relations, and rules are 
becoming a more sharpened focus for researchers.22 
Research on Female Guest Workers
Until the 1990s, in German-speaking countries, research on women 
from other countries and female labor workers was primarily done in socio-
logical and political science studies. The field of research was constantly 
brought into the focus of scientific discourses by those affected: the daugh-
ters of female migrants. Firstly, in the 1990s, a change of perspective in 
European, and especially German-speaking, migration research could be 
observed, and the category of gender was increasingly taken into account. 
Harzig’s studies paved the way in Germany, and numerous empirical inves-
tigations focused on the topic of migration and gender.23 However, as was 
the case before, there was a lack of research to determine the phases before 
and after migration. There is a lack of migration research in Austria too that 
needs to be addressed. 
Concerning guest worker migration, the first female migrant workers 
were pooled into the category of guest workers. Women first came to be 
21   Schrover and Moloney, “Introduction: Making a difference,” 10-11; Antonia 
Ingelfinger, “Migration – Mobilität – Geschlecht: Eine Einleitung,” in Migration – 
Mobilität – Geschlecht, Freiburger GeschlechterStudien 25, ed. Meike Penkwitt and Antonia 
Ingelfinger (Leverkusen: Budrich Unipress, 2011), 11-35 (here 16); Helma Lutz and 
Christine Huth-Hildebrandt, “Geschlecht im Migrationsdiskurs: Neue Gedanken über ein 
altes Thema,” Das Argument 224, no. 1+2 (1998): 159-173; Helma Lutz, “Migrations- und 
Geschlechterforschung: Zur Genese einer komplizierten Beziehung,” in Handbuch Frauen- 
und Geschlechtergeschichte: Theorie, Methoden, Empirie, ed. Ruth Becker, Beate Kortendiek 
(Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008), 565-573 (here 570-571); Erna revise Appelt, “Frauen in 
der Migration – Lebensform und soziale Situation,” in Österreichischer Migrations- und 
Integrationsbericht: Demographische Entwicklungen – sozio-ökonomische Strukturen – rechtliche 
Bestimmungen, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Irene Stacher (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2003), 144-171 
(here 145-147); Aufhauser, “Geschlecht und Migration,” 97-122.
22   Appelt, “Frauen in der Migration,” 145-147; Aufhauser, “Geschlecht und Migration,” 
97-122.
23   Helma Lutz, Monika Mattes, Saskia Sassen, Elisabeth Aufhauser, Lydia Potts, Brigitte 
Young, and Ilse Lenz are engaged in this research topic. 
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the focus of research when their economic relevance in European coun-
tries of destiny could no longer be overlooked. The non-consideration of 
female mobility at the start of the confrontation with the consequences of 
guest work resulted in a focus limited to non-employed married women 
and mothers. Pregnancy, birth, and childcare were the central perception 
of migrant women’s lives. Investigations about the connection between 
employment and family activities, or the specific situation of female labor 
migrants on the job market were entirely missing. Emphasis was placed on 
the differences between female guest workers and German and Austrian 
women. The overriding depiction in public and scientific discourse was that 
of the uneducated and oppressed woman.24 
In spite of the fact that the relevance of the category gender for the 
purpose of research had been established, the cliché of the male “guest 
worker,” who brought his wife and child over at a later point in time, was 
still assigned to new research work and exhibition projects. Therefore, the 
task of gender-sensitive migration research is to reveal every form of stereo-
typing and to reflect critically.25 
The depiction of the female migrant as dependent wife hindered 
a consideration of the high level of work activities of Yugoslavian and 
Turkish women in Austria for a long time. Female guest workers were first 
focused on in the year 1986, in an article by Gerda Neyer in a collection 
of essays entitled Ausländische Arbeitskräfte in Österreich.26 Her starting 
point is that women’s life situations are massively changed by migration, 
and that female migrants have far less time to proceed through the levels 
of industrial and cultural adaptability than women and men from the 
West, who have decades.27 She claims that most women were not in 
employment before their migration. This is a presumption that does not 
reflect reality. In contrast to other countries of recruitment, Yugoslavia 
had an institutionalized equality of the sexes, which led to higher job 
activity amongst women. The strong participation of women on the job 
market can be observed through the fact that, in 1965, only 63% of the 
Yugoslavian unemployed were women.28 
24   Lorber, Angeworben, 39-45.
25   Appelt, “Frauen in der Migration,” 145-147; Aufhauser, “Geschlecht und Migration,” 
97-122; Monika Mattes, Gastarbeiterinnen in der Bundesrepublik: Anwerbepolitik, Migration 
und Geschlecht in den 50er bis 70er Jahren, Geschichte und Geschlechter 48 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Campus, 2005), 18-20. 
26   Gerda Neyer, “Jugoslawische und türkische Frauen in Österreich,” in Ausländische 
Arbeitskräfte in Österreich, ed. Hannes Wimmer (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1986), 433-
459.
27   Ibid., 455.
28   Huth-Hildebrandt, Das Bild von der Migrantin, 84.
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Neyer’s depiction of the female guest worker corresponds to a typical 
topos in the creation context: that of the multiply oppressed woman, who 
migrates from an under-developed region into a modern society. Twenty 
years later, in the framework of the exhibition “Gastarbajteri,” female migra-
tion was taken into consideration by making visible women as actors in the 
migration process.29 Hale Sahin, in her socio-psychological study, describes 
the life stories of eight female pioneer migrants from Turkey.30 She shows 
that the biographies do not correspond to the prevailing public opinion 
of the non-self-sufficient, man-dependent migrant. In the year 2013, a 
study about guest workers in Carinthia was published, which described the 
heterogenic life and work realities of female labor migrants through the 
use of Carinthian media and by analyzing interviews with contemporary 
witnesses.31 It was the aim of the author to place female labor migrants as 
active participants at the center of the investigation. This research approach 
is also implemented in the author’s dissertation.32 In the following sec-
tion, the intention is to show that women shared an important part of the 
migration movement to Austria. The aim is to make their life realities and 
strategies visible. This is an approach that was also applied by the author 
in an exhibition project about the life situations of female Slovenian guest 
workers in Styria in 2015.33
Employment of Female Guest Workers in Austria
The peak of guest worker employment in Austria was reached in 
1973, with a total of 226,000 persons, nearly 80% of which came from 
Yugoslavia. Nearly half of these persons were employed in Vienna. 
In the rest of the Austrian states, the division was as follows: Upper 
Austria employed 11.9% of workers, Lower Austria 11.5%, Salzburg 
8%, Vorarlberg 7.6%, Styria 6.9%, Tyrol 5.4%, Carinthia 1.6%, and 
Burgenland 0.5%. The majority of them, around 95%, were employed as 
unskilled workers in the leather industry (31.3%), the textile industry 
29   Alev Korun, “Frauen in der Migration,” in Gastarbajteri: 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration, ed. 
Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia Matll (Wien: Mandelbaum, 2004), 69-81 (here: 
69).
30   Hale Şahin, Unter unserem Seelenteppich: Lebensgeschichten türkischer Frauen in der 
Emigration, Sozialpsychologische Studien 3 (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2006).
31   Elisabeth Koch et al., “Gastarbeiterinnen” in Kärnten: Arbeitsmigration in Medien und 
persönlichen Erinnerungen (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2013).
32   Lorber, Angeworben.
33   Elisabeth Arlt and Verena Lorber, Lebenswege: Slowenische “Gastarbeiterinnen” in der 
Steiermark (Laafeld: Pavelhaus, 2015).
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(27.4%), the construction industry (22.5%), and in the tourism sector 
(17.4%). Characteristic for these branches are: a high degree of phys-
ical labor, a high degree of accident risk, working during bad weath-
er conditions, jobs without clear working times and with limited free 
time, seasonal fluctuations, and high fluctuation in terms of the levels of 
employment. These factors were obstacles to the continued employment 
of guest workers and increased the risk of them losing their rights of 
residence through the loss of workplace.34
In 1962, the proportion of women among foreign workers in Austria 
stood at 19%. By 1973, it had risen to 31%. Above all, this was caused by 
the increasing employment of women from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavian census 
data confirms the high proportion of women involved in labor migration. 
In 1971, the proportion of women was 31.4%. This proportion rate corre-
sponds to the employment rate of women in Yugoslavia.35
Most men and women from Yugoslavia came from the following 
Republics: Serbia (17.3%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (16.8%), and the Vojvodina 
(13.3%).36 Initially, people from urban areas were the ones who migrated. 
This involved mostly qualified male workers. After this followed the migra-
tion of young and unqualified workers, with an increasing proportion of 
women from countryside areas.37 In regards to Croatia, however, it can be 
seen that “the integration of the woman in the working process increas-
es with a higher level of development.” Migrating women, in contrast to 
Croatian men, of whom a significant proportion came from economically 
underdeveloped areas, did not leave the traditional areas from which people 
34   Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, Einwanderungsland Österreich? Historische 
Migrationsmuster, aktuelle Trends und politische Maßnahmen (Wien: Jugend und Volk, 1995), 
66; Gudrun Biffl, “Zuwanderung und Segmentierung des österreichischen Arbeitsmarktes: 
Ein Beitrag zur Insider-Outsider-Diskussion,” in Internationale Migration: Die globale 
Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts?, Historische Sozialkunde 17, ed. Karl Husa, Christoph 
Parnreiter, and Irene Stacher (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2000), 207-229 (here 
213); Helga Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985: Der Kampf um und 
gegen die ausländische Arbeitskraft,” Journal für Sozialforschung 25, no. 2 (1985): 159-198 
(here 175).
35   Matuschek, “Ausländerpolitik in Österreich 1962–1985,” 175. Ivo Baučić, “Yugoslavia 
as a Country of Emigration,” Options méditerranéennes 22 (1973): 56-66 (here 59). 
36   Ulf Brunnbauer, “Jugoslawische Geschichte als Migrationsgeschichte (19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert),” in Schnittstellen: Gesellschaft, Nation, Konflikt und Erinnerung in Südosteuropa.
Festschrift für Holm Sundhaussen zum 65. Geburtstag, Südosteuropäische Arbeiten 113, ed. 
Ulf Brunnbauer, Andreas Helmedach, and Stefan Troebst (München: Oldenbourg, 2007), 
111-131 (here 120-121).
37   Pascal Goeke, “Jugoslawische Arbeitswanderer in West-, Mittel- und Nordeuropa 
seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs,” in Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa: Vom 17. 
Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Klaus Bade et al. (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 731-735 
(here 731-733).
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migrated. Croatian women first migrated from “urbanized areas” and sec-
ondarily from regions characterized by agricultural work.38
Yugoslavian women came primarily from Vojvodina (42.7%), Slovenia 
(40.1%), Croatia (36.8%), and Serbia (34.1%).39 In contrast, women from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia migrated in lesser num-
bers. The low proportion of women from Kosovo stands out. In this case, a 
direct connection between migration and household structure can be made. 
Ethnic Albanians were the group most strongly characterized by patriarchy. 
Usually, in a multi-generational household, one or two sons went abroad to 
secure the income of the family. Through the income derived from desti-
nation countries, it was possible to ensure that women were excluded from 
paid work. In this way, the multi-generational household could continue.40
In spite of the male connotation of labor migration, women were 
needed for the Austrian job market, and strategies for their recruitment 
were developed. After the Second World War, the bourgeois ideal of the 
woman as housewife and mother became the model for family politics 
again. As a result of the economic expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, an 
increasing need for female workers arose. For this reason, the migration of 
female workers was encouraged over the integration of married women and 
mothers into the job market in order to uphold the bourgeois family ideal. 
Only in the 1970s did the constant increase of job market participation by 
Austrian women begin.41 The reasons for this are not only gender equality 
policies and the expansion of education, but also the transformation from 
an agrarian to a service society. Through this, more opportunities for women 
arose, particularly in administration, in the health and social services, trade, 
transport, or teaching and culture areas.42 Then as now, women’s work is 
38  Othmar Nikola Haberl, Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus Jugoslawien: Zur Problematik 
ihrer Auslandsbeschäftigung und Rückführung, Untersuchungen zur Gegenwartskunde 
Südosteuropas 13 (München: Oldenbourg, 1978), 60.
39   Ibid., 286.
40   Brunnbauer pointed out that these structures had begun to disperse within the last 
decade, because the possibility to migrate was more restricted and therefore the remittances 
decreased. Ulf Brunnbauer, “Labor Emigration from the Yugoslav Area from the late 19th 
Century until the End of Socialism,” in Transnational Societies, Transterritorial Politics: 
Migrations in the (Post-) Yugoslav Region 19th-21st Century, Südosteuropäische Arbeiten 
114, ed. Ulf Brunnbauer (München: Oldenbourg, 2009), 17-51 (here 36-37).
41   In 1971 the percentage of female employees in Austria, including female labor 
migrants, was 30.4%, in 1981 34.6%, in 1991 37.7% and in 2001 42.7%. Bundeskanzleramt/
BM für Frauen, Medien, öffentlichen Dienst, Frauen und Männer in Österreich (Wien: 
Bundeskanzleramt, 2007), 70.
42   In 1961 21% percent of women helped out in agriculture and forestry, 37.5% as non-
self-employed workers and 25% as white collar workers and civil servants. In the following 
year the number of workers and employees in agriculture and forestry decreased and by 1981 
more than half of Austrian women were employed as white collar workers or civil servants.
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concentrated on typical “women’s professions,” which are traditionally less 
well paid.43 Many female migrants contributed to an improvement of the 
situation for native women on the job market, since due to the gender 
hierarchies the employment possibilities for migrant women were limited 
to unqualified jobs at the lower end of the labor market. Thus, this was a 
process accompanied by marginalization and exploitation. As a result of 
this, native women got more opportunities to get a white-collar job.44
How urgently foreign women were needed for the Austrian job mar-
ket is expressed in the recruitment actions of the Chamber of Commerce, 
which was responsible for the recruitment of female migrants. In docu-
ments from the recruitment commission in Istanbul, there is reference 
to how challenging the recruitment of female workers was. Many of the 
submitted recruitment applications for women could only be dealt with 
partially and with a great deal of effort. The main reason for this was that 
Austrian employers were above all looking for women aged between 18 and 
24 years. The Turkish employment offices, however, did not take the age of 
the female workers into consideration during the recruitment. A further 
reason for the low rate of placement was the required qualifications. Many 
employers only wanted to employ female migrant workers who could read 
and write. They explicitly sought “intelligent” women, who did not come 
from rural areas, as the level of education in urban areas was higher.45
In 1979, the head of the Turkish recruitment commission, Dr. Pflegerl, 
said, regarding Turkish women, that it was a far more difficult time psycho-
logically, and that it was substantially more complicated for them to take 
a job abroad, than for men.46 He related this to the general social standing 
of women in Turkish society. For this reason, according to Pflegerl, many 
women changed their opinion about taking up employment in Austria 
43   See Peter Penner and Elisabeth Scheibelhofer, Qualifikation und Erwerbsarbeit 
von Frauen von 1970 bis 2000 in Österreich, IHS-Reihe Soziologie 49 (Wien: IHS, 
2000); Sonja Dörfer and Georg Wernhart, Die Arbeit von Männern und Frauen: Eine 
Entwicklungsgeschichte der geschlechtsspezifischen Rollenverteilung in Frankreich, Schweden 
und Österreich, Österreichisches Institut für Familienforschung: Forschungsbericht Nr. 19 
(Wien: OIF, 2016).
44   Huth-Hildebrandt, Das Bild von der Migrantin, 69-72; Leonie Herwartz-Emden, 
“Einleitung,” in Einwandererfamilien: Geschlechterverhältnisse, Erziehung und Akkulturation, 
ed. Leonie Herwartz-Emden (Osnabrück: Rasch, 2000), 9-53 (here 27); Maria do Mar 
Castro Varela, “Zur Skandalisierung und Re-Politisierung eines bekannten Themas: 
Migrantinnen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt,” in Migration, Gender, Arbeitsmarkt: Neue Beiträge 
zu Frauen und Globalisierung, ed. Maria do Mar Castro Varela and Dimitria Clayton 
(Königstein im Taunus: Ulrike Helmer, 2003), 8-30 (here 20-25).
45   WKÖ Archiv, Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul K 4, Übersetzung türkische 
Botschaft Istanbul 11. 2. 1972.
46   WKÖ Archiv, Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul K 4, Schreiben AKO an AGA 15. 
7. 1975.
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during the recruitment process. In his view, this was the cause of the delay 
in recruitment.47
Apart from this, he was able to conclude that the health related default 
rate was higher among women due to pregnancy. Despite these difficul-
ties, Dr. Pflegerl pointed out that for the recruitment office it was easier to 
recruit women for Austrian companies that needed larger groups of women 
to work for them.48 He found out that Turkish women, due to their integra-
tion into authoritarian social structures, were less able to cope with the psy-
chological difficulties associated with the integration process. He assumed 
that women with a higher level of education could be better integrated and 
that successful integration also depended on whether the woman migrated 
to Austria alone or with a group.49 For this reason, he proposed only to take 
on board recruitment assignments asking for higher levels of education and 
larger groups of women.50 
In contrast, a doctor who, from July 17-19, 1969, carried out the exam-
ination of 40 female workers for the recruitment commission in Banja 
Luka, suggested illiterate and partially illiterate women to enlist for the 
Austrian job market. He described it as being their destiny to end up doing 
what he considered to be primitive manual labor.51 
This implementation of recruitment of women shows that there was a 
necessity for female labor migrants and that strategies were developed 
to push forward the recruitment of female workers. This means that 
women were indeed a fixed part of the transnational labor migration 
and disproves the cliché of the exclusively male guest worker in scientif-
ic and public perception. The typical description of Turkish women cor-
responds to that of being victims of, and disadvantaged in, the migration 
process. The reason for this is given as a lack of education and patriarchal 
47   Ibid.
48   Ibid; WKÖ Archiv, Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul K 4, Übersetzung türkische 
Botschaft Istanbul 11. 2. 1972.
49   WKÖ Archiv, Bestand SP-A Kommission Istanbul K 4, Schreiben AKO an AGA 15. 
7. 1975.
50   Ibid. The initial difficulties with the recruitment of female workers in Germany were 
attributed to southern women “being different.” It was argued that reasons for this could 
be found in their vocations as mother and wife, and that they therefore had no interest in 
employment. This was how the low number of recruitments was explained away. As the 
number of female labor migrants increased significantly over time, the construct of the 
“exception migrant” was created, in order to maintain the picture of the female southerner. In 
particular, the reference to the gender relation in the country of origin was used to legitimize 
the attribution of being foreign and different. In this way the female labor migrant was 
considered as being a kind of “sondertypos” as compared to the “normal” female identity in 
the country of destiny. Huth-Hildebrandt, Das Bild von der Migrantin, 76-83.
51   WKÖ Archiv, BUKA – AGA, Mikrofilm JUG 125, 1969.
Migration in Austria 173
structures in Turkey. The conclusion is drawn that, because of this “disad-
vantage,” migration is a major psychological challenge for women, which 
leads to a situation that has further negative consequences on their inte-
gration process in countries of destination. Only the “group” can make 
assimilation to a new environment easier. Additionally, there is also the 
assignment of particular areas of activity for women with low levels of 
education. Through this representation, the self-sufficiency and individual 
ability of women to act within the migration process is not taken into 
consideration. It therefore corresponds to the dominant topos of the 
multiply oppressed woman, who migrates from an underdeveloped society 
into a modern one.52 
Situation in Styria
As is the case in the whole of Austria, the employment of female migrant 
workers in Styria can be traced back to the fact that in particular sectors 
of the economy there was a lack of workers. According to the population 
census of 1971, the main proportion of labor migrants in Styria (90.7%) 
were employed as blue-collar workers. Only a low percentage (4.7%) were 
in white collar jobs, namely women from Yugoslavia who were employed in 
the health sector.53
Men from Yugoslavia were mostly employed in the construction sector, 
manufacturing, and industry. Women from Yugoslavia were mostly in the 
economic sectors of manufacturing and industry, tourism and public hous-
es, personal, social, and public services, as well as housekeeping. But women 
also worked in trade and in storage, as well as agriculture and forestry 
sectors. This meant that men from Yugoslavia worked, above all, in con-
struction and construction-related professions, manufacturing occupations, 
and in raw material production. Yugoslavian women were primarily in the 
service sector, in manufacturing occupations, and in raw material produc-
tion. Men from Turkey were mainly in the commercial department of the 
manufacturing industry as well as in construction. Thereby, raw material 
production, construction, and construction-related jobs were at the fore, as 
well as manufacturing occupations. Turkish women were, without excep-
tion, in the manufacturing industry, above all in raw material production. 
It can be determined that the professions pursued by labor migrants in 
52   Lorber, Angeworben, 107-111.
53   Statistik Austria, Volkszählungsdaten 1971: Erwerbspersonen in der Steiermark nach 
NUTS-III-Regionen, Geschlecht, Staatsangehörigkeit, Berufs- und Wirtschaftsabteilung.
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Austria at this time reflected the dominant traditional attribution of male 
and female spheres of work.54
Most Yugoslavian labor migrants worked in Graz (46.3%) and Eastern 
Styria (30.5%), regions in which the economic sectors mentioned above 
were dominant. Yugoslavian men worked, to a lesser degree, in Liezen. 
Women were to be found mostly in the area of Graz, as it was there where 
large numbers of workplace offers in the fields of personal service activi-
ties, private services and housekeeping services were available. But also in 
Upper Styria, the tourist industry offered numerous work opportunities for 
women from Yugoslavia. A lesser number worked in Southern, Western, 
and Eastern Styria. The majority of Turkish men worked in the industrial 
companies in Eastern Upper Styria (52.9%). Many also found employment 
in Graz (26.5%). Turkish women worked, without exception, in the state 
capital of Styria. Most of them worked in the cleaning sector.55
Living Worlds
With the help of statistical records, it can be shown that the migra-
tion of women for the purpose of working in Styria did not represent an 
exception, but rather a fixed proportion, in the yearly labor migration. In 
addition, the dominant societal and scientific perception of labor migrants 
as exclusively male, which had existed for a long time, was not the case for 
Styria. Yet how did the living worlds of the women from Yugoslavia, who 
in the 1960s and 1970s decided to migrate to Styria for work purposes, 
look like? The following section will focus on the working experiences of 
female guest workers from Yugoslavia. The sources acting as a basis for this 
section are comprised of ten interviews with women from Yugoslavia, who 
migrated to Styria in the time period from 1967 to 1976. 
Nearly all of the women interviewed came from poor family back-
grounds and had a number of siblings. Better opportunities to earn money, 
a lack of school education, low expectations in Yugoslavia, desire for 
adventure, love, flight from the limitations of the community of origin, and 
individual exploitation of opportunities all played a part in these wom-
en’s decision for labor migration. Transnational migration often followed 
internal migration. Migration biographies make clear that it was not an 
either/or decision. Connections to country of origin remained intact. There 
was cross-border integration in different family, economic, political, or 
54   Lorber, Angeworben, 155-168.
55   Ibid., 155-168.
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cultural networks and organizations. Many female labor migrants lived a 
transnational life. Most of those interviewed postponed the date of their 
return. During the course of the migration process, permanent emigration 
emerged out of the plan for a temporary stay.56
Motives
In looking at migration biographies, it becomes clear that there is no 
one single group of Yugoslavian female guest workers, and that the course 
of migration and the motives behind it were very different, although all 
women migrated to Styria for the purpose of working. Five of the women 
interviewed came to Styria alone, whereas two of them already had a family 
or friendship network available in Graz. One of the women interviewed 
came together with her husband, and four migrated some months, or in the 
case of one of the women, two years after the migration of her partner to 
Styria. Two couples married after gaining employment in Graz. 
In the following, three examples of different migration biographies, 
based on three interviewees, will be considered: Ivanka S., who was born 
in 1954 in present day Slovenia, has lived in Graz since 1969. As a result 
of a lack of financial possibilities, she was not able to pursue an education 
in Slovenia. For this reason, she decided at the age of almost fifteen to take 
a job as a housekeeping assistant in Pula (Croatia). When she returned 
to Slovenia, after working for two years, an acquaintance asked her if she 
wanted to work in Graz. She explained: 
And of course I said yes, because it isn’t possible to get a job in 
Slovenia without education. I just wanted to get away. I didn’t 
see any future for me in my home country. Although I couldn’t 
imagine where Graz was, I went to Graz in 1969. But I had no 
idea what to expect.57 
She found a job in a confectionary factory near Graz. At the beginning, 
she lived in company accommodations. Ivanka S.’s course of migration is 
very typical. Often female labor migrants had been involved in internal 
migration beforehand, and the arrangement was set up through friends and 
relatives, who had already come to work in Austria.
56   Ibid., 192-204.
57   Ivanka S., in discussion with the author, Jan. 27, 2011.
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The situation for Meka Z. was completely different. She was born 
in 1949 in present-day Serbia, attended a four-year training program to 
become a textile technician, and worked nearly five years in this profession. 
Her husband at the time wanted to work in Austria. Initially, he went to 
Graz alone. She stayed in Serbia with her two small children. He was able 
to convince her to follow. Meka Z. chose the following strategy: “The first 
six months I took unpaid holidays from the company. I thought, I’ll take a 
look if I liked it there.”58 After six months she returned to Serbia, handed in 
her notice at work, and in 1973 she moved to Graz. She immediately found 
a job as a cleaner in a printing workshop, where her husband also had found 
a job as an unskilled worker. Until her retirement, the trained textile tech-
nician worked in different companies as a cleaner. This example makes clear 
that labor migration is often accompanied by professional disqualification.
Hilde L. on the other hand, was born in present day Slovenia, went 
to the primary school, and then worked in an iron factory immediately 
afterwards. She heard from an acquaintance that it was possible to earn 
more money abroad and made the decision to take part in labor migra-
tion. She decided to organize the journey and workplace officially through 
the Austrian Chamber of Commerce and the Yugoslavian employment 
office. First she registered with the Yugoslavian employment office and was 
recruited as a waitress for a restaurant in Rottenmann. She recounted: 
I had to give my details and a photo to the employment office, 
and then I had to wait. A couple of weeks later they let me know 
the decision that a Mr. S., the son of my boss at the time, would 
come to pick me up. They gave me a room there and on the next 
day I started working in the restaurant with a bowling alley.59
From the content of these interviews, it is clear how different the moti-
vations for, and the course of, migration was for the women whose objec-
tives were to improve their economic situation. Two of the women already 
had children before they left for labor migration. The others established 
families during the time of labor migration and had between two and three 
children. As women they worked, after the births of their children with 
only short interruptions until they retired. This was contrary to Austrian 
women, who, if they were employed at all, stayed at least one year at home 
after having a child, or then gave up their jobs. The interview with Meka 
Z. makes clear that even when women followed their husbands abroad, 
58   Meka Z., in discussion with the author, April 12, 2014.
59   Hilde L., in discussion with the author, May 7, 2013.
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they were actively involved in the decision making process. She firstly took 
a working vacation to check out the situation in Austria before she made 
a final decision. So, labor migration was a family decision. Additionally, 
the biographies illustrate the various pathways of their journeys, either as a 
tourist60 or officially over the Chamber of Commerce.
The Working Day
Ljublica P., who entered Austria as a tourist, initially found a job in 
catering. She described her work duties: “I cleaned and worked in the 
kitchen. You could say I was a kitchen help. […] I had to do what the 
boss said.”61 Katja J., who worked in Slovakia as a seamstress, described her 
working day in a Styrian guesthouse in the following way: 
It was difficult. It wasn’t easy. How did we work? When the 
children came, sometimes three buses at once, we had to get 
the breakfast ready and then we had to clear everything away. 
There were so many crumbs, I hadn’t seen that before at home! 
So many children! Then we cleaned everything away and went on 
to prepare everything for the snacks and for lunch. In between 
we tidied all three floors. We also cleaned the rooms, then we 
washed the bed sheets upstairs in the laundry. It continued like 
that. And then serving food again. It wasn’t easy for me.62 
Katja J. also did this work during her pregnancy. She explained: “Then 
I was pregnant. I can remember that I was serving twelve lettuces and I 
felt sick. I threw down these twelve lettuces. I’ll never forget this sound. It 
was such a rattling noise.”63 After the birth of her second daughter, Katja J. 
decided to work from home so that she could look after her children more 
easily but still earn a bit of money. She did sewing work for her family and 
friends and assembled pens for a Styrian company. But the situation did not 
work out as she had expected. Katja J. remembered: “I didn’t earn anything 
[…], but I worked day and night. The entire Sunday. My husband cooked 
and everything at that time. He was really crazy. And at the end I earned 
60   This was a very common way to migrate to Austria. Lorber, Angeworben, 65-67.
61   Ljublica P., in discussion with the author, Feb. 15, 2014.
62   Katja J., in discussion with the author, April 12, 2011. 
63   Ibid.
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1,200 shillings.”64 The electricity for the household had to be paid from 
this amount, so hardly anything was left over. She said that it became more 
difficult to feed the family when the second child came: 
And then with the second child, when she was two years old, 
we said that one should go to the kindergarten and the second 
to the crèche, and I went sewing. At the end I saw that there 
was nothing left over for me after I paid the nursery school and 
crèche.65
Ivanka G. earned more money as a nurse on the children’s ward in the 
state hospital. She said: “When they saw that you could work well, they 
kept you.”66 She spent too much of her first salary. Ivanka G. added: “It 
was such a massive pleasure to earn so much money. I bought much too 
much.”67 
For Hilde L. the working conditions were entirely different. Unpaid 
overtime hours were common for her. She recounted her job as a waitress in 
a café in Upper Styria: “The boss said, ‘today, there’s a lot going on. You have 
to stay here.’ We worked all the way through, but I was never paid for it. I 
got something to eat but the hours were never paid. I had my fixed salary 
and that was it! That wasn’t just once, that was often the case.”68 Despite the 
unpaid overtime hours, Hilde L. received a lot of support from her female 
boss at the time. Most of the female migrants interviewed had friendly 
relationships with their employers.
Jovanka R. had similar experiences. She had to work regular night shifts 
at the printers where she was initially employed. She explained: “Always 
from six o’clock in the evening until six o’clock in the morning. Normally it 
wasn’t allowed for women to do this, but we had to work.”69
Heavy physical work was a hallmark of Ruza S.’s working day. Her first 
job in Graz was in the kitchen of a restaurant at the main station: 
I was responsible for the washing up and the mugs were so big. 
That was really difficult for me. I washed up there for two months 
and there was a woman, like a boss, and she cooked. And she 
64   Katja J., in discussion with the author, April 4, 2011. 1,200 shillings are 87 Euro.
65   Ibid.
66   Ivanka G., in discussion with the author, Jan. 11, 2011.
67   Ibid.
68   Hilde L., in discussion with the author, May 7, 2013.
69   Jovanka R., in discussion with the author, Sept. 15, 2011. For the rules about night work 
for women at that time see BGBl. Nr. 237/1969, “Nachtarbeit der Frauen.”
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also came from Yugoslavia. And she asked the boss to give me 
something easier because I couldn’t manage it. In the evenings I 
always had a backache and so on.70
For Ruza S., it was easy to find a new job. She remembered: “At that 
time it was easy to find a job because they needed us.” Anica M. had similar 
experiences. On her second day in Graz, she got a job as a cook in a big 
Graz hospital. Ruza S. subsequently found a job in a factory, later also at 
the tailor, where she had to do the piecework. She recounted the salary 
conditions at the time: “You got paid for the amount you worked. When 
you worked less you got less money. But when you worked more, you got 
more money. It was very nice in the company.”71 After her maternity leave, 
she was employed for 13 years in the sanatorium, until she got a job as a 
cleaner with the Health Insurance Company of Styria, where she stayed 
until retiring in 2000. Ruza R. recalled her time at the sanatorium fondly: 
“Yes, for me the best time was in the sanatorium, where I took care of the 
patients. It was great for me to pep up the patients, talking and all that.”72 
Ivanka G. signed up at an evening school shortly after her arrival in 
Graz and was able to obtain her matriculation. She then decided to take on 
a university education. She said that she had met a lot of new people through 
going to school; “a window began to open”73 for her. Along with her work 
as a nurse at the hospital, she trained as an academically qualified translator 
for Serbo-Croatian. Finally, she finished the first part of the Study of Art 
History and completed the Diploma Study Translation for Slovenian and 
German at the Karl-Franzens-University in Graz. Ivanka G. worked in the 
General Hospital Graz until her retirement. Until the end of the 1980s, she 
was on the children’s ward, and then she got a position in administration.74 
Ivanka S. also decided to enroll in professional training in order to improve 
her position on the job market. In 2000, she completed the training to be a 
kindergarten assistant and opened her own kindergarten the following year. 
Becoming employed as a janitor offered many single and married 
women from Yugoslavia the possibility of a form of employment, which 
could be combined with looking after their children, and whereby they 
could avoid paying high rent for substandard housing. Although the hous-
ing possibilities linked to this employment were not always better, the 
financial aspects of this type of employment did make the lives of many 
70   Ruza S., in discussion with the author, May 20, 2011.
71   Ibid.
72   Ibid.
73   Ivanka G., in discussion with the author, Jan. 11, 2011.
74   Ibid.
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female labor migrants easier. Slavica T. got most of her janitor and unofficial 
cleaning jobs through acquaintances or newspaper ads. A “basis of trust”75 
developed between her and her employers over the course of time. She 
remembered: “I even got a key. I could come and go when I wanted to. I 
could eat and drink. At the beginning it wasn’t like that.”76 Slavica T. was 
always paid for her work on time, but she had to work, “very efficiently and 
a lot.”77 Today she suffers the adverse effects of difficult physical work. She 
has numerous joint problems and her state of health is not the best. This is 
a fate that she shares with many guest workers.
For Veronika B., the position as janitor offered a possibility to combine 
employment with raising children. Through the additional income, she and 
her husband, who worked in the construction branch, were able to buy a 
piece of land near Graz in the 1980s, and to build their own house. She 
recalls: 
So, after the birth of the first son, I took a janitor job. And I 
worked there. I was registered. And after the second son was here 
[…] we moved to another house. I was a janitor there too. And of 
course I did some additional work, which I did not declare. And 
after the third son had been born, I stayed at home with him for 
six years. And when he started the first class in school I started 
to work again.78
An acquaintance also arranged a janitor job for Jovanka R. She was very 
happy about this position. As she recounted: “The flat was rent free, and I 
got 1,300 for cleaning the building. Then life immediately became easier. 
Then the children benefit, and then it was alright.”79 After this she was 
employed as a member of the kitchen and cleaning staff in a restaurant in 
Graz. She received a great deal of support from her boss at the time. She 
explained: 
I had such a good boss. Every Sunday morning, I also did his 
personal cleaning. He didn’t pay me for this, but he always 
said. ‘Take what you need for yourself and the children in the 
restaurant.’ And I was in agreement with this. I took ten eggs and 
75   Slavica T., in discussion with the author, Oct. 27, 2011.
76   Ibid.
77   Ibid.
78   Veronika B., in discussion with the author, Feb. 27, 2012.
79   Jovanka R., in discussion with the author, Sept. 15, 2011.
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a bit of ham for the weekend. Then I didn’t have to buy it. And I 
haven’t forgotten that until today. And when my children came 
to my workplace, we had pancakes and pizza and didn’t have to 
pay for it.80
Before this, Jovanka R. worked in a different guesthouse in Mariatrost, 
where she had to do heavy physical work. In the evenings her hands hurt 
due to the carrying and washing up of the heavy plates. Jovanka R., like-
wise through a friend, got a position as a cleaner in the Episcopal office. 
She worked there until she retired, and was responsible for cleaning the 
office rooms. When Jovanka R. was still young, she had to help out in her 
parents’ farm. She considered her journey to Austria as being very positive. 
According to her, one aspect was that, as a woman, she had more possi-
bilities for personal development here. Additionally, she recounted, with a 
twinkle in her eye, the following about her life in Austria, in comparison to 
Bosnia: “[Here], I had to work less and I had a bit of money. And at home 
with my father you couldn’t get any money. He only shouted around and 
you had to work really hard. […] Here, I go to work, earn money, and buy 
myself whatever I want to.”81 
Working Biographies of Single Mothers
Ivanka S. took up an acquaintance’s offer and travelled with him to 
Graz. Her first workplace was in a confectionary factory near Graz, where, 
Ivanka S. recounts, many people from present day Croatia, Serbia and 
Bosnia were working. She described her first work experience as not being 
very good. She worked shifts and said that she 
didn’t feel so good, because there was a boss who was not keen 
on foreigners. So I just worked and worked. I did the packaging 
for bonbons, and this was just, quick, quick, quick into the packet 
and put the label on.”82 
She continued: “I said, ‘it doesn’t matter to me. Ok, I just have to hang 
in there and that’s the end of it.’ The main thing was that I was working 
80   Ibid.
81   Ibid.
82   Ivanka S., in discussion with the author, Jan. 27, 2011.
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and earning money. Everything else was unimportant for me. I was alone 
all week and on Friday I went home to Slovenia.”83 After Ivanka S. became 
pregnant, she was fired. She explained: “At that time I didn’t know what to 
do and didn’t know which rights I had.”84
As a single mother, Ivanka S. saw no other option than to return to 
Slovenia, where she lived with her sister. She describes life as a single moth-
er in the village community in Slovenia as being difficult. She recalls: “At 
that time in the place I come from, which was a small village, it was a 
catastrophe to be a single mother.”85 Ivanka S. decided to leave her child 
with her mother in Slovenia and take up a new job in Styria in order to earn 
money. Through the support of a friend, she found a job in a sanatorium. 
She described the application process as follows: “And then she [her friend] 
rang up for me, and then I went for a job interview. I went in, three times 
back out and then the fourth time the secretary caught me […], she said: 
‘You’re coming with me.’ I understood this straight away.”86 Ivanka S. was 
employed and was responsible for the kitchen service. She worked there 
for six years. On looking back, she saw her time at the sanatorium in a very 
positive light. As a result of a change in the management, Ivanka S. decided 
to look for a new job. She found a job with a cleaning company through an 
ad in a newspaper and worked there for ten years. She recalled: “The boss 
was really a very good one. So I told her how I got there, that I had two 
children and that I could work from 8 o’clock to 3 o’clock and not longer 
than that. And she completely accepted it.”87
After this, Ivanka S. did various office jobs, until she found a position as 
a cook in a kindergarten. The bad experiences she had there, and her enthu-
siasm for working with kids, was the reason for her deciding to train as a 
kindergarten assistant and to open her own kindergarten. She has run this 
since 2001 and, according to Ivanka S. herself, is very happy and satisfied.
As a single mother in Yugoslavia, Slavica T. had similar experiences as 
Ivanka S. She explained: “I had a child and I was relatively young at the 
time. I was nineteen. And the man left me. He said it wasn’t his child. And 
this was a disgrace in the 1970s. In 1971, it was a disgrace to have a child 
without a father and without being married. And this was a small province, 
where I lived, and I had to go away. I was ashamed, people looked at me in 
a bad way.”88
83   Ibid.
84   Ibid.
85   Ibid.
86   Ibid.
87   Ibid.
88   Slavica T., in discussion with the author, Oct. 27, 2011.
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Her mother suggested that she go abroad and leave the child with her. 
Due to her mother’s good contacts in Vorarlberg, Slavica T. firstly migrated 
to Bregenz, before she came to Graz in 1970. In the mid-1970s she brought 
her son there. She said: “I worked a lot. I was a single parent […]. I worked 
in chemical cleaning and had a lot of private janitor jobs […]. Shoveling 
snow in the coldest of winter, cleaning the houses and doing everything 
[…]. You could never be ill. You needed the money.”89
Alongside her main employment as a cleaner, Ljublica P. did a lot of 
janitor jobs and a lot of unofficial cleaning and care work. She said: “I didn’t 
care what I did. The main thing was the money, that I had work.”90 She 
hardly took any maternity leave. She recalled: “I worked up until the birth. 
After the birth of my daughter, I worked until the evenings. I worked until 
the evenings after the birth of my son. And three weeks later, I started to 
work again.”91 She described her working day as single parent at a cleaning 
company as follows: 
I did everything. In the early mornings, I cleaned at the university. 
I had to go to the University at four in the morning, and I worked 
there until six. And then I came home and woke up the children, 
prepared breakfast and then brought them to kindergarten and 
school. And then I went cleaning again. The children went from 
school to after school care, and I picked them up in the evenings.92
She gave her children something to eat and put them to bed, and then 
often went to work again. She worked in a restaurant where she was some-
times busy until two in the morning. She continued: “Then I came home, 
could sleep a bit until three thirty, and then I had quickly walk to the uni-
versity to clean.”93
The work experiences of the women depicted here show that the picture 
of the exclusively male labor migrant does not reflect reality. Women, as 
well as men, came to Styria for the purpose of employment. Many women 
also worked in private households alongside their full time employment.94 
Friendly relationships developed out of their employment relationships, 
and employers became important contact persons for the women and sup-
ported them in their problems. Ivanka S.’s employer helped her during her 
89   Ibid.
90   Ljublica P., in discussion with the author, Feb. 15, 2014.
91   Ibid.
92   Ibid.
93   Ibid.
94   In this case it concerned above all informal work activities.
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divorce and the custody battle for her children. Ljublica P. also reported 
that her employers, from the household where she worked, were always 
helpful to her: 
On Saturdays, when I came to cook and clean, [my employer] 
took my children and went for a walk with them, and I could 
clean. It was like my own family. Or she went with me to the 
kindergarten or the after school care if I needed something.”95 
Ljublica P. described her boss in the cleaning company as very nice 
and helpful.96 She helped her the most at the beginning with translation 
and learning the language. But deep friendships between the female labor 
migrants also developed, and they supported one another in every situation 
they found themselves in. Private networks were of particular importance 
for the single mothers, not only for the arrangement of workplaces and 
assistance with legal issues, but also in terms of looking after the children 
and on an emotional level. They were there for one another and supported 
each other in order to cope with the challenges of a life in Styria.
Summary
In scientific discourse, the presumption is that the economic reasons for 
migration are dominant, as are the assumptions that men, almost without 
exception, were the ones who migrated. In collective memory too, there was 
an overriding picture of the male guest worker, and the depiction of labor 
migration was that of an exclusively male form of migration. Empirical 
data material, however, reflects a different reality. The proportion of women 
participating in labor migration to Austria in the 1960s and 1970s stood at 
between 20% and 30% yearly.
Women, like men, came alone, together with their husbands and wives 
or partners, with their families, or for family reunification, or with acquain-
tances, to take up work. Yugoslavian labor migrants were not a homoge-
nous group. They did not make decisions solely based on age, their gender/
sex, their religious backgrounds, and their level of education. But also not 
according to their ethnic, religio-cultural characteristics and political posi-
tions. Their motives for migration, its course and their life realities, were 
quite diverse.
95   Ljublica P., in discussion with the author, July 13, 2012.
96   Ljublica P., in discussion with the author, Feb. 15, 2014.
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With the help of qualitative research methods, it was possible to show 
that female migration processes were not simply a reflection of male ones. 
Women were confronted with other challenges, demands and gender role 
attributions, which influenced their daily lives. Their lives were particularly 
characterized through the connections between employment, looking after 
the family and running the household. Professional as well as social net-
works made their lives in their new surroundings easier.

Neither Here Nor There – Ni ovde, ni tamo
Religiously Connoted Social Media Self-
Representations of
“Generation In-Between”
Eva Tamara Asboth/Silvia Nadjivan
Introduction
This article focuses on a generation in Austria who considers them-
selves as living between two worlds because of their migrant heritage from 
the former Yugoslavia.1 Either they are grandchildren of the so-called 
Gastarbeiter, or gastarbajteri2 who formed the immigrant workforce move-
ment during the second half of the twentieth century; or they are children 
of war, who fled to Austria from the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Today 
they all have grown into young adults. We refer to them as “Generation 
In-Between.”3
On first glance, it appears that this generation has successfully inte-
grated into the Austrian society.4 However, their perspectives on faith, 
1   This article is based on the research project “Glaube, Leben, Hoffnung der Generation 
In-Between: Glaubens- und Lebenswelten junger, ex-jugoslawischer Erwachsener in 
Österreich,” which was headed by Erhard Busek (Chairman of the Institute for the Danube 
Region and Central Europe, IDM) and Rainer Gries (Professor and Holder of the Franz 
Vranitzky Chair for European Studies at the University of Vienna), and which was supported 
by the Future Fund of the Republic of Austria from June 2016 to March 2017. Researchers 
were Eva Tamara Asboth (Franz Vranitzky Chair for European Studies at the University of 
Vienna) and Silvia Nadjivan (Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, IDM).
2   In reference to the German term, gastarbajteri is—mostly in an ironic way—used in the 
Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian language(s); see Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia 
Mattl, eds., Gastarbaitjeri: 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration (Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2004).
3   Rainer Gries at the book presentation “Generation In-Between: The Children of the 
Balkan Wars. Getting to Know a Crucial Generation,” March 10, 2016; see also Katharina 
Schmidt, “Die dazwischen stehen,” Wiener Zeitung, March 11, 2016.
4   It is worth noting that Austria and the Yugoslav successors share a common history 
of alternating cooperation and conflict times since the expansion politics of the Habsburg 
Monarchy and other empires. As a result, economic, social and cultural exchange processes 
among Austria and the Balkans have a long tradition, with comparable values and beliefs. 
See Wolfgang Pensold, Silvia Nadjivan, and Eva Tamara Asboth, Gemeinsame Geschichte? 
Ein Jahrhundert österreichischer und serbischer Mythen (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2015).
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their attitudes and opinions toward religion, combined with political 
and everyday life issues, have hardly been publicly discussed, despite 
the fact that they were mostly born into fragmented family and cultural 
situations, which means that important questions on social structures 
and social cohesion arise. We therefore want to know which political, 
social, and cultural attitudes and opinions these young people share in 
Austria, and to what extent they might attach to radicalized or extremist 
attitudes in the context of today’s secularized world.
The aim is to gain an insight into the generation’s worldviews and 
belief systems, which we managed to converge through the documen-
tation and evaluation of several conjunctions of religiousness. We thus 
revealed conjunctions between religiousness and self-representations, 
including imaginations of homeland correlating to, or competing with, 
mental maps of Europe; religiousness and collective memories; and reli-
giousness and gender (divided into masculinities and femininities as well 
as gender roles and gender order). So on the one hand we explore their 
loyalties and their affiliations and on the other their understandings of 
past, present, and future.
Social media platforms give us direct access to the exchange and 
negotiation processes of these young people’s opinions and attitudes. The 
members of Generation In-Between articulate themselves, like other young 
people in Austria today,5 over social media: in forums, blogs, the short news 
service Twitter and, of course, over Facebook. This enables us to monitor 
and analyze their communications authentically, in the face of events and 
topics that were relevant not only for Austria, but also throughout Europe 
in 2016.
The Generation In-Between in Austria
In focusing on young adults of ex-Yugoslav origin, the concept of gener-
ation provides a formidable theoretical basis; generation has become a basic 
category of social and cultural science research in the last century.6 Thus, its 
importance is comparable to other basic, later-developed categories such as 
class, milieu, gender, or ethnicity.
5   According to the Social Media Radar Austria, the age group who dominates 
significantly in terms of having a Facebook account is between 20-29 years old, 
followed by those who are between 30-39 years old; accessed Apr. 20, 2017, http://
socialmediaradar.at/facebook.
6   Karl Mannheim, “Das Problem der Generationen,” Kölner Vierteljahreszeitschrift für 
Soziologie 7 (1928): 157-185.
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To investigate social groups from a generational perspective means 
that typical needs and experiences of people at different stages of their 
lives, from childhood to adulthood, are put in relation to specific pos-
sibilities for actions a society offers in times of stability or stagnation, 
build-up, change, or even in times of crises, conflicts, and wars. As a 
matter of fact, generations form their own cultures, in which their mem-
bers communicate about the essentials and the appearance of “their” 
generation.7 
Speaking about generation is by no means an attempt to create a con-
tainer into which we compress all different groups of young adults with 
ex-Yugoslav background. Quite the contrary: the category generation rath-
er serves as a frame to capture all questions concerning this age cohort, for 
those who had to cope with similar existential challenges in their lives and 
still have to cope with it today, in the sense of Karl Mannheim. Their mul-
tiform and complex responses will help us discover all the ways in which 
we can differentiate this generation scientifically and politically, in Austria 
as an immigration country, and in the Yugoslav successor states as countries 
of origin.8
The most important characteristic of Generation In-Between is the 
fact that their members lead an “experienced double life,”9 which means 
they live as natives in two different cultural worlds—at least—where they 
use two or more everyday languages as mother tongues and prove to be 
familiar with different, even opposing, traditional values and habits.10 As 
children, they were either directly affected by the wars on the territory of 
former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, or they indirectly—through conveyed 
7   Rainer Gries and Thomas Ahbe, Geschichte der Generationen in der DDR und in 
Ostdeutschland: Ein Panorama (Erfurt: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Thüringen, 
2007); Rainer Gries, “Kommunikationshistorie aus generationengeschichtlicher Perspektive: 
Ein kursorischer Überblick,” in Kommunikationsgeschichte: Positionen und Werkzeuge. Ein 
diskursives Hand- und Lehrbuch, ed. Klaus Arnold, Markus Behmer, and Bernd Semrad 
(Münster: LIT, 2008), 235-258; Ulrike Jureit, Generationenforschung (Göttingen: UTB, 
2006).
8   Rainer Gries, “Integration von Flüchtlingen aus Jugoslawien in den 1990er Jahren: 
Die ‘Generation In-Between;’ Aufriss der Forschung,” in Migration: Flucht – Vertreibung – 
Integration, ed. Stefan Karner et al. (Vienna, forthcoming). Under the direction of Rainer 
Gries, the Franz Vranitzky Chair for European Studies—apart from this present study 
in cooperation with IDM—aims to encompass the polymorphism of this generation in 
Southeastern and Central Europe, to be able to compare it with the diversity of their peers 
in Northern, Western, and Southern Europe.
9   Claus Leggewie, “Kirche oder Sekte? Muslime in Deutschland und in den USA,” 
in Politik und Religion, ed. Michael Minkenberg and Ulrich Willems (Wiesbaden: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), 164-183 (here 172).
10   Hilde Weiss, Leben in zwei Welten: zur sozialen Integration ausländischer Jugendlicher der 
zweiten Generation (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007).
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experiences—used to get in touch with the tragic war situations in their 
grandparents’ homelands.11
As family ties between the country of origin and the host country may 
hold on for decades, it is usually not only the so-called second genera-
tion, the guest workers’ children, but also the third generation in Austria, 
the Gastarbeiters’ grandchildren, who still maintain contact with relatives 
and friends living in the Yugoslav successor states and emigration coun-
tries, such as, for instance, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, 
and Montenegro.12 Today’s young adults make use of the technological 
advances and extended networks as well as communication spaces in both 
directions.13
According to the latest findings of Statistik Austria, 513,000 persons 
of the resident population in Austria show an ex-Yugoslav migration back-
ground, whereas 153,700 people belong to the second generation.14 Worth 
mentioning is that naturalized citizens are not gathered by this data. Further, 
statistical specifications regarding Generation In-Between have proved not 
to be available yet. In that sense, literature such as the first (2003) as well 
as the second Migration and Integration Report (2007),15 edited by the 
well-known migration researcher Heinz Fassmann, revealed statistical dif-
ficulties in covering the second generation appropriately, which also applies 
to data regarding the third generation.
Also among this age cohort are the approximately two hundred thou-
sand children, who fled to Austria due to the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s 
and are now grown up.16 They experienced expulsion and flight during their 
11   In Austria, where the former Yugoslavia was hitherto perceived as a popular destination 
for summer holidays as well as the guest workers’ home country, the break up of the Yugoslav 
wars was hardly understood. What followed were contradictory peacekeeping neighborhood 
policies. See Wolfgang Pensold, Silvia Nadjivan, and Eva Tamara Asboth, Gemeinsame 
Geschichte? Ein Jahrhundert österreichischer und serbischer Mythen, 145-146, 148-149.
12   As research findings show, Austrian immigrants—even in the third generation—tend to 
liaising with someone from their countries of origin. See Gudrun Biffl, Migration and Labour 
Market Integration in Austria – SOPEMI Report on Labour Migration: Austria 2015-16 (Krems: 
Danube University Krems, Department for Migration and Globalisation, 2016), 98.
13   Leggewie, “Kirche oder Sekte? Muslime in Deutschland und in den USA,” 172.
14   “Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund im Überblick ( Jahresdurchschnitt 2015),” 
Statistik Austria, accessed Jan. 10, 2017, http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/
menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_
migrationshintergrund/index.html.
15   Helga Amesberger and Heinz Fassmann, eds., Österreichischer Migrations- und 
Integrationsbericht: rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen, demographische Entwicklungen, 
sozioökonomische Strukturen (Klagenfurt: Drava-Verlag, 2003); Heinz Fassmann, ed., 2. 
Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht (Wien: Drava Verlag, 2007).
16   Rainer Gries, Eva Tamara Asboth and Christina Krakovsky, Generation In-Between: The 
Children of the Balkan Wars; Getting to Know a Crucial Generation for Europe (Wien: ERSTE 
Stiftung Studies, 2016), 45; Gudrun Biffl, Migration and Labour Market Integration, 38.
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early socialization. It is a fact that they became victims of military violence, 
which in many cases led to serious traumata. They passed through personal 
crises, and they have usually been left alone with their traumatic experi-
ences.17 They still carry fragments of memories and experiences with them, 
as well as fragments of stories and opinions passed on from their family 
members, which are possibly official narrative patterns from their home 
countries.18
When attempting to discuss religious confessions among members of 
Generation In-Between in Austria, we face a similar data shortage as men-
tioned before. As a result, we take a short look at the religious confessions 
in all of Austria19: Catholicism dominates historically and traditionally. 
After the last census of 2001 ceded 75% of the Roman Catholic faith, and 
since the census was no longer allowed to record the religious confession 
statistically,20 current figures are merely based on estimates. According to 
the Media Services Center New Austrians, most people are still Catholic 
(5.36 million), the second largest is Muslim (up to 600,000), and the 
third Orthodox (with about 500,000). Fourth place are members of the 
Protestant Church (302,000). A significant minority are members of the 
Jewish faith (about 15,000) as a result of the Shoah under the Nazi regime 
in the Second World War.21
Apart from still existing difficulties in statistically capturing young 
adults with ex-Yugoslav migration background, we have nevertheless con-
sidered this age cohort as one generation with regards to their common 
17  On-site studies show the extraordinary daily burdens of the children during these 
wars, see Sarah Warshauer Freedman and Dino Abazović, “Growing Up During the 
Balkan Wars of the 1990s,” in International Perspectives on Youth Conflict and Development, 
ed. Colette Daiute, Zeynep Beykont and Craig Higson-Smith (Oxford: University Press, 
2006), 57-72; Andreja Brajša-Žganec, “The Long-Term Effects of War Experiences on 
Children‘s Depression in the Republic of Croatia,” Child Abuse & Neglect 29, no. 1 (2005): 
31-43.
18   Kalina Yordanova shows how transgenerational knowledge in the case of the Bosnian 
War is passed on. As a result, the children have formed their own image of the war strongly 
influenced by the war stories that family members have told them. See Kalina Yordanova, 
“The Second Generation’s Imagery of the Bosnian War (1992-1995),” in Anthropology of 
East Europe Review 33, no. 1 (2015): 70-86.
19   For additional information on religion in Austria, see Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, 
and Hermann Denz, eds., Religion in Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies 13 (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2005). 
20   Walter Reichel, Thomas Eder, and Roman Kasses, “Religionen in Österreich: 
Übersicht der in Österreich anerkannten Glaubensgemeinschaften,” Bundeskanzleramt, 
Bundespressedienst (2014), accessed March 18, 2016, https://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.
axd?CobId=55998.
21   “Weltreligionen in Österreich – Daten und Fakten,” Medienservicestelle Neue Österreicher/
innen, last modified Jan. 18, 2013, accessed Mar. 8, 2016, http://medienservicestelle.at/
migration_bewegt/2013/01/18/weltreligionen-in-osterreich-daten-und-zahlen/.
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heritage (correlating or competing collective memories), common knowl-
edge of the past and present time, and their daily practices of switching 
between at least two cultural worlds. Thus, the concept of generation pro-
vides a formidable theoretical basis for examining the focus group’s system 
of beliefs. And it serves as an category of analysis to grasp the young adults 
with ex-Yugoslav background as a “Generation In-Between.” Either born 
in Austria as guest workers’ grandchildren, or having fled with their parents 
during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, all of them share similar collective 
memories and social experiences. When comparing their living standards 
with those of their peers in the Yugoslav successor states—countries they or 
their grandparents had left behind—they may have the impression of fac-
ing better living standards. At the same time, they may perceive themselves 
as being disadvantaged compared to Austrian peers, a fact highlighted by 
expressions of individual experiences.22 For many years, the migrant blue 
color workforce has been marginalized with regards to employment, hous-
ing, education, social networks, and political participation. Even the third 
generation of immigrant children appear to not be as well integrated as 
their peers without migration backgrounds.23
The term migration background has varying definitions. In general, it 
refers to the ancestry of the parents of affected persons, not the persons 
themselves, as pointed out by the Austrian Media Service Point.24 However, 
to encapsulate all young adults of ex-Yugoslav origin, we talk about the 
“ex-Yugoslav background,” regardless of their birthplace and actual citizen-
ship. From a statistical point of view, citizens with ex-Yugoslav migration 
22   Result of the discussion of generations at the book presentation “Generation In-
Between: The Children of the Balkan Wars. Getting to Know a Crucial Generation,” at the 
University of Vienna on March 10, 2016. As some participants emphasized, at school, for 
example, they had to prove themselves more than their peers without migration background.
23   Fabian Georgi, “The Politics of Adaptation and Integration in Austria: European 
Migration Centre,” emz-berlin.de (2003), 14, accessed Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.emz-
berlin.de/projekte_e/pj32_1pdf/IntPol_Austria.pdf; Stephen Castles, “Guestworkers in 
Europe: A Resurrection?” International Migration Review 40, no. 4 (2006): 741-766; for 
further critical points see Rainer Bauböck, ed., Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, 
Rights and Political Participation; IMISCOE Reports (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press 
2006); Jochen Blaschke and Bastian Vollmer, Employment for Immigration in the European 
Union (Berlin: Parabolis, 2004); Ulrike Davy and Harald Waldrauch, eds., Die Integration 
von Einwanderern: Ein Index der rechtlichen Diskriminierung (Frankfurt am Main: Campus 
Verlag, 2001).
24   “‘Migrationshintergrund’: ForscherInnen uneinig,” Medienservicestelle Neue Österreicher/
innen, last modified Mar. 15, 2012, accessed Dec. 5, 2016, http://medienservicestelle.at/
migration_bewegt/2012/03/15/forscher-migrationshintergrund-sensibel-verwenden/; 
Silvia Nadjivan, “(In)Visibilities of migration backgrounds in Austria,” in Challenges for the 
European Union in the Next Decade: Proceedings of the 9th DRC Summer School, ed. István 
Tarrósy and Susan Milford (Pécs: Publikon, 2013), 43-57.
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backgrounds have about half less housing area than non-immigrants.25 And 
as in previous years, after finishing their academic studies, young adults 
with an ex-Yugoslav (and also Turkish) migration background still have 
more difficulties in finding an appropriate job than those without a migra-
tion background.26 As a result, the members of Generation In-Between in 
Austria observe their peers leading clearly more privileged lives. 
However, due to both these previously mentioned migration flows to 
Austria (the so-called guest workers movement since the 1960s and the ref-
ugee movement during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s), the relatively high 
number of Generation In-Between members lead to their increasing polit-
ical, economic, social, and cultural importance. Of interest to us, therefore, 
were the social media self-representation and socializing processes among 
these young adults with ex-Yugoslav migration backgrounds.  
Backstage Discourses on the Kosmo Facebook Page
In our study, we analyzed the postings of our focus group on Facebook, 
which has proved to be one of the most influential social network sites 
globally. Facebook can be defined as a “hybrid space that challenges the 
traditional distinctions such as offline and online, and private and public.”27 
It more or less shows what its members seem to do “right now” by offer-
ing the possibility to post everyday information, photos and statements. 
It also reveals fading distinctions between the public and private sphere, 
“because there is no critical point where online activities can be defined as 
private as opposed to public.” Therefore, “Facebook could be understood 
as a public sphere where individual users contribute with private postings 
and through their activities negotiate the degree of intimacy.”28 And finally 
Facebook interlinks mass and personal communication so that boundar-
ies between one-way and two-way communication are disappearing. As a 
25   Statistik Austria, “Mikrozensus-Wohnungserhebung 2014; Jahresdurchschnitt über 
alle Wochen. Bevölkerung in Privathaushalten,” Migration & Integration: Zahlen, Daten, 
Indikatoren (Wien 2015), 77.
26   Hilde Weiss and Anne Unterwurzacher, “Soziale Mobilität durch Bildung? 
Bildungsbeteiligung von MigrantInnen,” in 2. Österreichischer Migrations- und 
Integrationsbericht, ed. Heinz Fassmann (Wien: Drava Verlag, 2007), 227-241 (here 
229); Roland Verwiebe and Melek Hacioglu, “Berufseinstiege von AkademikerInnen mit 




27   Gunn Sara Enli and Nancy Thumim, “Socializing and Self-Representation Online: 
Exploring Facebook,” Observatorio (OBS*) Journal 6, no. 1 (2012): 87-105 (here 91).
28   Ibid., 92.
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result, Facebook users are simultaneously producers and recipients of media 
content. They have the possibility to share their opinions relating to news 
on various local, regional and international events. The Facebook interface 
and infrastructure gives its users the impression of being part of a global 
community, which is additionally supported by the fact that this global 
social network is independent from territorial borders.29
In contrast to the nation as an “imagined community” (according to 
Benedict Anderson), Facebook appears as an “online community based 
on social relationships rather than geographical territories.”30 However, 
this essay will show that this so-called online community is discursively 
composed of permanently changing imagined communities with varying 
loyalties and enmities which by themselves are embedded and expressed in 
specific power relations so that the constructions of loyalties and distinc-
tions are always changing.
In terms of methodology, the first step of the analysis was to collect 
and extract Internet threads that were written by Austrian young adults 
with an ex-Yugoslav background and dealt with topics of faith and religion. 
Therefore, we relied on the ethno magazine Kosmo, which is produced and 
published by people of ex-Yugoslav origin in Vienna. Due to the focus on its 
target group, Austrian residents with ex-Yugoslav migration background—
the so-called ex-YU community—the monthly magazine Kosmo uses the 
Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian language(s), or BCS. Moreover, as Kosmo is 
partly available online and has a separate Facebook page, it turned out to be 
a most appropriate source to start with. The Facebook page in particular is 
highly frequented by Generation In-Between, a fact that is proved by the 
parallel use of German as well as Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian language(s). 
Sometimes, even Cyrillic postings can be found.
Due to the fact that Kosmo editors regularly post topics on their 
Facebook page that inspire a huge number of comments, we compiled a 
corpus of sources from selected topics from the year 2016 that directly 
or indirectly touched questions of religion. The corpus includes twen-
ty-eight topics such as wearing headscarves, feeling at home in Austria, or 
homosexuality/homophobia.31
29   Ibid., 92-94.
30   Ibid., 95.
31   The source base is compiled by individual comments which we do not claim to represent 
a whole generation. We took screenshots from all comments we have analyzed to make 
sure that the sources are available even if they are removed from the Kosmo Facebook-
page. Quotes from users are designated with their abbreviated user names and the time of 
publishing the comment. All comments that are taken from the Kosmo Facebook-page and 
translated into English, serve as responses to postings from the Kosmo editors advertising 
new articles in their magazine.
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A factor that is usually problematic for privacy reasons turned out to 
be a highly important advantage for our research: the condition of already 
being registered on Facebook and having a profile in order to comment on a 
Kosmo posting. Individuals who want to participate in online networks like 
Facebook are obliged to register themselves by setting up a Facebook account 
or other online identity.32 On the basis of posted photographs, shared videos 
and self-descriptions, we were able to assume with some probability that 
the users belonged to our focused generation. Other important variables 
for profiling the users was—apart from the visual self-representation and 
language use (in the cases of German or BCS)—also the style young peo-
ple wrote their comments in, particularly in regard to the use of emojis or 
pictograms. According to the semiotician Marcel Danesi, the use of emojis 
depends on age and peers, which means it mostly appears in the commu-
nication of younger generations, including Generation In-Between.33 The 
same can be assumed for the use of abbreviations like “lol,” which stands for 
“laughing out loud.” A visual expression of “lol” is meanwhile the emoji or 
the pictograph “Face with Tears of Joy” which proved to be highly popular 
among all collected postings. Incidentally, in 2015, this emoji was select-
ed by the internationally well-respected Oxford Dictionary as the word of 
the year, although it was just a pictograph, without any words at all.34 In 
our project, we identified and scrutinized the collected Facebook postings 
including religiously connoted statements that were often underlined by 
such pictographs in order to reveal specific discourse patterns. 
With the aid of the discourse analytic approach of Siegfried Jäger, the 
collected threads were then assigned to specific discourse strings.35 The main 
question herein was to what extent are religiousness and self-representations 
and perceptions of the so-called “other” interrelated? Moreover, to what 
extent are religiousness and self-representations interlinked with debates 
among young adults with ex-Yugoslav migration background? Given that 
knowledge, norms, and values are produced in a specific discourse repre-
senting specific power relations, we define discourse in accordance with 
the sociologist Reiner Keller as “identifiable ensembles of cognitive and 
normative devices. These devices are produced, actualized, performed, and 
transformed in social practices (not necessary, but often, language use) at 
32   Enli and Thumim, “Socializing and Self-Representation Online,” 88.
33   Marcel Danesi, The Semiotics of Emoji: The Rise of Visual Language in the Age of the 
Internet (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016).
34   “Oxford Dictionaries Word of the Year is the Tear of Joy Emoji,” BBC, Nov. 17, 
2015, accessed Dec. 20, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/34840926/oxford-
dictionaries-word-of-the-year-is-the-tears-of-joy-emoji.
35   Siegfried Jäger, Kritische Diskursanalyse: Eine Einführung (Münster: Unrast-Verlag, 
2004).
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different social, historical and geographical places. […] Discourses in this 
sense constitute social realities of phenomena … [and] are realized by social 
actors’ practices and activities.”36 As Keller tells us, the power to enforce 
their own interpretation or discourse depends on the resources available 
for social actors. Thus, the teaching of “common knowledge” is not focused 
on, but rather the social production of knowledge within differing public 
sectors, or identifiable and distinct institutional, and thus permanent, fields 
of society.37
A novelty about social media like Facebook is the fading distinction 
between the public and the private sphere. However, a fruitful approach 
for our study is offered by the sociologist Anders Persson. Instead of 
drawing distinctions between the public and the private sphere regarding 
social media representations and socializing processes, Persson directs the 
attention to the difference between frontstage discourse and backstage dis-
course.38 Referring to Erving Goffman’s39 concept of the frontstage and 
backstage performances and behavior, Persson compares (offline) face-to-
face communication with online person-to-person interaction, or “comput-
er-mediated” and delayed “ping-pong” interaction, and comes to the con-
clusion that social media brings backstage discourse to the front.40 Due to 
the physical absence of an audience, the impression (illusion) of anonymity, 
and a consequently lacking “interaction order” of respectful behavior, users 
are seduced to articulate themselves in a way that would be inappropriate in 
face-to-face communication.41
“Social media entail the creation of a private place in public, the back-
stage nature of which is underscored in that the individual is often actually 
in his or her private physical back region when the communication occurs.” 
As a “self-centered social medium,” the blog can be seen as a mostly “back-
stage medium.”42 Therefore, the collected postings do not represent public, 
not to mention reflective, debates on various topics in relation to religious-
ness, but rather a spontaneous backstage discourse mostly characterized by 
self-representations more or less interlinked with religiousness.
36   Reiner Keller, “Analysing Discourse: An Approach From the Sociology of Knowledge 
[33 paragraphs],” Forum: Qualitative Social Research 6, no. 3 (2005), accessed Dec. 20, 2016, 
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0503327.
37   Ibid.
38   Anders Persson, “Front- and Backstage in Social Media,” Language, Discourse & Society 
1, no. 2 (2012): 15-17. 
39   Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (University of Edinburgh: 
Social Sciences Research Centre, 1956).
40   Persson, “Front- and Backstage in Social Media,” 21.
41   Ibid., 22-23.
42   Ibid., 23.
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Conjunctions of Religiousness
Due to various developments in recent years, particularly current 
migration movements, religion and religiousness (or even religiosity, as a 
pejorative term for religiousness) became a new, highly important polit-
ical and social factor not only in Austria, but also throughout Europe 
and worldwide.43 In religiously plural and disparate societies like Austria, 
negotiation processes about the importance and relevance of religious 
symbols and achievements must be made possible and opened up in the 
common social coexistence. Christian-Jewish and Western influences are 
no longer sufficient as a framework to meet the strongly divergent needs 
of different groups and generations in European societies in the twen-
ty-first century. 
Additionally, secularization processes of the societies are still continu-
ing, while processes of an “individualization of religion,”44 as well as a diver-
sification and optimization of religious contents and rituals, are emerging, 
which lead to new and complex forms of religiosity. Religiousness is now no 
longer bound by religious institutions, but instead based on the diversity of 
competing religious and quasi-religious offerings outside the churches. We 
have to acknowledge the production of individually selected and mixed reli-
giousness as “multireligious collages of religious convictions.” In this sense, 
there is not only one religiousness that exists. Instead, a “variety of attitudes, 
experiences and behaviors” can be found so that consequently religiousness 
exists in the sense of a fundamental setting that is expressed through diverse 
attitudes, experiences, and behaviors.45 This kind of patchwork-religious-
ness and multiple forms of religion do not pre-suppose a fixed or declared 
membership but instead are based on a voluntary basis with a temporary 
character.46 The basis for these multi-option religious practices are, there-
fore, community selection, evaluation, exchange, and negotiation processes, 
which are conveyed essentially through social media. This is also true for 
43   Ulrich Willems and Michael Minkenberg, “Politik und Religion im Übergang: 
Tendenzen und Forschungsfragen am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts,” in Politik und Religion, 
ed. Michael Minkenberg and Ulrich Willems (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), 
13-41 (here 32).
44   Ulrich Beck, Der eigene Gott: Die Individualisierung der Religion und der Geist der 
Weltgesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008).
45   Gert Pickel, Religionssoziologie: Eine Einführung in zentrale Themenbereiche (Wiesbaden, 
2011), 401.
46   Ronald Hitzler, Anne Honer and Michaela Pfadenhauer, “Zur Einleitung: ‘Ärgerliche’ 
Gesellungsgebilde,” in Posttraditionale Gemeinschaften: Theoretische und ethnographische 
Erkundungen, ed. Ronald Hitzler, Anne Honer and Michaela Pfadenhauer (Wiesbaden, 
2008), 9-31.
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young adults, like Generation In-Between, as they have the possibility to 
communicate with peers in Austria as well as in Yugoslav successor states.
As a matter of fact, we draw conjunctions, first between religious-
ness and the self-representations in connection to Austria, Europe, 
and the Balkans, secondly between religiousness and collective memo-
ries within the “Yugo” or “ex-YU” community, and lastly between reli-
giousness and imaginations of femininities/masculinities, and gender 
roles and orders.
Religiousness is, as previously mentioned, not based on fixed religious 
membership, but instead on voluntary activities with a temporary character. 
Conjunctions between religiousness and self-representation in opposition 
to the so-called “other” also vary depending on the specific context, embed-
ded in specific power relations. This constellation embodies a “complex 
triangular” relation among the self, the other, and object/representation.”47 
With regards to the analyzed Facebook postings, the self is embodied by the 
user or communicator, the other by the respondent, or audience in general, 
or third persons, and the object/representation is illustrated by the topic that 
is discussed in relation to religiousness. It is worth noting that religiousness 
hardly ever plays an important role, but is rather arbitrarily referred to when 
felt to be appropriate for the communicator.
Within this self-other-object triangle, social representations offer var-
ious possible identities to adopt “in relation to the symbolic field of cul-
ture.”48 When entering the online network Facebook as a specific social 
field, individuals participate in processes of reproducing and negotiating 
meanings, values, and norms. So, “the production, circulation and recep-
tion of representations […] always take place in complex and specific 
contexts,”49 embedded in concrete power relations. Social representations 
moreover convey “the meanings related to an object as well as the posi-
tions towards that object.” In that sense, “social identities ‘reflect individuals’ 
efforts to situate themselves in their societies”50 according to specific values 
and norms. That all takes place in communication processes embedded in 
specific power relations and social hierarchies. So, identities and concepts 
of oneself and the so-called other are discursively constructed and nego-
tiated. As a process, this can be defined as “doing identities.”51 Values and 
47   Eleni Andreouli, “Identity, Positioning and Self-Other Relations,” Papers on Social 
Representations 19 (2010): 14.1-14.13 (here 14.2). 
48   Ibid.
49   Enli and Thumim, “Socializing and Self-Representation Online,” 89.
50   Gerard Duveen and Barbara Lloyd, “The Significance of Social Identities,” British 
Journal of Social Psychology 25 (1986): 219-230 (here 220), quoted in Andreouli, “Identity, 
Positioning and Self-Other Relation,” 14.2.
51   Andreouli, “Identity, Positioning and Self-Other Relation,” 14.4.
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norms within a society are also the product of concrete power relations and 
dynamics.52 In that sense, social representation as a way of self-legitimation 
refers to internalized values and norms and changes relating to concrete 
situations and settings.
Between Religiousness and Self-Representations
Our research showed that those postings that were directly addressing 
religious topics such as the Orthodox “Slava” tradition—feasts celebrated 
for Orthodox saints—were hardly commented on by anyone.53 It was rath-
er postings only indirectly or even tangentially dealing with religious topics 
that offered occasions for religiously connoted statements and postings 
from Generation In-Between members.54 Moreover, religiousness did not 
play an important role in the first comments on a Kosmo posting. It was 
much more often the case that during a heated discussion, users posted 
phrases such as “I am following the Bible,”55 or “When you are a Christian, 
you should show that you understand what it means to be Christian.”56 
Both comments, however, referred to Christianity when calling for the 
respect of human rights. As phenomena of the Facebook backstage dis-
course, which does not offer an interface for profound or philosophical 
discussions on religiousness, comments in general mostly proved to be 
ephemeral expressions. Much more obvious is that religiousness is implicit-
ly used to draw distinctions between oneself and the other, which therefore 
leads to the paradoxical situation that despite the ideal of participating in 
a broad and equal online community, the self is set apart from a—mostly 
degraded—other.
According to the 2015 “Migration & Integration” report commissioned 
by the foreign ministry and conducted by Statistik Austria, a huge major-
ity of people with ex-Yugoslav migration backgrounds identify themselves 
52   Ibid., 14.5.
53   “Srećna slava, Beograde! [Happy feast, Belgrade!],” posting on Kosmo Facebook-page, 
June 9, 2016 by Kosmo editors.
54   One exception was the debate on women’s veiling that will be elaborated later on in this 
text.
55   “Ich richte mich nach der Bibel,” comment on Kosmo Facebook-page, Oct. 22, 2016 
by N. I., who wrote these words in order to stress the need of respecting human rights and 
furthermore accepting homosexuality.
56   “Wenn du Christin bist, zeige dass du verstehst was es bedeutet eine Christin zu sein,” 
comment on Kosmo Facebook-page, Nov. 16, 2016 by G. D. T., who in a heated discussion on 
the current refugee movement called for understanding the situation of refugees in Austria, 
instead of denigrating them.
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with Austria or being Austrian.57 Feeling home in Austria or not is another 
discourse string we detected in the communication on the Kosmo Facebook 
page among Generation In-Between. Most of the young people stated that 
they felt connected to the Balkans as well as to Austria. It is not an either/
or decision, but rather a both/and. We can assume that the topic of being 
Austrian or sharing an Austrian identity really matters for Generation 
In-Between by taking into consideration their self-representations.
Coming back to the backstage discourse, some comments regarding an 
Austrian identity give insight into the generation’s inner division. As one 
young woman summed up: “in Austria we are foreigners or Tschuschn… 
in Yugo dijaspora, stranci [aliens], bauštelci [construction workers],”58 which 
means that she feels like a foreigner or unwelcome stranger in Austria as 
well as in ex-Yugoslavia. Interestingly, there is more than one comment, 
which shows the “lost in space”59 situation, and all of those similar state-
ments are surrounded by “Red Heart” emojis posted by other Facebook 
users. The imagined community supports its members within this discourse 
string, as long as they share their feelings about being in-between two home 
countries.
So, at first stage all Facebook users seem to have the equal chance to 
participate in the Kosmo Facebook page—provided that they speak and 
write in German. In case somebody uses the Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian 
(BCS) language(s) in the second stage, all those who are not capable of 
speaking the South Slavic languages are excluded. Thus, when Generation 
In-Between members want to “stay among themselves” without disturbing 
comments of outsiders—representatives of the now-excluded Austrian 
majority—they immediately switch to their common mother tongues. 
At that stage, they understand each other, no matter if typical Bosnian, 
Croatian or Serbian expressions are in use. The common link among these 
participants is characterized by individual experiences of marginalization 
and discrimination within the Austrian majority society. So, now within 
this protected sphere, they turn the tables and exclude Austrians, who 
are ironically also named “Švabos,”60 the South Slavic modification of 
the German Schwaben (Swabians). At that stage, religiousness does show 
57   Statistik Austria, “migration & integration: zahlen. daten. indikatoren 2016,” 
integrationsfonds.at (Wien 2016), 17, accessed Jan. 24, 2017, http://www.integrationsfonds.
at/fileadmin/content/migrationintegration-2016.pdf.
58   “in AT sind wir Ausländer, Tschuschn…in Yugo ‘dijaspora, stranci, bauštelci’,” comment 
on Kosmo’s Facebook-page, Oct. 26, 2016 by L. M. The term Tschuschn, a discriminating term 
for ex-Yugoslav migrants, etymologically originates in the Habsburg Monarchy.
59   “lost in space,” comment on Kosmo’s Facebook-page, Oct. 26, 2016 by S. B.
60   “Und zum Punkt ‘swabo’ – Dođi Švabo,da vidiš gde je srpski Tekeriš!,” April 28, 2016 
by K. T.
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hardly any relevance for self-representation in distinction to the other, 
i.e. the German speaking users, and for creating a common ex-Yugoslav 
community.
For Generation In-Between, their roots seem to be important for their 
identity building process and should not be forgotten. For example, one 
user expressed concerns about the loss of a Balkan identity for the next 
generations, because they increasingly prefer to speak German at home. 
Taking a look at the Kosmo Facebook comments, the grammatical mis-
takes in Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian writings are obvious. It seems as if 
a correct written text is not important, neither in BCS language(s) nor in 
German. Quite the contrary, the commenters joke about some mixed words 
and phrases and simply switch between both languages, more or less cor-
rectly used, within one comment. This underlines their cynic interpretation 
of being in-between. 
The imagined community stands together against comments from 
outsiders. In defense of knowing the German language quite as well as 
Austrians, one Facebook user highlighted his perfect German, which has 
been reflected in his graduation work. Members of this generation make 
clear that they are as hardworking, diligent, and responsible as those 
Austrians citizens without migration backgrounds. Moreover, the often 
self-appointed “Yugo” group is able to handle injurious comments by rac-
ist and xenophobic users quite well and self-confidently, which becomes 
possible through the building of a strong online community. Regarding 
the “Yugo” group, which proves to be a “hybrid” sphere, the members are 
shown to have a lot in common and express their commonalities through 
language and feelings (with the aid of emojis), but without religion. It is 
reminiscent of Tito’s time: standing together requires avoiding touching 
upon sensitive topics such as religion, history, or nation states, while at the 
same time stressing the commonness, which in today’s case means having 
a migrant background and some kind of feeling of living in exile, neither 
here nor there.
The ex-Yugoslav community quickly loses its apparent unity, how-
ever, when religion comes into play. In the socialist state of former 
Yugoslavia, religious practices were defined as part of the private sphere, 
and therefore marginalized; the ex-Yugoslav heritage of the Titoist 
slogan “brotherhood and community” may implicitly still serve as a 
common reference. Addressing religion or religiousness may, however, 
imply feelings about nation. As nationalisms have referred to existing 
religions in South East Europe during the 19th century, the Croatian 
nationhood now consists of the Catholic religion, while the Serbian 
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one refers to the Orthodox religion.61 In the course of destabilizing and 
destroying the Yugoslav state, former communist leaders misused religion 
in order to stay in power and to create new nation states on the basis 
of heretofore-marginalized religions. The Yugoslav wars of the 1990s 
were therefore constructed as religious wars, silencing concrete power and 
socio-economic interests of the warring political elites.62 The newly estab-
lished post-Yugoslav states, however, revealed drastic contradictions 
between national(istic) narratives and the broad ethnic and religious 
spectrum of their inhabitants.63 
Against the background of specific (liberal or xenophobic) narratives 
shared within their families and social milieus, Generation In-Between 
members show more or less nationalist, religiously connoted, or even 
nationalist-clerical positions, even in postings about Austrian or European 
political issues. The young people transfer their heritage in knowledge they 
think they might use for European or Austrian topics, like the refugee 
movements since 2014 or the presidential elections in 2016. In that sense, 
the “Yugo” group is quite outstanding, because they form their own mixed 
social realities concerning the past and the present, which is mirrored in 
their self-representations.
We then discovered those topics that conjured different opinions 
along nationalist and religious attitudes. Especially inner political or 
European issues, such as the presidential election or refugee movements in 
2016 revealed a dividing line between two camps. On the one hand, there 
were users who openly supported Alexander Van der Bellen during the 
presidential elections in 2016 and expressed their anger against members 
from the other camp, who voted for Norbert Hofer with the intention 
to endorse his restrictive policy regarding refugees and asylum seekers. 
The discourse strings of Austrian domestic politics, today’s refugee move-
ments, and memories or narratives from the past always get intertwined 
61   Holm Sundhaussen, Experiment Jugoslawien: Von der Staatsgründung bis zum 
Staatszerfall (Mannheim: Meyers Forum, 1992), 9-15; Ernest Gellner, Nationalismus und 
Moderne (Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1991), 87-90.
62   Mary Kaldor, Neue und alte Kriege: Organisierte Gewalt im Zeitalter der Globalisierung 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 82, 95; Radivoj Cvetićanin, “Serbian Media in the 
Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution,” in The War Started at Maksimir: Hate Speech in the Media, ed. 
Velimir Ćurgus Kazimir (Belgrade: Media Center, 1997), 71-96 (here 72).
63   Serbia consists also of a Croatian population, and there are still Serbs living in Croatia. 
Besides, Muslims are living in Croatia and Serbia, while Sandžak and Christians live in 
Kosovo—not to mention the highly diverse population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See 
Matjaž Klemenčič and Mitja Žagar, The Former Yugoslavia’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference 
Source Book (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2004).
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and thus generate two camps that often argue in their postings with reli-
gious motivations.
There are some comments from young people, mostly women, who 
show concerns or even fear about a future possibility in Austria where Hofer 
or the right populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) holds the power. In that case, 
they would struggle more than today, due to their migration and addition-
ally their Muslim backgrounds. Furthermore, they feared being excluded 
from the Austrian collective identity, which they see based on Christianity 
as propagated by the FPÖ party.
On the other hand, there were users who tried to persuade the online 
community to vote for the FPÖ64 in order to get rid of the refugees. Those 
users were mostly not members of Generation In-Between, but older peo-
ple, often the generation of their parents, i.e. the second generation.65
We can observe that Generation In-Between members experienced a 
ground-shaking identity crisis caused by the interplay of national and inter-
national shifts to the right, and their perception of religiously based argu-
ments about political issues.66 Some young members of the Kosmo Facebook 
community seemed to be quite upset about religiously connoted political 
comments. Such reactions might result from the influence of family and 
social milieu beliefs that the combination of politics and religion can lead to 
war. One young woman posted: “The only shame is that no one of you has 
read what he [Hofer] wants for this state! All [people] only heard about one 
topic Asylant Asylant Asylant [pejorative German term for asylum seeker], 
what about the rest? No one has a clue! That means someone of us works all 
the time and suddenly loses the job and gets nothing. This is indeed fine!”67
64   In order to attract possible voters with Serbian migration background, the FPÖ also 
uses strategies such as not recognizing Kosovo’s independence which of course does not 
show to be a guarantee for more votes among this group. So, other more actual populist 
xenophobic performances are used as well.
65   Such new expressions of xenophobia show that the older generations (the first and the 
second ones) feel so well integrated in Austria that they openly express their negative feelings 
against current refugee and migration movements. That was brought up by the debuty Alev 
Korun from the Austrian Green Party during the panel discussion “‘Natürlich ging ich 
weg…’: 50 Jahre Anwerbeabkommen mit dem ehemaligen Jugoslawien” [‘Of course I left…’ 
: 50 years of the agreement on labour recruitment with former Yugoslavia] in the Austrian 
parliament in Vienna on December 13, 2016. The panel discussion was organized by Emina 
Adamović from the “Initiative Minderheiten” [Minorities Initiative] in cooperation with 
Alev Korun and the Green Party.
66   There are a lot of comments that stressed the personal observation that the interplay of 
politics and religion is scary and growing. 
67   “Sramota je samo to, sto niko od vas nije procitao sta on hoce za ovu drzavu! Svi samo 
culi jednu temu Asylant Asylant Asylant, a ostalo? Nema niko pojma! Znaci neko od nas, 
radi citavo vrijeme od jednom dobije otkaz i ne dobija nista. Bas je to fino!,” comment on 
Kosmo’s Facebook-page, on April 29, 2016, by M. O. D.
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Another young woman photographed her ballot paper of the presiden-
tial elections after checking the box “Van der Bellen” and posted it on her 
Facebook account. There seems to be a strong Muslim community worried 
about their future in the country that once saved them. So, the notion of 
a safe and secure home appears to be stronger than feelings of love for 
Austria or Europe. One posting of a young woman shows an anxious and 
victimized position: “FPÖ has always been against foreigners and especially 
now against Muslims, don’t forget that, he [Hofer] wants to put all foreign-
er in the second class.”68
Between Religiousness and Collective Memories
Due to the fact that Generation In-Between mostly grew up in Austria, 
they have internalized different and even competing narratives from the 
past, passed on by their parents and grandparents who either live in Austria 
or in the Yugoslav successor states. Postings indicate that this generation is 
highly interested in the history of the Balkans, not only in recent wars, but 
also in the time of former Yugoslavia and before. Additionally, the trans-
ferred narratives they post are either uncertain, unfinished or contested, or 
very convinced and therefore nationalistic. Comparing the voiced narra-
tives and collective memories of ex-Yugoslav migrants, the structure and 
the dynamics of the intra-generational backstage discourse shows different 
worldviews of young adults who grew up in Austria, compared to those 
of their parents or elder siblings. Fragmentary images of the past that are 
absorbed and formed by Generation In-Between fit into their migrant and 
in-between lives in Austria. Their remembrance culture as a specificity of 
their youth culture conquers the narratives of their older family members. 
The Slovenian psychologist Marija Kuzmanić highlighted the “utter-
ly dialogical relationship” between identity and (collective) memory in her 
article about the memories of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia.69 One 
has to acknowledge the importance of collective memories for the creation of 
individual and group identities. Collective memories emerge from the process 
of remembering, forgetting, representing and identifying and are organized 
in narrations that provide the structures for this process. They are therefore 
68   “[…] FPÖ je uvjek bio protiv Ausländera a pogotovo sad protiv muslimana, nezabori 
to, on hoce da stavi sve ausländere u drugu klasu,” comment on Kosmo’s Facebook-page on 
April 29, 2016, by A. B.
69   Marija Kuzmanić, “Collective Memory and Social Identity: A Social Psychological 
Exploration of the Memories of the Disintegration of Former Yugoslavia,” Psihološka obzorja 
/ Horizons of Psychology 17, no. 2 (2008): 5-26 (here 9).
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linked to the concept of social representations and essential to consider in 
research about “historical transition or rupture,” as in our case disintegration, 
war, or refugee movements. “Taken together, current social representations 
determine our memories of the past and are, at the same time, sustained by 
them. Memories and representations ‘feed’ group or social identities, but, in 
turn, they are also determined by people’s membership of particular groups.”70 
In fact, they contribute to the concept of generation.
Discussing history is much more dividing than talking about Austrian 
issues, and it proves to also be an alternative, anonymous, emotional, and 
often shameless form of exchange within the generation. If a comment 
attacks Kosovo for its independence, for example, or Serbia for not rec-
ognizing Kosovo’s independence, the answers follow national(ist) lines. 
The backstage discourse within the online “Yugo” (or ex-YU) community 
serves to them as a vehicle to provoke, to speak out opinions and narratives 
that are better not stated face-to-face, and therefore function as a coping 
strategy. The closed sphere of ex-Yugoslav migrants, which is guaranteed by 
using BCS language(s), indicates a strong need for exchanging, opposing or 
defending narratives among members of Generation In-Between.
One Kosmo article that was shared on the magazine’s Facebook page 
dealt with the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. The title of the 
Kosmo story was “Serbia threatens Kosovo,” which led to an impromptu 
discussion including, for example, postings about the wish to understand 
the conflict; but also centuries-old narratives came to surface, as one young 
man commented: “Why should Serbia threaten Kosovo, for Serbian people 
Kosovo is their holy land! And it still hurts if someone dances on it… it 
was brutally ripped off…”71 On the top of his Facebook page, he presents a 
photograph of an Orthodox church, and in his timeline there is a collection 
of pictures full of religiously and politically mixed symbols. Religion serves 
not only as legitimation for a national Serbian master narrative—including 
that Kosovo belonged to Serbia—but also for the feeling of being treated 
unjustly and misunderstood. His self-representation shows his belief in the 
Serbian Orthodox community that conserves the narratives of the former 
“golden times”72 and today’s injustice brought by the West (he posted a 
drawing of Slobodan Milošević tearing the American flag). Another young 
70   Ibid., 9-10.
71   “Wieso sollte serbien kosovo drohen, wenn die Serben das als heiliges Land sehen ! Und 
es weiterhin weh tut wenn man da herumtanzt... es wurde brutal weggerissen...,” comment 
on Kosmo’s Facebook-page, Oct. 27, 2016 by Б. Ш.  The use of the Cyrillic alphabet might be 
understood as a support of the old, orthodox Christianity, described as the authentic one in 
contrast to the Western one, accused of being decadent. 
72   Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997), 45.
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man expresses his worldviews through posting symbols of the national 
football-club Delija, which holds a strong friendship to other clubs based 
on the common Orthodox faith, like Spartak Moscow.
As we have shown, narratives rooted in the Middle Ages as well as 
in the recent Yugoslav wars are discussed by the Generation In-Between. 
Narratives from the Second World War especially mark another referen-
tial horizon for this generation and are still very much present in their 
collective memory.73 “I have fun seeing angry Četniks [like you], just be 
annoyed about it [Kosovo] until you tumble down,”74 was a comment of 
one young man. The term “Četnik” refers to supporters of the Serbian King 
since the 1930s and during the Yugoslav civil war during the Second World 
War (1941-1945).75 From those days on, a “Četnik” was a metaphor for an 
orthodox Serb, most probably a monarchist, in delineation to the catholic 
Croats who are labeled as “Ustaše” and who supported the German Nazi 
regime during the Second World War. 
We can assume that religion, especially in combination with war guilt, 
still plays an important role for Generation In-Between. The Second World 
War often serves as an aid to talk about issues from the 1990s because young 
adults have much more distance to events that happened more than seventy 
years ago. Additionally, popular national narratives that often go hand in 
hand with religion allude to historical events and heroes several centuries 
ago, such as the (Serbian) Empire of Zar Lazar, which was also brought up 
in such discussions. Religion therefore serves as a marker along national 
lines, which is often reflected in the Facebook profiles of this generation’s 
members. Remarkably, historical events and developments are referred to in 
a selective and ahistorical matter, for instance by neglecting a timeline that 
spans more than 500 years. According to such a nationalist-clerical logic, 
all historical events may appear at the same time, where the living might 
feel the support of their ancestors and deceased, in a “permanent presence,” 
as the social anthropologist Ivan Čolović argues.76 Such narratives include 
73   Mila Dragojevic, “Memory and Identity: Intergenerational Narratives of Violence 
Among Refugees in Serbia,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 41, 
no. 6 (2013): 1065-1082.
74   “mir macht richtig Spaß wenn ich wütende Cetniks sehe, also ärgere dich bis zum 
umfallen,” comment on Kosmo’s Facebook-page, June 24, 2016 by J. M.
75   Wolfang Pensold, Silvia Nadjivan, and Eva Tamara Asboth, Gemeinsame Geschichte? Ein 
Jahrhundert österreichischer und serbischer Mythen, 66-67, 97, 100-102.
76  Ivan Čolović, “Die Erneuerung des Vergangenen: Zeit und Raum in der zeitgenössischen 
politischen Mythologie,” in Bosnien und Europa: Die Ethnisierung der Gesellschaft, ed. Nenad 
Stefanov and Michael Werz (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994), 90-
103; Ivan Čolović, Bordell der Krieger: Folklore, Politik und Krieg, translated by Katharina 
Wolf-Giesshaber (Osnabrück: fibre, 1994), 12.
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clearly defined, bipolar images between Us and Them, whereas masculin-
ities are not contested, in contrast to the issues addressed in the following 
chapter.
Between Religiousness and Gender
Issues such as homosexuality (often provoking homophobia), as well 
as Muslim women’s veiling, reveal close conjunctions between religiousness 
and gender. Similar to the previously mentioned social practice of “doing 
identities,” the feminist concept of “doing gender” also points to the social 
construction of gender.77 Gender relations form power relations as well, 
where according to the male-female bipolar logic the knowledge produc-
tion of men is perceived as more valid than the one produced by females, 
according to various studies mentioned by the social psychologist Eleni 
Andreouli.78
According to the political scientist Eva Kreisky, the term gender 
includes the following interfering dimensions: first of all, men and women 
on the micro level; then masculinities and femininities, and consequently 
gender roles and gender relations, on the meso level; and finally gender 
order—or gender regime—on the macro level, and gender ideologies on the 
meta level (such as nationalisms for instance).79 Both topics, homosexuality 
and Muslim women’s veiling, show that the deeply emotional backstage 
discourse is mostly focused on masculinities and femininities, gender roles 
as well as gender order. Remarkably, these gender-related discussions were 
predominantly conducted in German, not in Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian, 
since nationalities or ethnicities appeared not to be important therein.
With respect to homosexuality, postings—not surprisingly—either 
illustrated the acceptance of homosexuality as a part of an enlightened and 
liberal society that fosters human rights and freedom of expression, or they 
showed traditionalist, sexist, and homophobic points of view. Arguments 
77  Regine Gildemeister, “Doing Gender: Soziale Praktiken der Geschlechterunterscheidung,” 
in Handbuch der Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung: Theorie, Methoden, Empirie, ed. Ruth 
Becker and Beate Kortendiek (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008), 137-145.
78   Andreouli, “Identity, Positioning and Self-Other Relation,” 14.3.
79   Eva Kreisky, “‘Staatenlenker und Staatsdiener’: Männlichkeiten im Bild des Staates,” 
summary by Martin Weidinger and Marion Löffler of a lecture during the lecture series 
“Staatsfiktionen,” Dec. 10, 2009, 1-5 (here 4), accessed Jan. 30, 2017, http://evakreisky.
at/2009-2010/ring-vo/Kreisky_Maennlichkeiten.pdf; Eva Kreisky, “Männlichkeit regiert 
die Welt: Ein exemplarischer Rückblick; der Krieg im Kosovo als Arena von Männlichkeiten; 
Zur Relevanz der Dekodierung von Geschlechtlichkeit,” accessed Feb. 3, 2017, http://
evakreisky.at/onlinetexte/maennlichkeit_kreisky.php.
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in this second illiberal and homophobic point of view often referred to 
nature and religion, such as: “Adam and Stevo were sent to earth by God; 
buy the Bible; what should be O.K. here?”80 It is worth noting that homo-
sexuality was only discussed in relation to men, not in relation to women, 
not to mention lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer movements 
(LGTBQ). So, self-representation is based here (by a young man) on the 
concept of heterosexual normality, while the so-called other is thought to be 
“abnormal.” The short reference to the Bible serves to legitimate the poster’s 
own position where nature, normality, and religion seem to form one unity 
and unmistakably regulate heteronormative gender roles and relations.
Interestingly, as a counterpart answer, a female contributor just—from 
an obviously agnostic or atheist point of view—deconstructs the religious 
connotation in the following: “Your God would not tolerate it? How can 
you presume to speak in his name? To judge? You think that everything was 
created by God, right?”81 The self-representation in distinction to the other 
is defined here in accordance to faith, believing in God or not.
Although the postings within this backstage discourse mostly do not 
show highly reflected elaborations on religion in relation to gender roles, 
but rather reveal short cynical statements combined with various picto-
graphs, meaningfully underlining the personal cynical perspective, they 
all reveal differing and even controversial experiences among Generation 
In-Between. Rising ethno-nationalisms in former Yugoslavia since the 
1980s and the violent dissolution and wars on its territory during the 
1990s went hand in hand with Catholicism, Serbian Orthodoxy, Islam, and 
therefore with patriarchy, re-traditionalism, and xenophobia.82 All those 
developments, changes, and disruptions determined the values and habits 
within the post-Communist societies. That all influenced the highly diverse 
Generation In-Between, whether born in Austria as guest workers’ grand-
children, or arriving here as refugees.
80   “Ah jaaa Adam und Stevo wurden von Gott auf die Welt geschickt kauf dir die Bibel 
was soll da OK sein!?,“ comment on Kosmo’s Facebook-page, Nov. 12, 2016 by E. E.
81   “Euer Gott würde es nicht tolerieren? Wie könnt ihr euch nur anmaßen in seinem 
Namen zu sprechen? Zu (ver)-urteilen? Ihr denkt doch, dass alles von Gott geschaffen 
wurde, right?,” comment on Kosmo’s Facebook-page, Nov. 12, 2016 by L. N.
82   Patricia Albanese, “Nationalism, War, and Archaization of Gender Relations in the 
Balkans,” Violence Against Women 7, no. 9 (2001): 999-1023 (here 1005-1009); Silvia 
Nadjivan and Stefanie Wöhl, “Women’s Political Participation and Representation in South 
Eastern Europe: Introduction,” Der Donauraum 51, no. 2 (2011): 89-118 (here 107-110); 
see further: Mirjana Morokvasić, “The Logics of Exclusion: Nationalism, Sexism and the 
Yugoslav War,” in Gender, Ethnicity and Political Ideologies, ed. Nickie Charles and Helen 
Hintjens (London 1998), 65-90; Jelena Batinić, “Feminism, Nationalism, and War: the 
‘Yugoslav Case’ in Feminist Text,” Journal of International Women’s Studies 3, no. 1 (2001): 
2-24.
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However, religious attitudes among this generation do not only show a 
new acceptance of national traditions in Austria, but rather a new form of 
youth culture, which the backstage discourse on Muslim women’s veiling 
proves. Sociologists such as Maruta Herding even speak of a new Islamic 
youth culture, which inspires the music, fashion, and media sphere in 
Western Europe.83 According to Herding, this new youth culture is charac-
terized by “halal fun” that “opposes two adverse concepts: on the one hand 
that of having fun without any moral barriers and without a dedication 
to God, and on the other, the concept of being purely religious without 
any generation-specific means of expression.”84 Of course, on the Kosmo 
Facebook page, hardly anyone declared him- or herself as being religious, 
agnostic, or atheist within the first posting. But in the course of several 
statements, it was possible to reconstruct many users’ self-representation 
in distinction to others’. The emotionally charged debate on the Muslim 
women’s veiling especially enabled us to capture this new form of youth 
culture.
With its highly charged question about being for or against a burka 
ban in Austria, the Kosmo team provoked various parallel, long-lasting, and 
partly polemic discussions. The positions ranged from the advocacy of the 
burka ban, to a partial prohibition and ultimately a strict rejection of ban-
ning all veiling. While the necessity of adapting to the Austrian society was 
brought up and a cynical comparison between burka wearing women and 
nuns was made, one short statement drew the attention to women’s moti-
vation wearing veils: “They do that for God, not for men!”85 An immediate 
reaction to this posting was: “I have not read this much trash in a long 
time.”86
Of course, the pro and contra positions were argued intensively, and 
not only deeply atheist and agnostic, but also openly faithful, points of view 
were articulated with high self-esteem. Moreover, a kind of expert discus-
sion arose on the question to what extent women’s veiling is manifested 
by the Koran. Both niqab and burka opponents and veiling proponents 
83   Maruta Herding, “The Conservative Avant-Garde: Islamic Youth Culture in 
Contemporary Western Europe,” Forum21: European Journal on Child and Youth Research 
6 (December 2010): 92-99 (here 93). This paper is based on a conference paper, presented 
at the XVII ISA World Congress of Sociology, Gothenburg, Sweden, July 11-17, 2010 at 
the Joint Session of Research Committees Sociology of Religion (RC22) and Sociology of 
Youth (RC34) on July 13, 2010.
84   Ibid., 94.
85   “Sie machen es für Gott und nicht für ihre Männer !,”  comment on Kosmo’s Facebook-
page, Aug. 24, 2016 by S. A. D.
86   “Soviel mist habe ich schön lange nicht gelesen,” comment on Kosmo’s Facebook-page, 
Aug. 24, 2016 by E. B.
Asboth/Nadjivan: Neither Here Nor There – Ni ovde, ni tamo210
similarly referred to the Koran in order to confirm their arguments and 
quickly switched to BCS. Herein, one proponent even posted a link to an 
Islamic information portal.87 By doing so, the proponent seemingly tried 
to convince the opponent by referring to the common religion and South 
Slavic language, while the other politely refused mixing up religion and 
politics and thus political Islam. 
While the burka opponent was easily identifiable as a young Muslim 
man, the identity of the burka proponent, who obviously tried to proselytize 
the other one, was a lot more difficult to determine. With his or her careful-
ly designed profile, mysterious self-representation and shared postings, the 
user seemed to play with identities in regards to religion and gender. The 
findings by the political and communication scientists Barbara Franz and 
Gerit Götzenbrucker could indicate that the proponent might be a young 
Muslim woman. Their study revealed that young Muslim women much 
more than their male counterparts recognize the potential danger of social 
media and therefore tend to use pseudonyms or ambiguous presentations in 
order to save and free themselves from gendered censorship.88 
An example of deconstructing religious habits was shown by another 
backstage discourse where a young Islamic expert who had explained the 
various forms of women’s veiling according to the Koran was confront-
ed with the following question by a young woman: “Why don’t you and 
all the other men of your religion wear burkas yourselves? Why does only 
the woman have to cover her face or her beautiful body with those long 
clothes?”89 His answer—“Don’t you understand German [...]?”90—pro-
voked a heated discussion on integration in Austria, the correspondence 
of someone’s own faith to another one’s, and finally on proper religious 
practices.
Apart from interreligious debates, there was also a lot of discussion with-
in the virtually constructed Islamic community, for instance about what “real 
Islam” might mean. There was a lot of polemic, which also involved denying 
the so-called other being a real Muslim. In contrast to former Yugoslav 
state socialism, religion, no matter if in the post-Yugoslav successor states 
87   Putemislama: Islamski informativni portal [The Way of Islam: Islamic information 
portal], accessed on March 8, 2017, https://putem-islama.com/.
88   Barbara Franz and Gerit Götzenbrucker, “The Second Generation and the Use of the 
Internet: Communication and Friendship Structures of Young Turks in Vienna, Austria,” 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 2, no. 5 (2012): 38-49 (here 42).
89   “[...] warum trägst du keine Burka bzw. alle anderen Männer euren Glaubens? Warum 
muss nur die Frau ihr Gesicht bzw. ihren schönen Körper mit diesen langen Stoffen 
bedecken?,” comment on Kosmo’s Facebook-page, Aug. 24, 2016 by N. M.
90   “Verstehst du kein Deutsch [...]?,” comment on Kosmo’s Facebook-page, Aug. 24, 2016 
by D. L.
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or in Austria, is no longer only part of (often silenced) Yugoslav private life, 
but instead spreads into the public and political life, and even influences 
youth culture. With respect to Austria, the legal recognition of Islam is 
based on the “Recognition Law” of 1874 (Anerkennungsgesetz), where Islam 
was also recognized as an official religion in 1912.91 The highly polarized 
debates surrounding headscarf, niqab, burqa, or veiling in general are mostly 
characterized by two competing positions: on the one hand, veiling as a 
symbol of oppression and discrimination of women; and on the other, as a 
human right and illustration of their freedom of expression, as articulated 
by Islamic feminists.92 In Austria, where prohibitive regulations have not 
hitherto existed, the governing Social Democrats and People’s Party have 
agreed on the ban of full-face veils in public places, which has been main-
tained in the government’s work program for 2017/18.93 
Apart from heated women’s veil debates, Generation In-Between mem-
bers prove to confidently choose, discuss, and contest religiously connoted 
self-representations, neglect religion at all, or claim real religiousness, and 
finally modernize all religions according to the needs of the twenty-first 
century. The conjunctions between religiousness and gender brought to 
light striking insights concerning their values, habits and orientations. 
Apart from a joy-oriented agnostic or atheist youth culture, a new, reli-
giously connoted one is currently emerging and influences the Facebook 
backstage discourse.
Conclusion
According to our findings, the Kosmo Facebook page serves as an 
exchange platform for Generation In-Between where worldviews, mean-
ings, and narratives are negotiated by the use of teasers touching sensible 
91   Sevgi Kiliç, Sawitri Saharso and Birgit Sauer, “Introduction: The Veil. Debating 
Citizenship, Gender and Religious Diversity,” Social Politics 15, no. 4 (2008): 397-410 (here 
402).
92   Masood Khan, “The Muslim Veiling: A Symbol of Oppression or a Tool of Liberation?” 
UMASA Journal 31 (2014): 1-11 (here 2-4). This so-called Islam Law of 1912 resulted from 
the Monarch’s decision in 1867 to guarantee constitutional equality of legally recognized 
churches and communities in Austria, which was extended to the provinces Bosnia and 
Herzegovina after their occupation in 1878. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1908 also led to Islam friendly policies. See Richard Potz, “Das Islamgesetz 1912 – eine 
österreichische Besonderheit,” SIAK-Journal: Zeitschrift für Polizeiwissenschaft und polizeiliche 
Praxis 1 (2013): 45-54 (here 47-48).
93   “Für Östereich: Arbeitsprogramm der Bundesregierung 2017/18,” accessed on March 
9, 2017,  http://archiv.bundeskanzleramt.at/DocView.axd?CobId=65201.
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topics. It provides a space for the self-appointed “Yugo group” that seems to 
be terribly in need for such a safe space. Members of this online community, 
who are strongly interconnected through common language(s), even make 
fun of their complicated past by sharing inside jokes and creating their own 
timing when talking about the recent past: “prije rat” (before the war), “za 
vrijeme rata” (during the war), and “poslije rata” (after the war).94 Within 
this online community, young adults who grew up during the 1990s seem 
to be overrepresented and make strong use of the possibilities the platform 
offers. A topic about being a “Yugo-child in the 90s” gathered 326 likes, 
twenty-three “Haha” emojis, and one “Love” emoji.95 Additionally, it was 
shared thirty-four times and commented on seventy-seven times, mostly 
with a lot of “Face with Tears of Joy” emojis.
The generation’s status of being in-between is also reflected in the 
Facebook communication among its members. From one topic to another, 
they replace their smiley and heart emojis with fights and accusations to 
the point of extremist statements. Here, backstage, everything seems to be 
allowed and every opinion is represented. This is what makes it a perfect 
space for a generation that has a lot in common, but also shows numerous 
differences and disagreements regarding their contested collective memo-
ries, values, and different forms of youth culture.
As a result, the backstage discourses prove to be religiously connoted 
along gendered distinctions as well as national(istic) lines. However, even 
within the same religious beliefs borders are drawn, along the question of 
who might be the true believer. The highly diverse Generation In-Between 
shows changing distinctions always depending on various reference points. 
Their religious patchwork setting is not stable, but rather interferes with 
their (changing) values, present lives, and future expectations in Austria. 
Instead of reproducing religious habits, these young people create new 
forms of social practices, in search for like-minded persons within the 
digital backstage or hybrid space. Finally, they seem to be able to adapt 
everywhere, but share the intimate feeling of belonging nowhere.
94   “Jugo-Eltern und ihre am häufigsten verwendeten Zeitformen,” posting on Kosmo’s 
Facebook-page, May 20, 2016 by Kosmo editors.
95   “4 Dinge, von denen kein Jugo-Kind der 90er verschont blieb,” posting on Kosmo’s 
Facebook-page, March 4, 2016 by Kosmo editors.
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Austria Bordering Europe: Blocking and Brokering 
Routes Amid a Manifold Crisis
Andreas Th. Müller/Andreas Oberprantacher
Austr(al)ia is in Europe
In Austria, it is a running joke to play with the phonological proximity 
between Austria and Australia while emphasizing that the former should 
not be confused with the latter. This joke features on a variety of souvenir 
t-shirts warning prospective tourists that the letters “a” and “l” matter, since, 
unlike Australia, there are no kangaroos in Austria. At the end of Austria’s 
satirist video contribution to the pseudo-competition “America First (but 
which country is second?),” the team from the Austrian Broadcasting 
Corporation (ORF) responsible for the country’s mock presentation 
referred to this popular joke by stressing that Austria—and not Australia—
should be ranked second after America.1
But as Sigmund Freud, the prominent Viennese psychoanalyst, already 
noted in his study Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), in order 
to generate pleasure, jokes tend to “employ the device of distracting atten-
tion by putting forward something in the joke’s form of expression which 
catches it.”2 In the case of the aforementioned running joke, it may indeed 
be argued that while the attention of the audience is diverted to remarkable 
differences between the two countries, the confusion of a minor member 
state at the margins of the European Union with a major country at the 
center of Oceania is still secretly enjoyed. But apart from this concealed 
jouissance, there is also something else that is being repressed when insisting 
on insurmountable differences between Austria and Australia: Austria—
through large parts of its government, administration, and population—is 
becoming one of the most fervent European supporters and promoters of 
1  Thanks are given to Mag.a Verena Kirchmair for her support with the documentation of 
the present paper. See ORF – Willkommen Österreich, “Austria Second (Official Video),” 
accessed Mar. 6, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bGoqs9wJC6E.
2   Sigmund Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, trans. and ed. James Strachey, 
with a biographical introduction by Peter Gay (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1989), 186.
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the “Australian model”3 of dealing with people who are crossing borders 
without the required documentation. Especially the Federal Minister 
of the Interior, Wolfgang Sobotka, and the Federal Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Sebastian Kurz, both politicians belonging to the right wing of 
the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), have repeatedly called for viewing the 
Australian policies of pushing back “coffin boats” with asylum-seekers on 
board, of installing off-shore detention centers for undocumented refugees 
and migrants on remote islands like Manus or Nauru, and of investing in 
the Operation Sovereign Borders (established 2013 and on-going) as a par-
agon for the European Union’s own border management system.4
Even though none of Austria’s state borders coincide with the very 
borders of the European Union, except for those that are shared with 
the neighboring non-EU countries Switzerland and the Principality of 
Liechtenstein, which have both become parties to the Schengen Agreement 
in 2008 and 2011 respectively, this relatively young EU-member state has 
been repeatedly at the European front of redefining notions of the border. 
Be it terms like Obergrenze (upper limits),5 introduced in the European 
debate by Austrian politicians in order to explore legal means to limit the 
number of asylum-seekers by restricting their admission to the asylum pro-
cedure, or experiments with so-called besondere bauliche Maßnahmen (par-
ticular constructional measures) around the Styrian district of Spielfeld, 
situated at the border between Austria and Slovenia, or the Tyrolean moun-
tain pass of Brenner that links Austria to Italy, Austria has turned out to 
be quite an inventive key player for blocking and brokering routes to and 
through Europe.
In our joined paper, we plan to make sense of some of the perplexities 
that concern Austria’s efforts to become a chief gatekeeper of the European 
Union in the wider context of the manifold crisis that has become known 
as the European “refugee crisis,” but also as the European “migrant cri-
sis.” Since these efforts are multidimensional, our own approach is itself 
3   Cf. Suvendrini Perera, Australia and the Insular Imagination: Beaches, Borders, Boats, and 
Bodies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Tania Penovic and Azdeh Dastyari, “Harm 
and Accountability in Transnational Detention Environments: The Case of Australia’s 
Extraterritorial Processing of Asylum Seekers,” in Detaining the Immigrant Other: Global 
and Transnational Issues, ed. Rich Furman, Douglas Epps, and Greg Lamphear (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 141-154.
4   See in this respect also the briefing addressed to the members and staff of the European 
Parliament: Ionel Zamfir, “Refugee and Asylum Policy in Australia: Between Resettlement 
and Deterrence,” Briefing for the European Parliament (November 2016), accessed Mar. 
6, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593517/EPRS_
BRI(2016)593517_EN.pdf.
5   See chapter “What a Border Is (Not).”
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transdisciplinary in the sense that our arguments will repeatedly cross 
the line between legal analysis and political theory while considering also 
related fields of scholarship. As far as the structure of our argumentation 
is concerned, we will first confront limited concepts of the border as a 
device of state sovereignty with the more comprehensive notion of borders 
as “border regimes” serving a plurality of (conflicting) interests. Secondly, 
we will discuss Austria’s ambivalent role as a “gatekeeper” in the midst of 
the manifold crisis dubbed the European “refugee crisis.” After that, we 
will try to characterize some of the most problematic traits of the Austrian 
interests to manage the current crises by experimenting with schemes and 
by advancing propositions that tend to be situated at the margins of the 
rule of law. And finally, we will conclude our paper with a reflection on the 
European asylum system which at the least claims to be based on solidarity.
What a Border Is (Not)
In a controversial interview for the German journal Cicero, a “magazine 
for political culture,” the notorious German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk said 
that the “postmodernist society dreams itself in a state ‘beyond border secu-
rity.’ It exists in the surreal mode of border-oblivion [Grenzenvergessenheit]. 
It enjoys its existence in a culture of thin-walled containers. Where once 
were thick-walled borders, there are now small membranes. And these 
are massively overrun [trans. by AM and AO].”6 Such statements, which 
reflect popular sentiments that are typically catalyzed by right-wing pres-
sure groups such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD), or the Patriotic 
Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) in Germany, 
or by the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria as well as by pan-European 
movements like the Identitarian Movement, are significant insofar as they 
illustrate how the notion of the border is conventionally identified with 
massive border fortifications that are said to coincide with the territorial 
limits of the modern state.
In other words, Sloterdijk exemplifies what is frequently the case among 
scholars of rather conservative disciplines such as philosophy and law, two 
disciplines that contributed to legitimize the formation of the modern state. 
It is a common prejudice that archetypical borders are those maintained 
by states in order to separate one sovereign country from another and to 
6   Peter Sloterdijk, “‘Das kann nicht gut gehen’: Peter Sloterdijk im Gespräch mit 
Alexander Kissler und Christoph Schwennicke über Angela Merkel, die Flüchtlinge und 
das Regiment der Furcht,” Cicero: Magazin für politische Kultur 21 (2016): 14-23 (here 21).
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determine who is allowed to enter (or exit) under which conditions. What 
is more, Sloterdijk’s arguments, echoed by intellectual companions such as 
Rüdiger Safranski,7 are also evidencing that at least in philosophical terms 
the Conservative Revolutionary movement, which was mostly active in the 
interwar period, seems to still be thriving among some European thinkers. 
For it was Carl Schmitt who first claimed in his post-bellum book, The 
Nomos of the Earth (1950), that modern border fortifications supported by 
states are basically the result of a Euclidian vision of political modernity; 
that is, they were born from a legal mos geometricus. According to his line 
of reasoning,
[l]ines were the first attempts to establish the dimensions 
and demarcations of a global spatial order. Since these 
lines were drawn during the first stage of the new planetary 
consciousness of space, they were conceived of only in terms 
of surface areas, i.e., superficially, with divisions drawn more or 
less geometrically: more geometrico. Later, when historical and 
scientific consciousness had assimilated (in every sense of the 
word) the planet down to the last cartographical and statistical 
details, the practical-political need not only for a geometric 
surface division, but for a substantive spatial order of the earth 
became more evident.8
Such preconceptions are problematic because the rhetorical figure of 
the infinitesimally small dividing “line” gradually evolving into substantive 
border fortifications usually overshadows how inconsistent the histori-
cal formation of modern states was, how many transitions, passages, and 
crossings between various “surface areas” existed side by side, and how the 
Jus Publicum Europaeum was implicated in the colonial disordering of the 
earth.9 They are also problematic because one—rather simplistic—defini-
tion of the border is preferred over many others that are silently neglected. 
In an essay entitled “What is a Border?,” the French philosopher Étienne 
Balibar argues that the
7   See Rüdiger Safranski, “Rüdiger Safranski über den Sinn von Grenzen,” in NDR.de, 
Nachdenken über… Grenzen, Mar. 29, 2016, accessed Mar. 3, 2017, http://www.ndr.de/
ndrkultur/Ruediger-Safranski-ueber-Sinn-von-Grenzen,safranski116.html.
8   Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum, trans. and annot. by Gary L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2006), 
86.
9   See, in contrast to Carl Schmitt’s arguments, Lisa Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).
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idea of a simple definition of what constitutes a border is, by 
definition, absurd: to mark out a border is, precisely, to define 
a territory, to delimit it, and so to register the identity of that 
territory, or confer one upon it. Conversely, however, to define 
or identify in general is nothing other than to trace a border, 
to assign boundaries or borders (in Greek, horos; in Latin, finis 
or terminus; in German, Grenze; in French, borne). The theorist 
who attempts to define what a border is is in danger of going 
round in circles, as the very representation of the border is the 
precondition for any definition.10
Unlike Schmitt and, these days, Sloterdijk or Safranski, whose argu-
ments reflect a rather conventional definition of “the” border as a device 
that separates sovereign states (on idealized maps), Balibar warns against 
simplistic notions, since borders are, in truth, complex entities.
In order to come to alternative terms when engaging with “the equiv-
ocal character of borders in history,”11 Balibar suggests that it makes sense 
to consider the following three aspects: their over-determination, their pol-
ysemic character, and their heterogeneity. As Balibar clarifies in more detail, 
it is first of all paramount to comprehend that basically all types of borders 
are over-determined to the extent that there is a range of “other geopolit-
ical divisions”12 that either weaken or strengthen the borderlines running 
between single states. In other words, since the Schengen Agreement and 
the so-called Dublin system came into force, it makes a difference, for 
example, if a country’s borders overlap (in part) with those of the European 
Union or not. Secondly, borders “do not have the same meaning for every-
one;”13 they transport a polysemic character, since it is also a question of 
passports and, beyond that, of social status, which borders may be easily 
passed and which may not. Or, as Balibar puts it, for “a poor person from a 
poor country [who risks getting stuck on their journeys], […] [the border 
tends to become] an extraordinarily viscous spatio-temporal zone, almost 
a home—a home in which to live a life which is a waiting-to-live, a non-
life.”14 And thirdly, borders can be said to be also heterogeneous. This is to 
10   Étienne Balibar, “What is a Border?,” in Politics and the Other Scene, Étienne Balibar, 
trans. Christine Jones, James Swenson, and Christ Turner (London: Verso, 2002), 75-86 
(here 76).
11   Ibid., 78.
12   Ibid., 79.
13   Ibid., 81.
14   Ibid., 83; see also Shahram Khosravi, ‘Illegal ’ Traveller: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
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say that they are increasingly falling apart in the sense that “some borders are 
no longer situated at the borders at all [italics in original],”15 considering, for 
example, that with the advent of satellite imaging and biometric imaging 
technologies borders become as mobile as those people who, suspected of 
being illegal trespassers, are monitored from a macroscopic or a microscopic 
level.
When Balibar argues that it is a problematic preconception to 
believe that borders coincide first and foremost with state borders, he 
is ultimately also asserting that it would be a gross misconception to 
perceive borders in such a limited fashion. In similar terms, the archi-
tectural theorist Eyal Weizman also notes that the “last fortified line to 
have entertained the fantasy of solid defense was the Israeli Bar-Lev 
Line.”16 At the latest since the collapse of the Iron Curtain, it became 
increasingly visible that “contemporary geopolitical space has several 
frontier characteristics.”17 Accordingly, Weizman contends that such 
space “instead of being demarcated by continuous lines, […] has come 
to resemble a territorial patchwork of introvert enclaves,”18 which tend 
to suspend sovereignty and extra-territorialize jurisdiction for strategic 
purposes and thus “violate the traditional juridical territoriality of the 
sovereign state and call the Westphalian border-based state system into 
question.”19
It is against this theoretical background that scholars like Sandro 
Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, or research groups like Transit Migration, 
have adopted the comparatively elastic term “regime” when discussing bor-
ders as complex entities that comprise different (public, private, national, 
transnational, etc.) actors, material and immaterial elements, documents 
and rituals, more or less sophisticated technologies, and that more often 
than not are organized transnationally.20 In fact, a variety of contemporary 
15   Balibar, “What is a Border?,” 84.
16   Eyal Weizman, “Principles of Frontier Geography,” in City of Collision: Jerusalem and the 
Principles of Conflict Urbanism, ed. Philipp Misselwitz and Tim Rieniets (Basel: Birkhäuser, 
2006), 84-92 (here 85).
17   Ibid.
18   Ibid.
19   Ibid.; see also Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel ’s Architecture of Occupation (London: 
Verso, 2007), 1-16; Didier Bigo, “Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in 
Control?,” in Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe, ed. Didier Bigo 
and Elspeth Guild (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 49-99.
20   Serhat Karakayali and Vassilis Tsianos, “Movements that Matter: Eine Einleitung,” 
in Turbulente Ränder: Neue Perspektiven auf Migration an den Grenzen Europas, 2nd ed., 
ed. Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2007), 13-17; Sandro 
Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, Border as Method, or, The Multiplication of Labor (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2013), 178-183.
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borders are “managed” both by police and military units, but also by inter-
national agencies such as the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) or the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), 
and increasingly in cooperation with multinational corporations such as 
G4S or Sodexho.
Moreover, it would be too reductive to identify borders solely with 
material arrangements such as walls, fences, gates, etc.21 For people 
who are classified as “deportable” aliens, it is the fear of being detected, 
of being separated from significant others, and of being removed by 
force that makes the border an immaterial, but embodied, sensation.22 
In this sense, it may also be argued that border regimes consist of a 
combination of policies and performances that in one way or another 
regulate how borders are to be operated (controlled, passed, or sealed). 
And finally, one should not forget that the history of border regimes 
reflects the history of technological change: the Border Security Expo 
in San Antonio, Texas is just one of the many venues that could be 
used as an example to illustrate how the newest technologies are traded 
between companies and countries in order to render “border environ-
ments” more secure while forcing border-crossers to attempt even more 
insecure journeys.
Keeping such methodological provisos in mind, it makes sense to 
take “the border not only as a research ‘object’ but also as an ‘epis-
temic’ angle […] [that] provides productive insights on the tensions 
and conflicts that blur the line between inclusion and exclusion, as 
well as on the profoundly changing code of social inclusion in the pre-
sent,”23 as Mezzadra and Neilson put it. And with respect to the theme 
of our paper, there are indeed several reasons to assume that Austria 
acts as quite an inventive gatekeeper that tries to regulate the access 
to the European Union by brokering and blocking routes with a variety 
of means. In the next section, we will refer to some of these means while 
discussing the ambivalent attitude of Austria with regard to the manifold 
crisis the European Union is facing.
21   See Ronald Rael, ed., Borderwall as Architecture: A Manifesto for the U.S.-Mexico 
Boundary (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2017); Olivier Razac, Barbed Wire: A 
Political History, trans. Jonathan Kneight (London: New Press, 2002).
22  See Victor Talavera, Guillermina Gina Núñez-Mchiri, and Josiah Heyman, 
“Deportation in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands: Anticipation, Experience, and 
Memory,” in The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement, 
ed. Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 
166-195.
23   Mezzadra and Neilson, Border as Method, viii.
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The EU “Refugee Crisis” and Austria’s Role in It
The “refugee crisis” dominated public discourse in 2015 and 2016, in 
Europe and particularly in Germany and Austria. This becomes manifest, 
on the one hand, in “refugee” being chosen as the word of the year 2015.24 
On the other hand, the “crisis” is evidenced by the sheer numbers of per-
sons arriving in Austria: Throughout the year 2015, 88,340 applications for 
international protection were submitted to the Austrian authorities.25 This 
made Austria, behind Germany and Sweden, the third-largest recipient 
in absolute numbers of asylum seekers within the EU.26 In relative num-
bers, with 10.3 asylum seekers per 1,000 inhabitants, Austria was, behind 
Sweden, the second-most frequented EU country.27 Even higher was the 
number of persons crossing through Austria on their way to Germany and 
further north: It is estimated that more than 800,000 persons transited 
through Austria between mid-2015 and mid-2016, with only 5 to 10% 
among them filing an application for international protection in Austria.28
The steep increase in the number of refugees knocking at Austria’s doors 
was due to at least two interwoven developments: First, in the last years, 
more and more people started fleeing from conflict zones in Syria, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, etc., but there were also people crossing over from Africa.29 
While countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey shoulder the lion’s share 
of refugees coming from the Near and Middle East,30 the number of per-
sons arriving at the borders of the EU has also grown substantially over the 
past years. It is in this context that the second and even more important 
factor has been realized. In 1990, the EU countries devised a distribution 
24   Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache, “GfdS wählt ‘Flüchtlinge’ zum Wort des Jahres 
2015,” in gfds.de, Dec. 11, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://gfds.de/wort-des-jahres-2015/.
25   See BMEIA, “Austrian Integration Report 2016,” in bmeia.gv.at, 27, accessed 
Mar. 7, 2017, https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Integration/
Integrationsbericht_2016/Integration_Report_2016_EN_WEB.pdf.
26   Ibid.
27   Ibid.; Germany with 5.9, Italy with 1.4, Greece with 1.2, France with 1.1, Spain with 
0.3, and Poland with 0.3. The European Union average was 2.6 per 1,000.
28   Government ordinance on the determination of threat to public order and inner 
security, Explanation according to § 36 Abs. 2 AsylG 2005 (Verordnung der Bundesregierung 
zur Feststellung der Gefährdung der Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ordnung und des Schutzes 
der inneren Sicherheit, Begründung gemäß § 36 Abs. 2 AsylG 2005). From 803,600 persons 
transiting through Austria between Sept. 5, 2016, and June 6, 2016, 56,600 requested 
international protection in Austria.
29   4.9 million refugees came from Syria, 2.7 million from Afghanistan and 1.1 million 
from Somalia; “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015,” unhcr.org, June 20, 2016, 
accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-
global-trends-2015.html.
30   Ibid.
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mechanism for asylum seekers, the Dublin system.31 Its chief objective was 
(and is) to identify a single responsible state for every asylum application 
in order to avoid both asylum shopping (i.e., strategic applications in more 
than one member state) and the phenomenon of “refugees in orbit” (i.e., 
the situation where no state accepts responsibility to examine an asylum 
application).32 
While reformed twice since then,33 the substantial features of the sys-
tem have remained the same. In practice, the most important criterion is 
that which allocates the responsibility to conduct asylum proceedings (and 
to care for the needs of asylum seekers while these proceedings are under 
way) to the member state whose borders the asylum seeker has “irregu-
larly crossed” from a third country,34 with the other member states being 
authorized to send an asylum seeker back to the “Dublin state,” i.e. the 
member state responsible according to the Dublin regime.35 Typically, this 
is a country at the southern and southeastern periphery of the European 
Union, notably Italy and Malta (from Northern Africa) as well as Greece 
(from Turkey).36 
As living conditions and the quality of the asylum procedure had massive-
ly deteriorated in Greece already in the late 2000s, the two highest European 
courts, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg and 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg, inter-
vened in 201137 and declared the sending back of asylum seekers to Greece 
to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment and thus it was in violation 
of the human rights obligations of the EU members states seeking to return 
asylum seekers to the member state where they originally entered European 
Union soil.38 This brought the Dublin mechanism to the brink of collapse, 
and it has remained in this state of dysfunction ever since then.
31   Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum 
lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities (Dublin Agreement) of 
June 15, 1990, OJ 1997 C 254/1.
32   See Valsamis Mitsilegas, “Solidarity and Trust in the Common European Asylum 
System,” Comparative Migration Studies 2 (2014): 181-202 (here 185); see also European 
Court of Justice (CJEU), joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, 
para. 79.
33   Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003, OJ 2003 L 50/1 (Dublin II) and Regulation (EU) No. 
604/2013, OJ 2013 L180/31 (Dublin III).
34   See Art. 13 para. 1 Dublin III Regulation.
35   Art. 18 Dublin III Regulation.
36   See Iris Goldner Lang, “Is there Solidarity on Asylum and Migration in the EU?,” 
Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 9 (2013): 1-14 (here 6).
37   See European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Aug. 27, 1997, No. 20837/92, M.S. 
v. Sweden and ECtHR (GC), Jan. 21, 2011, No. 30696/09, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.
38   See e.g. Andreas Th. Müller, “Solidarität in der gemeinsamen europäischen Asylpolitik,” 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 70 (2015): 463-489 (here 477ff.).
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The rising awareness of this dysfunction and the poor prospects for 
achieving a solidarity-based redistribution mechanism on the EU level39 
have made it increasingly attractive for the affected member states to 
look for unilateral solutions. Lamentabile dictu, Austria has become one 
of the forerunners of such unilateralist policies in 2016. This harshly con-
trasts with a quite different approach initially pursued by the Austrian 
government. The first reaction to the massive increase in the numbers 
of persons seeking refuge in Austria was to generously allow them to 
enter the country,40 invoking humanitarian responsibilities and historical 
traditions regarding the admission of refugees (notably with respect to the 
Hungarian Uprising of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, as well as the 
dissolution and the wars in Ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s). The “welcome 
policy” (Willkommenspolitik), first adopted on the government level, was 
reflected and reinforced in the civil society camp with people applaud-
ing the arriving refugees, spontaneously providing for food, clothes, and 
accommodation, as well as organizing solidarity concerts such as “Voices 
for Refugees.”41 Yet the massive inflow of persons also led to a temporary 
breakdown of the train traffic between Austria and Germany due to the 
vast number of persons seeking to continue their journey northwards.42 
For several weeks, the underground parking of the Salzburg railway sta-
tion was turned into a refugee camp.43
Against this background, in October 2015, the Austrian government 
reversed its policy and effectively closed the Nickelsdorf border crossing 
between Austria and Hungary for asylum seekers. Since, also due to similar 
measures by the Hungarian government, the Eastern Balkans route was 
not available any more, the migratory movements relocated to the Western 
Balkans route. In the case of Austria, this meant that the refugees arriving 
from the south would now seek to enter the country through the Styrian 
border crossings Spielfeld and Bad Radkersburg between Slovenia and 
39   See chapter “(The Lack of ) Solidarity in the Common European Asylum System.”
40   Announcement of Federal Chancellor Werner Faymann of Sept. 4, 2015; “Budapest 
will Verkehrskollaps verhindern,” ORF.at, Sept. 4, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://orf.at/
stories/2296946/2296947/.
41   Oct. 3, 2015, Heldenplatz, ca. 100,000 participants; Voices for Refugees, accessed Mar. 
7, 2017, voicesforrefugees.com.
42   See “Zugverkehr Salzburg-München bleibt bis 4. Oktober eingestellt,” diepresse.com, 
Sept. 22, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/4826657/
Zugverkehr-SalzburgMuenchen-bleibt-bis-4-Oktober-eingestellt.
43   See “Der Tag, an dem die Grenze (kurz) verschwand,” diepresse.com, Sept. 6, 2015, 
accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/4814424/Der-Tag-an-
dem-die-Grenze-kurz-verschwand?from=suche.intern.portal; “Flüchtlingsrückstau in 
Salzburg,” diepresse.com, Sept. 27, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://diepresse.com/home/
innenpolitik/4830558/Fluechtlingsrueckstau-in-Salzburg?from=suche.intern.portal.
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Austria.44 Shortly afterwards, the Austrian government announced to erect 
a 3.7 kilometer long border fence in Spielfeld in order to be able to better 
control the border movements in this area and to facilitate the registration 
of asylum seekers in a “transit zone” near the border.45
The next—and, in symbolical terms, particularly telling—step was 
the political agreement, on the occasion of the January 20, 2016 “asylum 
summit” including the federal government, the governors, as well as the 
Association of Cities and Towns and the Association of Municipalities, to 
establish an “upper limit” for the admission of asylum seekers to Austria. 
In September 2015, an amendment to the Austrian constitution46 had 
been adopted, creating a legal obligation for every municipality, town, 
and city in the country to receive and house at least 15 asylum seekers 
per 1,000 inhabitants.47 The political agreement on the upper limit took 
inspiration from that law and set a limit of 127,000 asylum seekers (i.e., 
1.5 % of the Austrian population of 8+ million people) for the following 
four years. This number was allocated degressively so that the following 
annual upper limits were defined: 37,500 for 2016, 35,000 for 2017, 
30,000 for 2018 and 25,000 for 2019.48 With 36,030 persons admitted 
to asylum proceedings, the upper limit for the year 2016 was eventually 
not reached.49 Nonetheless, the ÖVP has launched a debate as to whether 
the limit for the year 2017 should be divided in half, since the influx of 
asylum seekers into Austria is still regarded as overstraining the country’s 
reception capacities.50
44   See “Nickelsdorf leer – Route verlagert sich nach Süden,” diepresse.com, Oct. 8, 2015, 
accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/4846518/Nickelsdorf-leer-
Route-verlagert-sich-nach-Sueden?from=suche.intern.portal.
45   Wolfgang Benedek, “Recent Developments in Austrian Asylum Law: A Race to the 
Bottom?,” in “Constitutional Dimensions of the Refugee Crisis,” special issue, German Law 
Journal 17, no. 6 (2016): 949-966 (here 951); “Erste Zaunpfosten in Spielfeld aufgestellt,” 
derstandard.at, Dec. 7, 2015, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://derstandard.at/2000027113824/
Erste-Zaunpfosten-in-Spielfelder-Boden-getrieben.
46   Federal constitutional law on accommodation and allocation of vulnerable foreigners 
in need of help (Bundesverfassungsgesetz über die Unterbringung und Aufteilung von hilfs- und 
schutzbedürftigen Fremden), Federal Law Gazette I 120/2015.
47   Ibid., Art. 2 para. 1.
48   Common approach of Bund, Länder, Städte and Gemeinden to the asylum summit of 
Jan. 20, 2016 (Gemeinsame Vorgangsweise von Bund, Ländern, Städten und Gemeinden zum 
Asylgipfel am 20. Januar 2016), bka.gv.at (Office of the Federal Chancellor, 2016), point 4, 
accessed Mar. 7, 2017, https://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=61858.
49   Ministry of the Interior, “Asylum Statistics 2016,” bmi.gv.at, December 2016, accessed 
Mar. 7, 2017, http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_Asylwesen/statistik/files/2016/Asylstatistik_
Dezember_2016.pdf.
50   “ÖVP will Obergrenze auf 17.000 Asylanträge halbieren,” derstandard.at, Jan. 11, 2017, 
accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://derstandard.at/2000050551611/OeVP-will-Obergrenze-auf-
17-000-Asylantraege-halbieren.
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The lawfulness of binding upper limits for the admission of persons 
requesting asylum at Austria’s borders inspired controversial discussions 
within Austria and beyond. Regarding the latter, the President of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, Koen Lenaerts, clearly objected 
such a measure.51 Concerning the former, the President of the Austrian 
Constitutional Court, Gerhart Holzinger, also took a negative stand 
regarding binding upper limits.52 As there existed serious doubts regarding 
the compatibility of the planned upper limit with international law, EU as 
well as constitutional law, the Austrian government commissioned a legal 
opinion on these questions from two law professors.53 
The ensuing legal opinion indeed confirmed that absolute and uncon-
ditional upper limits violate international law, EU law, and constitutional 
law. In particular, the non-refoulement principle, i.e. the prohibition to return 
persons to a country where they face a real risk of being killed, tortured, or 
treated inhumanely or degradingly, must be respected at all times, irrespec-
tive of capacity concerns on the part of the receiving country.54 In addition, 
the comprehensive corpus of EU law on substantive and procedural aspects 
of asylum law must be complied with. However, the legal opinion suggests 
a certain relaxation of these requirements by relying on Article 72 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), according to 
which those provisions “shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities 
incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and 
order and the safeguarding of internal security.”55 Yet the relevance of this 
provision in justifying a deviation from the guarantees of EU asylum law 
was critically received within Austria’s legal academia.56
In spite of this criticism, the Austrian government opted for realiz-
ing the upper limit along the lines suggested by the aforementioned legal 
opinion. Subsequently, a new section entitled “Special provisions regarding 
the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security 
51   “Lenaerts: Asylrecht schwer vereinbar mit Obergrenze,” noz.de, Jan. 18, 2016, accessed 
Mar. 7, 2017, http://www.noz.de/deutschland-welt/politik/artikel/659460/lenaerts-
asylrecht-schwer-vereinbar-mit-obergrenze.
52   “Verfassungsgerichtshof: Obergrenzen wären rechtswidrig,” derstandard.at, Mar. 
15, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://derstandard.at/2000032924967/Obergrenze-
Gutachten-duerfte-Regierung-Ruecken-staerken.
53   Legal Opinion “Völker-, unions- und verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen 
für den beim Asylgipfel am 20. Januar 2016 in Aussicht genommenen Richtwert für 
Flüchtlinge” of Mar. 29, 2016, by Professors Bernd-Christian Funk and Walter Obwexer; 
bundeskanzleramt.at (Office of the Federal Chancellor, 2016), accessed Mar. 7, 2017, https://
www.bundeskanzleramt.at/DocView.axd?CobId=62571.
54   See ibid., 9, 43-44, 48, 77-78.
55   See ibid., 15ff., 41ff.
56   See in particular Benedek, “Recent Developments in Austrian Asylum Law,” 954ff.
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during the conduct of border controls” was added to the Asylum Act.57 It 
authorizes the federal government to adopt, with the consent of the Main 
Committee of the National Council, i.e. the Parliament’s first chamber, a 
regulation—commonly, albeit not technically termed “emergency regula-
tion” (Notstandsverordnung)—formally determining that the maintenance 
of law and the safeguarding of internal security are in danger.58
When adopting this regulation, the government would re-establish bor-
der controls (as opposed to the open borders provided for by the Schengen 
regime) and set up specific “registration offices.” Asylum seekers would have 
to submit their applications exclusively at those offices. Yet such an applica-
tion would only be accepted, and asylum proceedings conducted, if the person 
can demonstrate that he or she would face the risk of being killed or tortured 
or treated in an inhuman and degrading fashion if returned (i.e., a violation 
of the non-refoulement principle), or that his or her presence is mandated in 
Austria for private or family life reasons.59 If this is not the case, the application 
would be treated as not having been made in the first place, and thus no asylum 
procedure would be opened.60 Hence, as soon as the emergency regulation is 
adopted,61 the right to asylum in Austria would, to a large extent, be suspended.
On 7 September 2016, the Austrian government released the draft of 
the emergency regulation to the public for comments and reactions.62 In 
view of the widespread criticism in regard to this draft63 and the dissent 
57   §§ 36-41 AsylG 2005, Federal Law Gazette I 24/2016.
58   See § 36 AsylG 2005; see in this regard also Benedek, “Recent Developments in 
Austrian Asylum Law,” 956.
59   See Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, Federal Law 
Gazette 210/1958 as amended by Federal Law Gazette III 47/2010, which enjoys the status 
of constitutional law in Austria.
60   As regards the functioning of the emergency regulation regime see in particular 
Benedek, “Recent Developments in Austrian Asylum Law,” 955-956; Andreas Th. Müller, 
“Die Flüchtlingskrise 2015/2016: Eine rechtliche Chronik aus österreichischer Perspektive,” 
in Aktuelle Probleme der Flüchtlingspolitik, ed. Roman Lehner and Friederike Wapler 
(forthcoming).
61   According to § 36 AsylG 2005, the regulation can only be adopted for a maximum 
duration of six months, extendable for further six months three times. Hence, there is a 
maximum duration of the emergency regulation regime of two years.
62   “Entwurf für Asyl-Notverordnung liegt vor: Regierung einigt sich auf Text,” derstandard.
at, Sept. 7, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, derstandard.at/2000043960567/Entwurf-
fuer-Notverordnung-liegt-vor-Regierung-einigt-sich-auf-Text; “Asyl-Notverordnung 
‘höchstens für ein paar Tage,’” diepresse.com, Oct. 6, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://
diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/5097248/AsylNotverordnung-hoechstens-fuer-ein-
paar-Tage?from=suche.intern.portal.
63   See in particular the criticism in UNHCR, “UNHCR-Kurzanalyse der 
Asylgesetzesnovelle 2016,” unhcr.at, Apr. 21, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://www.unhcr.
at/fileadmin/rechtsinfos/fluechtlingsrecht/4_oesterreich/4_2_asyl_positionen/4_2_4_
positionen_ab_2011/FR_AUS_Positionen_AsylG-Novelle_2016.pdf; Benedek, “Recent 
Developments in Austrian Asylum Law,” 957ff.
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among the coalition parties on the question whether the regulation should, 
for reasons of prevention, be adopted immediately (ÖVP’s position), or 
only when the upper limit is actually reached (Social Democratic Party of 
Austria’s, i.e., SPÖ’s position), the emergency regulation has not been set 
into force so far. Yet the mere existence of the amendment to the Asylum 
Act, making the far-reaching suspension of the right to asylum a realistic 
scenario, has already contributed to the erosion of asylum guarantees in 
Austria. Even though the numbers of asylum seekers in Austria are declin-
ing, notably after the closure of the Western Balkans route in the wake of the 
EU-Turkey deal in March 2016,64 the Austrian government is continuously 
working on the tightening up of the accessibility and “attractiveness” of the 
Austrian asylum system,65 thus making Austria one of the most restrictive 
countries in admitting asylum seekers.66
Of Horizontal and Vertical and Other Borders
In her seminal essay entitled Waning Sovereignty, Walled Democracy, the 
US-American scholar Wendy Brown writes that 
one irony of late modern walling is that a structure taken to mark 
and enforce an inside/outside distinction—a boundary between 
“us” and “them” and between friend and enemy—appears as 
precisely the opposite when grasped as part of a complex of 
eroding lines between the police and the military, subject and 
patria, vigilante and state, law and lawlessness.67 
Even though Austria has not shown any serious interest to date to 
build a massive wall along its southern and eastern territorial borders, it is 
nonetheless important to note that it experimented repeatedly with ad hoc 
barricades and with the idea to take other “particular constructional mea-
sures” in order defend its professed sovereignty against people suspected to 
be “economic refugees” (Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge), as they are disrespectfully 
64   European Council, “EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016,” consilium.europa.eu, 
Mar. 18, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press-
releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.
65   See only in the last two years Federal Law Gazette I 70/2015 and Federal Law Gazette 
I 24/2016; see also the draft law of Feb. 28, 2017, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, https://www.
parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/ME/ME_00279/index.shtml.
66   See Benedek, “Recent Developments in Austrian Asylum Law,” 950.
67   Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 25.
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referred to. However, as Brown further contends, such fortifications “often 
function theatrically, projecting power and efficaciousness that they do not 
and cannot actually exercise and that they also performatively contradict.”68
In the case of Austria’s efforts to block routes through and to Europe 
not only by investing in material means, but also by coercing—through 
immaterial means—a number of states along the Western Balkans Route to 
curb the number of people on the move, it may certainly be argued that such 
means are more often than not contradictory. Apart from the theatrical effect 
of such efforts, which was reinforced when units of the Austrian military 
patrolled the transit zone around Spielfeld next to Austrian police units, it 
is also important to recall that the Balkan Peninsula in particular is of great 
economic importance for Austrian industries such as finance, construction, 
and retail companies. This is to say that any effort by Austria to portray itself 
as a sovereign state that is able to protect its territorial borders by temporarily 
interrupting the “free” flow of goods, services, and people had and has to be 
balanced with all the transnational interests that connect Austria with a wide 
range of countries along the Balkans route. But even in the case of Austria’s 
threat to block the Brenner Pass to Italy, should the number of illegal bor-
der-crossers further increase, one should not forget that such measures would 
have seriously undermined the relationships with South Tyrol, the northern-
most province of Italy, which was part of the Austro-Hungarian County of 
Tyrol until 1919 and which is still of special political interest for the Austrian 
Government. Considering these ties, there is indeed little reason to assume 
that Austria planned to shut its borders by putting up walls.
Very much like the sound bite coined by the former Australian Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd in 2009, when he said that, in view of all the peo-
ple that are trying to reach the shores of Australia on derelict vessels, it is 
mandatory to be “tough but humane,”69 it may be argued that Austria too 
tried to reconcile contradictory interests by means of diversifying its bor-
der regime and, with it, the European border regime. In fact, the ominous 
legal discourse of “upper limits” may be read as part of the comprehensive 
strategy to complement “horizontal border control” initiatives with “vertical 
border control” policies. In other words, the Austrian government was and 
is well aware of the fact that it cannot possibly risk its reputation as a liberal 
country that has overcome its totalitarian past by declining access to groups 
of people who have suffered from persecution and destitution, in some cases 
consisting of families travelling with infants. A tough stance at Austria’s 
territorial limits, where military and police units confront impoverished 
68   Ibid.
69   Mezzadra and Neilson, Border as Method, 167-175.
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civilians, would immediately backfire, at least on an international, if not 
also on a national level. Considering this risk, it is quite plausible to argue, 
then, that Austria has a genuine interest to explore other options for how 
to retain a tough stance as a European gatekeeper without appearing exces-
sively inhumane at the border crossing points.
As Mezzadra and Neilson stress in their reflection of the contradictions 
of the Australian model, it would nevertheless
be a mistake to correlate toughness with border reinforcing and 
humaneness with border crossing. […] Toughness is a quality 
associated not only with the violence of interceptions and border 
reinforcement but also with the forced border crossing implicit 
in practices of deportation and refoulement […]. Humaneness, 
by contrast, is a quality associated with the international system 
of human rights, which plays an important role in migration 
management. Human rights provide the dominant frame for 
negotiating questions of borders and migration in the world today.70
While Austria acted comparatively “humane” at its border crossing 
points, despite occasional threats to restrict the free passage for people who 
had already crossed into the European Union without (valid) documenta-
tion, it became much “tougher” in terms of how it began to deal with their 
situation once they decided to apply for asylum, that is, to remain.
The emergency regulation draft, discussed in the previous section of our 
paper, is just the proverbial tip of the iceberg of a range of related efforts to 
find alternative, that is, “vertical” means to manage borders, without being 
denounced for using disproportionate violence at the border. Apart from 
this draft, which reveals the interest to shift burdens and responsibilities 
from the Austrian authorities to the asylum applicants who have to provide 
valid reasons for not being refouled—in an asylum interview that is itself 
problematic from the beginning71—there are also further examples that 
can be given in order to illustrate how ingeniously Austria borders Europe: 
A number of Austrian federal states, such as Salzburg, Upper Austria, or 
Lower Austria, are just granting “basic care” (Grundversorgung)—instead 
of the much better financed “needs-based minimum benefit system” 
(bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung)—to those who qualified for subsidiary 
protection status instead of asylum. This results in situations where the 
70   Ibid., 175.
71   Khosravi, ‘Illegal ’ Traveller, 33-35.
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families concerned are usually unable to afford a flat on their own, where 
especially children are at risk of further impoverishment and where there 
are also little chances to improve one’s situation by finding an adequate 
job, since the subsidiary protection status is usually conferred for one year 
only (after which it may or may not be prolonged). What is more, the new 
Integration Act (Integrationsgesetz), which is still being discussed as of this 
writing (March 2017), will require all people who either qualify as refugees 
or for subsidiary protection status to regularly attend language courses in 
German language as well as so-called “value courses” (Wertekurse). And 
those who fail to meet the requirements will be sanctioned by having their 
social benefits reduced.
Besides these efforts to make the lives of many people—who barely 
reached Austria after crossing treacherous zones such as the Mediterranean 
or the Balkans—quite miserable in order to persuade them that they might 
be better off somewhere else, there are also other, more drastic means that 
indicate how borders may differ from the territorial limits of a country. 
While the Federal Minister of the Interior, Sobotka, has proudly pro-
claimed at the European Police Congress in Berlin that Austria is the 
most successful European country at deporting people without the right 
of abode,72 the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kurz, has stated that 
he will urge the European Union to extra-territorialize reception centers 
by developing such infrastructures in Georgia, the Maghreb countries, or 
in the Western Balkans.73 Both statements are not isolated incidents of 
high-ranking Austrian politicians, but rather integrated attempts to rede-
fine the European border regime in accordance with Austrian preferences 
that are in turn inspired by the Australian model. In both cases, the “tough-
ness” of securing borders occurs not necessarily where borders are conven-
tionally believed to be located, but somewhere else: in confined and, to a 
certain extent, legally “obscure” environments such as deportation centers or 
so-called “hotspots,” where people are either removed or restrained by force.
According to Nicholas de Genova, it is precisely such situations of 
deportability (and, we may add, detainability) that mark
the zone of indistinction between a condition that is (virtually) 
stateless and one that is positively saturated with the state. […] 
72   “Österreich laut Sobotka bei Abschiebungen in EU ‘deutlich führend,’” derstandard.at, 
Feb. 23, 2017, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://derstandard.at/2000053045083/Oesterreich-
laut-Sobotka-bei-Abschiebungen-in-EU-deutlich-fuehrend.
73   “Kurz verlangt Flüchtlingslager außerhalb der EU,” faz.net, Mar. 5, 2017, accessed 
Mar. 7, 2017, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/asylbewerber-kurz-verlangt-
fluechtlingslager-ausserhalb-der-eu-14910008.html.
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Deportation [and detention too, AM and AO] is, indeed, a 
premier means for perpetrating, embellishing, and reinstating a 
“threshold […] that distinguishes and separates what is inside 
from what is outside.”74
We are not claiming that Austria is the only or even the most zealous 
gatekeeper of the European Union, but we have reasons to assume that over 
the past few years it has become quite inventive when trying to block and 
broker routes through and to Europe. This is to say that Austria is at the 
front of redefining the European Union’s border management system, even 
though it is located rather at its margins than at its limits. And these per-
plexities will almost certainly aggravate unless the structural deficits of the 
current asylum system of the European Union, which contributed to make 
Austria’s position so prominent, are not addressed with more solidarity.
(The Lack of) Solidarity in the Common European Asylum System
It has become common to conceive of, and conceptualize, the ques-
tion of admitting asylum seekers to Europe first and foremost as the 
“refugee problem” or as a challenge of “burden sharing,” which chiefly 
carries negative associations.75 It is true, however, that the arrival, pres-
ence, and inclusion of human beings fleeing from their home countries 
to the EU create various challenges to the European Union and its 
member states that should be coped with in a spirit of solidarity. This 
is not only a moral claim or a political program, but a legal principle 
prominently enshrined in EU law. According to Article 67 paragraph 
2 and Article 80 TFEU, the Common Asylum Policy of the European 
Union shall be “based on solidarity between Member States” and “be 
governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibil-
ity, including its financial implications, between the Member States.” 
74   Nicholas de Genova, “The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom 
of Movement,” in The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement, 
ed. Nicholas de Genova and Nathalie Peutz (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 33-68 
(here 46); see also Judith Welz, “Die österreichische Abschiebepolitik in Zahlen: 1995-
2013,” INNEX Working Papers 1 (2014), accessed Mar. 6, 2017, https://inex.univie.ac.at/
fileadmin/user_upload/ag_divpol/INEX-working-paper-Nr-1-Öst-Abschiebepolitik-in-
Zahlen-JuWe-310314.pdf.
75   See also in official documents: European Parliament resolution of Sept. 2, 2008 on 
the evaluation of the Dublin system (2007/2262(INI)); see, for instance, the criticism in 
Mitsilegas, “Solidarity and Trust in the Common European Asylum System,” 186, 190, 198.
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Solidarity is therefore laid down as a principle of EU law in general76 
and of EU asylum law in particular.77
Alas, it is difficult to see such a spirit of solidarity at work when looking 
at the current asylum policies of EU member states. First, if at all, there is 
a discourse on the solidarity between member states, but not on solidarity 
with the human beings fleeing to Europe, and second, while lip service 
may be paid to the need for solidarity mechanisms between member states, 
those mechanisms are currently (and in the foreseeable future) not working.
The One-sidedness of the European Solidarity Discourse
The aforementioned Articles 67 and 80 of the TFEU expressly refer to 
the solidarity between member states. And indeed, this is what the EU trea-
ties78 and, following them, the predominant legal discourse are focusing on.79 
76   See Christian Calliess, Subsidiaritäts- und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union, 2nd 
ed. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999); Peter Gussone, Das Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union 
und seine Grenzen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006); Martina Lais, Das Solidaritätsprinzip im 
europäischen Verfassungsverbund (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007); Malcolm Ross and Yuri Borgmann-
Prebil, eds., Promoting Solidarity in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2010); Andreas 
Th. Müller, “Solidarität als Rechtsbegriff im Europarecht,” in Solidarität: Vom Wert der Gemeinschaft, 
ed. Clemens Sedmak (Wien: Facultas, 2010), 77-104; Ségolène Barbou des Places and Chahira 
Boutayeb, La solidarité dans l’Union européenne: éléments constitutionnels et matériels (Paris: Dalloz, 
2011); Andrea Sangiovanni, “Solidarity in the European Union,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 
(2013): 213-241; Stefan Kadelbach, “Solidarität als europäisches Rechtsprinzip?,” in Solidarität als 
Europäisches Rechtsprinzip?, ed. Stefan Kadelbach (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 9-19.
77   See European Commission, COM(2011) 835 final, 2: “a guiding principle of the 
common European asylum policy.”
78   See also Articles 23, 31 and 32 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as well as Article 78 
paragraph 3, Article 122, Article 174, Article 175, Article 194 and in particular Article 222 of the Treaty 
on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the latter constituting the so-called “solidarity clause” 
in the EU Treaties; see in this regard Antonio-Maria Martino, The Mutual Assistance and Solidarity Clause: 
Legal and Political Challenges of an Integrated EU Security System (European University Studies, 2014).
79   Daniel Fröhlich, Das Asylrecht im Rahmen des Unionsrechts: Entstehung eines föderalen Asylregimes 
in der Europäischen Union (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 262ff., 317ff.; Roland Bieber and 
Francesco Maiani, “Ohne Solidarität keine Europäische Union: Über Krisenerscheinungen in 
der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion und im Europäischen Asylsystem,” in Schweizerisches 
Jahrbuch für Europarecht 2011/2012, ed. Astrid Epiney and Tobias Fasnacht (Bern: Stämpfli 
Verlag, 2012), 297-328, 311ff.; Paul McDonough and Evangelia Tsourdi, “The ‘Other’ Greek 
Crisis: Asylum and EU Solidarity,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 31 (2012): 67-100, 67ff.; Reinhard 
Marx, “Solidarität im grundrechtskonformen europäischen Asylrechtssystem,” Neue Zeitschrift 
für Verwaltungsrecht (2012): 409-413, 409ff.; Goldner Lang, “Is there Solidarity on Asylum and 
Migration in the EU?,” 1ff.; C.A. Groenendijk, “Solidarität im europäischen Einwanderungs- 
und Asylrecht,” in Solidarität: Hohenheimer Tage zum Ausländerrecht 2012, ed. Klaus Barwig et al. 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 41-52, 41; Peter Hilpold, “Solidarität im EU-Recht: Die ‘Inseln 
der Solidarität’ unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Flüchtlingsproblematik und der 
Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion,” Europarecht, no. 4 (2016): 355-474, 389-390.
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At the same time, there have been (so far widely unheard) calls for a need 
to develop a more comprehensive perspective on the concept of solidarity 
within EU law.80
A first step in this regard is becoming aware that the EU Treaties, at a 
closer look, not only provide for solidarity between member states, but also 
for transnational solidarity with human beings in other EU member states. 
This becomes manifest first and foremost in the guarantees emerging from 
EU citizenship, i.e. the rights of EU citizens and their close relatives (even 
of third-country nationality) to travel to and reside within other EU mem-
ber states, including non-discriminatory access to social welfare, the educa-
tion and healthcare systems, etc. This transnational aspect of EU solidarity 
is prominently reflected in the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, which 
includes a special title devoted to “solidarity.”81 Furthermore, the Charter’s 
preamble as well as Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
guarantee that the European Union is founded on the indivisible, universal 
values of human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity. This testifies to an 
understanding of solidarity that transcends a mere member states-focused 
perspective of burden sharing.
Inasmuch as the aforementioned provisions refer to solidarity as an 
“indivisible and universal value,”82 the perspective is widened so as to 
go beyond the borders of the European Union to include human beings 
in a spirit of trans-EU solidarity. Moreover, as the preamble of the EU 
Fundamental Rights Charter stipulates that the European Union “places 
the individual at the heart of its activities,” the well being of all human 
beings, not only EU citizens, should be the yardstick of the European 
Union’s action. This cosmopolitan perspective inherent to the EU Treaties 
further becomes manifest in Article 21 of the TEU, according to which, 
“the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the prin-
ciples which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, 
80   Timo Tohidipur, “Solidarität in der europäischen Asyl- und Flüchtlingspolitik,” in La 
solidarité dans l ’Union européenne/Solidarität in der Europäischen Union, ed. Otmar Seul and 
Tomas Davulis (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012), 164, 179; Mitsilegas, “Solidarity and Trust in the 
Common European Asylum System,” 186-187; Marx, “Solidarität im grundrechtskonformen 
europäischen Asylrechtssystem,” 189; Bast, “Solidarität im europäischen Einwanderungs- 
und Asylrecht,” in Solidarität als Europäisches Rechtsprinzip?, ed. Stefan Kadelbach (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2014); 19-32 (here 21); see also European Commission, COM(2011) 
835 final, 12: “[…]especially as the Union has a duty not only to its Member State, but 
also to asylum applicants”; see also Andreas Th. Müller, “Solidarität in der gemeinsamen 
europäischen Asylpolitik,” 465ff.
81   See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Title IV, Articles 27-38.
82   The wording is inspired by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, as 
adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, June 25, 1993, no. 4: “All 
human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.”
Migration in Austria 237
and which it seeks to advance in the wider world,” amongst others “the 
principle of solidarity.”
The constitutional framework of the European Union thus provides for a 
legal basis for solidarity beyond its borders. At the same time, such trans-EU 
solidarity is systematically marginalized in the dominant EU law discourse. 
Indeed, “the way in which the concept of solidarity has been theorised in EU 
law leaves little, if any space for the application of the principle of solidarity 
beyond EU citizens or those ‘within’ the EU and its extension to third-coun-
try nationals or those on the outside.”83 This gives rise to the one-sidedness 
from which the current EU solidarity discourse direly suffers. It tends to 
conceive of the human beings leaving their countries of origin and fleeing to 
the European shores and borders primarily as a “burden” whose financial and 
other implications are (or are not) to be shared between the member states, 
making “the refugees” mere objects of the political discourse. But even on that 
level, the inter-member state solidarity mechanisms, insofar they exist at all, 
have proven weak and inoperable.
The Lack of Genuine Solidarity Mechanisms within the EU Asylum 
Policy
The Common European Asylum System is often identified with the 
Dublin regime, which is certainly its most well-known component. 
However, the Dublin system, even when functional (which it is not84), 
is not providing for mechanisms of redistribution of asylum seekers and 
is in that sense not a solidarity mechanism.85 The rules for the allocation 
of responsibility in the Dublin Regulation, as also acknowledged by the 
European Commission,86 are not accompanied by any relevant corrective 
mechanisms. The inequalities in terms of distribution of asylum seekers 
throughout the European Union are rather reinforced by the fact that 
legal transit to other member states is not possible, since once a member 
83   Mitsilegas, “Solidarity and Trust in the Common European Asylum System,” 187, 
criticizing the EU solidarity concept as “exclusionary.”
84   See chapter “The EU ‘Refugee Crisis’ and Austria’s Role in It.”
85   See Bast, “Solidarität im europäischen Einwanderungs- und Asylrecht,” 35; 
Tohidipur, “Solidarität in der europäischen Asyl- und Flüchtlingspolitik,” 175; Goldner 
Lang, “Is there Solidarity on Asylum and Migration in the EU?,” 13; Daniel Thym, 
Migrationsverwaltungsrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 365.
86   See European Commission, COM(2008) 360 final, no. 5.1.2.: “The Dublin system 
was not devised as a burden sharing instrument: nevertheless, its functioning may de facto 
result in additional burdens on Member States that have limited reception and absorption 
capacities and who find themselves under particular migratory pressures because of their 
geographical location.”
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state becomes responsible for examining an asylum application, it remains 
the responsible state even if the asylum seeker travels to another EU 
country.87
Efforts to reform the Dublin regime so as to include a genuine redistri-
bution mechanism have so far failed. In view of the situation in Greece, the 
Commission had proposed an early warning mechanism that would have 
provided for a temporary suspension of the Dublin regime to the benefit 
of a stumbling member state, with the effect that its peers would have had 
to shoulder additional responsibilities.88 However, there was no majority 
in the Council for that proposal.89 When the new Dublin (III) Regulation 
was adopted in 2013, member states could solely agree on the introduction 
of a “mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management.”90 
Accordingly, if the Commission establishes that the Regulation’s application 
“may be jeopardised due either to a substantiated risk of particular pressure 
being placed on a Member State’s asylum system and/or to problems in 
the functioning of the asylum system of a Member State,” the latter shall 
be invited to draw up a “preventive action plan.” If the situation worsens 
and the Commission establishes that “the implementation of the preventive 
action plan has not remedied the deficiencies identified or where there is 
a serious risk that the asylum situation in the Member State concerned 
develops into a crisis which is unlikely to be remedied by a preventive action 
plan,” the Commission may request the member state concerned to draw 
up a “crisis management action plan.”
This mechanism might be elaborate, but this cannot change the fact 
that it remains a purely optional instrument. In addition, it focuses on the 
member state under duress, but does not create any obligations for the 
other member states to provide assistance. Since the EU “refugee crisis” 
of 2015/2016 which mostly affected Austria, Germany, and Sweden, it is 
precisely those states that are now campaigning for such solidarity obli-
gations of the other, less-affected member states as well as a meaningful 
redistribution mechanism after having helped to prevent it for many years 
before. This rather recent change in attitude tends to undermine the credi-
bility of those member states, and it is not surprising that the member states 
that still oppose redistribution mechanisms, notably the so-called Visigrad 
Group or the Visigrad Four (i.e., the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
87   See ECtHR (GC), Jan. 21, 2011, No. 30696/09, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 
223.
88   See European Commission, COM(2008) 820 final, 9; COM(2011) 835 final, 13.
89   See Minutes of 3111th Council Meeting Justice and Home Affairs, Sept. 22/23,  2011, 
Council document nr. 14.464/11, 8.
90   Dublin III Regulation, Article 33.
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and Slovakia), continue to remind Austria and Germany of their previous 
rejection of redistribution of asylum seekers within the European Union.
A year ago, the Commission launched a further attempt to comple-
ment, and thereby correct, the misallocation of asylum seekers by the 
Dublin regime by virtue of a genuine solidarity mechanism. In its proposal 
for a Dublin IV Regulation, submitted only three years after the adoption 
of its predecessor, the Commission suggests the creation of a “corrective 
allocation mechanism.”91 Accordingly, an automated system shall moni-
tor each member states’ share in all asylum applications made within the 
European Union. The application of the corrective allocation for the benefit 
of a member state is triggered automatically, where the number of applica-
tions for international protection, for which a member state is responsible, 
exceeds 150% of the figure identified in the respective reference key. This 
key is calculated based on two criteria with equal 50% weighting, namely 
the size of the population and the total GDP of a member state. As of the 
triggering of the mechanism, all new applications lodged in the member 
state experiencing the disproportionate pressure are proportionately allo-
cated to the other member states. However, a member state of allocation 
may decide to temporarily not take part in the corrective mechanism for 
a twelve-month period. Such a member state must then make a solidarity 
contribution of EUR 250,000 per applicant.92
Not surprisingly, this proposal was also doomed to fail. At least cur-
rently, the qualified majority in the Council that would be needed to adopt 
a general and binding redistribution mechanism does not seem politically 
feasible. Alas, the state of inter-member state solidarity is even worse. On 
Sept. 22, 2015, the Council had adopted a decision in which it relied, for 
the first time, on Article 78 paragraph 3 of the TFEU.93 Pursuant to this 
provision, in the event of one or more member states being confronted 
with an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nation-
als of third countries, the Council may adopt provisional measures for the 
benefit of the member states concerned. On this basis, the Council decided 
that, as a one-time solidarity measure, 120,000 asylum seekers should be 
relocated from Greece and Italy to the other member states. Even though 
the Visigrad States, as well as Romania, fervently opposed this measure, 
and even though Slovakia and Hungary even took it to the Court of Justice 
91   European Commission, COM(2016) 270 final (Dublin IV), Chapter VII, Articles 34-
43.
92   See ibid., Explanatory Memorandum to Proposal, II.
93   Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of Sept. 22, 2015 establishing provisional measures 
in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, OJ 2015 L 248/80.
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of the European Union,94 the decision was adopted by qualified majority 
and is thus legally binding. Yet the implementation of the decision, many 
months after its adoption and entry into force, is still highly disappointing,95 
so much so that the policy of binding relocation measures among member 
states, even if only in single instances, must be deemed to have failed.
As an alternative and arguably more appropriate concept, the Visigrad 
States are now advertising mechanisms of “flexible solidarity.”96 Hence, 
every member state shall, on the basis of its experience, social structure, and 
economic potential, make voluntary contributions to handle the challenges 
faced by the European Union and its member states. For those critical of 
the concept, the call for voluntariness is only a pretext to evade any effective 
solidarity mechanism and, even worse, to avoid the admission of persons 
of different (notably Muslim) religion and creed to avowedly Christian 
nations.
While Austria is so far (albeit rather lukewarmly) distancing itself from 
such “Occidentalist” advances on the part of the Visigrad States, the spirit 
of unilateralism becoming manifest in their political rejection and sabotage 
of legally binding relocation decisions is mirrored in Austria’s own unilat-
eralist ambitions, as described before in relation to the adoption of upper 
limits, with seeming reliance on Article 72 of the TFEU.97 Against this 
background, we are witnessing a general trend of renationalizing asylum 
and migration policies, which belies the long-standing efforts to establish a 
Common European Asylum System. The existing solidarity mechanisms—
the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF)98 which administers 
an amount of EUR 3.136 billion for 2014-2020 as well as the European 
94   CJEU, case C-643/15, Slovakia/Council; case C-647/15, Hungary/Council; both cases 
still pending.
95   Relocated from Greece: 9.632; relocated from Italy: 3.946 (as of Mar. 3, 2017); 
European Commission, “Member States’ Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism,” 
ec.europa.com, Mar. 3, 2017, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/
homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/
state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf.
96   Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries, visegradgroup.
eu (2016), accessed Mar. 7, 2017, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-
statement-of-the-160919; Markus Kotzur, “Flexible Solidarity – Effective Solidarity?,” 
voelkerrechtsblog.org, Nov. 16, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/
flexible-solidarity-effective-solidarity/; Solon Ardittis, “Flexible Solidarity: Rethinking the 
EU’s Refugee Relocation System after Bratislava,” blogs.lse.ac.uk, 2016, accessed Mar. 7, 
2017, http://bit.ly/2cCR3Yo; Zsuzsanna Végh, “‘Flexible Solidarity’: Intergovernmentalism 
or Differentiated Integration. The Way out of the Current Impasse,” visegradinsight.eu, Dec. 
19, 2016, accessed Mar. 16, 2017, http://visegradinsight.eu/flexible-solidarity/.
97   See chapter “The EU ‘Refugee Crisis’ and Austria’s Role in It.”
98   Regulation (EU) No. 516/2014, OJ 2014 L 150/168.
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Asylum Support Office (EASO),99 the EU’s asylum agency in La Valletta 
with its mostly technical mandate—are not sufficiently relevant to compen-
sate for the massive centrifugal forces that are currently impacting on the 
European asylum system.
99   EASO, accessed Mar. 7, 2017, https://www.easo.europa.eu/.

Marginalized Memories: The (In)visibility of 
Migration History in Public Space in Austria1
Christiane Hintermann
Introduction and Approach
“Where are sites of remembrance for migrants? Where are the places 
for migrants to remember and where are the places where they are remem-
bered?” Christiane Harzig asked these questions in the introduction to the 
anthology Migration und Erinnerung (Migration and Memory) which she 
edited in 2006.2 Especially the last question is in the focus of my research 
and this contribution, which is situated at the intersection of migration 
history and migration research in general, memory studies and urban and 
cultural geography.
Starting point of my work and the work of others in the field is the 
empirical fact that most European societies today are pluralistic, heteroge-
neous immigration societies. Population differs not only according to ethnic 
origin, religion or country of origin but also with respect to their individual 
and family biographies as well as their collective histories and transmitted 
historical and political experiences. Despite all the past and present migra-
tion experiences and the emerging pluralistic societies, Europe’s self-im-
age is still very much centred on national paradigms and narratives. These 
national paradigms also prevail when it comes to the shaping of historical 
consciousness and memory by institutions like museums, media or schools. 
What we are focusing on when we are talking about the interrelations 
of migration and memory not on an individual but a societal level is the 
question in which ways immigration societies construct, reconstruct and 
negotiate their migration past. We are dealing with central questions like 
“Is (im)migration history part of the post-World War Two narratives in 
Europe?,” “How is the rich (im)migration history of Europe remembered 
1   Research for this contribution has been done within the frame of the project V 186-
G18 “Lieux de mémoire of migration in urban spaces: the example of Vienna,” funded by 
the Austrian Science Fund FWF.
2   Christiane Harzig, “Einleitung: Zur Persönlichen und kollektiven Erinnerung in der 
Migrationsforschung,” in Migration und Erinnerung: Reflexionen über Wanderungserfahrungen 
in Europa und Nordamerika, ed. Christiane Harzig (Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2006), 7-20.
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in the national histories of different European countries?,” “Have immi-
grants a position in the historical consciousness of a society?,” or “Do they 
have a place in the cultures of remembrance of a society?”
Generally speaking, migration history is no integral part of the hege-
monic narratives of European societies in general and Austria in particular. 
Migrants and their histories live on the fringes of our historical conscious-
ness and also migration research has neglected the memories of migrants 
and the marginalization of the younger Austrian migration history for a 
long time.3 One piece of evidence for this general observation is the fact 
that historical museums in Austria completely ignored the migration his-
tory of the country in their permanent exhibitions until recently.4 Another 
indicator is the observation that public space is virtually free of any symbol-
ic places that would point to the recognition of national, regional or local 
migration histories, especially regarding the younger migration history of 
the country. In the following I will investigate this (in)visibility of migration 
history in public space. I will shortly argue that it might also be interpreted 
as selective representation and will then discuss the making of a visible site 
of remembrance in the context of migration and asylum in public space in 
Vienna—the so called Marcus Omofuma Stone, a memorial in remem-
brance of a Nigerian asylum seeker who was killed during his deportation 
flight from Austria to Bulgaria in 1999. The analysis will especially focus on 
the conflicts connected to the installation of the memorial and the appro-
priation of public space connected to it. Fundamental questions of equality, 
of exclusion and inclusion are at the bottom of the study: Whose history is 
visible in public space? Who tells the stories and from which perspectives? 
Who has the right to be remembered permanently in public space either 
with a monument, a memorial, a commemorative plaque or with street 
names? These are eventually questions of uneven power relations in society 
and unequal access to social, financial and cultural resources. 
3   Christiane Hintermann, “Gedächtnislücke Migration? Betrachtungen über 
eine nationale Amnesie,” Zeitgeschichte 40, no. 3 (2013): 149-165; Dirk Rupnow, 
“Deprovincializing Contemporary Austrian History: Plädoyer für eine Geschichte 
Österreichs als Migrationsgesellschaft in transnationaler Perspektive,” Zeitgeschichte 40, 
no. 1 (2013): 5-21; Christiane Hintermann and Dirk Rupnow, “Orte, Räume und das 
Gedächtnis der Migration: Erinnern in der (post)migrantischen Gesellschaft,” Mitteilungen 
der Österreichischen Geographischen Gesellschaft 158 (2016): 59-83.
4   Hakan Gürses, Cornelia Kogoj, and Sylvia Mattl, Gastarbajteri: 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration 
(Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2004); Christiane Hintermann, “‘[…] that migration simply 
and really is the absolute normality’: The Narration of Austrian Immigration History in 
Exhibitions,” in Migration & Memory: Representations of Migration in Europe since 1960, ed. 
Christiane Hintermann and Christina Johansson (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2010), 162-
181; Regina Wonisch and Thomas Hübel, Museum und Migration: Konzepte – Kontexte – 
Kontroversen (Bielefeld: transcript, 2012).
Migration in Austria 245
Selective Representation and Marginalization
Visible representations of Austrian migration history in public space 
are rare and highly selective. An investigation of the symbolic landscape 
suggests that some events of the Austrian migration history are more eas-
ily integrated in and accepted as part of the hegemonic narratives of the 
Second Republic than others. Analyses of school textbooks show that while 
labor migration only inhabits a very small part of the country’s cultural 
memory, the story of Austria as an asylum country is an uncontested part 
of the historical consciousness.5 This self-perception and self-definition of 
Austria as a generous asylum country is very much founded in the reception 
of refugees from Hungary in 1956, from Czechoslovakia in 1968 and from 
Poland in 1981. In her study on ethnic discourse in the Austrian parlia-
ment in the 1990s, Sedlak refers for instance to the “myth of the ‘Austrian 
golden heart’” put forward in parliamentary speeches in the context of 
Austrian asylum policy in order to establish a positive self-presentation and 
imply that Austria is “a nation of donors and helpers.”6 That many of these 
5   Christiane Hintermann, ‘Beneficial’, ‘problematic’ and ‘different’: Representations 
of Immigration and Immigrants in Austrian Textbooks,” in Migration & Memory: 
Representations of Migration in Europe since 1960, eds. Christiane Hintermann and Christina 
Johansson (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2010), 61-78.
6   Maria Sedlak, “You really do make an Unrespectable Foreigner Policy … Discourse 
on Ethnic Issues in Austrian Parliament,” in Racism at the Top: Parliamentary Discourses on 
Ethnic Issues in Six European States, eds. Ruth Wodak and Teun A. van Dijk (Klagenfurt: 
Drava 2000), 107-168.
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refugees did not stay in the country but only used it as transit country is 
another story, seldom told. For instance, only approximately 10% of the 
originally roughly 180,000 refugees from Hungary settled in Austria per-
manently. The flight of Hungarians or rather their reception in Austria is at 
the same time one of the few “migration events” of the last 60 years, which 
is not only prominently represented in Austrian school textbooks but also 
visibly remembered in public space. The Bridge of Andau at the Austrian-
Hungarian border, spanning the so-called Einser Kanal is such a site of 
remembrance.
More than 70,000 Hungarian refugees used this bridge as their way to 
Austria before it was destroyed by the Soviet troops in November 1956. The 
new bridge was reconstructed in 1996 as a symbol of tolerance and helpfulness. 
It is symptomatic for the Austrian remembrance policy in connection with 
refugee movements during the Cold War that not the refugees who crossed 
the bridge or their difficult situation are remembered in the commemorative 
plaque but mainly the hospitality, the helpfulness of the Austrian population.7 
7   Cf. the Austrian perception of Hungarian refugees: Karin Liebhart and Andreas 
Pribersky, “Brücke oder Bollwerk? Grenzland Österreich-Ungarn,” in Memoria Austriae II: 
Bauten, Orte, Regionen, ed. Emil Brix, Ernst Bruckmüller, and Hannes Steckl (Wien: Verlag 
für Geschichte und Politik, 2005), 411-441; Berthold Molden, “Die Ost-West-Drehscheibe: 
Österreichs Medien im Kalten Krieg,” in Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und 
Österreich, ed. Manfred Rauchensteiner (Wien: Böhlau, 2010), 687-774.
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The refugees themselves are not even mentioned. A similar example is a 
commemorative plaque fixed to the Red Cross building in Eisenstadt, 
also remembering the events of 1956.8
Quite a number of historical sites in Austria, especially commemora-
tive plaques and memorial stones are connected to the flight and the settle-
ment of so-called “ethnic Germans.” Laa/Thaya for instance—a small town 
in Lower Austria on the border to the Czech Republic—hosts a museum 
on the history of refugees from South Moravia (Sudetendeutsche). And the 
district museum Floridsdorf, one of the twenty-three districts in Vienna, 
shows a small exhibition on Siebenbürger Saxons, based on the initiative of 
a migrant himself. 
There is, however, no reference to labor migration to and from Austria 
at all or the recruitment of labor migrants in the 1960s and 1970s. Jan 
Motte and Rainer Ohliger confirmed this result for Germany. They argue 
that labor migration to Germany from the 1950s onwards has largely been 
invisible in public space.9 
The Marcus Omofuma Stone
To raise a historical monument means to create special “places” with the 
central function to commemorate historic events and/or people in public 
space. Remembering materializes in public space, memories are written 
into the landscape. Contrary to most monuments, the Marcus Omofuma 
Stone (MOS) can be interpreted as an expression of a counter memory.10 It 
represents a marginalized and contested part of the younger Austrian his-
tory and focuses on a central und much disputed conflict in our migration 
society: How to deal with asylum seekers and refugees in Austria as well 
as with structural racism and discrimination. The story of the MOS can 
also be read as a reference to an official policy of remembrance that tends 
to be exclusionary when it comes to the representation of events that are 
questioning the principles of our democratic societies, like cases of racism 
and discrimination. 
8   Liebhart and Pribersky, “Brücke oder Bollwerk,” 425.
9   Jan Motte and Rainer Ohliger, “Geschichte und Gedächtnis in der 
Einwanderungsgesellschaft: Einführende Betrachtungen,” in Geschichte und Gedächtnis 
in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft: Migration zwischen historischer Rekonstruktion und 
Erinnerungspolitik, ed. Jan Motte and Rainer Ohliger (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2004), 7-16.
10   Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews 
(Sage House: Cornell University Press, 1977).
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Marcus Omofuma
Marcus Omofuma was a Nigerian asylum seeker. He applied for asy-
lum in Austria in 1998 on the grounds of religious persecution. His appli-
cation was rejected twice by the court of the first as well as the second 
instance. The reason given for the rejection by the authorities was “obvious 
unfoundedness.”11 After the sentence he was taken in detention pending 
his deportation. 
On May 1, 1999 Marcus Omofuma suffocated on his deportation 
flight from Vienna to Nigeria via Sophia. He was escorted by three police 
officers from the alien’s police who wrapped his body including his mouth 
and obviously at least partly also his nose with an adhesive tape and tied 
him to his seat in the aircraft.12 The police officers anticipated resistance 
from Omofuma because he had told them before that “he was not willing 
to return to his home country.” 
The three police officers justified their action among other things 
with the explanation that Omofuma “went wild” which made it nec-
essary to bind him. They had only acted in defence. The officers were 
only shortly suspended and accused of “torture of a prisoner resulting in 
death,” a crime which can be punished by a maximum of ten years’ arrest 
in Austria. Eventually the court followed the line of argumentation of 
the defence lawyers (both of them prominent members of the Austrian 
Freedom Party) that the officers were only subordinates and that gag-
ging and tying people up was a well-established police practice in the 
routine of deportation flights in Austria at that time. The officers were 
finally sentenced to eight-month imprisonment suspended for a proba-
tion period of three years. This also implied that they were still allowed 
to keep their jobs. 
The police officers were not the only ones to be charged. There were also 
proceedings against the Minister of the Interior (at that time a politician 
from the Social Democratic Party, well known for pursuing a restrictive 
migration and asylum policy), the Austrian Head of Security, the respective 
head of department in the Ministry of the Interior and the Chief of Police 
in Vienna. All of them were accused of having had notice of the practice 
and not having stopped it. 
11   AK Marcus Omofuma Stein, Ohne Aufenthaltstitel (Wien, 2009).
12  If not indicated otherwise the following argumentation as well as quotes are taken 
from the opinion of the court on the trial against the three policemen from Sept. 
29, 2002; “Das Urteil,” no-racism.net, accessed Feb. 27, 2017, http://no-racism.net/
article/303/. 
Migration in Austria 249
The Stone Story
The suffocation of Omofuma is most certainly a crucial incident in 
the younger Austrian migration history and the history of racism and dis-
crimination. It was then the culmination of an inhuman asylum policy and 
practice and a culmination of stereotypical and racist reporting in certain 
media on especially Nigerian asylum seekers. But it was also a starting point 
for a closer cooperation and networking of African communities in Austria 
and anti-racist and anti-discrimination NGOs and it is one of those rare 
incidents in the younger Austrian migration history which is publicly—
although not officially—remembered. 
The Marcus Omofuma Stone is the product of a private initia-
tive. The sculpture was produced by the Austrian artist Ulrike Truger 
without any public funding. Her applications for financial support 
to Austrian officials like the Federal President or the respective City 
Councillor of Vienna were all declined. She finally managed to finance 
the big stone—African granite from Zimbabwe, called Nero Assolute 
Zimbabwe—by selling ten bronze casts of the original model she had 
made, € 2,500 each. 
The sculpture – it is three meters high and weighs five tons—is not an 
image presentation of Omofuma himself but an abstract and symbolical 
presentation symbolizing the torture and the pain he had to endure. The 
cuts represent the adhesive tapes that cut into Omofuma. It was the first 
time in her work that Ulrike Truger used a cut-off wheel and not only 
hammer and chisel which she found appropriate in the context of the bru-
tality against Omofuma. “And I thought that it was alright, this cutting, this 
brutal handling [of the stone].”13 
The most interesting part of the stone story in the context of remem-
brance policy and questions like who has the right to public space and who 
has the right to be commemorated in public space was the positioning of 
the stone in October 2003, four and a half years after the death of Omofuma 
and its relocation to its actual position a month later. 
Contemplating over the disinterested and negative attitude of the city 
and national representatives towards her funding applications, the artist 
thought she would not be very successful in getting permission to position 
her stone in the city centre where she wanted it to be raised; in her own 
words: “... and then I thought, when I now turn to them and dutifully ask 
for a place, this will not work. At the end I might get permission to put it 
13   Ulrike Truger, in discussion with the author, March 27, 2012.  
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somewhere in a ‘Beserlpark.’”14 Ulrike Truger decided to position her stone 
unauthorized on a Friday morning next to the National Opera in Vienna’s 
city centre at the so-called Herbert v. Karajan Square. “Then I came to the 
conclusion that illegality is part of the topic anyway. Consequently, I erected 
it there illegally and exactly at the right place, a place where it got the most 
possible attention. And that was the Opera.”15
Ulrike Truger chose the square next to the National Opera, the famous 
Hotel Sacher and the Kärntner Straße not only because it is one of the bus-
iest parts of the city and it was clear that it would attract a lot of attention. 
For her this was also the right place because it is a meeting point of society, 
culture and commerce. It was her intention to bring important topics like 
racism and asylum policy forward and make them central in a central place 
of the city “[…] because it is here that people spend money and live in their 
idyllic world of sophisticated culture. It is exactly here where it has to be 
14   A “Beserlpark” is a colloquial expression for a very small park, sometimes not more than 
a green traffic refuge in Vienna. 
15   Ulrike Truger, in discussion with the author, March 27, 2012. 
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between Sacher, Kärntner Straße and Opera, that is where it belongs as a 
symbol that there is something else to be integrated as well.”16 
After this unauthorized act Ulrike Truger got notice that she had to 
remove the stone within a certain time limit. In an open letter to the city 
mayor Michael Häupl she asked for time of consideration of four weeks to 
think and negotiate about a “good” place for the stone in Vienna; a time 
which she was granted. This of course also implied that the stone would 
remain where it was during that time as a “thorn in the side”17 of society. 
During that time the current location was found; a place which is again 
a meeting point of culture and commerce; the corner of the Mariahilfer 
Straße—the most popular and busiest shopping street in Vienna—and the 
Museumsquartier (museum quarter), a cultural and social hot spot in Vienna 
with art museums, cultural venues, restaurants and pubs. The place belongs 
to Vienna’s 7th district, one among three of the twenty-three districts in 
Vienna with a green majority in the district council and Thomas Blimlinger 
of the Green Party as District Chair Person. He and the Green party sup-
ported the idea of Ulrike Truger to move the stone there and to have it stay 
there for good. 
With her artistic intervention Ulrike Truger took a stand against for-
getting. It was civil society who called for remembrance and challenged 
the national narrative of a generous asylum country when those politically 
responsible for the death of Marcus Omofuma would have preferred collec-
tive forgetting. The social need of collective forgetting, which is as important 
for the establishment of collective identities as shared memories,18 has been 
disturbed by the intervention and a controversial debate has been initiated 
on the questions of what is memorable in public space in society and who 
has or takes the power to decide. 
The Intervention in Public Space – A Provocation of the 
Population?
The undocumented installation and the repositioning of the Marcus 
Omofuma Stone raised heated social, political and media debates. All 
bigger Austrian newspapers – among them Der Standard, Die Presse, 
16   Ibid. 
17   Ibid. 
18   Jaques Le Rider, “Mittel- bzw. Zentraleuopa und Österreich als imaginäre 
Gedächtnisorte der euroäischen Identität,” in Die Verortung von Gedächtnis, ed. Moritz 
Csáky and Peter Stachel (Wien: Passagen Verlag, 2001), 139-150.
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Kurier, Wiener Zeitung, Salzburger Nachrichten, Tiroler Tageszeitung, Neue 
Vorarlberger Tageszeitung, Kleine Zeitung – with the exception of the Kronen 
Zeitung, reported on the positioning and repositioning of the memorial. 
The Kronen Zeitung, Austria’s tabloid newspaper with the highest circu-
lation and well known for its populist style, discriminatory language and 
depiction of immigration as a problem, only covered the topic in letters to 
the editors. Here Marcus Omofuma was again, like in the coverage on his 
death, depicted and criminalized as drug dealer. The authors of the letters 
to the editor expressed their concerns and their consternation that Austria 
honors a drug dealer in a monument.
In general, the media coverage concentrated on the unauthorized posi-
tioning of the stone, which was described in a matter-of-factly or slightly 
positive way when it was interpreted as an act of civic courage:
 
It was the aim of the action to provoke and to rouse – the 
sculptress Ulrike Truger, 55, from Hartberg [Styria] succeeded in 
both last Friday morning on the Front of the National Opera.19    
 You have to take important things in your own hands because 
authorities and politicians tend to forget topics that are not to 
their own credit, is the opinion of Ulrike Truger.20 
Some journalists interpreted the “illegal act” as an unreasonable 
demand, though.21 The media did not at all engage in a debate on remem-
brance policy. Authorizations, responsibilities and potential consequences 
were discussed, but not the issue of remembrance. Surprisingly, there was 
also no discussion on the artistic work of Ulrike Truger. This is also reflected 
in the finding that only two reports were published in the arts section of the 
papers, the majority however in the local news. Not the artistic work but the 
intervention in public space was discussed most prominently. 
After the repositioning of the memorial it became obvious that the 
MOS would be permanently visible in the public space of the city. That 
was the time when the Austrian Freedom Party interfered in the debate 
and took a stand against the memorial and, moreover, took the occasion 
to start a racist discourse on African asylum seekers in Vienna, who were 
overall accused of being drug dealers. In press releases the memorial as 
19   “Denkmal-Aufstellung auf Wienerisch,” trans. by the author, Kurier [italics], Oct. 11, 
2003.
20   “Wichtige Dinge, meint die Bildhauerin Ulrike Truger, muss man ...,” trans. by the 
author, Der Standard [italics], Oct. 11, 2003.
21   “Stein des Anstoßes,” trans. by the author, Die Presse, Oct. 11, 2003.
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such was described as a “questionable case” and a “provocation of the whole 
population of Vienna […] who are daily confronted with asylum seekers 
from black Africa who are dealing drugs in the streets of Vienna.”22
Implicitly the Freedom Party also answers the central question regard-
ing remembrance policy: the question if African asylum seekers have a right 
to be publicly remembered in Austria. Their answer is a clear “no.” On the 
contrary, Marcus Omofuma was posthumously accused of being an illegal 
immigrant abusing the right to asylum.
The Marcus Omofuma Stone and its installation were also debated 
in the Vienna City Council.23 Similar to the media coverage, the debate 
mainly highlighted the “breaking of the law” by Ulrike Truger. The social 
democratic government in Vienna was blamed for their passive attitude and 
their acceptance of the offense. Josef Wagner, a local city counsellor from 
the Freedom Party at that time, interpreted the installation as such and the 
assumed inactivity of the City government as a concerted action against the 
then national government, the coalition between the Austrian People’s Party 
and the Freedom Party. The former Austrian chancellor Werner Faymann, 
who was the responsible city counsellor at that time, was accused of having 
influenced the administrative procedure. Werner Faymann himself inter-
preted the installation of the memorial at the Herbert von Karajan Square 
as a problem of the city building authority, who found a solution and acted 
according to the administrative rules and procedures. Neither the social 
democrats nor the member of the Austrian People’s Party, who raised his 
voice in the debate, positioned themselves as supporters or opponents of the 
memorial. It was mainly a debate on a suggested political influence on the 
Vienna city administration. Only a member of the Green Party interfered 
in the debate with regard to contents and remembrance policy. 
In her press releases, however, also the Freedom Party considered the 
dimension remembrance policy, when they asked on the one hand who had 
the right to be an actor in the field of remembrance culture and policy and 
argued that also “other” parts of society might raise memorials and stones 
ad libitum. On the other hand, they raised the question of who was mem-
orable and which merits of a person were necessary to justify a memorial. 
That Omofuma did not meet the necessary criteria was very clear for the 
Freedom Party, who argued: “As tragic as the death of Marcus Omofuma 
may be, his achievements and his behaviour for our country and our city are 
in no way suitable to justify memorial stones in his remembrance.”24 
22   Press Release, Nov. 10, 2003, OTS0075, trans. by the author.
23   City council of the capital city Vienna, 34th session, verbatim protocol, Nov. 4, 2003. 
24   Press Release, 17 Nov. 2003, OTS0108, trans. by the author.
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That the MOS really was a thorn in the side of parts of the society 
is also obvious by the fact that it has been the target of right wing and 
neo-Nazi devastation many times, especially during 2004 and 2008.25 The 
information plaque has been damaged and stolen repeatedly, poured with 
resin and tar and garbled with varnish. The Stone itself has been sprayed 
and doused with varnish as well, right wing propaganda has been scrawled 
on it and in 2004 even a KKK-symbol (for Ku-Klux-Klan) appeared on the 
memorial. 
The Marcus Omofuma Stone – An Invisible Memorial?
By symbolizing a marginalized and contested part of younger Austrian 
history, the Marcus Omofuma Stone fulfills a central function of memori-
als, which is according to Stachel “to focus slumbering conflicts in society” 
and to “provide an occasion and a place to exchange differences.”26 The 
central and open social conflict addressed with the MOS is how a soci-
ety deals with the right to seek asylum as well as questions of structural 
discrimination and racism in our migration societies. As controversial as 
the topics were the reactions and debates around the installation of the 
memorial.
Although migration and asylum continue to be very controversial 
issues in Austria, and they even gained a new momentum with refugees 
from Syria trying to escape to the European Union since 2015, the Marcus 
Omofuma Stone did not raise a lot of attention during the last years. It has 
not been attacked as frequently as before, which might be interpreted as 
a sign that people got used to the monument or that the meaning of the 
memorial sank into oblivion; that the Stone itself became invisible again 
like migration history as such. This interpretation is supported by empirical 
findings which show that even people who pass by the stone daily have no 
idea about its meaning and its history. Two surveys with questionnaires 
among 115 randomly selected passers-by near the Stone show that the 
meaning and the story of the memorial is widely unknown. Only six of the 
interviewees knew who and which fatal incident was commemorated there, 
25  A photo documentation of the destructions and the cleaning actions afterwards is 
published in: AK Marcus Omofuma Stein, Ohne Aufenthaltstitel (Wien: no publisher, 
2009).
26   Peter Stachel, “Stadtpläne als politische Zeichensysteme: Symbolische Einschreibungen 
in den öffentlichen Raum,” in Die Besetzung des öffentlichen Raumes: Politische Plätze, 
Denkmäler und Straßennamen im europäischen Vergleich, ed. Rudolf Jaworski and Peter Stachel 
(Leipzig: Frank und Time, 2007), 13-60.
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hypotheses about the possible meaning included mainly the Holocaust and 
the time of National Socialism in Austria.27 
This low degree of awareness does not mean, however, that the memo-
rial has no importance regarding the remembrance topography of the urban 
landscape. The Marcus Omofuma Stone as well as Marcus Omofuma as 
an individual are points of reference in the continuous discussion of the 
Austrian asylum law and policy as well as for NGOs working in the field of 
anti-discrimination and anti-racism. The stone itself is often used as meet-
ing point for rallies in connection with migration and asylum policy or as 
place for closing rallies.28
Altogether the example of the Marcus Omofuma Stone shows quite 
clearly that the visualization of migration history in public space in Austria 
and elsewhere is a conflict about the material and symbolic availability and 
appropriation of public space and the unequal opportunities of self-rep-
resentation. The demand for visibility and audibility of migrant stories is 
therefore also a basic issue of equality and acceptance in our societies.
27   The first interview round was conducted within the frame of a university course at the 
Institute for Geography and Regional Research at the University of Vienna by the students 
Philipp Polanski and Rainer Rockenbauer in December 2010. The second was carried out as 
part of the FWF project, headed by the author “Lieux de mémoire of Migration in Urban 
Spaces.” These interviews were carried out by Corinna Wachtberger and Dieter Huemer in 
October 2014.
28   Cf. reports and documentations on the platform http://no-racism.net/.

Austrian Public Opinion in the “Refugee Crisis”
Manfred Kohler
Introduction
The European Union and its member states, as well as the United States, 
if not the whole western industrialized world, have been grappling with the 
challenge of high and rising inflows of asylum seekers and refugees, the most 
recent ones being triggered mainly by the conflict in Syria as well as political, 
economic, and socio-religious instability haunting the entire Middle East and 
North Africa at least since the Arab Spring. At the end of 2015, UNHCR 
registered a total of 65.3 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide. This 
equals a 5.8 million increase over the previous year, a year that already saw an 
unprecedented rise by 8.3 million.1 The extent to which origin and receiving 
countries are affected differs, however, across the world. The current “refu-
gee crisis” may serve as an illustration. While the United States of America 
counted “only” some 286,200 refugees,2 the EU-28 registered 1.3 million new 
asylum applications by the end of 2015 alone, 28% of which were Syrians; 
the next most common applicants originated from Afghanistan and Iraq.3 
With almost 90,000 first-time asylum applications, Austria ranked fourth 
among the top five refugee-receiving EU countries in 2015, which together 
processed more than 70% of all asylum applications across the EU-28. That 
speaks volumes for the issue of fair burden sharing. 
1   UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2016), 1 
2   Ibid., 45. 
3   Eurostat, “Asylum and Managed Migration Database,” accessed Feb. 5, 2017, http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database.
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Figure 1: Number of first-time asylum applicants in the EU and EFTA 
in 2014 and 2015 (in thousands)
Source: Eurostat 
Article 80 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) requests from 
the Union legislator to provide for the fair distribution of burdens among 
member states in the framework of creating a common border checks, 
asylum, and immigration policy. However, the implementation of this 
objective has not yet been possible due to a lack of solidarity among EU 
member states against the backdrop of the recent mass-inflow of asylum 
seekers: in 2015, some 1.5 million refugees entered Europe, of whom 1.3 
million registered as asylum seekers. In Germany alone, some 500,000 
asylum seekers were documented. The handling of these larger numbers 
represents a major risk for the European Union as it stands. Right-wing 
parties are gaining power, a trend for which national parliamentary 
elections in Austria may testify this or next year. The same accounts for 
Germany, Italy, and France, which are all facing elections this year that 
could tilt the electoral balance more to the right and spark the ultimate 
surge of anti-EU and anti-immigration parties in some of the most pow-
erful EU member states. The Front National under Marine Le Pen had 
particularly strong chances of winning this year’s presidential elections. 
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She is a pronounced anti-EU contender and had the potential to reverse 
European integration, since France has been one of the two main engines 
of European unification, along with Germany. We can see from the above 
that refugee migration is a global issue that affects countries in different 
ways and to varying degrees. This article focuses on the case of Austria, 
one of the countries most strongly affected by refugee migration over the 
past two to three years within the European Union, notwithstanding the 
fact that more than two thirds of all refugees worldwide still remain in 
developing countries.4 
The main question to be answered here is how this surge in asy-
lum-seekers and refugees has affected public opinion in Austria. Herbert 
Vytiska presented a survey carried out by GfK-Austria in the fall of 2015 
at the height of the “refugee crisis” that suggested a tilt to the right by 
Austrian public opinion. The survey showed that the asylum issue was par-
ticularly polarizing among the Viennese population. Of all respondents, 
80% said that the refugee issue was the most frequently debated topic 
with family, friends and at the workplace. Additionally, 50% responded 
that the maximum capacity to absorb refugees would soon be reached, 
with another 49% of the surveyed thinking that the flow of refugees can 
be best controlled by stricter border protection. However, reinstating bor-
der fences or walls within EU territory also did not constitute the right 
solution, according to 63% of respondents. Only 37% of the surveyed 
were satisfied with how the government handled the refugee issue, with 
63% heavily criticizing the government for its refugee management; 90% 
of the surveyed agreed with restrictive asylum and immigration policies, 
which also formed their foremost motive to possibly vote a right-wing 
party like the FPÖ.5 
But does that mean that Austrians—and Europeans—are becoming 
increasingly right-wing? Or are they just dissatisfied with the government’s 
refugee management? In the following, we want to dig a bit deeper and 
present an unpublished opinion survey by GfK among mayors of more 
than 900 Austrian municipalities and a survey published by the Institute 
for Social Research and Consulting (SORA) among residents of 248 towns 
and municipalities in Austria.6 Both surveys were carried out in 2016 and 
the questions therein relate to 2015. 
4   UNHCR, Global Trends, 1ff. 
5   Herbert Vytiska, “Asylthema polarisiert Österreichs Öffentlichkeit,” EurActive.de, 
Oct. 19, 2015, accessed Feb. 10, 2017, https://www.euractiv.de/section/osterreich/news/
asylthema-polarisiert-osterreichs-offentlichkeit/ 
6   SORA, “Städtebarometer: Endbericht” (Vienna, 2016); GfK, “Bürgermeister und 
Flüchtlinge” (Austria, 2016). 
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How Austrians Assess the Refugee Issue
Local and Regional Authorities Are Better Refugee Issue 
Managers than National Ones
In March and April of 2016, SORA carried out a survey among a 
random sample of 1,054 persons, aged above 16 and scattered across a 
total of 248 towns and municipalities in Austria. An interesting out-
come of the survey was how different the respondents assessed the 
performance of the different levels of government in handling the ref-
ugee issue. The further away a government institution, the worse people 
assessed its performance. 
Figure 2: Public opinion on how institutions and persons handled the 
refugee issue 
 
Source: Author’s own depiction. Data from SORA, “Städtebarometer: 
Endbericht” (Vienna, 2016), 47. 
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While approximately 60% of respondents found the handling of 
the refugee issue by the mayors and the Länder (federal states) to be 
excellent and fairly good respectively, less than half of the respondents 
found the same to be true for the Austrian federal government and only 
20% for the European Council, the institution made up of the heads of 
state and government at EU-level, which also happens to be the most 
important institution for decision-making in European affairs.7 This 
assessment by respondents corresponds with the fact that the European 
Council, or the EU overall, has not managed to apply and implement 
a fair scheme to relocate asylum-seekers from overly burdened Italy 
and Greece to other member states. Even though the member states 
pledged in September of 2015 to relocate 160,000 refugees from Italy 
and Greece by September 2017, only 86,317 have been relocated by 
February 6, 2017.8
The Refugee Issue Stirs Concern and Optimism Alike
Another interesting question the survey raised was what kind of 
emotions the residents of Austrian cities and municipalities associated 
with the current refugee situation. Regarding the refugee situation in and 
around Austria, 34% of the respondents were optimistic, while an equal 
34% were concerned, and 25% were even angry. The attitudes regarding 
refugee assistance and the integration of the latter were more optimistic. 
When it came to refugee assistance in Austria and at the municipal level, 
approximately 50% of respondents were optimistic, while the share of the 
concerned and angry was markedly lower. In terms of the integration of 
refugees, people were more optimistic (52%) regarding integration at the 
municipal level than at the national level (41%), as can be seen in figure 
3 below. 
7   Manfred Kohler, “European Governance and the European Parliament: From Talking 
Shop to Legislative Powerhouse,“ Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 3 (2014): 600-
615 (here 609). 
8   “Member States’ Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism,” European 
Commission, Feb. 6, 2017,  accessed Feb. 10, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/
homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/
state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf 
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Figure 3: Emotions regarding the refugee issue
Source: Author’s own depiction. Data from SORA, “Städtebarometer: 
Endbericht” (Vienna, 2016), 46. 
Public Opinion on Refugees Became More Positive Once 
Refugee Flows Abated
As opposed to the generally more negative attitudes toward refugees 
at the height of the refugee flows in the fall of 2015, indicated by the GfK 
poll in the introduction section,9 the SORA survey conducted in March 
and April of 2016 drew up a more positive picture, with positive attitudes 
and emotions prevailing towards refugees: seven out of ten respondents 
were shocked by the hatred of some people for refugees. Less than half of 
respondents (40%) said that Austria should prioritize domestic problems 
over spending money for refugees. Of all respondents, 30% felt like strang-
ers in their own country (see figure 4 below). 
9   Herbert Vytiska, “Asylthema polarisiert Österreichs Öffentlichkeit.” 
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Figure 4: Attitudes towards the refugee issue in 2016
Source: Author’s own depiction. Data from SORA, “Städtebarometer: 
Endbericht” (Vienna, 2016), 47. 
GfK conducted an unpublished survey called Bürgermeister and 
Flüchtlinge in March and April of 2016 among the mayors of more than 
900 Austrian municipalities, of which more than 600 hosted refugees. The 
public opinion as expressed by the closest representatives of the people, the 
municipal mayors, did not necessarily appear to be negative. While 22% of 
the mayors said that the reception and hosting of refugees entailed more 
risks and disadvantages, another 23% of them claimed that opportunities 
and advantages prevail; 55% of the responding mayors just simply remained 
neutral in this respect (see figure 5 below), suggesting that it would be bet-
ter to see how things develop in the longer run. It appears that, overall, the 
real problems with refugees in general are not as far-reaching as depicted 
by some media outlets in Austria, like the Kronen Zeitung (the most widely 
circulated newspaper in Austria), which takes a more anti-immigration 
stance.10 
10   “Flüchtling überfällt eigenen Betreuer mit Messer,” Kronen Zeitung (Feb. 15, 2016), 
accessed Feb. 11, 2017, http://www.krone.at/oesterreich/fluechtling-ueberfaellt-eigenen-
betreuer-mit-messer-serie-an-gewalttaten-story-496154 
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Figure 5: In general, do the advantages or disadvantages prevail regard-
ing the reception of refugees? 
Source: Author’s own depiction. Data (in percentages) from an unpub-
lished poll among mayors of Austrian municipalities that host refugees 
(n=682) by GfK, “Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge” (Austria, 2016). 
Civil Society and Faith-based Organizations are the Best 
Support Providers
Similar to the SORA survey mentioned above, in which people did not 
consider the national and European levels of governments good refugee 
issue managers (see figure 2), the GfK poll Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge 
shows that mayors have a negative opinion of the national institutions, 
like the Ministry of Interior or the Austrian Foreign Ministry, in terms of 
how helpful they were in organizing accommodation and care for refugees. 
While faith-based organizations like CARITAS ranked first in terms of 
how helpful they were in providing and finding accommodation and care 
for refugees in the eyes of the responding mayors (46%), the national min-
istries mentioned above only mustered 4% and 3% respectively, as can be 
seen in figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6: Which institutions are most helpful in terms of accommoda-
tion and care for refugees?
Source: Author’s own depiction. Data (in percentages, multiple answers 
possible) from an unpublished poll among mayors of Austrian municipal-
ities that host refugees (n=682) by GfK, “Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge” 
(Austria, 2016). 
Quite contrary to national institutions, the voluntary support for refu-
gees by municipal residents (civil society) seemed to be overwhelming: 47% 
of the responding mayors in the 682 municipalities said that collaboration 
and support by local residents was great, paralleled by 48% of them who 
claimed that there was at least partial voluntary support. Hardly any mayor 
suggested that people were not helping during the “refugee crisis” in 2015. 
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Figure 7: Voluntary assistance by municipal residents
   
Source: Author’s own depiction. Data (in percent) from an unpublished 
poll among mayors of Austrian municipalities that host refugees (n=682) by 
GfK, “Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge” (Austria, 2016). 
Mayors Say There Are Jobs Refugees Can Perform for the 
Common Good
The Austrian Foreigner Employment Act (Ausländerbeschäftigunsgesetz) 
provides little opportunity for asylum-seekers to work while they are wait-
ing for their applications to be admitted or denied. The law only provides 
for seasonal work in forestry, tourism, and agriculture three months after 
asylum-seeker applications were accepted for processing, while at the same 
time there are labor market tests, which make sure that jobs go to Austrians 
first.11 However, the GfK survey clearly shows that there are public-ben-
efit activities refugees or asylum-seekers could perform, as figure 8 below 
suggests. 
11   Anny Knapp, “Country Report: Austria,“ Asylum Information Database (December 
2015), 71. 
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Figure 8: In which areas could refugees perform public-benefit activities? 
Source: Author’s own depiction. Data (in percent) from an unpublished 
poll among mayors of Austrian municipalities that host refugees (n=682) by 
GfK, “Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge” (Austria, 2016). 
As figure 8 suggests, among the possible jobs refugees could potentially 
perform at that time, according to the surveyed mayors, were the mainte-
nance of public areas (78% of mayors mentioned this kind of public-benefit 
activity), cleaning corridors (72%), road cleaning (64%), building yards 
(59%), and the maintenance of pathways, just to mentioned a few. With the 
unemployment rate among asylum-seekers so high, public sector work for 
refugees seems more logical in terms of the integration of these newcomers. 
It may give them hope and keep them off the streets. 
Summarizing the Survey Results
The Reception and Care for Refugees Works Well in the 
Majority of Cases, the Work of Local and Regional Governments is 
Appreciated
More than half of the residents of towns and municipalities that 
received refugees in 2015 claimed that the reception of refugees in their 
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municipalities worked excellent or fairly well:12 30% of the respondents 
said that it worked “not so good” or “not good at all”;13 59% of respondents 
assessed the mayors’ performances as “excellent” or “fairly good,” while 27% 
found their performances “not so good” or “not good at all.” Regarding the 
performance of the Austrian federal government, 47% were satisfied and 
48% expressed dissatisfaction (see figure 2 above). 
Reception Worked Rather Well Because of Civic Engagement, 
However There is a Desire for Fair Refugee Distribution
Among the reasons why refugee reception was deemed to have 
worked pretty well were people’s voluntary commitment to providing 
and caring for refugees and the willingness of refugees to integrate, along 
with smooth organization and accommodation. The reasons for problems 
regarding refugee reception were attributed to the great number of (male) 
refugees and their aversion to integrating. There was also fear among 
respondents that there would not be enough training and employment 
opportunities for all refugees, and respondents thought that the distri-
bution of refugees among municipalities and Länder was not fair enough. 
Approximately 70% of the respondents indicated that they were in favor 
of resettling refugees according to the population size of the respective 
town or municipality.14 
Individual Living Conditions and Future Prospects are Key 
Determinants for Attitudes Towards Refugees
Popular sentiment toward refugees was predominantly positive: 69% 
of the respondents were shocked about the hatred by some people for 
refugees (see figure 4). People with a higher degree of education, women, 
and persons living in rural areas with adequate income reported that the 
reception of refugees worked well. Furthermore, respondents who were 
optimistic regarding future job security and adequate living standards 
were more positive in general in terms of both the reception and accep-
tance of refugees.15
12   SORA, “Städtebarometer: Endbericht” (Vienna, 2016), 50
13   GfK, “Bürgermeister und Flüchtlinge” (Austria, 2016).
14   SORA, “Städtebarometer: Endbericht,” 50
15   SORA, “Städtebarometer: Endbericht,” 51 
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Concluding Remarks: Why Nation-States Fail in the Governance of 
Refugee Migration
One of the obvious results of the two surveys presented here is that 
Austrians are not happy with the way the EU and the national government 
handled the refugee migration issue over the past couple of years. I argue 
here—and this is a hypothesis that requires further testing—that the rea-
son for popular discontent with the national government in terms of how 
it has handled the “refugee migration crisis” is not so much a direct result 
of obvious mismanagement, but more a latent consequence of the structure 
of migration governance in general and the structural constraints states are 
facing in that particular policy domain. There are several constraints states 
have to face when determining priorities about groups of persons receiving 
humanitarian protection and/or settlement rights on humanitarian grounds. 
These constraints are multi-facetted in that they are, amongst other factors, 
structural, political, and ethical in nature. The structural constraints of states 
are determined by the fact that they are particularistic agents that are mainly 
bound to further the interests of their own citizens. The political constraints are 
defined by (domestic and electoral) politics, in turn influenced by the interests 
of business and labor, NGOs, religious and other interest groups and by foreign 
and security policy concerns. These political constraints reduce the capacity 
of governments to contribute to a morally adequate response to refugees and 
asylum seekers. The third constraint, the ethical one, denotes the “difficulty 
of predicting the societal costs of applying a particular normative standard in 
entrance.”16 Other constraints stem from the global character of refugee flows 
and differing regimes trying to cope with them. Betts (2009) puts it that way: 
The challenge in the current refugee regime is that asylum 
is subject to a strongly institutionalized and widely accepted 
norm, while the burden-sharing is subject to weakly and highly 
contested norms. In other words, states have a strong obligation 
to protect refugees who reach their territory but little incentive to 
support refugees elsewhere in the world.17
Forced migration in the form of refugee migration is an issue that has 
to be tackled by its roots. As long as refugee migration is merely governed 
16   Matthew J. Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response 
to Refugees (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 196f. 
17   Alexander Betts, Global Migration Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 315. 
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by the obligation of states to protect people who seek asylum and not so 
much by the need to eradicate the reasons for flight, there will be no change 
to the current migration pattern from the southern to the northern hemi-
sphere. In fact, climate change will increase these patterns in the decades to 
come. As long as these forced migration issues that are global in character 
and outcome are not addressed globally and in solidarity, there is no end in 





Elisabeth Röhrlich (assisted by Agnes Meisinger), 
ed., Migration und Innovation um 1900: 
Perspektiven auf das Wien der Jahrhundertwende 
(Vienna: Böhlau, 2016)
Annemarie Steidl
Migration to Vienna and Viennese modernism around 1900 are 
well-studied research fields; much has already been written on these top-
ics. So why, when taking a first look at the volume edited by Elisabeth 
Röhrlich, do we need another book discussing this thematic? What makes 
this conference volume innovative and worth reading, at a second glance, 
is the unique combination of many authors who approach the topic from 
various angles. The different texts deal with varying aspects of migration, 
innovation, identities, heterogeneity, diversity, and culture, thereby trying 
to give answer to the question of whether Vienna around 1900 can aptly 
be described as a “melting pot” of the Habsburg Empire. By combining 
different aspects, the papers not only focus on high numbers of internal 
migrants from all over the Habsburg territories, but they integrate this high 
degree of spatial mobility with groundbreaking innovations in arts, culture, 
and sciences. Many male, but also female, protagonists of the cultural boom 
at the end of the nineteenth century were either migrants of the first or sec-
ond generation. In the introduction, Röhrlich, referring to the well-known 
US-American cultural historian Carl E. Schorske, remembers the role his 
research plays for modernity and fin-de-siècle Vienna. 
Migration is omnipresent in our global societies, either in the form of 
foreigners moving internationally from one country to the other, or intense 
discussions on the phenomenon, which dominate our everyday life. Given 
the sharp increase of newcomers in Vienna since the 1980s, and inspired 
by a questionable historical-political discourse on the 200-year celebration 
of the victory over the Ottoman Empire (Türkenbefreiung), the editors, 
together with research colleagues, took up the challenge of presenting a 
new perspective on immigration to Vienna around 1900. The articles in 
this volume are the result of a research project initiated by Oliver Rathkolb 
and based at the Vienna Institute for Contemporary History (2011-2015). 
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The authors focus on various aspects of the topic in music, literature, and 
fine arts, thereby commenting on political conditions and experiences of 
discrimination, which affect many migrants. 
The volume starts with an overview on immigration to Vienna by 
Michael John, but other papers also deal with aspects of the large number 
of urban migrants, who were characterized by a great heterogeneity and a 
great proportion of women. This migration pattern is still remembered by the 
Viennese population and part of a collective memory. While Sylvia Hahn 
especially discusses women who moved to Vienna from Habsburg territories, 
as well as from other European countries, Andreas Weigl addresses the ques-
tion of whether the high number of migrants and their influence on Viennese 
population growth was really unique at the end of the century. Andreas Resch 
writes about the participation of foreigners in the Viennese “creative indus-
tries,” such as publishers, architects, or artists, with a quantitative approach, 
similar to the aforementioned authors. Other articles—such as the text writ-
ten by Steven Beller on the influence of Jewish migrants on modern culture 
or Klaus Hödl, who focuses on stereotyping of Galician Jews by Viennese 
citizens—deal with specific migrant groups. In contrast to the Jews, who 
represented an important and influential minority in town, smaller numbers 
of different Slavic migrants from southern provinces of Imperial Austria and 
from Croatia-Slavonia never gained that much influence. By challenging the 
group identity of South-Slavs, Wladimir Fischer-Nebmaier emphasizes the 
importance of their associations. 
What makes this collection of 18 articles unique is the combination 
of broader overviews on immigration with various aspects of cultural life. 
For instance, Birgit Peter writes about the diversity of Viennese theaters, 
while Wolfgang Müller-Funkes’ essay on migration of writers and poets 
who lived at least parts of their lives in Vienna presents a study on the 
works of Joseph Roth and Elias Canetti; both have a long migration story 
but, as writers, were most different from each other. Focusing on the carrier 
of various musicians with a migration background, Christian Glanz stress-
es the complex connections of innovation and cultural diversity. Based on 
the biographical story of the family Hölzel, who managed an important 
publishing house, Alexander Klee illustrates special conditions and entan-
glements of economy, society, culture, and science in Vienna at the turn of 
the century. Elisabeth Heinmann’s article describes Vienna as an important 
magnet for artists and art patrons from mostly southeastern regions of the 
empire. During this era of intensified globalization and industrialization, 
the city was the Habsburg Empire’s center for a fresh start for social climb-
ers from the provinces. 
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Some of the articles emphasize the process of identity creation and the 
hybridity of identities of mobile people. Moritz Csáky’s contribution elab-
orates Vienna as the capital of a multi-ethnic empire, where migrants from 
all over Central Europe, who spoke various languages, gathered and influ-
enced a unique space for communication. Jacques Le Rider describes “crisis 
of identity” as a characteristic of Viennese modernism (Wiener Moderne) 
around 1900, because of its tremendous social and cultural plurality and 
the ambivalent potential within such a plurality. In contrast, Hans Petschar 
deals not with individual stories but with the story of a special book series, 
the Kronprinzenwerk, an encyclopedia of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
in 24 volumes, published from 1885 to 1902 under the patronage of Crown 
Prince Rudolf. In this rather long text, the author tries to give an example 
how researchers, who contributed to the encyclopedia, created identities 
and ethnic groups. How politics and politicians dealt with the high num-
ber of migrants, xenophobia, and antisemitism is discussed at the end of 
this elaborated volume. Isabelle Lehner is interested how the Viennese 
municipal council discussed language as an area of conflict in the multi-na-
tional empire and how antisemitism marginalized Jewish fellow citizens 
when finding employment. Thomas Olechowski, whose articles deals with 
the doctrine of constitutional law (Staatsrechtslehre) and its history at the 
University of Vienna, presents another approach via individual stories. The 
article by Marcus Gräser is unique in this volume, as it presents a compar-
ison of Vienna with another city, namely Chicago in the United States. 
The author is interested in how the formation of political parties and local 
politics works in these ethnically inhomogeneous urban agglomerations, 
which in 1900, at first glance, show some fascinating similarities. However, 
a closer inspection uncovers significant differences.
With more than 500 pages, the volume offers innovative macro- and 
micro-approaches on migration and modernism in Vienna. However, the 
individual articles would have gained from more intense attention and revi-
sions by the editor. Some of the essays are rather long, and many overlaps 
could have been avoided. While it is understandable that the article by 
the American contributor Steven Beller is in English, it is puzzling why, 
in a German conference volume, the German-speaking author Wladimir 
Fischer-Nebmaier writes in English. Given these minor criticisms, what 
makes this book even more interesting to read is the fact that many of the 
authors assembled here talk about migration patterns and migrants always 
in conjunction with current public discourses in Austria. 

Tara Zahra, The Great Departure: Mass Migration 
from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free 
World (W.W. Norton & Co.: 2016)
Sarah Cramsey
If you look closely at the walls of the former Red Star Line buildings 
in Antwerp, you might see faded Hebrew letters materializing, as if out of 
historical mist, from behind the chalky paint. Throughout the warehouses 
and disinfection rooms of the shipping line that, for nearly half a century, 
linked Belgium to the United Kingdom and ports in New York and 
Philadelphia, Hebrew letters forming Yiddish words alerted passengers 
transiting through this space that “everything for passengers is done free of 
charge in this building.” As evidenced in pictures dating from after 1900, 
this black-lettered promise appeared in Polish, Czech, German and English 
as well and was, by linguistic default, intended for migrants coming in large 
part from the lands of the Habsburg Empire. Tara Zahra’s impressive new 
book The Great Departure (Norton & Co., 2016) begins with the fraught 
transatlantic journey of these Imperial subjects. Across nearly 300 pages 
of narrative, Zahra explores how Europeans born in the (presumed) “east” 
moved westward and, for upwards of 30 to 40% of migrants, back eastward 
(p. 14), how the states to which these migrants belonged attempted to 
control their movement to varying levels of success and how the dynamic 
between states and people morphed from the mid-19th century onward, in 
the wake of two World Wars, during multiple political revolutions in the 
region, throughout the Cold War, and even up to the present day.
This is an ambitious book about the link between labor and migration, 
the power struggle between the potential migrant and state officials and 
collective visions, some skewed and some more accurate, of the “free world” 
from the 1840s onward. Across a century and a half, Zahra charts how ideas 
and anxieties about freedom, mobility, race, the “whiteness” of Slavs and 
Jewish territoriality changed amongst policy makers, political activists and 
the migrants themselves on both sides of the Atlantic. While Zahra does 
not fully contextualize Zionism against other forms of (or indifference to) 
Jewish nationalism and avoids situating the movement of peoples during 
the Second World War in her narrative, most of this book reads as a stellar 
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example of what Zahra does best: weaving original archival sources in 
English, French, Polish, Czech and German alongside an enviable polyglot 
bibliography of secondary literature to create a clear narrative that is at once 
personal, social, and transnational. 
Of her seven chapters, Chapter Three, “Happy and Unhappy Returns,” 
warrants special consideration. This section utilizes a narrative exploring 
migration, return migration, and population control to understand the 
breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the emergence of new 
states like Poland and Czechoslovakia on the map of east central Europe 
in new ways. If the Great Departure begins with the mass movement of 
people like Faustina Wiśniewska away from European homelands in the 
1840s and peaks in the first decade of the 20th century, when “Austria-
Hungary was the top supplier of migrants to the United States, sending 
more than two million subjects of the Dual Monarchy through the gauntlet 
at Ellis Island” (p. 4), the ramifications of this mass exodus multiply as 
new states centered around Prague and Warsaw begin protecting the 
human capital necessary for their interwar citizenries. Zahra traces a few 
notable shifts to this post World War I moment. First, “new institutions 
created to regulate migration after World War I were intended to signify 
the expansion and consolidation of national sovereignty and national ‘self-
determination,’” but in fact “became representative of sovereignty’s limits” 
(p. 108). Zahra traces the use of physical force after 1945 in the region to the 
institutional framework set in place and the backlash provoked against this 
framework after the Great War. Second, since national self-determination 
was incomplete, the still-heterogeneous Habsburg successor states had to 
deal with minority groups that now had protection from the League of 
Nations. Paradoxically, in Zahra’s assessment, “the least ‘desirable’ citizens 
from a nationalist perspective, members of national and linguist minorities, 
actually enjoyed the most of freedom of mobility” (p. 112), and “the flow 
of migrants from East Central Europe mostly shifted from North America 
towards destinations closer to home, especially France” (p. 109). And third, 
Czechoslovak and Polish statesmen encouraged expatriates abroad to return 
and experience the true freedom promised by their new states, seemingly 
reversing “the decades of movement out of Eastern Europe” (p. 114).  For 
example, nearly 900,000 re-migrants returned to these two states between 
March 1918 and July 1922 (p. 114). These three shifts represented a stark 
change from the pre-1914 European context. 
Zahra illuminates these shifts by employing references to a popular 
novel (Karel Čapek’s Hordubal), an understanding of the International 
Labor Organization, and fresh archival sources from Prague, Warsaw, 
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and Paris, while simultaneously making gestures to other European states 
like Romania (we learn that emigration was outlawed, yet it’s unclear why), 
and Yugoslavia (the government made it difficult to get a passport).1 The 
story contained in this chapter engages with the Great Depression, gender 
issues, passport-acquiring procedures, and labor regulations. Like most of the 
book, it focuses mostly on Poland and Czechoslovakia (which are termed 
at varying points in the chapter, see even the quotes above, and throughout 
the book as both “Eastern Europe” and “East Central Europe”) and the 
citizenries therein. This comment concerning nomenclature is not so much 
a critique as it is an observation. On the territory that once encompassed the 
northwestern and northern reaches of the Habsburg Empire, it is hard to 
find an agreeable regional term that suits the long chronology of this history 
and the contemporary perspective of actors inside and outside of these 
places. Zahra’s story is more about Polish-, Czech-, and Yiddish-speaking 
populations than it is about “Eastern Europe” with a capital (Cold War-era 
and/or western-imagined) “E.” Zahra might have considered offering her 
audience a clear explanation about her own use of terminology and why the 
“Eastern Europe” of the title is both used and not used throughout the book.
Any story about mass migration from east central or “Eastern” Europe 
will be, at least in part, a story about the Jewish experience, and this book 
is no exception. Jewish themes, references and people can be found in each 
chapter, from the Jewish travel agents on trial in the town of Oświęcim 
in Chapter One to Zahra’s utilization of Joseph Roth’s novelette, “The 
Wandering Jews,”2 and her hesitant engagement with perhaps the most 
divided historiography in European Jewish Studies, that of Jews living 
in Polish spaces throughout the modern period. In fact, Zahra identifies 
Eastern Europe’s Jews as the “most tragic victims of a growing conviction 
that emigration could solve the perceived ‘problem’ of national, linguistic 
and religious diversity” (p. 18). In this way, the Jews from this region 
constitute her main subjects. Already, in the introduction, she identifies 
a “broad consensus” that developed in the 1930s “among Western diplomats, 
Zionists, humanitarian organizations and East European officials as well 
as ordinary Jews” whereby “the ‘solution’ to the so-called ‘Jewish problem’ 
would entail the mass emigration of Jews from Eastern Europe” (p. 18). 
She details these schemes in a chapter problematically entitled “The 
First Final Solution.” If, as Zahra argues, “the lines between rescue and 
renewal, between emigration and expulsion, and between humanitarianism 
1   I am grateful to Dr. Irina Marin for alerting me to the overall lack of coverage regarding 
the lack of emigration from Romania in Zahra’s book and the historiography overall.
2   Joseph Roth, Juden auf Wanderschaft (Berlin: Die Schmiede, 1927).
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and ethnic cleansing were already hazy in 1938-1939” (p. 144), historians 
of the real “Final Solution” or the Shoah (which began with the revision 
of German citizenship laws, continued with systematic discrimination and 
not-necessarily-voluntary migration in the 1930s but became genocidal 
in the summer and fall of 1941) should certainly take notice. Zahra does 
have a point with her provocative language, but it’s a strange thing to say 
explicitly nonetheless. Arguably, two of the most important challenges 
faced by historians of the Holocaust relate to contingency (it must be kept 
alive), while also explaining the obscured process by which Einsatzgruppen 
members, Order Police, and allies attached to the Third Reich apparatus 
began to kill Jewish women and children en masse in the wake of Operation 
Barbarossa. The Endlösung, as discussed at the Wannsee Conference in 
January of 1942, referred to “evacuations to the East,” but I have been taught 
that this intentionally veiled language masked a truer meaning of past and 
future systematic killings, which nearly all the participants possessed. Does 
the hazy line between humanitarianism and ethnic cleansing in the late 
1930s extend to the event that would later be termed genocide as well? 
And how do these hazy lines account for what is perhaps the most essential 
element in the shift from plans that evacuate to plans that eliminate: 
ideology?3 
In the end, forced resettlement and, to be more precise, interwar 
discussions (which often amounted to little) about hypothetical and real 
plans for forced resettlement did not constitute a “final solution” as they did 
not provide long-lasting answers for the Jewish question as a whole. In fact, 
while Polish government officials harbored visions for the mass movements 
of peasants and Jews away from Poland in the 1930s, these plans for the 
most part evaporated when faced with logistical realities.4 The importance 
of charting failed discussions of utopian visions should not eclipse the 
understanding that the context of the pre-World War II era did not allow 
for such plans targeting millions of Jews and others for expulsion to fully 
mature. And while I agree with Zahra that a strange consensus began to 
coalesce in the 1930s, my research indicates that any developing consensus 
did not produce clear solutions until the 1940s, when a large group of east-
central European diplomats, transnational observers and allied statesmen 
agreed that the region’s surviving Jews “belonged” in Palestine and that 
the United Nation’s Relief and Rehabilitation Administrations should 
3   John Connelly, “Rule by Inspiration,” London Review of Books 27, no. 13 ( July 7, 2005): 
27-28.
4   Timothy Snyder mentions that peasants constituted the first targeted group for mass 
evacuation schemes in the Second Polish Republic. See Timothy Snyder, Black Earth: The 
Holocaust as History and Warning (New York: Penguin Random House, 2015), 60. 
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fund their transit away from postwar Europe.5 While Zahra shows that 
few conclusive solutions emerged from the 1930s, she does not follow how 
this “broad consensus” changes across the early 1940s to better understand 
precisely how the bricha (or the semi-legal migration of Jews away from 
postwar Europe) gained support from both Jewish and non-Jewish east-
central European (and more specifically Czechoslovakian and Polish) 
leaders, statesmen, and bureaucrats.6
Going further, any discussion of Jewish movement away from Europe 
after 1945 must be fully situated in a discussion about the transformation of 
international norms and how those norms expanded in the 1940s to allow 
for state-sponsored campaigns of ethnic cleansing (for example, the Polish 
state’s changing policy toward the Ukrainian minority, the largest minority 
in interwar Poland and the most dangerous threat to the state, from the 
1920s to the 1940s).7 Students of this puzzling development would do well 
to challenge the title of Chapter Four, press Zahra’s claim regarding the 
“hazy lines” in the early 1930s, and wonder why the migrations unleashed 
by Nazi and Soviet occupying forces within Poland’s former borders 
found minimal coverage in this book. In fact, mass migrations for some 
Volksdeutsche, more “Slavs,” and for millions of Jews, especially those groups 
in Czechoslovakia and Poland, reached their peaks only during World War 
II, when these movements were subsidized by the infrastructure of the 
expanding Third Reich.8 Remarkably, those migrations between 1939 and 
1945, which contributed to events like the Final Solution and began the 
forcible reordering of Ost Europa along racial lines, find little space in this 
book.
In conclusion, scholars attentive to various manifestations of Zionism, 
other forms of Jewish nationalism, citizens indifferent to the calls of Jewish 
nationalist activists and the success of Jewish socialism in specifically the 
Polish context would notice one particular insinuation that runs like a red 
thread throughout this book: that Jews, and especially Polish Jews at that, 
5   Sarah A. Cramsey, Uncertain Citizenship: Jewish Belonging and the Ethnic Revolution in 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948 (PhD. Diss, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 2014).
6   Zahra does not engage with Yehuda Bauer’s magisterial work Flight and Rescue: Brichah 
(New York: Random House, 1970) but does reference two of his other books Jews for Sale? 
Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) and My 
Brother‘s Keeper: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1929-1939 
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1974). 
7   Sarah A. Cramsey and Jason Wittenberg, “Timing is Everything: Changing Norms of 
Minority Rights and the Making of a Polish Nation-State,” Comparative Political Studies 49, 
no. 11 (2016): 1480-1512.
8   Very useful on Volksdeutsche is Valdis Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries: the Volksdeutsche 
Mittelstelle and the German national minorities of Europe, 1933-1945 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of 
North Carolina Press, 1993). 
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of both Zionist and non-Zionist stripe were “clamoring to escape interwar 
Poland” (p. 151). Zahra notes that 400,000 Jews emigrated from Poland 
between 1921 and 1938 and that “thanks to high birthrates, the Jewish 
population nonetheless hovered at around three million” (p.151). Even if 
several hundred thousand more Polish Jews “had registered with Zionist 
and non-Zionist emigration societies, indicating their desire to leave” by 
the end of the 1930s it still does not follow that a “majority of Polish Jews” 
were actively looking for routes out of Poland (and simply by registering 
as a Zionist should not be taken as an indication of willingness to move 
toward Palestine or elsewhere immediately; in fact a golden rule of Zionism 
has been the unwillingness of people self-identifying as Zionists to leave the 
places of their birth for an arguably foreign homeland in the Middle East). 
As Ezra Mendelsohn noted, in the 1930s the Polish Socialist Bund “rose 
again.” This “seemingly unexpected development” which flew “in the face of 
all logic” emerged after the 1935 split in the World Zionist Organization 
and in response to the tightening of migration into the Palestinian Mandate. 
In fact, on the eve of World War II the Polish Bundists “could and did 
claim—without appearing ridiculous—that they had become the single 
strongest Jewish political party in Poland.”9 
It seems that the strand of political Zionism tethering Jewish 
populations to the historical biblical lands had failed miserably on the 
eve of the Second World War. Samuel Kassow has argued as such in the 
early chapters of his brilliant book Who Will Write Our History? Emanuel 
Ringelblum, the Warsaw Ghetto, and the Oyneg Shabes Archive, which 
analyzes the landscape of interwar Polish Jewish politics and dissects the 
political platform of Left Poalei Zion, the party for which Ringelblum 
held a life-long membership.10 For Kassow, Emanuel Ringelblum is 
representative of Polish Jews who came of age in an independent Second 
Polish Republic, who spoke Yiddish and Polish fluently, and who were, 
for better or for worse, unwilling to abandon the “do for the dortn” or the 
“here” in Poland for the “there” somewhere else.11 From a demographic 
perspective, more than half of more than three million Polish Jews 
living in Poland were under the age of 30 by  1938, further cementing 
that generation’s submersion in at least a partially Polish context. And 
9   Ezra Mendelsohn, On Modern Jewish Politics (New York: Oxford UP, 1993), 75.
10   Emanuel Kassow, Who will write our History? Emanuel Ringelblum, the Warsaw Ghetto, 
and the Oyneg Shabes Archive (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 15. Also helpful 
is Kassow’s The Emergence of Modern Jewish Politics: Bundism and Zionism in Eastern Europe 
(Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 2003) and, most recently, Who will write our History? 
Rediscovering a Hidden Archive from the Warsaw Ghetto (New York: Vintage, 2009). 
11   Kassow, Ringelblum, 48.
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further, it is helpful to remember that, according to the 1931 census, 
nearly half a million Polish citizens identified their everyday language as 
Polish and their religion as Jewish, thereby forcing historians to recast our 
understanding of the elastic possibilities of Polish belonging long after 
the period that Polish nationalism began to hate.12 Polish Jewry was a 
diverse group indeed and a more-than-high birthrate kept their numbers 
strong in the Second Republic. Ironically, Zahra’s coverage of “Zionists” 
as a seemingly monolithic group would benefit from the nuance present 
in her other works that understand “national indifference” as an important 
category of analysis.13 And while Zahra is correct to identify postwar 
Poland as an often-unfriendly place for Jewish returnees, she could offer a 
more nuanced historiography to understand the complexity of the postwar 
era. Works by Marci Shore, Anna Cichopek-Gajraj, David Engel, and 
Natalia Aleksiun help us understand why a majority of Polish Jews left 
Poland and also why upwards of 80,000 Polish Jews refused, at least in 
the immediate postwar years, to join their generation’s great departure.14
Even with those critiques in mind, the reader looking to understand 
more about the Jewish experience in this part of Europe can learn many 
things from Zahra’s book. That reader will join an impressed audience 
already populated by a number of experts on transatlantic migration, on the 
connection between labor and work, on changing ideas about whiteness, 
and on the complicated process by which human beings born in a certain 
parcel of eastern-ish Europe were (voluntarily and involuntarily) uprooted 
from the 1840s onward. And, finally, Zahra’s book offers the descendants 
of the Great Departure a notable balance between the personal stories of 
multiple migrants and the broader social, diplomatic and governmental 
streams that carried them away from Habsburg lands to unexpected 
futures. My own great-grandmother Johanna left her rural home nestled 
in the mountains of Carinthia and arrived at Ellis Island in 1913 ready to 
become (after quarantine) an indentured servant for a family in Patterson, 
New Jersey. This story belongs to her as well as my office bookshelf. That 
is no small feat.
12   I am referring to Brian Porter’s wonderful book When Nationalism Began to Hate: 
Imagining Modern Politics in 19th Century Poland (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
13   Tara Zahra, “Imagined Non-Communities: National Indifference as a Category of 
Analysis,” Slavic Review Vol. 69, No. 1 (Spring 2010): 93-119.
14   Marci Shore, Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw Generation’s Life and Death in Marxism, 1918-
1968 (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 2006); Anna Chichopek-Gajraj, Beyond 
Violence: Jewish Survivors in Poland and Slovakia, 1944–1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); David Engel, “Patterns Of Anti-Jewish Violence In Poland, 1944-
1946,” Yad Vashem Studies 26 (1998): 43-85; Natalia Aleksiun, Dokąd dalej? Ruch syjonistyczny 
w Polsce (1944–1950) (Warsaw: Trio, 2002).

Marco Büchl, Dogface Soldiers: Die Frontsoldaten 
der US-Infanterie und der Krieg gegen Hitlers 
Wehrmacht im Mittelmeerraum und in 
Nordwesteuropa (Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2016)
Peter Karsten, Understanding World War 2 Combat 
Infantrymen in the European Theater: Testing 
the Sufficiency of Army Research Branch Surveys 
and Infantry Combatant Recollections against the 
Insights of Credible War Correspondents, Combat 
Photographers, and Army Cartoonists, World War 
2 History 5 (Bennington, Vermont: Merriam Press, 
2016)
James J. Weingartner 
Austrian author and photographer Marco Büchl has endeavored 
to write a social and cultural history of U.S. Army infantrymen in the 
Mediterranean and European Theaters during World War II. Offered 
as his doctoral dissertation at the University of Vienna, it is an effort to 
explore and define the “dogface” as a key component of the myths of “The 
Good War” and “The Greatest Generation.” It may seem curious that an 
Austrian should choose to write on American soldiers in World War II 
when so little has been done on Austrian troops serving in the Wehrmacht. 
Indeed, military history seems a forgotten discipline in the Austrian acad-
emy, there being in fact no specialists in that field serving on the faculty 
of any Austrian university. Contact with American troops during Büchl’s 
employment in the headquarters of NATO/PfP-Multinational Battlegroup 
South may have stimulated his interest in U.S. military history. Whatever 
his motivation, Büchl, has written a useful book, although perhaps more 
so to an Austrian/German non-specialist than to an American reader, at 
least one who is reasonably familiar with U.S. military history and the U.S. 
Army’s role in World War II. Büchl lays a foundation for his analysis with 
an overview of the evolution of “The American Way of War.” Surprisingly, 
although his bibliography is extensive, he seems to have made no use of 
Book Reviews288
Russell Weigley’s 40-year-old, but still valuable, book of that title. Büchl, 
drawing on the more recent work of Edward Coffman, points to the chron-
ic tension in American consciousness between the professional soldier, a 
putative threat to a democratic polity, and the “citizen soldier,” the latter 
concept embodied in the militia or, later, National Guard in the Civil War 
and again in the two World Wars in the form of a mass conscript army 
with which the United States would fight both twentieth century global 
conflicts. It was out of the mass of millions of draftees provided by the 
reintroduction of conscription in September 1940, the first peacetime draft 
in American history, that the World War II dogface would emerge. 
But what does Büchl understand the term “dogface” to mean? Its ini-
tial usage by American soldiers who regarded themselves as belonging to 
that category appears to have slightly antedated American involvement in 
World War II. Functionally, the dogface was an infantry rifleman, an enlist-
ed man or non-commissioned officer and a member of that component of 
the U.S. Army which, although constituting a minority of the Army’s total 
manpower, was fated to suffer the heaviest casualties of any of its combat 
branches. Sociologically, the dogface was a “citizen soldier,” conscious and 
deeply resentful of his status as an expendable element in a vast and imper-
sonal organization. The dogface’s lowly status, at least as he perceived it, was 
eloquently expressed in that and other canine terminology (“dog tags,” “pup 
tents,” “fox holes,” etc.). 
The core of Büchl’s book purports to be an effort at a Geertzian “thick 
description” of the culture that evolved within this subset of U.S. Army 
combatants. It is contextualized within a narrative describing the growth 
and experiential development of that army over the course of the war from 
call-up and training, through shipment overseas, to actual commitment to 
combat in North Africa and Europe and the conditions under which com-
batants fought and struggled to survive. 
Although he does not ignore other sources, Büchl relies primarily on 
the work of William Henry “Bill” Mauldin, which the author believes bears 
comparison in terms of its expressive power with Francisco Goya’s Disasters 
of War, depicting the horrors unleashed by the Peninsular War in Spain of 
the early nineteenth century. One might question, as does this reviewer, 
whether Mauldin’s comparatively anodyne cartoons are really in the same 
league as Goya’s shattering representations of human cruelty and suffer-
ing, while at the same time recognizing his success in creating the iconic 
figures of the bedraggled, cynical and long-suffering Willy and Joe, who 
became the quintessential dogfaces in the minds of millions of Americans. 
Mauldin understood the dogfaces because he served among them as a 
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youthful sergeant in the 45th Infantry Division, which was to experience 
some of the most brutal combat of the European war in often appalling ter-
rain and horrendous weather conditions. As the central component of his 
“thick description,” Büchl subjects each of thirteen of Mauldin’s cartoons 
to a detailed analysis of the personalities, physical settings and accompa-
nying equipment depicted by Mauldin, as well as his interpretation of the 
message that he believes the artist intended to convey. In light of the fact 
that Mauldin produced over 600 cartoons in the course of the war, it is 
surprising that Büchl has used so few of them, particularly in view of his 
conviction that they are a peerless source that conveys the dogface’s per-
ceptions with an immediacy that cannot be matched by the vast memoir 
literature that is typically the product of years, often decades, of reflection. 
But letters and diaries written by combatants in the immediate aftermath 
of their experiences are more “immediate” than Mauldin’s cartoons, and 
Büchl might have found Peter Schrijvers’ Crash of Ruin: American Combat 
Soldiers in Europe during World War II, based on such sources, valuable. In 
fact, his description does not seem very “thick” at all. And how completely 
do Mauldin’s cartoons convey the reality of dogface culture anyway? They 
succeed admirably in depicting the muddy squalor and physical discomfort 
in which the dogface subsisted: his hatred of K-rations, the comradeship, 
even love, that develops between men in combat. Willie and Joe are, in a 
real sense, lovers. The dogface recognizes the humanity of the enemy soldier, 
sharing as he did in the dogfaces’ misery. Mauldin’s German soldiers are, 
save for their uniforms, indistinguishable from his American protagonists. 
The dogface is skeptical of higher authority, although not openly defiant of 
it, and is contemptuous of rear echelon troops not subject to his perils and 
sufferings. But what about the darker aspects of the combat infantryman’s 
experience: his reactions to the death and dismemberment of buddies, his 
own fear of suffering a similar fate, his callousness toward replacements not 
yet accepted by veterans, his pre-occupation with sex, and the near-univer-
sality of a vocabulary based on the seemingly indispensable “fuck,” as Paul 
Fussell conveys so well? And what about the episodic brutality towards 
enemy prisoners that was common in the fury of combat? Mauldin’s own 
regiment, the 180th of the 45th Infantry Division, was involved in the mass 
murders of Axis prisoners in Sicily. Some dogfaces expressed revulsion at 
the atrocity, while others had voluntarily participated in it. Maudlin was 
likely aware of these events, yet there is not the faintest hint of any of this 
or anything similar in his cartoons, nor is it reasonable to expect that there 
should be. Self-censorship growing out of loyalty to comrades, not to men-
tion the certainty of official censorship, surely would have rendered such 
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candor impossible. Any assessment of “dogface culture” based primarily 
on a tiny fraction of Mauldin’s iconic oeuvre must therefore be considered 
incomplete, though nevertheless of value. 
Büchl’s book can be compared with a contemporary work by University 
of Pittsburgh military historian Peter Karsten, which, while serving a 
different purpose, also addresses the mentalité of the World War II U.S. 
combat infantryman in the European Theater. Although a much briefer 
treatment, it points the way towards a thicker description. Karsten assesses 
the “sufficiency” of the U.S. Army’s Research Branch’s wartime surveys of 
dogfaces’ opinions on a variety of subjects and the private observations of 
combatants by comparing them with the record created by war correspon-
dents, photographers, and cartoonists. Karsten evaluates the work of 25 of 
the latter and selects seven who “got it,” namely those who were actually 
in contact with combat infantrymen on the European fighting fronts for 
extended periods of time, as most were not. These include well-known fig-
ures such as Eric Sevareid, Robert Capa, Ernie Pyle and, of course, Bill 
Mauldin. Karsten provides insightful and often entertaining observations 
on the work of both categories of commentators and convincing arguments 
for doubting the reliability of most of them. He concludes that the obser-
vations of the “got its,” Army Research Branch surveys, and the private 
commentaries and recollections of veteran dogfaces both during and after 
the war, are complementary and necessary for the fullest possible under-
standing of the dogfaces’ experience. But a broader question is suggested by 
these two books: to what extent is “dogface culture” a uniquely American 
phenomenon, and to what degree are its characteristics simply outgrowths 
of experiences common to all World War II combat infantrymen? 
Hellmut Butterweck, Nationalsozialisten vor 
dem Volksgericht Wien: Österreichs Ringen um 
Gerechtigkeit 1945-1955 in der zeitgenössischen 
öffentlichen Wahrnehmung (Innsbruck: 
StudienVerlag, 2016)
Winfried Garscha
Hellmut Butterweck is an Austrian writer, theater critic, and journalist. 
He had served for decades on the editorial staff of the catholic weekly Die 
Furche and is still publishing commentaries in Viennese newspapers like 
Der Standard. Butterweck encountered Nazism personally, first as a young 
forced laborer during the war, and then as a committed anti-fascist activist 
in the 1950s and 1960s. During those postwar years, a considerable number 
of Austrians refused to confront their country’s, and their own, Nazi past. 
Austria’s failure at mastering its own past led Butterweck to a lifelong com-
mitment to raise his voice against the continued belittling of Nazi crimes 
in postwar Austria and to castigate Nazi nostalgia. Some of his non-fiction 
works deal with the prosecution of Nazi crimes. His book Verurteilt und 
begnadigt was a detailed documentation of what he called the “clemency 
lobby” among Austrian politicians. They thwarted the punishment of the 
Nazi perpetrators by pardoning them after they had served only a short 
sentence, even if the courts had imposed a life sentence.1
Among Butterweck’s most impressive works of historical fiction is his 
play Das Wunder von Wien (The Miracle of Vienna).2 It is a malicious gro-
tesque about the appearance of a rabbi in Vienna twenty years after the 
Holocaust performing miracles (“Wunderrabbi”). He claims to be able to 
raise one murdered Jew from the dead in exchange for 36 signatures from 
Gentiles. The first resurrected Jews get generously compensated for their 
suffering. But soon people start to question if they really want the Jews 
back: what will happen to all the shops and other Jewish property, which 
1   Hellmut Butterweck, Verurteilt und begnadigt: Österreich und seine NS-Straftäter (Vienna: 
Czernin Verlag, 2003).
2   Hellmut Butterweck, Das Wunder von Wien, Der Souffleurkasten (Vienna: Thomas 
Sessler Verlag, 1983).
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they had purchased at favorable rates after the “Anschluss”? Had there not 
been too many Jews living in Vienna before 1938 anyway? As it becomes 
more and more difficult to gather the required 36 signatures, eventually 
people start to think about how to get rid of the rabbi. Butterweck wrote 
the play in 1967. The audio version was broadcasted on radio in Austria and 
West and East Germany to no acclaim.3 Only in 1982, 15 years later, did 
Vienna’s Theater in der Josefstadt stage the play for the first time. It got favor-
able reviews. A Hebrew version was performed in Israel. Austrian National 
Radio broadcasted the play again in 2012.
  Butterweck, at the ripe age of 89, published his magnum opus in 
2016. He meticulously reconstructed 838 court cases, dealing with 1,137 
defendants standing trial before the People’s Court (Volksgericht) of Vienna. 
The Viennese court tried 48 percent of all the cases against Nazis that 
came before the four Austrian People’s Courts. These special courts were 
established after the war, and between 1945 and 1955 prosecuted and pun-
ished Nazi crimes and offenses based on the Nazi Prohibition Act of 1945. 
Butterweck’s expansive sample represents around ten percent of all verdicts 
of the Viennese Volksgericht. Viennese newspapers and their editors, rather 
than Butterweck, made the choice and determined the sample, for the book 
presents all those court cases that the postwar media had covered, including 
all trials that were politically significant.
In an article in the quarterly of the Social Democrats’ organi-
zation of survivors from Nazism—the Bund Sozialdemokratischer 
FreiheitskämpferInnen—Butterweck explained the reasons why he wrote 
this book4 as being related to both his play about the Wunderrabbi being 
met with silence and his personal witnessing of Nazi crimes during his 
youth. This made him question, after the war, what happened to the perpe-
trators. On November 10, 1938, as a ten-year-old boy, Hellmut Butterweck 
accidentally stumbled into a crowd standing in front of the still-smoking 
rubble of a synagogue in Vienna’s fifth district. A Nazi mob had burned 
down the venerable Jubilee Temple in the Siebenbrunnengasse, which had 
been built in 1908 in honor of Emperor Franz Joseph’s sixtieth anniversary 
of his accession to the throne. The young Butterweck witnessed somebody 
dragging out the remnants of a ritual vessel from the glowing debris of 
the Temple and heard a loud voice yelling and sneeringly calling it “Sara’s 
3   See “Hellmut Butterweck: Das Wunder von Wien,” in-berlin.de, https://user.in-berlin.
de/~hoerdat/voll.php?a=Butterweck&b=Das+Wunder+von+Wien&c=NDR%2FORF.
4   Hellmut Butterweck, “Warum ich das Buch ‘Nationalsozialisten vor dem Volksgericht 
Wien’ geschrieben habe,” Der Sozialdemokratische Kämpfer 10-11-12 (2016): 11, accessed 
Feb. 2, 2017, http://www.freiheitskaempfer.at/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Heft-04-
_2016_finale-Version_low_res.pdf.
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chamber pot!” Butterweck noted in his article that this was the moment 
when he began to think for himself in the Nazi environment. At the age 
of 16, he was kicked out of the school and conscripted as a forced laborer 
for the Nazi regime. He met other anti-Nazis who helped him to survive 
the war. 
Butterweck’s hope that his fellow Austrians would draw lessons from 
their recent past did not come true after the liberation of Austria. Writing 
the play on the Wunderrabbi in the 1960s was his way of dealing with his 
anger and disappointment that the malevolent spirit of Nazism in Austrian 
society was continuing into the postwar era. In one scene, some of the Jews 
who came back to life are standing in line in front of the prosecutor’s office. 
They are standing there to bear witness against their own Nazi murderers. 
While waiting, two of the witnesses conclude that the Austrians are will-
fully postponing the trials against Nazi perpetrators until such a time when 
they could finally claim that it was too late for such trials. 
Butterweck was convinced at the time that Nazi war crimes would never 
be prosecuted at all in postwar Austria. Even after the 1961 Eichmann 
trial in Jerusalem, all efforts in the Austrian courts to prosecute Nazi war 
criminals were doomed to fail. When, during the 1970s, Butterweck did 
library research leafing through a newspaper of spring 1948, he chanced 
into three trials against Nazi perpetrators being reported in a single issue of 
the newspaper. He remembers: “I still see the newspaper volume. I went on 
leafing. More and more trials. How could I have been mistaken to such an 
extent? Why did they disappear from my memory?”5 
Butterweck began consulting the statistics of the Ministry of Justice. 
He learned that in the years 1945-1955, prosecutors in the Volksgerichte 
launched indictments against more than 28,000 people; almost 23,500 
defendants received a verdict and more than 50 percent amongst them were 
pronounced guilty.
Now his interest began to focus on the public perception. If only a 
small number of those trials were mentioned in the newspapers, this might 
explain why they were committed to oblivion. But in fact the media cover-
age was extensive; the Viennese newspapers studiously reported on every 
10th trial before the Viennese People’s Court. A great number of them 
published detailed accounts from the courtrooms, depicting the dialogues 
between judge and defendants in great detail. Butterweck’s extensive 
extracts from these newspaper reports fill most of the 800 pages of this 
book. So it could not have been the insufficient public attention given to 
these trials that might have explained why the sentencing of more than 
5   Ibid.
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13,000 Austrian Nazis in the immediate postwar period had been forgotten 
completely when the People’s Courts were dissolved in December 1955, 
after the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Austria. For it had been 
the Allied occupiers that pushed the Austrian government to “de-Nazify” 
their society. Among those Nazi perpetrators convicted, more than 2,000 
were guilty of murder, manslaughter, assault and battery, or other violent 
crimes. Butterweck was greatly perplexed.
An explanation came in May 1997, when the Austrian contempo-
rary historians met for their third biennial meeting (“Zeitgeschichtetag”) in 
Vienna. Austrians simply refused to perceive their actions in World War II 
as crimes, so no prosecution was needed. Claudia Kuretsidis-Haider recog-
nized the collective postwar amnesia that had been puzzling Butterweck so 
much. She argued that the “first round of suppression” was the elimination 
of Nazi crimes from the public consciousness. This called for a “second 
round of suppression,” namely the need to punish those crimes: “Part of the 
suppression of the crimes was that whatever had been done to punish them, 
was deleted from public memory.”6 No mastermind was needed to organize 
this collective amnesia; it worked as a socio-psychological process.
Butterweck’s book tries to uncover the forgotten story of these trials 
and thus bring the hidden history of Nazism in Austria alive again. His 
approach is not to present statistics or elaborate analyses of the different 
types of proceedings instituted by the postwar Austrian judiciary. He 
simply wants to narrate the tales of hundreds of court cases by letting the 
contemporary journalists tell these stories. The result represents as close to 
a master narrative of Austrians’ Nazi crimes and their thorough prosecution 
in the Volksgerichte as we will ever get. Butterweck also does not hesitate to 
describe in detail those cases, where the courts delivered misjudgment, or 
prosecutors were biased against Jewish witnesses, or even tried to protect 
perpetrators from meeting justice. 
Butterweck’s sample contains all cases of mass murder tried in the 
Viennese People’s Court and all high treason trials against prominent Nazis 
and members of the Austrian political and economic élite. He does not 
claim his sample to be representative in the statistical sense. The courts 
saw, as Butterweck writes in his introduction, “an endless parade of ‘golden 
6   “Denn zur Verdrängung der Verbrechen gehört die Tilgung dessen aus dem öffentlichen 
Gedächtnis, was zur Ahndung eben dieser Verbrechen getan wurde,” see Claudia Kuretsidis-
Haider, “Forschungsergebnisse und -desiderata zum Umgang mit NS-Verbrechen in 
Österreich” in Zeitgeschichte im Wandel: 3. Österreichische Zeitgeschichtetage 1997, ed. Gertraud 
Diendorfer, Gerhard Jagschitz and Oliver Rathkolb (Innsbuck: StudienVerlag 1998), 300; 
see also Rudolf Ardelt, “Warum mangelt es in Österreich an einer Auseinandersetzung mit 
der Zeit 1938-1945? Die gegenwärtigen Folgen,” in DÖW-Jahrbuch (1988): 8-9.
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pheasants,’ as the office-holders of the Nazi Party had been called because 
of their fancy uniforms, of small and smallest functionaries, who often had 
been masters over the life and death, exerted inhumane pressure and spread 
fear and terror in their range of authority” (p. 13). The newspaper report-
ed a great number of trials, and thereby shedding light on everyday life 
in the “Danube and Alpine Gaue” under Nazi rule, with its “ubiquitous 
repression, denunciations, and encroachments of all kinds.” However, these 
trial reports also shed light on the deep antipathy of a considerable part of 
the population against the Nazi regime, “because where there had been an 
informer, there had to be also a person denounced” (p. 13).
Butterweck presents his cases in a strict chronological order. Moreover, 
Butterweck is providing a real service for future research with his extremely 
useful register of the 1,137 defendants of these court cases, complemented 
by a register of the judges and of the lawyers involved in these trials. No 
future work about postwar Austria “can ignore this monumental source 
work,” posits Oliver Rathkolb, professor for contemporary history at the 
University of Vienna, in his foreword to Butterweck’s courageous book.

Florian Traussnig, Militärischer Widerstand 
von Außen: Österreicher in der US-Armee und 
Kriegsgeheimdienst im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Vienna: 
Böhlau, 2015)
Georg Hoffmann, Fliegerjustiz: Gewalt gegen 
abgeschossene alliierte Flugzeugbesatzungen 
1943-1945, Krieg und Geschichte 88 (Paderborn: 
Ferdinand Schöningh, 2015)
Günter Bischof
These two excellent books by two young Graz historians deal with the 
interactions of Austrians and Americans during World War II and are part 
of the fabric of the larger trajectory of Austrian-American relations in the 
20th Century.1 With their focus on “war and society,” these books may 
be taken as a strong signal that “the new military history” has arrived in 
Austria too, where little serious military history is being done in academia.2 
Florian Traussnig’s study, a by-product of his Graz dissertation on the role 
of Austrian émigrés in American wartime propaganda, deals with Austrian 
refugees from all political camps that fled to the United States after the 
“Anschluss.” They supported their new homeland by joining the American 
armed forces or intelligence services to make personal contributions to the 
defeat of Adolf Hitler and his murderous National Socialist regime, which 
had persecuted them in their native Austria. Georg Hoffmann’s published 
University of Graz dissertation deals with the “lynching” of Allied airmen 
shot down over Austria and Hungary during World War II. Hoffmann 
highlights the cold-blooded murder of American aircrews by the “commu-
nity” of local people: Nazi bigwigs and soldiers, egging on civilian bystand-
ers. Both books carefully analyze larger stories through the lens of individ-
ual biographies, both Austrians fighting for the U.S. against the Nazis and 
1   On the tergiversations of the trajectory of the ups and downs of bilateral relations, 
see Günter Bischof, Relationships/Beziehungsgeschichten: Austria and the United States in the 
Twentieth Century, Transatlantica 4 (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2014).
2   See the review essay by Robert M. Citino, “Military Histories Old and New: A 
Reintroduction,” American Historical Review 112, no. 4 (Oct. 2007): 1070-1090.
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Austrians who, propelled by Nazi propaganda, murdered American flyers 
on the ground. 
As many as 6,000 to 7,000 Austrians in exile in the United States (p. 
16) joined the U.S. military and/or the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 
the U.S. civilian intelligence service during World War II (and predeces-
sor to the postwar CIA). These Austrians became Americans—“leaning 
on” the U.S. (“Anlehnungsmacht”)—to participate in the defeat of Adolf 
Hitler’s Third Reich. Many of them were Jews from Vienna who used 
their military service as a “fast track” to U.S. citizenship during the war. The 
Anglo-American powers were less interested in an Austrian resistance that 
would make a contribution to the defeat of Nazism (according to the 1943 
“Moscow Declaration”). They needed loyal people who spoke the German 
language and were prepared to gather intelligence from the German Army, 
or were prepared to fight in the trenches to defeat the Nazis. Traussnig aims 
at elaborating on the role this large group of Austrian exiles played in the 
Austrian “resistance” against the Nazis. Traussnig is able to show, through 
a careful biographical approach, that these “Austrians” were quickly forget-
ting about their homeland and had many different motives in fighting the 
Nazis. His analysis of some 700 individual biographies of Austrians in the 
United States gives these anonymous exiles “a face and a name” (p. 25) by 
adding these hitherto anonymous characters to the historical narrative of 
the Austrian resistance during World War II.
Traussnig starts his book with the story of the aborted “Austrian 
Battalion.” Otto von Habsburg, with his excellent contacts to President 
Roosevelt, managed to persuade the President and the War Department 
to start an Austrian unit in the U.S. Army, destined both to support the 
Allied war effort and to serve as a symbol of an Austrian contribution to the 
reconstruction of Austria after the war. The idea of an “Austrian Battalion,” 
calling for an Austrian contribution to the reestablishment of an indepen-
dent Austria, was born before the November 1943 Moscow Declaration 
was issued. The Battalion failed as a result of the deep ideological divisions 
among Austrian exiles in the United States. Exiles on the Left and their 
allies in the American press considered it a reactionary and restorative 
Habsburg project (“a bunch of fascists and royalists,” p. 43) and agitated 
against it. The War Department established the Austrian Battalion in 
November 1942, and President Roosevelt disbanded it in May 1943 due 
to a lack of recruits. Among some 600 soldiers trained in Camp Atterbury, 
Indiana, only 29 volunteers signed up. The rest were Austrian exile draft-
ees and Austro-Americans, many of them from the non-German parts 
of the former Habsburg Monarchy who opposed a Habsburg restoration 
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in Central Europe (pp. 47-49). The War Department transferred Joseph 
Podlipnig, an exiled Socialist from Carinthia, to the Austrian Battalion. 
He did not think much of the morale and fighting quality of the Battalion 
(p. 60). Anton Greissle grew up in a Communist milieu in Vienna. “The 
Emperor’s Battalion” raised some feelings of nostalgia in him about the 
Habsburg Monarchy, but like so many of the involuntary transfers to the 
Battalion, he was not interested in serving in “Otto’s imperial guards” (pp. 
66-67). Like most involuntary transfers, he concluded: “I don’t want to fight 
for Otto – I want to fight for America” (p. 91). Traussnig concludes that the 
Austrian Battalion was “a disaster;” however, one had to give Otto and his 
conservative supporters credit for their “Austrian patriotism and spirit of 
resistance” (p. 92).
Traussnig dedicates a chapter to the “Ritchie Boys.” The U.S. Army 
recruited thousands of Central European exiles to be trained at the 
“Military Intelligence Training Center” in Camp Ritchie, Maryland (p. 94). 
The “Ritchie Boys” were usually anti-authoritarian exile intellectuals not 
much given to military discipline – they saw Camp Ritchie as a “utopian 
counterpoint to a traditional military camp” (p. 106). Take the Jew Karl 
Frucht, born in Brno/Brünn, who went to law school in Vienna. He worked 
as a writer in Vienna and in his Paris exile after the “Anschluss” before 
he managed to get to safety in New York. Frucht, like many of his fellow 
Austrian exiles, was trained to interrogate German Prisoners of War in 
Europe. The tactical and operational information they gathered in France 
after the Normandy invasion was helpful to the U.S. Army as they advanced 
into Germany. Their intelligence warnings gathered from German POWs 
about the imminent last Nazi offensive in the Ardennes (“Battle of the 
Bulge”) was not heeded (pp. 107-126). The secrecy of Camp Ritchie trans-
formed the “enemy alien” soldiers from Central Europe into an elite corps 
of vital intelligence gatherers in the U.S. Army (pp. 150-151).
Many Austrians in exile were drafted into the 10th Mountain division, 
an elite unit in the U.S. Army that saw some heavy fighting in Northern 
Italy toward the end of the war. After observing the “winter war” between 
Finland and the Soviet Union in 1939/40, the U.S Army began training 
a division of soldiers in Colorado who knew how to ski and negotiate 
mountains. Austrians, who had been ski instructors and mountain guides 
in the U.S. before the war, ended up in the 10th Mountain Division. 
Friedl Pfeiffer, who had been a ski instructor in the 1930s in St. Anton, as 
well as in New South Wales in Australia and Sun Valley, Idaho, had been 
a member of the Austrian National Ski Racing Team. Pfeiffer ended up 
in the 10th and was wounded badly in Italy in April 1945 (pp. 196-198). 
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Traussnig falls victim to the contemporary mythology proffered in 
many newspaper accounts that these mountain troops were archetypical 
American “frontier” pioneers who managed to negotiate the harsh envi-
ronment of the “Wild West” (p. 167). 
The approximately 300 Austrians in exile who served in the American 
intelligence unit “Office of Strategic Services” (OSS) may be the most 
distinguished group. Many worked in the propaganda division of the OSS 
“Morale Operations Branch” and utilized their many talents in propagan-
dizing the Third Reich in general and enemy soldiers on the frontline in 
particular. Take the young Viennese Socialist Rudolf Anzböck, who was 
involved in sabotage action against Austrofascism and had to flee Austria 
to save his life. One step ahead of the Nazis, Josef Buttinger, the leader 
of the Vienna “Revolutionary Socialists,” managed to get him to New 
York from his Swedish exile. After a brief interlude in the 10th Mountain 
Division, the OSS Labor Section recruited the Social Democrat. The 
OSS trained him and a number of Austrian compatriots for a “penetra-
tion” mission into Nazi Germany to gather intelligence on German and 
foreign slave labor, and, if possible, unleash a revolt against the Nazis. But 
Anzböck never was dropped into Nazi Germany. Instead, he was used as 
a research analyst in London on assessing everyday life in Germany (pp. 
222-261). The OSS decorated Anzböck for his service; he stayed involved 
in intelligence work after the war and, like most Austrian exiles, never 
returned to Austria. Traussnig makes a good case that many Austrian 
leftists like Anzböck continued their resistance against Austrofascism/
Nazism from the prewar era into the wartime. Their personal contribution 
to the defeat of Hitlerism also contributed significantly to the “liberation 
of their former Heimat” (p. 263). For this, they deserve credit from Austria 
and Austrian historians. 
Traussnig has dug deeply into American archives to provide us with a 
number of compelling paradigmatic portraits of Austrians who fought in 
the U.S. Army and served in the OSS. Traussnig is particularly insistent on 
rescuing these resistance fighters in Allied armies from the ignominy of 
having been “deserters” due to their support of the victorious side. Austrians 
who had supported the Nazi regime and latched on to the myth of Austria 
as “the first victim of Nazism” gave no credit to such “bandits” who had 
left the country. In a sort of Austrian continuity of anti-Semitism, tens of 
thousands of Jews, who had been expelled after the “Anschluss,” have been 
silenced in the historical narrative. The official narrative of the Austrian 
resistance constructed after World War II as part of the Austrian “victims 
myth” ignored them and so has a recent quasi-official symposium on the 
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Austrian resistance and a major new survey of the Austrian resistance.3 
These “deserters” have been given their due in the Austrian public recently 
and have received a monument in a prominent square in Vienna.4 They are 
now considered a crucial element in the Austrian resistance to Nazism and 
are also included in Austrian memory of World War II (pp. 13-14). Given 
the “negligible size” of the resistance inside the “Alpen- und Donaugaue” (p. 
323) during the war, the role of this “transnational” Austrian resistance in 
exile is all the more remarkable.
Hoffmann is the first scholar who presents a firm “body count” of 
captured and killed airmen in Austria and Hungary during World War 
II. On the basis of impressively exhaustive research in American, Austrian 
and German archives he has established a database of every airplane shot 
down over Austria and Hungary and their crews. 556 airplanes were shot 
down in the “Alpine- and Danube Area” of today’s Austria (and 281 over 
Hungary). Crewmembers numbering 2,511 lost their lives, and 169 are 
“missing-in-action” to this day. Aircrews numbering 4,046 came down 
alive on their parachutes, of which 149 were killed, while the rest ended 
up in German POW “Stalags” (p. 136). The Anglo-American Air Forces 
lost a staggering 27,000 airplanes and 152,000 airmen during World War 
II. Allied airmen numbering 61,000 were captured alive, most surviving 
the war in Nazi POW-camps (p. 128). Given that the air war came to the 
“Alpine- and Danube Area” and Hungary late during the final two years 
of the war, civilian defenses were not attended to in preparation for Allied 
attacks. American bombers launched the first large attack against Wiener 
Neustadt on August 13, 1943 (p. 49). Before this attack, the “Alpine- and 
Danube Area” had the reputation of being the Third Reich’s “air-raid shel-
ter” (p. 50). From that moment onwards, Austria’s and Hungary’s large 
cities Vienna, Linz, Graz, and Salzburg, as well as Budapest, Pécs, and 
Györ, increasingly suffered Allied attacks in 1944. The culmination of the 
air war against Austria came in the winter/spring of 1945. During the “oil 
offensive,” the Anglo-American air forces lost 30 planes over Austria and 
11 over Hungary on June 26, 1944, with 122 airmen losing their lives (p. 
135). On April 12/13, 1944, the U.S. Air Force lost 22 airplanes in wave 
3   Rot-Weiss-Rot-Buch: Darsellungen, Dokumente und Nachweise zur Vorgeschichte 
und Geschichte der Okkupation Östereichs; Nach amtlichen Quellen (Vienna: Verlag der 
Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1946); Stefan Karner and Karl Duffek, eds., Widerstand in 
Österreich 1938-1945: Die Beiträge der Parlaments-Enquette 2005 (Graz: Verein z. Förderung 
d. Forschung v. Folgen nach Konflikten u. Kriegen 2007); Wolfgang Neugebauer, The 
Austrian Resistance 1938-1945, trans. John Nicholson and Eric Canepa (Vienna: Edition 
Steinbauer, 2014).
4   “Denkmal für Deserteure in Wien,” Deutsche Welle, accessed Feb. 20, 2017, http://
dw.com/p/1Dbbz. 
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of attacks against Vienna, Wiener Neustadt, and Budapest (p. 134). These 
were staggering losses.
The focus of Hoffmann’s study is the situational circumstances and the 
social psychology – or, the “referential frame” as he calls it – of the lynching of 
Allied airmen. In the summer of 1943, Nazi Germany’s propaganda chief Josef 
Goebbels changed his tune by suggesting that the Allies waged the air war 
as a “criminal war” against German “women and children” (p. 149). Focusing 
the new “enemy image” on the “terror flyers” and “air bandits” (pp. 150-151), 
Goebbels called upon the population to exact vengeance against downed air-
men on their own. When Kenneth D. Williams was shot down over Bremen 
on November 26, 1943, he carried the imprint “Murder Inc.” on the back of 
his flight suit. This was a welcome propaganda message for Goebbels, giving 
him the opportunity to spread the news of Mafia “gangsters” being recruited 
in Chicago to murder women and children in Nazi Germany (p. 152). The air 
war had become existential for the survival of Germany. The Nazi leadership 
unleashed violence (“Freigabe von Gewalt,” p. 167) against Allied fliers, call-
ing upon the German people—including Austrians and Hungarians, once 
Hungary was occupied by the Nazis—to take matters into their own hands 
and exact vengeance against these murderous bombing crews. Hoffmann 
carefully reconstructs the “narrative” of Goebbels’ propaganda campaign 
against Allied flyers as a means to analyze how local communities, egged on 
and directed by local Nazi bigwigs, gathered to retaliate against Allied flyers 
as they floated to the ground on their parachutes after their planes had been 
shot down by German fighters or anti-aircraft guns (“flak”). Curious groups 
of people assembled to watch the flyers come down, or were gathered by local 
Nazi bigwigs. They usually were “bystanders,” reluctant to mete out vengeance 
themselves. They passively watched as uniformed men killed airmen in cold 
blood (pp. 323-326). As in recent historical scholarship on lynchings in the 
American South after the Civil War, these local spectacles of communities of 
violence became quasi-public rituals.5
Ironically, on June 6, 1944, the very day the Normandy invasion was 
launched, the Nazi leadership gathered on the Obersalzberg for a meeting, 
deciding to allow “lynching justice” (Lynchjustiz) to be unleashed by the 
German people and for Goebbels to further arouse the “people’s anger” 
(Volkszorn) against the “air gangsters” (pp. 170-171). Hoffman then careful-
ly dissects the various scenarios of group actions—various group formations 
incited by the local Nazi leadership to hunt downed allied airmen—result-
ing in the capture and murder of downed Allied flyers.
5   W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993).
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The “meat” of Hoffmann’s vast empirical work comes together in 26 
meticulous case studies of allied airmen captured and killed and the detailed 
personal biographies of a half dozen murderers of allied airmen.6 As late as 
April 4, 1945, probably drunken Nazi officers brutally murdered Walter P. 
Manning, one of the African-American “Tuskegee airmen,” on the airfield 
of Linz-Hörsching. Second Lieutenant Manning’s P-51 was shot down on 
April 1. Manning’s body was found with a plaque hanging around his neck 
reading “We are taking care of things ourselves! The werewolf ” (Wir helfen uns 
selbst! Der Werwolf) (pp. 293-297). The case of Franz and Markus Lienhart is 
particularly telling. On March 4, 1945, Franz, a local farmer in Straßgang, a 
village close to Graz, chased down the flyer Sergeant Steven Cudrak. With 
the words, “You dog, dumping bombs on women and children” (Du Hund 
du, du schmeisst Bomben auf Frauen und Kinder) (pp. 343-346) he beat him 
up; later on, his son Markus shot him. Markus had earlier killed with a pistol 
the two downed flyers, Corporal Harold D. Brocious and Sergeant Levi L. 
Morrow, with a large group of local women and children watching the vio-
lence (pp. 238-242). Military courts prosecuted the two Lienharts after the 
war and both were found guilty. Franz, the father, went to jail for ten years, 
and Markus, the son and murderer, was executed in 1946 (p. 346).  
Most of them actually got off scot-free and were not prosecuted after 
the war. Manning’s murderers slipped into obscurity after the war and were 
not brought to justice. The individual perpetrators who killed Allied air-
men portrayed by Hoffmann joined the Nazi movement early; they were 
ideologically deeply committed to National Socialism and volunteered for 
military service. After being wounded multiple times on the Eastern Front, 
they were posted close to home inside the Reich, where they slipped into 
the business of killing American airmen (pp. 364-365). Most of the “lynch-
ings” happened in villages where the airmen bailed out from planes that had 
been severely damaged in attacks over cities. Manning’s “lynching” in April 
1945 also is further evidence that a deep commitment to Hitler and the 
Nazi ideology persisted into the most remote corners of the “Alpine- and 
Danube Area” until the final days of the war.7
Concluding his book, Hoffmann reflects on Austrian memory of these 
war crimes. Austrians considered themselves as “victims” of the Allied air 
war during World War II. In their minds, this explained the “lynching 
6   For a model extended case study of the “lynching” of seven American airmen on the 
island of Borkum in Northern Germany, based on the extensive postwar trial records, see 
James J.  Weingartner, Americans, Germans, and War Crimes Justice: Law, Memory, and “The 
Good War” (New York: Praeger, 2011).
7   Evan Burr Bukey, Hitler’s Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era, 1938–1945 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
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justice” of allied airmen. These Austrian perpetrators continued to consider 
themselves “victims” and the Allied airmen “perpetrators” long after the war 
(p. 371). These murders became taboos in the local communities where they 
were committed and were silenced after the war. In other words, Austrian 
society never atoned for these war crimes. Postwar Austria has lived with 
such inversions of World War II perpetrators and victims for a long time. 
While the victims of the Nazi takeover of Austria, who fought for the Allied 
cause in exile, were considered “traitors,” the perpetrators of “lynchings” of 
allied airmen considered themselves “victims” of Allied bombing attacks 
during and after the war. These two subtle books provide long overdue cor-
rections to these narratives so dear to Austrians.
Maximilian Graf, Österreich und die DDR 1949-1990: 
Politik und Wirtschaft im Schatten der deutschen 
Teilung, Internationale Geschichte 3 (Vienna: Verlag 
der Akademie der Wissenschaften 2016)
Robert Mark Spaulding
This a timely, well-researched book that reaches far beyond the 
Austrian-East German bilateral relationship stated in its title to offer infor-
mation and insights to readers interested in the structures and operations of 
European international politics in the period of the Cold War.
Graf aims to offer the “first overview” of the “political-diplomatic” and 
“economic” aspects of Austrian-East German relations, from the founding 
of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949 to end of that state in 
1989/90, although the first chapter does reach back to 1945 to establish the 
sharply different political trajectories of these two parts of Hitler’s former 
Reich.
Graf ’s introduction establishes that his subject has not yet received an 
adequate treatment. Previous work on Austria’s relations with the Soviet 
bloc initially focused on the period from 1945 to 1955, with a few studies 
exploring relations through the 1970s. Newer work on Austrian-Soviet 
relations extending to 1991 did not devote much energy to the GDR 
because the West German-Austrian-Soviet triangle was perceived as more 
important. But Graf ’s book convincingly demonstrates that Austrian-East 
German relations merit a thorough investigation, both for their own sake 
and for the new insights they provide into larger and broader themes of 
European international politics in that era. 
In order to explicate this ignored and forgotten subject, Graf has 
mined a wide array of archives and memoirs. In particular, he has taken 
advantage of East German records, including those of the Council of 
Ministers (Ministerrat) and several individual ministries, which are 
available at the German Federal Archives in Berlin-Lichterfelde and 
are not subject to the usual thirty-year closure. The source base might 
strike some readers as very traditional, but the political structures of the 
GDR—a highly insulated one-party dictatorship—scarcely leave room 
for innovative approaches to international politics from below or from 
other angles. 
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Graf is well aware of recent developments in international and trans-
national history, as well as new approaches to understanding the history 
of relationships and exchanges (historie croisée, for example), but he wisely 
declines to frame his work as a demonstration or justification of any one 
model or approach. Instead, Graf takes advantage of the lack of earlier 
work and a field free of established conclusions to produce “primary source 
based research” (p. 12) that lets the material dictate the shape and scope 
of the book. As a result, politics and economics are the dominant themes, 
with other subject areas, such as cultural relations, media representations, 
and popular perceptions squeezed out. Readers deeply enmeshed in the 
European Cold War will regret that interparty relations between Austrian 
and East German communists have also been omitted for reasons of space, 
but with a book already bulging at 656 pages, it is difficult to argue with 
that choice. 
Graf ’s survey of political and economic affairs covers some high-profile 
incidents, such as the Interflug Affair of 1963, and the nebulous, possibly 
criminal, activities of the Novum trading company. Other important sub-
jects are less well known, like the significant deliveries of oil from Austria to 
the GDR in the first decades of the postwar period. Finally, some notewor-
thy issues are unpacked here for the first time, for example the significant 
energy devoted by the Austrian government in particular to managing the 
political and humanitarian consequences arising from 20,000 Austrians 
living and working in the GDR.
 Graf ’s best work lies in his analytic conclusions regarding his two 
major themes: economics and politics. The central role of trade and finance 
in shaping the overall bilateral relationship between the two states is not 
unexpected in the era of non-recognition up to December 1972 when eco-
nomic negotiations were the only forms of official contact between the two 
states. But Graf insists that economics and politics were impossible to sepa-
rate even in the years thereafter. One unfortunate conclusion is that we lack 
reliable trade data for the early years from 1945 to 1949, and even into the 
early 1950s. Graf ’s detailed discussion of the gradual build-up of economic 
activities that culminated in the “glory days” (Blütezeit) of Austrian-East 
German relations from 1978 to 1984 offers some particularly revealing 
conclusions about Austrian goals and motives. Successive Austrian govern-
ments had pressing domestic reasons for allowing their state to accumulate 
20 percent of the GDR’s total hard currency debt in the early 1980s. A 
central factor was the Austrian use of economic relations with GDR as a 
means to maintain employment in Austria’s own struggling state-owned 
industries. Based on his examination of the GDR’s relationship with 
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Austria, Graf suggests that scholars of the GDR should be placing “con-
siderably more attention” (p. 24) on the economic and financial aspects of 
GDR foreign policy.
Cold War scholars will find much to chew on as Graf situates the East 
German-Austrian bilateral relationship in the “dynamically integrated 
multi-level system” (p. 16) of international politics in Cold War Europe. 
One of the book’s great services is to bore into the substructures of inter-
national politics in this era. Graf presents the Austrian-East German rela-
tionship as embedded in two international triangles, which are essential for 
understanding his subject: first is the Soviet-East German-Austrian circuit, 
and second is the West German-East German-Austrian. There can be no 
adequate understanding of Austrian-East German relations without an 
understanding of Soviet policies toward both the GDR and the Austrian 
republic, not least of all because Soviet policy towards Austria was part of 
larger set of Soviet policies directed towards all European neutrals, with 
Austria as a showcase for the benefits of “peaceful coexistence.” In the period 
after recognition, Soviet and East German policy attempted to use progress 
in relations with Austria as an “ice-breaker” to advance the GDR’s inter-
national standing; examples include the consular treaty (1975), Chancellor 
Kreisky’s visit to the GDR (1978) and Erich Hoenecker’s reciprocal visit 
to Austria (1980). Conversely, the German Federal Republic expected 
friendly states like Austria to support West German positions, at least in 
public pronouncements. Graf moves into a larger arena by placing Austrian 
policies in the network of European neutral states, particularly Switzerland, 
Sweden, and Finland. That multilateral context was clearly important in the 
Austrian decision to recognize the GDR in December 1972.
In view of Graf ’s thorough investigation into his major themes, this 
book should remain the standard historical work on political and economic 
relations between these two states for many years to come. It is difficult to 
imagine any reader concluding that more work needs to be done on these 
points. If European relations with Putin’s Russia continue to revert to a cold 
war in all but name, then some of the lessons from Austrian management of 
peaceful coexistence may find a more immediate relevance. 

Cornelia Wilhelm, ed., Migration, Memory and 
Diversity. Germany from 1945 to the Present, 
Studies in Contemporary European History (New 
York: Berghahn 2017)
 Dirk Rupnow 
German-US American historian Konrad Jarausch opens Cornelia 
Wilhelm’s collection of essays on migration and diversity in postwar 
Germany by pointing to the unexcused absence of historians from the 
debates on immigration: “They have largely failed to inform the public 
about the important impact of migration on the German past.” And rightly 
so. It is actually refreshing to see a scholar speak so clearly and explicit-
ly at the very beginning of this important volume. Part of the Berghahn 
series Studies in Contemporary European History, edited by Jarausch and 
his French colleague Henry Rousso, this volume brings together twelve 
essays by mostly German and US-American historians. They offer differ-
ent perspectives and thereby draw a truly multi-faceted picture of postwar 
(West) Germany and immigration. These essays reflect the rich history of 
migration and diversity in Germany but also the extremely reluctant and 
obnoxious positions Germans take toward both. 
Of course, here, too, the Nazi past and its aftermath play an import-
ant role. And we should not forget that, only less than two decades ago, 
Germany officially accepted that it is an immigration country, an obvious 
fact it had long been neglecting. In her own introduction, Cornelia Wilhelm 
discusses how important the labeling of “foreigners,” “others,” and “aliens” 
has always been to German identity construction. In spite of the significant 
political changes around the turn of the century/millennium, such dis-
courses have not changed much in German society even now. New political 
organizations and parties like Pegida and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 
continue these anti-immigrant discourses, addressing the current situation 
with more and more people migrating to Europe and Germany. 
After all, according to recent OECD studies, Germany has become one 
of the most important countries for immigration worldwide. Yet “integra-
tion” is still considered to be a major problem. Maybe this is because many 
Germans perceive it to be the responsibility of immigrants to integrate—
or rather assimilate—into the majority society. The current discourse in 
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Germany seems to suggest that migrants can never fully assimilate because 
of alleged cultural differences. Essentially, this perception is nothing less 
than racism, as the discourse invokes traditional concepts of the German 
nation. 
So one might wonder if it is really necessary to include ethnic German 
refugees (“expellees,” or Vertriebene) after Word War II in this picture. But 
Martin Schulze Wessel’s essay on the commemoration of forced migration, 
together with Anna Holian’s contribution on Displaced Persons (DPs) 
in postwar Germany, are extremely important to understand the longer 
traditions of handling migration and “foreignness” in Germany. It makes 
sense that both focus on discourse and memory; in the case of the DPs, 
this memory is basically a blank spot and missing link in Germany’s post-
war history of migration. The history of the DPs is widely overshadowed 
by a warmed-up public obsession about Germans expelled from Eastern 
Europe at the end of World War II: the Germans as victims. Here, and 
throughout the whole volume, it becomes clear that Germans are almost 
incapable of sympathizing with ethnically different people. This seems only 
to be possible when they have comparable experiences to be brought into 
the equation. At the same time, as Schulze Wessel demonstrates, in view of 
German history, universalization might not be the appropriate strategy to 
convey German experiences of expulsion and flight, depicting them as part 
of a paradigmatic experience in the twentieth century. Understandingly, 
neighboring Eastern European countries insist on a very concrete look at 
what happened before and after 1945. 
Asiye Kaya, with her focus on different strategies of labeling migrants in 
postwar Germany (as ethnically, culturally, religiously “one of us” or “other”), 
provides an excellent follow-up to these two articles. Kaya addresses the 
practical impact on migrants’ lives and experiences, opening up, or foreclos-
ing, possibilities for inclusion and participation, access to the social welfare 
system, and citizenship. Kaya points to some very important aspects, espe-
cially the transitional character of the 1990s. After reunification, more eth-
nic Germans kept coming from Eastern Europe, debates on German iden-
tity flourished, and—along with brutal outbursts of racism on the streets in 
Eastern and Western Germany—became common again. Finally came the 
insight that Germany had become a country of immigration, in contrast to 
the mantra of German politicians. With large parts of Europe mired in a 
deep immigration crisis, Germany embraces young, well-educated migrants 
who are seen as assets to the German economy, just like the poorly educated 
“guest workers” five decades earlier had been seen as assets. Kaya also makes 
clear that ethnic labeling has a long tradition in Germany. From the 1880s 
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through the 1940s, Germans worried about the “Jewish problem”; at the 
end of the 19th century, they fussed over the “Polish problem”; in the 1980s, 
they fretted over the “Turkish problem,” and today it is either the “Muslim 
problem” or the “Roma problem.” In these discourses, there are continuing 
echoes and reverberations of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. At the 
same time, the history of ethnic German expellees’ resettlement after the 
war documents how a successful integration policy works when people are 
actually granted access to society and institutions. 
Patrice Poutros’s essay on asylum and the mass media also spans the 
whole of postwar German history up to today. He starts with the extremely 
liberal and generous asylum provisions in the Basic Law of 1949, really 
an answer to the history of Nazism. Unfortunately, as Poutros persuasively 
shows, the actual reception of foreigners after World War II never met the 
high standard of the constitution. During the Cold War, all refugees, apart 
from ethnic Germans, were consistently seen as a threat. The conserva-
tive-liberal reforms of the fundamental right to asylum in the early 1990s 
can be read as a setback but also as a sign for the deep-rooted position 
of human rights in the political culture of unified Germany after 1990. 
Apparently, it was not possible to eliminate the right to asylum entirely, 
even though many called for it. From the German perspective, as long as the 
“third country regime” kept asylum-seekers in Southern and Southeastern 
Europe, with no external EU border, everything was fine. This system 
collapsed in the summer of 2015, finally resulting in a call for solidarity 
and the distribution of asylum-seekers across the entire European Union. 
Germans have shown considerable openness during the so-called “refugee 
crisis” in 2015, especially German NGOs and parts of the civil society. But 
racism, fear, and exclusion also returned, along with paternalism. 
Germans’ self-centeredness becomes visible when school textbooks are 
analyzed. Simone Lässig demonstrates how the only migration movements 
Germans have noticed were the ethnic German expellees. Later on, Jewish 
elite émigrés of World War II entered this discourse, but only because they 
were understood as a loss for Germany. Later again, the utility argument 
was the premise for “guest workers” to become visible as part of German 
history. Looking at textbooks corroborates again the transformative nature 
of the 1990s, serving as a caesura for educational policy and practice. 
Given the German reluctance to confront and accept migration and 
diversity, it should not come as a surprise that the challenge of writing 
about the perception of “race” in postwar Germany has been taken up by 
someone from the outside. University of Michigan historian Rita Chin rises 
to the task. She is well-known as the author of an excellent book on the 
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“Guest Worker Question” in Germany and coeditor of an outstanding essay 
collection on issues of “race” in postwar Europe. Chin discusses Germans’ 
blindness toward racism today. This represents another extremely twisted 
after-effect of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. Nazism had the effect 
that Germans—along with most Europeans—do not talk about “race” 
anymore, even though the concept of race, with all its effects, has hardly 
evaporated. But no language exists in Germany to address this issue when 
it crops up and becomes visible in German discourses. 
Wilhelm’s carefully assembled volume offers impressive and fresh 
overviews of postwar German history. Dietmar Osses’s and Katarzyna 
Nogueira’s contribution concentrates on the representation of migration 
in German history museums, Klaus Lankheit traces migration in German 
archives and Dietmar Schirmer in German citizenship laws. Kathrin 
Bower’s essay on the mutual perceptions of West and East Germans after 
1989, Karen Körber’s piece on Russian-Jewish immigration to unified 
Germany, and Annette Seidel-Arpaci’s exploration of the complex debates 
around antisemitism and Holocaust memory in connection with immigra-
tion discourses, all add up to an important book for everyone who wants to 
understand present-day Germany as a pluralistic and diverse society. 
Unfortunately, the texts do not always stand up to the standard of the 
whole undertaking and its theoretical sophistication. In stark contrast to 
his own introduction, stressing the necessity of giving the migrants their 
own voice, Jarausch uses the term “human tsunami” for the refugees coming 
in 2015, with no quotation marks. Lässig in her text points to this very 
problem of the omnipresent “water-related imagery” that is drowning the 
individual experiences of migrants. Klaus Lankheit fails to see that the bur-
den of responsibility to integrate “the others” into German history and to 
understand them as part of Germany falls on the Germans, not the immi-
grants who are asked to perceive themselves as part of German society in 
the face of racism and exclusion. But these are minor lapses in an overall 
excellent contribution to the history of migration and diversity in Germany. 
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This interdisciplinary volume offers methodologically innovative 
approaches to Austria’s coping with issues of migration past and 
present. These essays show Austria’s long history as a migration 
country. Austrians themselves have been on the move for the past 
150 years to find new homes and build better lives. After World War 
II the economy improved and prosperity set in, so Austrians tended to 
stay at home. Austria’s growing prosperity made the country attractive 
to potential immigrants. After the war, tens of thousands of “ethnic 
Germans” expelled from Eastern Europe settled in Austria. Starting in 
the 1950s “victims of the Cold War” (Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks) 
began looking for political asylum in Austria. Since the 1960s Austria 
has been recruiting a growing number of “guest workers” from Turkey 
and Yugoslavia to make up for the labor missing in the industrial and 
service economies. Recently, refugees from the arc of crisis from 
Afghanistan to Syria to Somalia have braved perilous journeys to build 
new lives in a more peaceful and prosperous Europe. 
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